ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

120

THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF 'CIVIL SOCIETY'

by

NORBERT WASZEK

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF 'CIVIL SOCIETY'

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDÉES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

120

NORBERT WASZEK

THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF 'CIVIL SOCIETY'

THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF 'CIVIL SOCIETY'

By
NORBERT WASZEK
Hegel-Archiv der Ruhr Universität,
Bochum, F.R.G.



KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Waszek, Norbert, 1953-
The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's account of "civil society."

(International archives of the history of ideas ; 120)
Bibliography: p.
1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Political and social views. 2. Enlightenment. 3. Philosophy, Scottish--18th century. 4. Scotland--Intellectual life--18th century. I. Title. II. Series: Archives internationales d'histoire des idées ; 120.
JC181.H452W37 1988 320'.01 87-22132

ISBN-13: 978-94-010-7735-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2750-6
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-2750-6

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of Dr W. Junk Publishers, MTP Press, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, and D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Distributors

for the United States and Canada: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, USA
for all other countries: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands

Für Barbara, Anna, John Waszek
und dem Andenken meines Vaters:
Anton Waszek (1925–1955)

Table of Contents

Foreword by Duncan Forbes

In the revival of interest in Hegel which has now gathered enormous momentum and spawned literally hundreds of books and articles, the question of his possible debt to eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers has not been investigated in a comprehensive and thorough fashion. One fairly well-known clue provided by Hegel himself, to Sir James Steuart's *Principles of Political Economy*, has been followed up, and is elucidated still further in Dr Waszek's book, but for the rest there is surmise, indeterminate pointers and, in recent years a certain amount of rather poor, misleading scholarship.

It is surprising that German scholars hitherto have not on the whole shown themselves to be very interested in the topic of this book, given the well-known enthusiasm for many aspects of Scottish culture in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and given Hegel's well-known extraordinary receptiveness and ability to painstakingly note and digest information and ideas from every available worthwhile quarter – and we now have much more solid knowledge about this as the result of Dr Waszek's laborious and detailed research into this part of the background of his story, including Hegel's knowledge of English.

The poor scholarship of recent years that has been mentioned is the result, as so often, of looking down the wrong end of the telescope and spotlighting the part at the expense of the whole. When Hegel was studied in the light of Marx, especially the newly discovered young Hegel in the light of the newly discovered young Marx – and it is probably true to say that it was this more than anything else that rescued Hegel from oblivion in the twentieth century – this light was bound sooner or later to be reflected back, too brightly, onto those Scottish thinkers, especially Ferguson and Smith, who had also shown keen awareness of the evils of modern commercial and industrial civilisation: the de-humanising division of labour, the alienation of the masses, the

rampant individualism of commercial society and so forth. Given twentieth century concern with such problems of 'alienation' and the break-up of community, these historical themes were bound to be taken up and studied with more enthusiasm than clinical detachment. There was a more or less conscious grinding of axes and the results appeared highly plausible but were in fact untrustworthy. Hegel's 'search for community' was over-simplified.

Any scholar with a reasonably sound knowledge of Hegel and the difficulties involved in trying to understand his political thought properly will recognise the phenomenon, which is mainly to be found in English writings, especially fashionable and widely used introductory books primarily designed for student use in Britain and America. Putting it necessarily rather crudely and elliptically, there has for example, been a tendency to stress 'community' at the expense of 'state' in Hegel's political philosophy, that is, the goal of wholeness and solidarity as such, rather than the idea of the state as a whole that *contains* tension and conflict, and related to this, to dwell on the lure of 'Hellas', the *Schöne Totalität* of the ancient Greeks, putting the weight of one's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of Right, or far too much of it, on writings of Hegel's immaturity. Also Marxist and marxist-influenced studies of Hegel's idea of the state have seen it as helpless in the face of the problem of poverty and the alienated proletariat, and as an essentially self-contradictory reflection of a bourgeois state on its way out. One well-known scholar of Hegel's theory of the modern state actually placed Hegel's contact with Sir James Steuart in this sort of interpretative framework, viz: the alleged inability of the state to step in and control the working of civil society where necessary, failing to see how it pointed in a wholly opposite direction.

To fully counteract these very influential and widespread views one needs to stress the importance of other influences than that of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially the enduring inspiration of the French Revolution on Hegel's political thought, and for example, what Hegel's philosophy of law and the state has in common with Benthamite radicalism – unless, of course, one is going to fall back on the old myth of Hegel's Prussian-bound, Restoration 'conservatism'. And one has to be thoroughly at home in the Hegelian dialectic, and it would be rather far fetched to look for a Scottish pedigree for that – though one can never be absolutely sure. Influences are strange, complex phenomena. There are many more or less plausible or far-fetched possibilities of relation or affinity; for instance between the risk-loving element in human nature in Ferguson's teaching and the life-and-death struggle in the *Phenomenology of Geist*. In general, the account as

reported in Rosenkranz's *Life* and seen in Hegel's early writings, of the causes of the weakness of the German constitution is very Fergusonian. But on the whole this sort of exercise is probably not much more than a kind of erudite play-time, or perhaps one ought to say partially erudite. So much in German literature at that time could be described as 'Fergusonian', for example.

The reader can rest assured. Dr Waszek has his historical imagination well under control. He is for the most part not immediately concerned with the main line of Hegel's political thinking; the main line, that is from a truly Hegelian point of view. (One fascinating and very noteworthy exception is when he directs the reader's attention to the importance for Hegel of Hume's *History of England* as a history of the emergence of the modern 'regular' state or *Rechtsstaat*.) The disinfectant he provides against the sort of tendencies and distortions just mentioned is a very much more careful and thorough and comprehensive approach to the question of what Hegel's account of *civil society* owes to the Scottish thinkers. Dr Waszek knows very well that his is a partial study of Hegel's political thought, that it is *not* the main line, in spite of Marxist and Marxist-inspired obsessions, and, he is well aware of the dangers of abstracting partial aspects of Hegel for special consideration. That is why the book is not called 'The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Political Philosophy'.

He has a degree from the University of Bochum, which is the centre of Hegel studies in Germany, so that he is well-informed as to the state of German Hegel scholarship, what is doing and still needs to be done. He also has a degree from the University of Stirling for a thesis on the Scottish Enlightenment. He thus has his feet firmly planted in two areas that have become, relatively recently, very large academic growth industries. In this he must be uniquely well equipped.

What the reader is invited to explore, then, is a branch line in the understanding of Hegel's social and political theory. However it is an important one. For one thing it helps to reinforce a side of Hegel's thought that has often been overlooked or played down, or alternatively said by Marxists, and not only Marxists, to be 'swallowed' or turned upside down. That Hegel from his youth onwards was consciously and avidly observing the theory and practice of what he knew to be the most advanced commercial and industrial country in the world makes nonsense of one recent, very large and elaborate and apparently influential English book on Hegel that sees his political and social thinking as essentially German-bound and therefore backward looking and indeed medieval.

The fact is that after years of neglect, especially in the English-

speaking world, Hegel has become a huge academic band-wagon with all that that implies of short cuts to comprehension that in various, sometimes very clever, ways, go astray, however much they turn their backs on the tiresome old Hegel myths – though these are still to be found in otherwise well-informed people. Careful studies like this provide the needed scholarly hygiene, without shrill polemic or clever manipulation, as well as being soundly based contributions to genuine knowledge.

Clare College, Cambridge

Preface

The present study, which investigates the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hegel's account of 'civil society' or "bürgerliche Gesellschaft", is based on my PhD thesis, submitted to the University of Cambridge in September 1983. Its publication provides me with a welcome opportunity to acknowledge the help and encouragement I have received over the years from scholars, friends, and relations.

At the Ruhr University of Bochum where I began my studies, I am indebted to Professor Otto Pöggeler (Director of the Hegel Archives), to the other, past and present members of staff at the Hegel Archives, and to Professors Jürgen Gebhardt, Jürgen von Kempski, Heinz Kimmerle; and Leo Kofler. It was my time at Bochum under the guidance of these scholars that kindled my love for the study of Hegel, which proved to be a lasting romance. In Scotland, where I continued my studies and spent two fruitful and happy years, I am indebted to George Elder Davie and Richard Gunn, who first introduced me to the Scottish Enlightenment, and to Professors R.H. Campbell and T.D. Campbell, who supervised my research in that field. At Cambridge, where most of this study was prepared, my greatest debt is to Duncan Forbes. I am grateful for his supervision of my research, but also, beyond the scope of my research, for what I have learned, genuinely learned, from the man. In my own College (Christ's), I am obliged to the Master and Fellows for granting me a research scholarship and other financial support, without which it would have been much more difficult to write the present study. Also at Christ's, the leading historian of ideas, Professor Quentin Skinner, tolerantly helped my project in several respects. Beyond my own College, a number of Cambridge scholars showed kind interest in my work, especially Greg Claeys, Istvan Hont, Stephen Houlgate, and Professor Barry Nisbet, but also many others. Drs. Christopher Berry and Nicholas Boyle examined my PhD thesis, upon which the present study was built. Their criticisms have helped me to

improve upon the earlier version. Finally, as such specialized research is often a very lonely task, I wish to thank all overseas scholars for their encouraging correspondence, a context in which two names have to stand for many others: Profs. H.S. Harris and M.J. Petry. All these scholars should be absolved from any responsibility for the remaining shortcomings in what follows.

Among the numerous friends on whose support I have relied, I can only mention a few. My Scottish friend David Simpson, in spite of his thorough scepticism about my sympathy for Hegel, was unfailing in his support. I would also like to express my gratitude to my closest Cambridge friends: Katja Binder, Chris Elvin, Sasha Kashlinsky, and Steve Love, who provided the necessary moral support during my labours there. The last stage in the preparation of this study saw the formation of a new fruitful friendship with Hans-Christian Lucas.

It is more than apt that my last words should be familial: apart from supporting me over the years, in what must appear to them obscure studies, my mother, grandmother, and brother have helped and encouraged me immensely when, in 1980, a serious illness had almost put an end to my researches. It is thus with more than conventional gratitude that I dedicate this study to them.

COPYRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF TECHNICALITIES

A number of arguments employed in the present study were first presented to the scholarly community in the following articles:

(1) "The Origins of Hegel's Knowledge of English", *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, No. 7 (Oxford, 1983) pp. 8–27;
(2) "The Division of Labour: From the Scottish Enlightenment to Hegel", *The Owl of Minerva*. Journal of the Hegel Society of America, Vol. 15, 1 (1983) pp. 51–75;
(3) "Bibliography of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany", *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, No. 230 (1985) pp. 283–303;
(4) "Miscellanea: Adam Smith and Hegel on the Pin Factory", *The Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 16, 2 (1985) pp. 229–233;
(5) "Hegel's Account of the Market Economy and its Debts to the Scottish Enlightenment", *Hegel-Jahrbuch 1984* (Rome, 1988);
(6) "Hume, Hegel, and History", *Clio*, Vol. 14, 4 (1985) pp. 379–392.

For the kind permission to reproduce the substance of these articles here, I should like to thank the relevant journals and their editors.

Some technicalities of the present study should be mentioned briefly. In the footnotes, references to the standard editions and other much-quoted books and articles are often made by means of abbreviations. Another device that has been used in order to shorten the footnotes is to refer to a work, at the second and subsequent mentions of it, by giving only the name of the author and the date of the study, followed by the page number. The full details of the publications thus referred to are to be found in the bibliography. I have used the standard German editions of the works of Hegel throughout, but, for the benefit of my readers, English translations of all quotations from Hegel have been provided. When published translations were not available to me, the translations are my own. The classical Greek which occurs in a few instances has been transcribed into Roman letters.

N. W. *Krefeld, October 1985.*

CHAPTER ONE

General Introduction

(A) THE NEED FOR A LIVING HEGEL: FROM 'DICHOTOMY' ("ENTZWEIUNG") TO 'RECONCILIATION' ("VERSÖHNUNG')

> Dichotomy is the source of *the need of philosophy*; . . . When the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need of philosophy arises. (HSH, pp. 89+91 – HGW, Vol. IV, pp. 12+14)

> To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend . . . (TMK, p. 12 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 73)

It has become conventional to introduce a study in the history of ideas by giving some indication of the wider relevance of the ideas and thinkers that are being dealt with. The addition of another book to the thousands of studies on Hegel – in the present case a lengthy investigation of one, at first glance, rather obscure source of Hegel's philosophy, i.e. the Scottish Enlightenment – seems to require special justification. A common way of providing such justification is to stress the vital rôle of the figure under investigation in the history of thought, i.e. to refer to his established place in a 'sacred' mausoleum, and then to define the aspect on which the respective study is trying 'to throw new light', i.e. to

locate one's own efforts in the front court of the mausoleum. This indirect method of justifying one's research is perfectly legitimate and, in the case of Hegel, perfectly easy, for very few philosophers would nowadays dare to treat him like a 'toter Hund'. The bicentenary of Hegel's birth, in 1970, with its world-wide 'jubilee' conferences and an amazing output of literature, both scholarly and popular, showed – despite the various unscholarly contributions that inevitably arise from such an anniversary – all the symptoms of a healthy growing industry:

> In the 200th anniversary of his birth, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has more contemporary relevance than ever. There exists not only a body of Hegel research work rapidly increasing in depth and range which has become widely institutionalised in East and West but also a 'living Hegelianism', and, even where the attempt is made to manage without him, it will be necessary to come to terms expressly with his ideas. Otherwise, one runs the danger of sinking below the level of philosophical consciousness.[1]

The investigation of the 'great man's' relation to the Scottish Enlightenment, certainly a much neglected field,[2] could, thus, easily be characterized as bearing its justification in itself.

And yet, there is another justification for the present study which takes us to the *living* Hegel, rather than to his dusty statue in the mausoleum of western civilization. As this justification is also interwoven with the author's own pathway towards Hegel, a few wider reflections may not be out of place; the personal dimension of some of these reflections seems legitimate when one remembers H.G. Gadamer's appeal for humility in defining the legacy of Hegel:

> No-one should be pretentious enough to claim that he can measure the extent of the great legacy of Hegelian thought that has come down to us. Each individual must be content to be beneficiary and be accountable to himself for everything that he has received from this legacy.[3]

[1] Michael Theunissen, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat* (Berlin, 1970) p. viii – Cp.: Joachim Ritter, "Vorbemerkung", J. Ritter & R. Heede (Eds.), *Hegel-Bilanz* (Frankfurt, 1973) p. ix.

[2] See below, pp. 15–17; 21–30.

[3] H.G. Gadamer, *Das Erbe Hegels*, Rede aus Anlaß der Verleihung des Hegel-Preises 1979 der Stadt Stuttgart (Frankfurt, 1979) p. 35.

It must count as one of the most crucial political experiences of the post-War generation that the aims and ideals of Marxism, however faulty or otherwise they may be in themselves, were evidently perverted in the Communist countries: East Germany (1953), Hungary and Poland (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), . . . , and yet the youth of Western Europe and North America only became cynical about the Stalinist and post-Stalinist 'deformation of Marxism'; too dissatisfied with their own political roots, students and young intellectuals mixed their justified refusal of out-dated structures and institutions with utopian and Neo-Marxist conceptions and the 1968 events at Berkeley and Paris, Berlin and Frankfurt suddenly revealed the widespread discontent. Hopes ran high for immediate, 'revolutionary' changes. Needless to say, the higher the hopes had been, the more crushing was the subsequent defeat and roll-back. Still dominated by 'abstract negation',[4] but having failed to translate that principle into political reality (fortunately, one might add), the majority of those young intellectuals 'retired' to a private life, largely defined by the products of their own subculture,[5] casting a cold and increasingly lethargic eye on public and political life: cynicism, as a German Professor summed it up, has become the disease of the age.[6] Another section of this generation, tiny in numbers but with well-known saddening consequences, set out to promote by force the principle of negation, and 'Red Brigades' and 'Baader–Meinhof' showed once more what Hegel called "der reine Schrecken des Negativen".[7] A further group, battered by their excursion into the real world of adverse political trends, returned to their desks, persuading themselves that a contribution to Neo-Marxist theory was their ultimate rôle in life, and created a sterile scholasticism often mocked as 'Marxology'.

Fortunately, there have also been signs of a more fundamental re-think, as many former participants in the 'protest movement' have checked the spiritual equipment they had set out with and found it too light. During a critical stock-taking of their Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories – a fine example of the cunning of reason – many were led to a study of Hegel and, apart from those who refused to listen to reason and stubbornly stuck to Marx's critique, have found Hegel's philosophy a more helpful introduction to the problems of the modern world. Thus, it

[4] Hegel's term is here used to denote the incapability of appreciating the real world rather than the chimaera behind the smoke-screen of revolutionary change.

[5] The whole range of 'alternative' forms of life is here thought of.

[6] Iring Fetscher, "Reflexionen uber Zynismus als Krankheit unserer Zeit", Alexander Schwan (Ed.), *Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus*. Festschrift für Wilhelm Weischedel (Darmstadt, 1975) pp. 334–345.

[7] HGW, Vol. IX, p. 322 – In Hegel, of course, this term is applied to 'la terreur'.

was via disappointing experiences that part of the rebellious youth was enabled to listen to Hegel afresh and there were various reasons why Hegel's lectures should appeal to them.

Firstly, Hegel had always had to face a despairing and torn German youth[8] and, just as he had succeeded in fascinating his Berlin audiences,[9] it is satisfying to see how he now seems able to fascinate again, inspiring new confidence with his old but immortal words:

> . . . at first I can only ask you to trust in science, to believe in reason, and to have confidence and faith in yourselves. The courage of truth, faith in the power of 'Geist' is the foremost condition in the study of philosophy; the human being ought to honour and consider itself worthy of the highest.[10]

Secondly, Hegel himself was intimately familiar with political frustration; a sentence from the letter of an unknown friend, with which Hegel, the addressee, had certainly agreed, is well suited to illustrate that bitter feeling: "Those responsible for the affairs of the great nation have given the most sacred rights of mankind over to the contempt and derision of our foes."[11] The comparable feeling of crushed hopes – though, needless to say, one cannot compare the course of the French Revolution with the defeat of the 'protest movement' in terms of objective significance – tended to make Hegel congenial to some participants in the latter events. Thirdly, and most important, Hegel had succeeded in raising these experiences to the level of philosophical inquiry and in providing stimulating solutions. Despair about the course of history, mainly in the spheres of religion and politics, and about what had happened to man in the course of such developments, i.e. "the subordinate needs of men,"[12] were *the* issues which, though themselves external to philosophy, paved Hegel's pathway to philosophy.[13] From his first published philosophical work (the 'Differenzschrift', from which the first motto of the present section has been taken) onwards, Hegel makes it clear that his philosophy is facing and trying to answer this 'Entzweiung'

[8] F. Heer, "Hegel und die Jugend", G.K. Kaltenbrunner (Ed.), *Hegel und die Folgen* (Freiburg, 1970) pp. 19–36, here pp. 22f.

[9] Otto Pöggeler, "Werk und Wirkung", O. Pöggeler (Ed.), *Hegel* (Freiburg & München, 1977) p. 21.

[10] Hegel, "Antrittsvorlesung Berlin 1818", HBS, p. 8.

[11] HBr, Vol. IV.2, Letter 27a, p. 4, dated August 7, 1798.

[12] Hegel, "Letter to Schelling, dated November 2, 1800", HBr, Vol. I, Letter 29, p. 59.

[13] Cp.: Hegel, "Letter to Schelling, dated April 16, 1975", HBr. Vol. I, Letter 11, p. 24 – HL, p. 35.

into which mankind had been pushed by the unholy alliance of despotic governments and what he called 'positive' religion, or, to borrow Prof. Pöggeler's formulation:

> . . . Philosophy as a system is not a theory separated off from life but the most urgent need of life and thus practical, indeed practical in the highest sense: as an answer to the dichotomy in life, it is the highest conceivable form of action, the leading of life towards a reconciliation with itself.[14]

We cannot here go into a detailed exposition of this highest aim of Hegel's philosophy or into the various shapes it took in the course of Hegel's development, but we have to stress the core which remained crucial: 'Entzweiung' and its 'Aufhebung' to 'Versöhnung', and, in this context, our second motto, especially the imagery of "reason as the rose in the cross of the present" (TMK, p. 12), needs to be approached. The cross of the present cannot simply be overcome and replaced by an earthly paradise; nor, on the other hand, are the tensions and conflicts 'absolute': they do not constitute a vale of tears, for amidst them grows the rose of reason:

> . . . Reason has united what was sundered and it has reduced the absolute dichotomy to a relative one, one that is conditioned by the original identity. (HSH, p. 91 – HGW, Vol. IV, p. 14)

What Hegel's image ultimately signifies is a qualified 'Yes' to reality, "to enjoy the present" (TMK, p. 12), but the qualification contains nothing less than all evil and suffering. "The rose in the cross of the present" is one attempt to express Hegel's vision of the 'concrete universal', and, thus, it is not surprising that the language is indeed mystical, as narrow-minded 'rationalists' have frowningly observed, as if congeniality with Meister Eckhart were something to be ashamed rather than proud of.[15] The real motive behind such invectives against Hegelian philosophy lies in the fact that neither 'rationalist humanism' nor 'revolutionary Marxism' can drink of the cup that Hegel drinks of;[16] neither can listen to the

[14] Otto Poggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg & München, 1973) p. 123, cp. also p. 161.

[15] An example of such invectives is: Willy Hochkeppel, "Dialektik als Mystik", G.K. Kaltenbrunner (Ed.), *Hegel und die Folgen* (Freiburg, 1970) pp. 69–112; for a much better attempt to define Hegel's relationship to Mysticism, see: Theodor Steinbüchel, "Hegel und Meister Eckhart", *Universitas* Vol. II (1947) pp. 1409–1423.

[16] Michael Theunissen (1977; p. 3) describes this 'unholy alliance' of Hegel opponents in similar terms.

long lament of human suffering, then add some further information in the same vein, and *then* explain and answer. The 'rationalist' philanthropist will squirm and try to evade some of the charge; the Marxist refers to his utopian 'realm of freedom', going to the extreme of re-interpreting human history as 'Pre-history' (a fact that should induce a reconsideration of the current usage of the labels 'idealist' and 'materialist'[17]), only Hegel did not falter:

> It [Spirit] wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away and pass on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. (AVM, p. 19 – HGW, Vol. IX, p. 27)

In short: optimistic rationalism could not withstand the disasters of this century; Marxism betrayed the youth that followed it so eagerly; and Hegel's interpretation of life, "the rose in the cross of the present", emerges as the ultimate challenge: "energetic conceptuality is courageous, belongs to the sphere of youth and men."[18]

But what is the concrete content and meaning of Hegel's lesson "to recognize . . . the rose"? In what sense can Hegel's philosophy still be considered a *relevant* answer to the problems of the modern world? In what way, in particular, does Hegel still survive the challenge of Marxism – for, in discussing Hegel, one cannot leave out Marx[19] – and is even able to lead the frustrated adepts of that creed back from, to use Marcuse's title, 'Revolution' to 'Reason'?[20]

The first issue, in this context, is Hegel's conception of 'Rechtsstaatlichkeit', his way of defining and ensuring freedom in legal and institutional terms, his conceptualization of "the whole life of freedom" (to

[17] Cp.: Duncan Forbes, "Introduction", G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. Translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975) p. XII – Henceforth quoted as "HBN", Roman page numbers are to Duncan Forbes's introduction.

[18] Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt–Objekt*. Erläuterungen zu Hegel (Frankfurt, 3rd edition, 1972) p. 18.

[19] Cp.: Christoph Helferich, *Hegel* (Stuttgart, 1979) p. 196: "Thus, it is the 'relationship' between Hegel and Marx that still remains, whether openly expressed or otherwise, the secret focal point of discussion and will remain so in the future, as long as the desires of *both* – a reconciled whole – cannot or does not wish to be realized."

[20] Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (New York, 1941).

borrow from E. Gans)[21] as 'state'. After Marx' conception of the state, a mere function or instrument of 'bourgeois' society, and the Marxist theory of the abolition of the state, have miserably failed – in more than sixty years of historical reality – to reach their objective, Hegel's 'Rechtsstaatlichkeit' emerges all the more convincingly:

> What the political deformation of the Soviet state reveals is the political inadequacy of Marxist theory. The state in the modern world is patently not merely the 'superstructure' of society but an institution sui generis, which must be *based on reason and shaped politically*, i.e. recognised as a reliable guarantee of the freedom of all and organised accordingly.[22]

It has thus become clear, as Duncan Forbes once stressed, that the objective which Marx aimed at and his followers have failed to reach is actually attained by Hegel:

> . . . Hegel's state is doing precisely what Marx wants communism to do . . . One could in fact argue that Hegel's philosophy of the state is the truth of Marx's 'true democracy', not vice-versa, in so far as Hegel is concerned with the eternal problem of liberty and authority . . . Only Hegel did not shirk the issue, but tried, risky venture as it is, to work it out in concrete detail in the complex messy world of actual society and politics . . .[23]

The contemporary dialogue between Marxists and non-Marxists has made this issue even clearer. Ernst Bloch's 'Naturrecht und menschliche Würde',[24] though its author was probably the most gifted, if unorthodox Marxist philosopher of the century, did not prevail – at least, so it appears to the present writer – against such defenders of the 'Rechsstaat' as Jürgen von Kempski, who challenged Bloch on this problem:

> Neither Marxism nor bourgeois sociology subsequently saw the fact that the state and the related legal structure contain elements that are absolute preconditions for any possible community of free

[21] Eduard Gans, "Vorwort zur 2. Ausgabe der Rechtsphilosophie" (1833), now in: Manfred Riedel, *Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1975) Vo. I, pp. 242–248, here p. 243.

[22] Riedel (1975) p. 36.

[23] HBN, pp. XXXIII f.

[24] Ernst Bloch, *Naturrecht und menschliche Würde* (Frankfurt, 1961).

> individuals . . . [Bloch] is too fascinated by his dream of direct human contact to recognize that 'the ordering of a freedom of the facultas agendi of all that has become widely practicable' can be achieved only at the expense of institutions. The difficult problem lies in the institutional safeguarding of freedom.[25]

Once Hegel's 'Rechtsstaat' is accepted as indispensable, the second vital issue, the relation of society and state, can come into focus. The great Depression has brought it home to people that unqualified liberalism may end in disaster. More recently, as Prof. Pöggeler has stressed, the desperate problems of the American towns have served to illustrate the devastating consequences of leaving everything to the mechanisms of society.[26] In the light of these developments, Hegel's middle course between liberalism and interventionism has once again attracted wide attention, notably in North America, where the above problems are most strongly felt.[27] Obviously, Hegel's discussion of this matter cannot be taken as a ready-made answer to contemporary problems, but his philosophy still provides an adequate conceptual framework for these problems, a general paradigm for, and indeed most of the actual elements of, their solution.[28]

We have thus reached a position from which we can relate these vital issues of Hegel's philosophy to the topic of the present study. In both, the issue of 'Rechtsstaatlichkeit' and that of the balance between state and society, the Scottish Enlightenment anticipated Hegel's account to a considerable extent. The first of these issues will not be developed as it would lead beyond the scope of this study (i.e. Hegel's account of 'civil society'), but it is a fundamental, underlying assumption of the present investigation: it is the same principle which pervades the Scots' appreciation of the rule of law after the Glorious Revolution, Hume's notion of 'regular government', and Hegel's 'Rechtsstaatlichkeit'. The second issue, the resemblance of Hegel's middle course between liberalism and interventionism to the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment, is, generally speaking, so obvious that the two positions which Hegel tried to mediate

[25] Jürgen von Kempski, "Bloch, Recht und Marxismus", J.v. Kempski, *Brechungen. Kritische Versuche zur Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Hamburg, 1964) pp. 176–180, here pp. 176 & 178.

[26] Otto Pöggeler, "Diskussionsbeitrag zu Iring Fetschers Referat", *Hegel-Bilanz*, op. cit., p. 214.

[27] It is thus possible to distinguish two phases in the recent Hegel-Renaissance in North America Within the first phase, Hegel was primarily used as a bulwark against analytical philosophy, whereas now, a Hegelian conceptual framework is used to approach current political problems.

[28] Iring Fetscher, "Diskussionsbeitrag", *Hegel-Bilanz*, op. cit., p. 215.

may in one sense – though further qualification will prove necessary – be identified with two figures of that movement: Adam Smith and Sir James Steuart. To follow this latter affinity in minute detail, to demonstrate by means of external and internal evidence that the parallels are not coincidental, but an influence which can to a large extent be documented, is a crucial task of the present study.

However, before we leave our wider reflections on Hegel's relevance and go on to define the place and significance of this investigation within the quest for the real historical Hegel, a third aspect of the 'living Hegel', though not directly related to the present study, should at least be outlined in a rough sketch: Hegel and religion. It is now generally agreed that, besides politics, it was religion which paved Hegel's pathway to philosophy. First religion and subsequently politics were also areas which caused the struggle and subsequent split (young and old Hegelians) in Hegel's School.[29] And religion and politics have remained the corner-stones in the dispute over Hegel's relevance.

The reason for this continuity may again be found in an analogy between the historical background of Hegel's account of religion, on the one hand, and the contemporary quest for God, on the other hand. The analogy has convincingly been criticized as "superficial" (by Heede[30]) and lacking in critical awareness of historical distance and of how such distance affects an interpretation (by Kimmerle[31]); nevertheless, the analogy has become effective and, thus, deserves to be described. Hegel's historical background, in this context, is characterised by two extreme attitudes towards God: (a) a theology bearing the stamp of the 'Verstandesaufklärung'; and (b) mere feeling: trivial, subjective, arbitrary. Neither position escaped Hegel's bitter scorn: those theologians, he said, "have only criticism and history" (TWA, Vol. XVI, p. 209), and their God is "hollow, empty, and poor" (ibid., p. 37); the theology of feeling (Jacobi, Schleiermacher, and others) receives an even harsher rebuke, which culminates in the well-known polemical dog comparison (TWA, Vol. XI, p. 58).

What Hegel opposed as 'rationalist theology' has nowadays been transformed radically into various sorts of scientific scepticism, agnosticism, and atheism; whereas the former insistence on feeling has now been replaced by a spectrum ranging from Barth's and Bultmann's

[29] Cp. my article: "Die Hegelsche Schule", in: *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen*, in 5 vols., edited by Iring Fetscher und H. Munkler (München, will appear in 1986).

[30] R. Heede, "Hegels Religionsphilosophie als Aufgabe und Problem der Forschung", *Hegel-Bilanz*, op. cit., p. 84.

[31] Heinz Kimmerle, "Zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie", *Philosophische Rundschau*, Vol. 15 (1968) p. 126.

'belief' to the enthusiasm of evangelists like Billy Graham, as if Spinoza and Lessing had not existed at all.

In direct opposition to these extremes, Hegel presented his theological views; thus, (a) rather than being "hollow, empty, and poor", his 'God' is "a living God, who is acting and working" (LPR, Vol. I, p. 33) and (b), rather than being hidden and secret (the notion of a 'deus absconditus' would indeed appear blasphemous to Hegel[32]), is open to reason, for reason is man's divine element, and, thus, man's knowledge of God is really God's self-recognition in 'otherness', his creature:

> It is sufficient here merely to observe regarding the supposed opposition of the Philosophy of Religion and positive religion, that there cannot be two kinds of reason and two kinds of Spirit; there cannot be a Divine reason and a human, which are *absolutely different.* Human reason – the consciousness of one's being – is indeed reason; it is the divine in man, and Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world. On the contrary, God is present, omnipresent, and exists as Spirit in all spirits. (LPR, Vol. I, p. 33)

In spite of the legitimate emphasis (as presented by Heede, Kimmerle, and others) on the different historical contexts – of course, it is not the *same* situation – Hegel's double opposition is still relevant:

> The apostrophizing of Hegel as the philosopher of the modern age means that Hegel . . . is philosophizing in the shadow of the theological problematics of post-Enlightenment Christianity; indeed, this situation is his theme. and its concept is his thesis.[33]

In the light of these circumstances, it is at least understandable that another generation of theologians (Marsch, Wagner, Cornehl, Pannenberg, on the Protestant, Splett, Beck, Küng, Lauer, on the Catholic side)[34] and philosophers of religion (notably Bruaire, Chapelle, Theu-

[32] Cp.: HBN, p. XXVI: "It is a blasphemy for a Christian to think of God as in any way unknown, a concealed object acting on mankind from without in a manner humanly unknown and unknowable."

[33] Karlfried Gründer, "Diskussionsbeitrag zu Karl Löwiths Referat", *Hegel-Bilanz*, op. cit., p. 30.

[34] W.D. Marsch, *Gegenwart Christi in der Gesellschaft*. Eine Studie zu Hegels Dialektik (München, 1965); Falk Wagner, *Der Gedanke der Persönlichkeit Gottes bei Fichte und Hegel* (Gütersloh, 1971); Peter Cornehl, *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung*. Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklärung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule (Göttingen, 1971); W. Pannenberg, "Die Bedeutung des Christentums in der Philosophie Hegels", *Stuttgarter Hegel Tage 1970*, HSBh (1974) pp. 175–202, Jörg Splett, *Die Trinitätslehre*

nissen, Fackenheim and Léonhard)[35] is now trying to bridge the histori-cal gap, of which they are indeed aware, and, while defending their God *and* human dignity (mindful of Matthew 5, 48[36]), they also defend Hegel. Theunissen's formulation of his conviction – a rare specimen of an outspoken credo by a contemporary philosopher – may serve as an example of this attitude:

> The interpretation here attempted can be justified only by reference to the dual conviction that (the crucified) Christ is the Truth and that Hegel is *of* the Truth.[37]

(B) THE WHOLE HEGEL AND THE PARTICULARS OF SCHOLARSHIP

> The Hegelian system is truly encyclopaedic. If it is to be fully appreciated therefore, it has to be grasped as a whole . . .[38]

> It is only by collecting all the various interpretations, strengthening them and relating them to each other that one can arrive at a picture of the whole Hegel.[39]

Hegel is said to have commented critically on his School that none of his followers had fully understood him, except for Rosenkranz, and even he had not got it quite right.[40] This statement – the historical truth of which

---

G.W.F. Hegels (München, 1965); Heinrich Beck, *Der Akt-Charakter des Seins* (München, 1965); Hans Kung, *Menschwerdung Gottes*. Eine Einführung in Hegels theologisches Denken als Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Christologie (Basel, Freiburg, Wien, 1970); Q. Lauer, *Hegel's Concept of God* (Albany, 1982).

[35] C. Bruaire, *Logique et religion chretienne dans la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris, 1965); A. Chapelle, *Hegel et la religion*. In 2 vols. (Paris, 1964–1971); M. Theunissen, op. cit.; E.L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (London-Bloomington, 1967); A. Léonhard, *La foi chez Hegel* (Paris, 1965).

[36] Hegel himself refers to this passage: TWA, Vol. XVI, p. 43.

[37] Theunissen, op. cit., p. 51.

[38] M.J. Petry in the introduction to his edition of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*. In 3 vols. (London, 1970) Vol. I, p. 21

[39] Henning Ottmann, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel*. Vol. I: Hegel im Spiegel der Interpretationen (Berlin & New York, 1977) p. 11

[40] I have used this anecdote, for which there may be other sources, as it is related by Marx: H.M. Enzensberger (Ed.), *Gesprache mit Marx und Engels* (Frankfurt, 1973) Vol. I, pp. 315 f.

need not concern us here – does amply characterize a situation which the followers themselves became suddenly aware of when Hegel had died: "Hegel leaves behind a multitude of ingenious disciples, but no successor," as Gans' obituary documents this awareness.[41] Why should Hegel – presuming he did – have singled out Rosenkranz as coming closest to an understanding of his philosophy? It seems most likely that this evaluation was caused by the scope of Rosenkranz' scholarship: an independent Kant scholar,[42] he also worked on logic, literature, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, theory of education, etc.; in other words, he was a versatile and extremely fertile thinker, certainly an example of "the widely educated person for whom Hegel wrote so allusively and cryptically".[43] Having an encyclopaedic mind himself, Rosenkranz was capable of recognizing this congenial element in Hegel's mind:

> Hegel's philosophy is too universal in its design for it to be completed already.[44]

Thus, it is not only the rich and genuine material which made Rosenkranz' biography of Hegel a lasting success, but also this congeniality between the two thinkers – in other words, Rosenkranz' awareness of Hegel's wide interests and 'Bildung', which allowed him to provide us with such a rich and vivid account. Characteristically, Rosenkranz' description of Hegel's School reflects his awareness of the subsequent loss of encyclopaedic range:

> Only by adding together the work of all Hegel's disciples does one gain an idea of the man himself; each one on his own is only one aspect of him.[45]

This lack of encyclopaedic range also holds true for modern Hegel research. Nowadays, few scholars dare to provide what used to be representative until the 1940s: a combination of detailed interpretation and overall image.[46] If they attempt to give a general account, like

[41] Eduard Gans, "Nekrolog", *Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung*. December 1, 1831. Now in: Günther Nicolin (Ed.), *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen* (Hamburg, 1970) pp. 490–496, here p. 496 – Henceforth quoted as "HBZ".

[42] Karl Rosenkranz, *Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1840).

[43] Duncan Forbes, "Review of Judith N. Shklar's 'Freedom and Independence' ", *Clio* (Fort Wayne, 1978) Vol. VII, No. 3 pp. 514–516, here p. 514

[44] Karl Rosenkranz, *G.W.F. Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844) p. XXVIII

[45] Karl Rosenkranz, *Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems* (Konigsberg, 1840) p. XXXV

[46] For example: Theodor Haering, *Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk*. In 2 vols.

Taylor's tightly printed 573 pages, it is normally at the expense of accuracy in the details.[47] Minute examinations of nicely isolated aspects, on the other hand, (e.g. the legion of studies which trace and discuss affinities and influences[48]) are always open to the criticism that their very scope implies a distortion. Karl Löwith's attack on Theunissen clearly illustrates this point, as Löwith thought he could simply dispose of this thorough analysis of the Christian core of Hegel's philosophy by referring to another important source for Hegel:

> [Theunissen] confines himself exclusively to traditional Christian theology in dealing with Hegel's metaphysics and claims that Hegel's ideas are clearly based on the Bible. However, Hegel himself was influenced at least as much by Greek philosophy.[49]

There is only one way out of this dilemma (a way that has convincingly been suggested in Prof. Pöggeler's "Perspektiven der Hegelforschung"[50]), and that is to cut back on claims and expectations: on the one hand, attempts at an accurate overall presentation ought to be given up for the time being; discussions of individual topics, on the other hand, need to emphasize their limited character. To put it more constructively, the task of contemporary Hegel research could be described in the methodological terms of 'resolution' leading on to 'synthesis'. The first stage of resolution consists of a humble concentration on individual problems – "neutrale Einzelforschung", as Prof. Pöggeler puts it.[51] In spite of the highly ideological nature of many of the problems involved, there is plenty of room for such 'neutral' investigation of details. This programme of detailed developmental research – associated with the names of Fulda, Pöggeler, Henrich, Nicolin, Harris, Peperzak and others[52] – is of a fairly recent date; it has only begun to be fulfilled, and, so far, it has

---

(Leipzig, 1929 & 1938); Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, 1941); Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft* (Zurich, 1948); Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt – Objekt* (Leipzig, 1951).

[47] Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, 1975); cp. my review of the recent German translation of Taylor's study in *Hegel-Studien* Vol. XVII (1982) pp. 226–229. – Henceforth quoted as "HS".

[48] Heinz Kimmerle, "Religion und Philosophie als Abschluss des Systems", Otto Pöggeler, *Hegel* (Freiburg & München, 1977) p. 154, has a nice compilation of such topics.

[49] Karl Lowith, "Aktualitat und Inaktualitat Hegels", *Hegel-Bilanz*, op. cit., p. 16

[50] Otto Poggeler, "Perspektiven der Hegel-Forschung", *Hegel-Studien: Beiheft* XI (Bonn, 1970) pp. 79–102. – Henceforth quoted as "HSBh".

[51] ibid., p. 101

[52] Their books and articles are too numerous to list here, cp.: Kurt Steinhauer (Ed.), *Hegel· Eine internationale Bibliographie* (München, 1980).

raised more questions than it has answered, but it has already succeeded in achieving a constructive shake up of traditional views. Only after these individual threads have been followed up to an extent that can compare with Hegel's own encyclopaedic interests and their assimilation (and this aim is still a long way off) – only then can we go on to the next stage of synthesis: to combine and balance those threads, to assess Hegel's own achievements in the light of his sources and face to face with his contemporaries, to try anew to portray 'den ganzen Hegel'.

Let us briefly apply these reflections to the present topic: "Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment" traces an influence which has not yet received the attention it deserves,[53] and it may, thus, enrich our knowledge of Hegel's 'Bildung'; however, it needs to be emphasized that we are dealing with *one* influence (a piece of a mosaic, not a portrait in its own right), which is meant to be a supplement to all the better known influence topics (e.g. "Hegel and Kant", "Hegel and Fichte", "Hegel and Schelling") and not a substitute for them. It will become clear that the framework of our topic allows a lot of 'neutrale Einzelforschung': not only such fundamental investigations as 'Hegel's knowledge of English' or 'Hegel's contacts with the Scottish Enlightenment', which, if their results are accepted, contribute to our 'factual' knowledge of Hegel, but even chapters like 'The division of labour', which, in one sense, lead right into the fierce quarrel between Hegelians and Marxists, provide a high proportion of non-ideological material (e.g. the textual comparisons between Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment) which will not solve the ideological dispute, but may force the disputants to use a more sophisticated armoury.

(C) HEGEL AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT

> Thirdly, and most obviously of all to the young Hegel and his contemporaries, there is the sunlight of the 'Aufklärung', the light of reason shining in the community of free men.[54]

It often happens that, when a height is climbed, the path that led to it is forgotten. In 1801, when Hegel entered the lively literary scene of Jena, he introduced himself with an essay on the difference between Fichte

[53] For a survey of previous research, see below.

[54] H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development*. Toward the Sunlight 1770–1801 (Oxford, 1972) p. XVII

and Schelling.[55] Similarly, in his later lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel places himself in the context of German Idealism: Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling.[56] Compared with such implicit (and the many explicit) acknowledgements of his indebtedness to German Idealism, Hegel's evaluation of the Enlightenment expresses a considerable distance, if not hostility:

> By means of its formal, abstract, and shallow thinking, the Enlightenment cf the understanding ('Verstandesaufklärung') . . . has emptied religion of all its content.[57]

> The German Enlightenment . . . even brought down metaphysics to its ultimate shallowness.[58]

For a long time, these facts imposed a somewhat inadequate perspective on Hegel scholarship: Hegel was seen only in the context of Kant, Fichte and Schelling; Kroner's otherwise impressive "Von Kant bis Hegel"[59] may here serve as the prime example of this tendency. When, in those days, Hegel was at all associated with the Enlighterment, it was done with malicious, derogatory intentions; thus, for Rudolf Haym (in turn echoing Schelling[60]), the young Hegel's contacts with the Enlightenment were considered and emphasized as a limitation ('Befangenheit').[61] Against this evidence – the lack of Hegel's acknowledgement of the Enlightenment, on the one hand, and the wide spectrum of sympathetic (like Kroner) or hostile interpreters (like the old Schelling and Haym), on the other hand – the claim for a strong Enlightenment influence on Hegel has to be established; an influence which, far from infecting Hegel's system, belongs to what is most important and significant in Hegel's heritage.

The first step towards the recognition of this influence was the quest for knowledge of Hegel's intellectual development, inseparably associated

[55] "Differenzschrift", HGW, Vol. IV, pp. 1–93 and HSH, passim.

[56] For an introduction to the various sets of lecture notes and their usage in various editions of the *History of Philosophy*, cp. TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 520–527 and below, p. 134

[57] G.W.F. Hegel, *Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. Vorrede zur dritten Ausgabe (1830), TWA, Vol. VIII, p. 36

[58] G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie*, TWA, Vol XX, p. 310.

[59] Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*. In 2 vols. (Tubingen, 1921 & 1924).

[60] F.W.J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie*. In 2 vols. (1856) = Reprint: (Darmstadt, 1976) Vol. I, p. 583

[61] Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Berlin, 1857) = Reprint (Darmstadt, 1962) p. 28

with the achievements and the school of Wilhelm Dilthey.[62] Although Dilthey himself can hardly be described as an Enlightenment follower or sympathizer – for not only did he lack a serious interest in the Enlightenment,[63] but his 'Jugendgeschichte' even tried to show the young Hegel in a very different light, labelling him a 'theologian' and a 'mystical pantheist'[64] – it was nevertheless Dilthey's interest in Hegel's origins, rather than his final results, which opened up a completely new method of research and thus rendered possible a study of the formative influences on Hegel. The most remarkable element in Dilthey's method, corresponding to his emphasis on Hegel's origins, was the attention he paid to *all* surviving evidence, particularly to Hegel's early manuscripts. A first and lasting achievement of this conception was the edition of the so-called 'Theologische Jugendschriften' by the Dilthey disciple Hermann Nohl.[65] Irrespective of the very different conclusions of Hoffmeister and Lukács, to which we shall turn presently, and in spite of the scorn that Lukács frequently poured on him, it was Dilthey who enabled these men to ask their own questions about Hegel's sources, a fact that even Lukács grudgingly acknowledged.[66] And it is to Dilthey that the current minute research of the Hegel Archives and the new Hegel edition owe their origins.[67] However, if one follows the development of research chronologically, after Dilthey and Nohl, the next and (for the topic of Hegel and the Enlightenment) decisive step was taken by Johannes Hoffmeister. In 1936, he not only continued the editorial work of Nohl, Lasson and others[68] with the publication of 'Dokumente zu

[62] Dilthey's approach to Hegel was first articulated in his review of Karl Hegel's edition of Hegel's letters: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, (1888) pp. 289–299; also: Wilhelm Dilthey, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (1905), now in *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. IV (Göttingen & Stuttgart, fifth edition, 1974) pp. 1–187.

[63] Cp.: José M. Ripalda, *The Divided Nation* (Assen/Amsterdam, 1977) p. 9: "Dilthey saw the Enlightenment as little more than the precursor of Romanticism and of the bourgeois society of the 19th century. The Enlightenment, the time of small books, and names without the aura of genius, could attract only with difficulty the congenial sympathy of a sensitive soul in search of its own images."

[64] Wilhelm Dilthey, op. cit., pp. 138 ff.

[65] H. Nohl, *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907). Henceforth quoted as "HTJ".

[66] Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel* (1948), here quoted from the edition: (Frankfurt, 1973), Vol. I, p. 15.

[67] Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, "Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Vol. 30, Part 4 (1976) p. 609; Otto Pöggeler, "Perspektiven der Hegelforschung", op. cit., pp. 88 f.

[68] Hermann Nohl, op. cit.; Georg Lasson (Ed.), *Hegel: Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1923); Georg Lasson (Ed.), *Hegel: Erste Druckschriften* (Leipzig, 1928); Georg Mollat (Ed.), *Hegel: Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches* (Stuttgart, 1935).

Hegels Entwicklung'[69] but also added to this edition an introduction and some 80 pages of notes, in which he convincingly emphasized the enormous impact of the Enlightenment on Hegel:

> Eighteenth-century thought is not merely the raw material, the subject matter of Hegel's system – it is its inherited intellectual substance. (Hoffmeister, DHE, p. viii).

One cannot fail to admire Hoffmeister's achievement, especially his humility in consciously restricting himself to preparing the ground for a new generation of Hegel scholarship; in this respect, his conception alone already characterizes the lasting significance of his efforts.[70] Consequently, Hoffmeister's notes nowhere claim completeness, but provide stimuli and hints and illustrate the latter with examples. In this way, however, Hoffmeister was able to trace back much of the 'mature' Hegel's outlook to the inspiration of the Enlightenment; for this movement not only shaped his formal education but also provided more subtle influences on him. Hoffmeister's perspective thus provides us with a first explanation of the abovementioned absence of Hegel's acknowledgement of the Enlightenment: Hegel's very proximity to the Enlightenment, his early acquaintance with and constant processing and re-processing of Enlightenment views transformed them into a part of his own intellectual property, so that, by the time Hegel constructed his own system, the Enlightenment was no longer a conscious 'influence' deserving acknowledgement, but had become a subterranean current in Hegel's mind.[71]

Alas, Hoffmeister's promising work did not bear the immediate fruits one would have hoped for. To begin with, there were the hostile critics headed by Justus Schwarz[72] – the controversy between Schwarz and

[69] Johannes Hoffmeister (Ed.), *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1936). Henceforth quoted as "DHE".

[70] DHE, p. 391: "It would have been easier to write a book about these texts, taking the actual insights gained from a study of the texts as the subject matter, than simply to let the actual sources speak for themselves, avoiding any appearance of personal achievement or literary ambition. The avoidance of these claims was due to the realization that the most important thing is that Hegel himself be studied directly. The main emphasis of these notes is placed, therefore, on the creation of a favourable climate for a more modern, better and more thorough study of Hegel."

[71] Cp.: Joachim Ritter, *Hegel und die französische Revolution* [1957], I have used the following edition: (Frankfurt, 1972) p. 52.

[72] Justus Schwarz, "Dokumente zu Hegels Frühzeit. Bemerkungen anläßlich der Veröffentlichung der Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung durch J. Hoffmeister", *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie*, Vol. XII (1938/39) pp. 416–423; Justus Schwarz, *Hegels philosophische Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1938).

Hoffmeister will shortly be dealt with – and, more important, the socio-political framework of philosophical research was more and more undermined by the Nazi regime; the interpretation of an Enlightenment Hegel had to yield to the use or abuse of Hegel by those scholars who marched with the brown shirts: Julius Binder, Martin Busse, Gerhard Dulckeit, Karl Larenz, Walther Schönfeld, and others.[73] In this way, a continuity was broken and it was left to a later generation to explore the land which Hoffmeister had discovered.

Before we continue our historical account of the stages of research, a second explanation of Hegel's apparent failure to show his indebtedness to the Enlightenment should be indicated, an explanation that was partly implied in Hoffmeister's demand for further research in this field:

> Before the crucial ideas of the Enlightenment in the documents of Hegel's youth and the various adaptations of these ideas in the early theological writings and all his later works have been fully recognized, it is impossible to add anything decisive to [our understanding of] Hegel's development. (Hoffmeister, DHE, p. viii)

The element of this formulation which at the moment attracts our attention is "die vielfachen Abwandlungen", the manifold modifications, to which Hegel subjected the ideas of the Enlightenment. Hegel's indebtedness to the Enlightenment is not straightforward – Hegel himself cannot be considered an Enlightenment figure[74] – but it is an example of a Hegelian 'Aufhebung'. Another way of expressing the manner of Hegel's indebtedness to the Enlightenment is the Leibnitzian image, which Ripalda applied to Hegel, of a "living mirror", which does not directly reflect the Enlightenment, but assimilates it.[75] Seen in this way, the interpretation of Hoffmeister, depicting Hegel as the heir of the Enlightenment, and the opposing claim of Schwarz that Hegel was "a very bold and pioneering innovator"[76] do not really clash; they only

[73] For a bibliography of these authors, see the appendix to: H.R. Rottleuthner, "Die Substantialisierung des Formalrechts", Oskar Negt (Ed.), *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels* (Frankfurt, 1970) pp. 215–268; for a critical discussion, besides Rottleuthner see: Henning Ottmann, op. cit., pp. 152–182; H. Kiesewetter, *Von Hegel zu Hitler* (Hamburg, 1974) pp. 213 ff. – For the opposition of this 'movement' to an Enlightenment Hegel see especially: Julius Binder, *Die Gerechtigkeit als Lebensprinzip des Staates* (Langensalza, 1926) pp. 42 ff.

[74] Cp.: Willi Oelmüller, *Die unbefriedigte Aufklärung*. Beiträge zu einer Theorie der Moderne von Lessing, Kant und Hegel (Frankfurt, 1979).

[75] J.M. Ripalda, *The Divided Nation* (Amsterdam, 1977) p. 11.

[76] Justus Schwarz, "Dokumente aus Hegels Frühzeit . . .", op. cit., p. 418.

emphasize different facets of this 'Aufhebung'. This paradigm of 'Aufhebung' will have to be kept in mind when we come to consider Hegel's diverse utterances about the Enlightenment: Hegel's explicit criticism on the one hand, and acceptance, on the other hand, are often mere elements of a larger consideration, the final element of which, the normally unacknowledged 'raising to a higher level', is extremely difficult to grasp and still harder to document; but, if one does not try, as Hoffmeister puts it, "it is impossible to add anything decisive to our understanding of Hegel's development." A first attempt to characterize Hegel's 'Aufhebung' of the Enlightenment – a way that appears to have been in the mind of Hoffmeister and Chamley[77] – is to see it as Hegel's road towards a system: the contents of the Enlightenment are worked over and assimilated till they emerge again as elements of the spiritual life of Hegel's system.

The next step in accounting for Hegel's apparent disrespect for the Enlightenment is to stress variety within unity. To be more precise, while it is perfectly legitimate, as Peter Gay has argued,[78] to speak of *the* Enlightenment, the differences between the British, French, and German Enlightenment must not be overlooked or played down, because Hegel was conscious of these national differences. If one makes this distinction, it becomes apparent that Hegel's most hostile utterances about the Enlightenment are directed against, if not restricted to, the German Enlightenment, seen as a belated, lifeless imitation:

> The Germans are busy bees who do justice to all nations, they are old-clothesmen for whom anything is good enough, and who carry on their haggling with everyone. Picked up as it was from foreign nations, all this had lost the wit and life, the energy and originality which with the French had made the content to be lost sight of in the form. The Germans, who honestly sift a matter to its root, and who would put rational arguments in the place of wit and vivacity, since wit and vivacity really prove nothing, in this way reached a content which was utterly empty, so much so that nothing could be more wearisome than this profound mode of treatment; such was the case with Eberhard, Tetens, and those like them. (LHP, Vol. III, p. 403 – TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 308 f)

Thus, having distinguished the foreign originals from the German

[77] Cp.: J. Hoffmeister, DHE, p. IX; Paul Chamley, *Économie Politique et Philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel* (Paris, 1963) p. 8 (mottos) & p. 140.

[78] Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment – An Interpretation*. In 2 vols. (London, 2nd edition, 1973) Vol. I, pp. XII & 3 ff.

popularizations, we have to balance French and British influences. In terms of Hegel scholarship, it was no doubt the French side which attracted both earlier interest and more thorough attention.[79] This state of affairs was partly caused by Hegel himself, for his references to French thinkers outweigh by far his acknowledgements to Britain's intellectual life.[80] In this respect, we owe it to Rosenzweig and Höhne that a new evaluation became possible, for both of them opened the topic of 'Hegel and Britain' by providing a wealth of material.[81] But why should Hegel have been uneven in his acknowledgements to the French and British Enlightenment respectively? In order to answer this question, which the claim for a British impact on Hegel has to face, we have to consider the emergence of the social sciences out of eighteenth century moral philosophy and the question of how this development was reflected in the scope and conception of Hegel's 'philosophy' in general and his distinction between 'philosophy' and the social sciences in particular. Although Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson – to choose two well-known British Enlightenment figures as examples – did much to emancipate the modern disciplines of economics and sociology, and it is, therefore, right that they should be frequently mentioned among the founding fathers of those subjects, they still considered themselves to be moral philosophers and saw their economic and sociological theories as branches of moral philosophy. Hegel, on the other hand, is writing from the other side of the hiatus: he is trying to find a philosophical synthesis *after* the emergence of isolated social sciences. 'Nationalökonomie' (political economy), for example, about which Hegel is quite explicit, provides him, like any other science, with material for his philosophical inquiry but can in itself no longer be considered part of 'philosophy'; in his 1825/26 lectures on the history of philosophy, here quoted from Helcel's notes, Hegel makes this point particularly clear:

> The recent political economy ('Staatsökonomie'), e.g. as initiated by Adam Smith, is [in England] considered to be part of philosophy; everything that is derived from general principles is called philosophi-

[79] From the wealth of available literature, I only wish to mention two older studies: H. Trescher, *Montesquieus Einfluß auf die philosophischen Grundlagen der Staatslehre Hegels* (Leipzig, 1920) & H.W. Brann, *Rousseaus Einfluß auf die Hegelsche Staatsphilosophie in ihrer Entwicklung und Vollendung* (Berlin, 1926).

[80] Cp.: Horst Höhne, "Hegel und England", *Kant-Studien*, Vol. XXXVI (Berlin, 1931) pp. 301–326, here p. 301.

[81] Horst Höhne, op. cit., passim; Franz Rosenzweig, *Hegel und der Staat*. In 2 vols. (Berlin & München, 1920) = Reprint in 1 vol. (Aalen, 1962) Vol. I, pp. 52 f., 114, Vol. II, pp. 228 f.

> cal. We intend to exclude all these aspects from the focus of our treatment.[82]

Many of his British sources Hegel, therefore, considered to be 'external' or 'extra-mural' influences, which he felt less obliged to acknowledge, especially in purely philosophical contexts: in his lectures on the history of philosophy, for example, he discusses Hume's Empiricism and Scepticism, and the epistemological and ethical principles of the Common-Sense School (Reid, Beattie, Oswald), but Smith and Ferguson, who no doubt exerted a far greater influence on him, he only mentions in passing.[83]

In subsequent Hegel scholarship, as it was affected by further emancipation of the specialized subjects and their institutionalization in separate academic departments, this perspective became even more pronounced: 'Hegel and British political economy' or 'Hegel and British social theory' were recognized topics, but the wider intellectual context, the Enlightenment environment of these 'sociologists' and 'economists' was overlooked or failed to be understood. Karl Marx must be mentioned in this context. His discussion of Hegel's 'Phenomenology' in the 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts',[84] irrespective of its many misunderstandings and misrepresentations, had the great advantage of seeing the political economists behind Hegel and realizing their importance for Hegel's philosophy. For two reasons, this fact deserves to be stressed. First, there is the context of explaining Marx' indebtedness to Hegel. Besides all the well-known topics like 'Marx and Hegelian dialectics', Marx' lifelong occupation with economic theory, culminating in 'Capital', was partly mediated through Hegel. Secondly, Marx' understanding of the economic element in Hegel's thought singles him out among the contemporary Hegelians. The prime example of this neglect of Hegel's economic ideas by his immediate disciples is the fact that Karl Rosenkranz – if I were to speculate upon the meaning of the second half of the above quoted anecdote, "that Rosenkranz did not get it quite right",[85] I would point to this aspect – showed so little understanding

[82] MS, Hegels Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie [1825/1826] nach der Mitschrift von Helcel. Quoted by kind permission of the present owner: The Polish Academy of Science at Cracow, MS, No.: 57, p. 15.

[83] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 275–281 (Hume), 281–286 (Reid, Beattie, Oswald), 285 (Ferguson & Smith).

[84] Karl Marx, *Oekonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte* [written in 1844]. First published in: D. Riazanov (Ed.), *Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels: Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. Section I, Vol. 3 (1932). Various modern editions and English translations.

[85] See above, p. 11 note 40.

of this interest of his master that he lost one of the most important documents, i.e. Hegel's commentary on Steuart.[86] But, though Marx was aware of the economic strain in Hegel, and this leads us back to the limits of understanding of the specialized social sciences, he was unable to consider it as part of Hegel's wider Enlightenment heritage.

The views of Marx, in their turn, sparked off further Marxist Hegel scholarship. In this context, the most important study is 'The young Hegel'[87] by Georg Lukács, in which most of the advantages and disadvantages of Marx' own discussion of Hegel reappear. Writing in conscious opposition to Dilthey's "reactionary legend of Hegel's 'theological' period",[88] Lukács emphasized the economic and political interests of Hegel. In spite of some bad-tempered polemics against Dilthey and his followers, Lukács' study has the merit of balancing Dilthey's view with an antithesis. Lukács even mentions the Enlightenment context of Hegel's economic studies[89] and indeed of Smith's economics:

> Hegel . . . builds on the tradition of the social philosophy of the Enlightenment from Hobbes to Helvetius, and above all Adam Smith. (Lukács/Livingstone, p. 481)

However, alongside these insights of the book there are various shortcomings. First of all, there is the Marxist blinker neatly summed up by Ernst Bloch:

> However, due to the author's effort to make clear the predecessor of Marx, the aspects which stress Hegel's position as a predecessor are overemphasized here [in Lukács' "The Young Hegel"], and whatever does not support this claim is often understated or even left out.[90]

Lukács' failure to discuss or even to mention Hegel's "Das Leben Jesu" is an obvious example of this tendency. Closely related to this one-sidedness is a second serious drawback, the uneven quality of Lukács' scholarship: impressive and influential[91] on Hegel's Berne period; re-

[86] His report of the commentary (1844, p. 86) makes it at least highly plausible that he still had it at hand.

[87] Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*. First published in 1948, but written some 10 years earlier. I have used the third German edition (Frankfurt, 1973) and the English translation by Rodney Livingstone (London, 1975).

[88] Lukács (1975) title of chapter one.

[89] ibid., Livingstone translation, p. 3

[90] Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt – Objekt* (Frankfurt, 3rd edition, 1972) p. 51

[91] Not only the later Marxists, but also such studies as Gunther Rohrmoser's *Subjektivitat und Verdinglichung* (Gutersloh, 1961) are clearly indebted to Lukács.

spectable as far as the Jena years are concerned; but rather confused with respect to the Frankfurt years, as the simultaneous occurrence of Hegel's economic studies (Sir James Steuart) and his partial acceptance of 'positive religion' leads Lukács to echo the tale of a depressed Hegel and his "experience of crisis".[92] Thirdly, the presentation of the Enlightenment in Lukács' study not only suffers from an anachronistic backward projection of 'class' distinctions – perhaps a predictable weakness in a Marxist author – but also from a lack of accuracy: frequent generalizations and lumping together, mistakes in the details[93] and insufficient provision of references to the actual texts of the Enlightenment authors – in this latter respect his work is certainly no match for the minute scholarship of Rosenzweig and Hoffmeister. All these weaknesses suggest that Lukács' knowledge of the Enlightenment, especially its British side, was based on secondary sources. His arguments, therefore, though often imaginative and stimulating, are almost always in need of further backing up.

When we finally turn to recent research using the material and hints provided by Rosenzweig and Höhne, Hoffmeister and Lukács, we can distinguish two groups: (a) those scholars who consider Hegel's socio-economic theories and their origins; and (b) those who are interested in the wider rôle of the Enlightenment in the formation of Hegel's thought.

(a) The leading figures of the first group are Joachim Ritter and Paul Chamley. Of Ritter, though some of his views need qualification,[94] it may well be said that he put a new face on the post-War interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy. His central thesis – as developed in "Hegel und die französische Revolution" and his article "Subjektivität und industrielle Gesellschaft"[95] relates Hegel's philosophy to the embodiment of universal political freedom in the French Revolution:

> In the French Revolution, political freedom as a right and, thus, the ability of all men to be themselves, in relation to all other men, was,

[92] Lukács/Livingstone, p. 101; for a criticism of this view, see Otto Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg, 1973) pp. 22 f.; Henning Ottmann, op. cit., p. 89

[93] For example, Lukács repeats Marx' mistake that Ferguson was Smith's teacher, Livingstone translation, p. 329

[94] See: Otto Pöggeler, "Review of Joachim Ritter's 'Metaphysik and Politik', HS, Vol. VII (Bonn, 1972) pp. 282 ff.; Henning Ottmann, op. cit., pp. 299–346; also Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfurt, 3rd ed., 1974) pp. 128–147.

[95] Joachim Ritter, *Hegel und die französische Revolution*, first published: (Köln, 1957). I have used the third edition (Frankfurt, 1972); J.R., "Subjektivität und industrielle Gesellschaft. Zu Hegels Theorie der Subjektivitat" (1961), now in J.R., *Subjektivitat* (Frankfurt, 1974). I have used this latter edition.

> for the first time, raised to the level of a principle and purpose of society and the state.[96]

This political revolution is, in its turn, related back to the processes of 'industrial society':

> Hegel had recognized already early on that, with the ideas concerning human rights connected with the French Revolution and the dissolution of the old order, forming the actual revolution on the basis of historical reality itself, bourgeois industrial society was created as a political entity and was subsequently intent on attaining its right and creating a state of its own."[97]

In this context, Ritter is keen to stress – and this aspect is closely related to our present inquiry – that Hegel's account of 'industrial society' is heavily indebted to the political economists (Steuart, Smith, Say, Ricardo).[98] These references were not missed, but carefully followed up by Ritter's disciples, most notably by Manfred Riedel. In a way, Riedel did for the liberal interpretation of Hegel what Lukács had done for the Marxist one: he pointed out the evidence of "Hegel's reception of political economy" (as his essay is entitled)[99] and showed its significance for Hegel's development. In a detailed comparison of all the texts from the Jena period, Riedel succeeds in reconstructing Hegel's gradual departure from the treatment of economic matters in the narrow classical (especially Aristotelian) context of 'oikos', the matters of the household, and his progression towards a placing of 'the system of needs' in a position of central importance. The Ritter–Riedel line of interpretation has been so widely accepted[100] that it has found its way into many general introductions to Hegel.

Paul Chamley approached Hegel's socio-economic thought from a different angle. An outstanding historian of economic thought, intimately familiar with the texts of the economists and thus capable of

[96] J. Ritter (1972) pp. 29 ff. – Ritter's italics have been omitted.

[97] J. Ritter (1974) p. 16 – Ritter's italics have been omitted.

[98] J. Ritter (1972) pp. 52 ff; (1974) p. 25.

[99] Manfred Riedel, "Die Rezeption der Nationalökonomie", *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1969) pp. 75–99.

[100] Cp.: Henning Ottmann, p. 299: ". . . the Western 'liberal' interpretation of Hegel as the proponent of the 'modern', democratic, constitutional state has been brought to the forefront of attention in Germany by Joachim Ritter, to such an extent that the middle-of-the-road Hegel interpretation has become almost the orthodox creed in academic circles."

catching the echoes in Hegel's texts (on reading Chamley, Lukács' lack of first-hand knowledge of the economists becomes obvious), Chamley traces the influence of Sir James Steuart (whose impact he considers more important than Smith's or any other's) on Hegel's economic thought. In his book,[101] he considers and compares their accounts of economic life (ibid., pp. 15 ff., 57 ff., 83 ff.), the rôle they ascribe to political intervention (pp. 38 ff., 66 ff., 94 ff.), and such wider aspects as the necessity of historical development (pp. 60 ff., 109 ff., 146 ff.). In later articles, Chamley followed up his arguments with regard to the precise time of Steuart's impact on Hegel's ideas, analysing the writings between 1792 and 1800, and with respect to Hegel's concept of labour.[102]

More recent general studies, especially those of Avineri, Plant, and Cullen, can be considered here only in so far as they affect the subject of the present thesis. Thus, the critical comments that will be made about them are not meant to deny other merits of those books. *Avineri*'s study, as its very title "Hegel's Theory of the Modern State"[103] seems to indicate, takes the reader straight into Hegel's tightrope walk between the necessary freedom of economic life *and* the need of some political control over the blind forces of 'civil society'. Avineri's highly relevant discussion of this issue even includes references to Steuart, Smith, and Ferguson.[104] Also, his characterization of Hegel's state as being based on the rule of law and as a warrant of the rights and freedom of the individual deserves applause.[105] However, there are also some shortcomings: the above mentioned references to earlier socio-economic theories are often insufficient and frequently distort the view of Hegel's predecessors such as Smith and Steuart.[106] Another criticism was made by Otto Pöggeler: Avineri's use of the untranslated Jena manuscripts, though immensely valuable to those English readers who had no access to the German originals, did not pay enough attention to the differences between the various texts, but lumped them together.[107] The discussion

[101] Paul Chamley, *Économie politique et philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel* (Paris, 1963).

[102] Paul Chamley, "Les Origines de la Pensée Économique de Hegel", HS, Vol. III (Bonn, 1965) pp. 225–261; P.C., "La Doctrine Économique de Hegel et la Conception Hégélienne du Travail", HSBh 4 (Bonn, 1969) pp. 147–159.

[103] Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge, 1972)

[104] ibid., pp. 4–5, 142 (for Steuart); pp. 5, 93, 142, 146 ff. (for Smith); p. 141 note (for Ferguson).

[105] ibid., pp. 190 ff. & 179–184

[106] Duncan Forbes, "Hegel's Theory of the State (Review of Avineri)", *Cambridge Review*, March 1973, pp. 120 ff.

[107] Otto Pöggeler, "Comment on Avineri's 'Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's Realphilosophie' ", J.J. O'Malley and others (Eds.), *The Legacy of Hegel* (The Hague, 1973) pp. 216–219.

of Hegel's political economy in Raymond *Plant*'s introductory "Hegel"[108] builds on Chamley's discussion of the Hegel-Steuart relationship,[109] but, following Andrew Skinner's scholarship, he is more inclined than Chamley to see Steuart in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment (Plant, p. 17). The wide scope of Plant's book did not allow him to take the matter much further, but, in two recent articles, he tried to follow up the nature and origins of Hegel's socio-political thought.[110] Unfortunately, these articles make it evident that Plant's acquaintance with the political economists is not intimate enough: the account of Steuart's 'statesman' oversimplifies the issue;[111] and Hegel's political thought is often described as more original than it really is: for example, when discussing poverty as a necessary element of civil society, Ferguson should have been mentioned and discussed at some length. But most regrettable in Plant's articles is the tendency to accept the proto-Marxist criticism that Hegel was unable to solve the problem of poverty.[112] Compared with Avineri and Plant, Bernard *Cullen*'s "Hegel's Social and Political Thought"[113] is rather superficial, simply taking for granted what Chamley and others had carefully argued, and, occasionally, his text is embarrassingly close to Plant's formulations without acknowledging them.[114] In the context of Hegel's socio-economic theories, a recent editorial enterprise should also be mentioned: Karl-Heinz *Ilting*'s edi-

[108] Raymond Plant, *Hegel* (London, 1973).

[109] ibid., p. 57 note

[110] Raymond Plant, "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy", D.P. Verene (Ed.), *Hegel's Social and Political Thought* (Atlantic Highlands N.J. & Brighton, Sussex, 1980) pp. 59–90; R. Plant, "Hegel and Political Economy", Part I: *New Left Review* No.: 103 (May 1977) pp. 79–92, Part II: *New Left Review* No.: 104 (July 1977) pp. 103–113.

[111] R. Plant (1980) p. 68.

[112] Although he does mention the constructive development of one of Hegel's answers (charity) among the British Hegelians, especially Bosanquet and Green. – Another type of answer that seems to have been in Hegel's mind is the self-help among the members of the corporation (Philosophy of Right, Paragraph 253).

[113] Bernard Cullen, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought* (Dublin, 1979). Cp. my review of Cullen's book, in: HS, Vol. XVIII (1983) pp. 417–419.

[114] ibid., p. 3: ". . . the growing awareness, from about 1770 on, of the works of the historians and political economists of the Scottish Enlightenment. The writings of Adam Ferguson (1723–1816) and John Millar (1735–1801), in particular, on the development of modern commercial society and the 'division of labour' in history, provided their German readers with tools for the analysis of their contemporary predicament." – Compare: Plant (1973) p. 17: "Finally the growing awareness, after about 1770, of the great works of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment on the development of commercial society, particularly the writings of Adam Ferguson and John Millar, provided them with a diagnosis of the contemporary malaise and made them more aware than they had been previously of the difficulties involved in any attempt to reform the situation."

tion of the unpublished "Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831".[115] Although this edition has come under attack for containing too many mistakes in the transcription of manuscripts, and will probably be superseded by the Berlin volumes of the new critical edition, it is nevertheless an extremely helpful tool in the hands of any researcher working on Hegel's social and political thought and the formative influences behind it.

(b) As regards the recent scholars looking at the rôle of the Enlightenment in the formation of Hegel's thought, let us first consider an author who can be characterized as a critical disciple of Ritter: Günther *Rohrmoser*.[116] Rohrmoser's approach is best described as an attempt to go beyond the Dilthey/Lukács dichotomy by stressing the necessary interconnection between the theological and the socio-political dimensions of Hegel's philosophy.[117] The Frankfurt years, according to Rohrmoser, are the decisive period in Hegel's development, as it was there that Hegel slowly came to see the possibility of a religiously inspired reconciliation, which Rohrmoser considers to be the climax of Hegel's system.[118] This interpretation of Hegel's mature philosophy and his views about the emergence of this maturity at Frankfurt determine Rohrmoser's (backward) reading of the Tübingen and Berne manuscripts. We cannot here follow the general line of Rohrmoser's argument and expose its weaknesses,[119] but have to restrict ourselves to his (often implicit) discussion of Hegel and the Enlightenment. According to Rohrmoser's interpretation, the Enlightenment appears to be completely overcome in the mature Hegel's onto-theology, and, even in the young Hegel's manuscripts, it is only a stumbling-block which Hegel is struggling to overcome and from which he parted in the process of an uneven development. The main criticism which this view evokes is that it defines 'Aufklärung' too narrowly (as the German version of enlightened reason in the field of biblical criticism; in other words, as the opponent of orthodoxy) and then mistakes Hegel's critique of this particular strand of Enlightenment for his general attitude towards this

[115] Karl-Heinz Ilting (Ed.), *G.W.F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831*. In 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1973 ff.).

[116] Günther Rohrmoser, *Subjektivität und Verdinglichung*. Theologie und Gesellschaft im Denken des jungen Hegel (Gutersloh, 1961) p. 85 and note 76; cp.: Ottmann, pp. 347 f.

[117] ibid., p. 25.

[118] ibid., p. 113: "The complete return from total renunciation ('Entaußerung') to the concrete being of society is, however, achieved by the self-conscious spirit, in command of its own substance, in religion. This is the place of reconciliation . . ."

[119] Cp.: Heinz Kimmerle, "Zur theologischen Hegelinterpretation", HS, Vol. III (Bonn, 1965) pp. 356–369.

complex intellectual movement. A closer look at Rohrmoser's developmental constructions makes this weakness evident: instead of recognizing the enormous differences between the "Schwätzer der Aufklärung" (of which Hegel spoke in "Volksreligion und Christentum")[120] and the Enlightenment values behind "Das Leben Jesu", and thus recognizing the continuity in Hegel's views, Rohrmoser indulges in improbable speculations concerning a young Hegel who slaughtered the Enlightenment in his "Volksreligion" of 1793/94, then wrote the "Life of Jesus" in the spirit of the Enlightenment, then changed his mind again. In short, Rohrmoser's assumption that Hegel moved away from and finally overcame the Enlightenment is diametrically opposed to the overall view of the present study. Nevertheless, Rohrmoser's book helped to inspire further research on Hegel's relation to the Enlightenment by *Krüger*[121] and theologians like *Cornehl.*[122] Krüger's "Theologie und Aufklärung" is a somewhat incongruous book of mixed quality. The first and best part is an attempt to throw light on the intellectual context of Hegel's early writings by emphasizing how closely, if 'mostly involuntarily' (cp.: Krüger, p. 4), theology and Enlightenment were related in six different thinkers (the last of which is Hume). The second part may critically be described as a backward projection of the liberal interpretation of Hegel to the Berne and Frankfurt period: it is an attempt to show affinities between Hegel's early manuscripts and "certain conceptions of the classical English [sic!] Liberalism." This attempt is not supported by any research into Hegel's reception of this tradition; indeed, such research is discarded with the dubious argument that the liberalism is present in the texts before it is consciously absorbed by Hegel. Krüger's results, one might add, betray his method: his alleged parallels are too vague, and his conception of 'Liberalism' is too spongy to be instructive. The third and weakest part of his book repeats commonplaces about the liberalism of the Jena 'Realphilosophie'. Cornehl's "Die Zukunft der Versöhnung", on the whole a better and less pretentious book than Krüger's, is a stimulating attempt to verify the 'Christian dimension' of Hegel's philosophy with respect to the eschatological problem, and the merits of the book more than balance Cornehl's unconvincing restatement of the hubris charge against Hegel.[123] As far as Hegel and the

[120] G.W.F. Hegel, *Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum* (1793/94). TWA, Vol. I, pp. 9–103, here p. 27.

[121] H.J. Krüger, *Theologie und Aufklärung*. Untersuchungen zu ihrer Vermittlung beim jungen Hegel (Stuttgart, 1966).

[122] Peter Cornehl, *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung*. Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklärung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule (Göttingen, 1971).

[123] Cornehl, op. cit., pp. 160–62; compare the critical review by Walther Zimmerli, "Hegel und die Zukunft der Religion", HS, Vol. VIII (Bonn, 1973) pp. 267–276.

Enlightenment is concerned, Cornehl provides an interesting account of Enlightenment figures in contemporary German theology and especially their eschatological views (Reimarus, Semler, Spalding, Mendelssohn, Lessing).[124] He furthermore manages to demonstrate how important these issues were – as a basis and a contrast – in the development of Hegel's philosophy of religion. Although, in many respects, Cornehl goes beyond Rohrmoser, his scope implies the same regrettable reduction of 'Enlightenment' to historical and critical exegesis, something which we deplored in Rohrmoser's case. In this context, Ripalda's contributions are a suitable antidote, as they widen this scope again and include once more the historical, socio-political and aesthetic elements of the Enlightenment.[125] Moreover, Ripalda is one of the very few interpreters who have fully understood the significance of Hoffmeister's hint that Christian Garve was a seminal influence on Hegel; he is also aware of the British sources and inspiration behind Garve's 'popular philosophy', especially Adam Ferguson, and, in his "Poesie und Politik", succeeds in identifying and clarifying the particular Enlightenment heritage in Hegel's early (primarily Stuttgart and Tübingen) manuscripts on poetry ('Dichtung'), elaborating on such topics as the contemporary poet's loss of tradition, wide experience, and universal vision. In his later book, unfortunately, Ripalda failed to carry out this programme adequately. Though he provides plenty of relevant material, his discussion is led astray by an overall Marxist perspective[126] and a number of crude and unhelpful classifications resulting from this: Ferguson, for example, is described as "typically bourgeois", "naive and elitist" and even blinded by "growing privileges" (Ripalda, p. 31). Thus, what could have become a valuable study of Hegel's relation to some crucial Enlightenment figures, degenerated into a Marxist critique of the Enlightenment and of Hegel. Finally, some of the above mentioned developmental studies (p. 13), especially those of H.S. Harris, F. Nicolin and O. Pöggeler[127] contributed many new insights into

[124] Cornehl, pp. 29–59.

[125] J.M. Ripalda (1977) and compare his earlier article: "Poesie und Politik beim frühen Hegel", HS, Vol. VIII (Bonn, 1973) pp. 91–118. – In contrast to the scholarly article, the book contains rather a lot of misprints as well as more serious mistakes, a fact that may be explained, if not excused, by the circumstances: a German manuscript, written by a Spaniard, translated into American English, published and printed in Holland.

[126] Ripalda (1977) p. 11: "By focusing on Hegel, the great bourgeois thinker, we hope to shed some light on the often opaque and confusing cultural traditions of bourgeois society". – Cp.: p. 22 and dust jacket.

[127] H.S. Harris (1972); F. Nicolin, *Der junge Hegel in Stuttgart* (Stuttgart, 1970); Otto Pöggeler (1973) & "Hegels praktische Philosophie in Frankfurt", HS, Bd. IX (Bonn, 1974) pp. 73–107.

Hegel's contacts and affinities with the Enlightenment. In our own exposition, several of these findings will be referred to and discussed.

(D) THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT[128]

> The spirit of British philosophy seems to be situated beyond Hadrian's Wall and to have gathered around itself at present a little group of its own adherents in the Scottish mountains. Herder (1772)[129]

Up to now, a 'British' Enlightenment has been distinguished from its French and German counterparts (see above, p. 19 f.). For various reasons, it is more accurate, in our context, to refer to the 'Scottish' Enlightenment. The most obvious reason lies in the fact that the foremost representatives of the movement in the fifty or so years of its prime, say between 1730 and 1780, were all Scots (Hutcheson[130], Kames, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, et alii), and it is only fair to say so. Moreover, their national origin is not coincidental to their achievement. The accomplishments of such geniuses as Hume and Smith, for example, though they overshadowed the contributions of other Scottish Enlightenment figures, were by no means isolated events. Firstly, Hutcheson, Kames and others had prepared the ground for them by stimulating their minds and even by helping them, in practical terms,[131] to proceed with their own schemes. Secondly, they lived in close social and intellectual intercourse with each other and with a number of comparable and some slightly inferior talents. Thirdly, this "cross-fertilisation of minds"[132] within the closely knit community of these Literati led to the emergence of a number of common views (to be discussed presently), some of which can, in their turn, be related back to, if not explained by, certain

[128] Some of the historical causes of the Scottish Enlightenment, touched upon in this section, are developed more fully in my Stirling M. Litt. Thesis: "Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting" (University of Stirling, submitted in November 1979).

[129] Bernhard Suphan (Ed.), *Herders Sämtliche Werke*. 33 in 25 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913); here: Vol. V (Berlin, 1891) p. 452.

[130] Hutcheson was born at Drumalig in Ireland but was of Lowland Scots' descent and studied and taught at the University of Glasgow.

[131] Lord Kames, for example, was instrumental in organizing Smith's lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1748–1751).

[132] T.C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560–1830* (Glasgow and London, 4th impression, 1972) p. 478.

aspects of their Scottish background. The personal ties between them and their various common convictions made them grow into a School that prevailed against the odds, at least till the death of Dugald Stewart and, some would argue, up to Hamilton, Ferrier, or even Flint.[133] Finally, the emphasis on *Scottish* Enlightenment is justified by the Continental awareness of a distinctively Scottish tradition; an awareness that, as will be shown below, was shared by Hegel in particular.

What were the common views of the Scottish School which demarcate its contribution from other strands of the Enlightenment? What caused the emergence, social acceptance and even predominance of these views? To answer these questions is not only immensely difficult, but also implies the great danger of substituting an abstraction for the living thing. Attempts to define the 'Scottish Enlightenment', removed from the given texts of particular philosophers, show a certain ghost-hunting quality, irrespective of how intelligent they may otherwise be. Historians of the calibre of John Clive, Hugh Trevor-Roper, and Nicholas Phillipson could hardly fail to throw light on the matter as soon as they turned their attention from the bees to the hive,[134] and their researches are, therefore, eminently worthwhile, but, ultimately, it appears that a sufficient explanation, as opposed to hints at and investigations of necessary pre-conditions, has not yet been given. This methodological reservation about *explaining* the Scottish Enlightenment, as well as the obvious point that any such attempt is a full-blown topic in its own right, induces the present writer to restrict himself to bringing out some relevant characteristics and causes of the movement through the indirect device of a brief historical account of the scholarship in this field.

In a certain sense, Hume himself opened the quest for causes of the Scottish School when he wrote in 1757:

> Is it not strange that, at a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government, even the Presence of our chief Nobility, are unhappy in our accent and Pronunciation, speak a very corrupt Dialect of the Tongue which we make use of; is it not strange, I say, that in these Circumstances, we shou'd really be the People most distinguish'd for Literature in Europe?[135]

[133] For that later part of the story, cp.: G.E. Davie, *The Democratic Intellect* (Edinburgh, 1961), a milestone in Scottish cultural history.

[134] This phrase is from Joseph de Maistre, and Nicholas Phillipson used it himself: N.P., "Towards a Definition of the Scottish Enlightenment", P. Fritz & D. Williams (Eds.), *City and Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto, 1973) pp. 125–147, here p. 125.

[135] *The Letters of David Hume*. Edited by J.Y.T. Greig. In 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932) Vol. I, p. 255.

and one could see the various acknowledgements of intellectual predecessors, made by Hume and the other members of the group, as hints at characteristics and contributing causes of the Scottish achievement. Among these hints, three stand out prominently and have received wide attention from modern scholars: (a) the methodological inspiration provided by the progress of the natural sciences, which led to the Scots' intention to become Newtons of the mind and of the moral sciences;[136] (b) the influence of the English philosophical tradition, especially Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Berkeley (of Ireland), and Butler; (c) the impact of their more immediate French predecessors, above all Montesquieu, whose name was hardly mentioned without eulogistic adjectives and, in Millar's famous formula, was linked with the Newtonian inspiration:

> The great Montesquieu pointed out the road. He was the Lord Bacon in this branch of philosophy. Dr. Smith is the Newton.[137]

The second generation of the Scottish School, notably Dugald Stewart and John Millar, instigated further discussion of "the sudden burst of genius" in Scotland.[138] They pointed to a number of causes that have kept their place in modern scholarship, four of which shall here be mentioned: to begin with, Stewart emphasized the significance of Hutcheson,[139] whose rôle as "a leader of the Scottish Enlightenment" was later followed up in the thorough researches of W.R. Scott,[140] and T.D. Campbell's recent essay "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightenment" may serve as an example of the modern scholarship on the issue.[141] A second cause, to which Stewart pointed, is the diffusion of information on the 'savages' of America, Africa, and the

[136] With respect to Hume, surveys of modern scholarly support of the Newtonian influence can be found in James Noxon, *Hume's Philosophical Development* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1975) pp. 27–33; cp.: Nicholas Capaldi, *David Hume* (Boston, 1975) p. 233.

[137] John Millar, *An Historical View of the English Government*. In 4 vols. (London, 1812) Vol. II, pp. 429–30 n.

[138] *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*. Edited by Sir William Hamilton. In XI vols. (Edinburgh, 1854–60) Vol. I, p. 551. – Henceforth quoted as "DSt".

[139] DSt, Vol. X, p. 82; also in SGE, Vol. III, pp. 269–351, here p. 334: "His [Hutcheson's] great and deserved fame, however, in this country, rests now chiefly on the traditionary history of his Academical Lectures, which appear to have contributed very powerfully to diffuse, in Scotland, that taste for analytical discussion, and that spirit of liberal inquiry, to which the world is indebted for some of the most valuable productions of the eighteenth century." – Cp.: DSt, Vol. I, p. 428.

[140] W.R. Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*. His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, 1900) = [Reprint: New York, 1966] here p. 266.

[141] In: R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (Eds.), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1982) pp. 167–185.

Australasian area.[142] Such information, derived from the narratives of travellers,[143] formed the raw material for the Scots' comparative study of social structures, a characteristic trait of the Scottish inquiry and one that was followed up by the twentieth century sociological interest in the Scots, especially by R.L. Meek.[144] – John Millar, in turn, expressed his belief that it was the Scottish Reformation and the religious strife in its wake that first aroused the Scottish spirit and the talents thus practised, led to a taste for wider philosophical inquiry (Millar, 1812, III, pp. 87 f.). This type of explanation was later echoed, in proto-Darwinian language, by Buckle and McCosh.[145] According to Millar, the excellence of Scotland's educational institutions (both schools and universities) was another vital element in the Scottish 'revival'.[146]

Modern scholars have scrutinized the movement's abovementioned efforts at self-interpretation and self-explanation; they have also looked into a number of other characteristics and their possible causes. Modern research on the Scottish philosophers really began with the social scientists' interest in the emergence of their own subjects. It soon became obvious that the story began "before Comte", to borrow from the title of an early and influential article,[147] and, on the Continent as well as in America, the Scots gained an accepted and sometimes prominent place in general historical accounts of the social sciences: Janet's

[142] DSt, Vol. X, p. 35; also in SGE, Vol. III, p. 294.

[143] For a short introduction to this field and recommendations for further reading, see: P. Smith, *The Enlightenment 1687–1776* [1934], now ed. by Crane Brinton (London & New York, 1966) pp. 140–47, 558–60.

[144] R.L. Meek, "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology" [1954], now in: R.L.M., *Economics and Ideology and other Essays* (London, 1967) pp. 34–50, especially p. 47; cp.: R.L.M., *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge, 1976).

[145] H.T. Buckle, *The History of Civilization in England*. In 2 vols. (London, 1857–61). I have used the following modern edition of the Scottish sections: H.J. Hanham (Ed.), *Buckle on Scotland and the Scottish Intellect* (Chicago & London, 1970) p. 235: "When the contest was ended, and peace was restored, the faculties which, for three generations, had been exercised in resisting the executive authority, sought other employment, and found another field in which they could disport themselves." – Cp.: James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy* (London, 1875) = [Reprint: Hildesheim, 1966] p. 21: "It could have appeared only in a time of peace and temporal prosperity, but there had been a preparation for it in the prior struggles. The stream which had risen in a higher region, and long pursued its course in ruggedness, – like the rivers of the country, – is now flowing through more level ground, and raising up plenty on its banks."

[146] Millar, 1812, Vol. III, pp. 88 f.; cp.: Macaulay who singled out the parish school act [1696] to account for the great progress of learning among the Scots: Thomas Babington, Baron Macaulay, *The History of England*. I have used an edition in 8 vols. (London, 1858–62) Vol. VII, p. 415.

[147] H.E. Barnes, "Sociology before Comte", *American Journal of Sociology* (Chicago, 1917) Vol. XXIII, pp. 174–247.

"Histoire de la Science Politique" (Paris, 1872); Dunning's "History of Political Theories" (New York, 1920); and Sombart's "Die Anfänge der Soziologie" [1923][148] may serve as examples of the French, American, and German contributions. These general books soon stimulated a number of more specialized articles and monographs on the Scots, most notably those of Lehmann, Pascal, and Bryson.[149] What these authors considered to be the distinctive Scottish achievements can here only be briefly summarised: (a) the emphasis on man's 'sociability'; (b) the account of the historical growth of different types of society – often in the form of a four stages theory – and the comparative aspects thus opened up; (c) the interest in the economic laws of any given society. With respect to this last point, the sociological interest in the Scots frequently took Marxist flavour (e.g. with Pascal and Meek), in the form of a presentation of the Scottish thinkers as forerunners of Marx's historical materialism. Looking for contributing causes of these features, the social scientists have primarily investigated the following three sets of circumstances: (a) the rapid economic growth of Scotland in the course of the eighteenth century; (b) the peculiar political vacuum in and sudden provincialism of post-Union Scotland; (c) the contrast between different stages of social development, which impressed itself most strongly upon the consciousness of the Scottish literati, as this contrast was to be felt on various levels: Highland–Lowland, Scotland–England, France–Britain, and finally, the 'primitive' New World versus civilized Europe.

To the philosophers, on the other hand, the main characteristic of the Scottish School is its emphasis on a 'moral sense'. In this respect, D.D. Raphael's admirable study[150] and the more recent contributions of T.D. Campbell and H. Jensen cover the ground well.[151] The 'aesthetic sense', a faculty capable of perceiving the beautiful and the sublime, which some of the Scots developed in analogy to the moral sense, received less detailed discussion.[152] When it is seen in this philosophical perspective,

[148] In: M. Palyi (Ed.), *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie*. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber (München & Leipzig, 1923) pp. 5–19.

[149] W.C. Lehmann, *Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology* (Chicago, 1930); Roy Pascal, "Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century", *The Modern Quarterly* (London, 1938) Vol. I, pp. 167–179; Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society*: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945) = [Reprint: New York, 1968].

[150] D.D. Raphael, *The Moral Sense* (Oxford, 1947). The work discusses Hutcheson, Hume, Price, and Reid.

[151] T.D. Campbell, *Adam Smith's Science of Morals* (London, 1971); H. Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson* (The Hague, 1971).

[152] For general accounts, see: P. Gay, *The Enlightenment*: An Interpretation. Vol. II:

at any rate, there is little in the movement that is distinctively Scottish: the debts to Shaftesbury and, through Shaftesbury, to the revival of classical learning are too obvious. Of these classical influences, the Stoic inspiration has been singled out by A.L. Macfie and D.D. Raphael.[153] In recent years, this line has received further reinforcement through the researches of the distinguished school associated with the names of Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock, as an extension of their interest in 'civic humanism' into the eighteenth century.[154] The Stoic impact on the Scots, the present writer believes, is a prominent factor,[155] but whether it really is *the* crucial aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment remains doubtful, and it seems that to overemphasize this influence could overshadow other aspects of the Scots' thinking that are more original and, perhaps, also more relevant. The note of compromise on which Pocock's paper ends is worth quoting:

> . . . a result which is predicted of further research: namely, that some aspects of Scottish social thought in the eighteenth century will continue to answer to the civic humanist paradigm, while others yield better results when treated by the jurisprudential.[156]

Some of the distinctly 'Scottish' qualities of the movement, which tend to be played down when the Scottish Enlightenment is studied as one of the 'Machiavellian moments', are captured by the social historians. We cannot here do justice to the numerous individual contributions of Clive, Trevor-Roper, Smout, Phillipson, Chitnis, R.H. Campbell, Devine, and others, but we shall present a brief synthesis of their four principal findings: (a) the 'institutional' connection of the literati with the Law and the Church. It has been shown that a great proportion of the philosophers belonged to or had roots in one of these institutions.

The Science of Freedom (London, 2nd edition, 1973) pp. 290–318; Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* [1932]. I have used the English edition (Princeton, 1951) pp. 312–331.

[153] See their introduction to Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments", SGE, Vol. I, pp. 5–10; and cp.: A.L. Macfie's earlier article: "The Scottish Tradition in Economic Thought", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. II (Edinburgh, 1955) pp. 81–103, especially pp. 82, 86 ff.

[154] Cp.: *Wealth and Virtue: the Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983).

[155] I have tried to clarify some elements of this impact in my article: "Two Concepts of Morality: a Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XLV, 4 (October 1984) pp. 591–606.

[156] J.G.A. Pocock, "Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers", in: *Wealth and Virtue . . .*, op. cit., pp. 249 f.

This has opened up a number of fruitful perspectives: (1) the impact of Roman-Dutch law on their own legal thought, (2) the possible undercurrent of Scottish theology (Rutherford's very title "Lex Rex" could provide a valuable hint) in Hutcheson's later stress on 'civil liberties' and Hume's 'regular government', and finally (3) the philosophers' contribution to the shaping of Scottish law and the Church, with Lord Kames and Lord Monboddo on the bench of the Court of Session, and Robertson rising to be moderator of the general assembly; (b) the rôle of the Scottish intelligentsia (especially the lawyers among them) in the post-Union political processes; (c) the economic growth, which had often been mentioned as a correlative of the intellectual progress, has been followed up by some of Scotland's most distinguished economic historians, and the result has been to antedate the origins of the economic 'take-off' by some twenty years; (d) the middle class origin of the Scottish literati and the remarkable living conditions of Glasgow's and Edinburgh's middle classes (such things as the rubbing of shoulders with all other classes in the tall houses of Edinburgh with their vertical social stratification[157]) may serve as examples of the kind of question with regard to which modern historians have investigated the anecdotal accounts of Graham and others.[158]

When one has considered the researches of the social scientists, philosophers, and historians in groups, three individual scholars deserve to be singled out, men, whose contributions I have found most perceptive and productive: Duncan Forbes, George Davie, and Andrew Skinner. In all brevity, then, I would say that I consider that the lasting achievement of Duncan Forbes, with respect to the Scottish Enlightenment, consists of the following three points: (a) his clarification of the Scots' 'scientific Whiggism', which freed their political views from the thick layers of prejudice and misunderstanding;[159] (b) his emphasis on 'the progress of society' as the central idea of the Scots, showing at once their unity on this point and their diversity within this unity: ". . . the idea of social progress meant different things in all of them, when it was seen in the light of their respective systems, the differences being at times a matter of subtle nuance" (Forbes, 1975, p. xi); (c) his more

[157] Cp.: William Ferguson, *History of Scotland, 1689–today* (Edinburgh, 1968) p. 86.

[158] H.G. Graham, *Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1901); cp.: Alexander Carlyle, *Autobiography* (Edinburgh, 1860).

[159] The early version of this thesis: "'Scientific Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar", *The Cambridge Journal*, Vol. VII (1954) pp. 643–670, grew into more detailed applications of it to Hume: D.F., *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge, 1975), and to Smith: D.F., "Sceptical Whiggism, Commerce, and Liberty", A.S. Skinner & T. Wilson (Eds.), *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 179–201.

recent thesis that the Scots' accomplishments have to be seen in the light of an even larger but unfulfilled intention, namely to build a new system of natural law on "more solid, truly empirical foundations."[160] With regard to George Davie's researches on the Scottish Enlightenment, I also wish to single out three points: (a) the evidence he put forward with respect to Berkeley's impact on the emerging Scottish School;[161] (b) his vision of the Scottish Enlightenment as a public-spirited intellectual élite in a backward country answering the timely question: "How could backward Scotland possibly prosper?"[162] by pointing to Scotland's asset of an educational system far ahead of its time;[163] (c) the literati's rôle in the shaping of the 'generalist' tradition of University teaching, best expressed in Davie's own title "The Democratic Intellect", which defines an important Scottish contribution to our 'Weltkultur'. The question, as Davie formulates it, is no longer whether a consideration is Scottish, but whether things that matter for the future of Western civilisation will continue to exist. In the case of Andrew Skinner, too, I can only mention some accomplishments: (a) his editorial and critical work on Sir James Steuart, showing that, in crucial aspects, Steuart is in line with the main members of the Scottish movement;[164] (b) his early attempt to characterize the movement in terms of method, analysis, conclusions and wider implications;[165] (c) his emphasis on Adam Smith's *system* of social science, providing a unified vision of Smith's work which incorporates the three principal aspects: ethics, jurisprudence, and economics, as well as the 'side-subjects' of Smith's genius.[166]

[160] D. Forbes, "Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment", R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (Eds.), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1982) pp. 186–204, here p. 193. – To some extent, this program has been followed up independently by Knud Haakonssen: *The Science of a Legislator* (Cambridge, 1981).

[161] Cp. G.E. Davie, "Berkeley's Impact on Scottish Philosophers", *Philosophy*. Vol. XL (1965) pp. 222–234; and his recent: "Berkeley, Hume, and the Central Problem of Scottish Philosophy", *McGill Hume Studies*. Ed. by D.F. Norton and others (San Diego, 1979) pp. 43–62.

[162] G.E. Davie, "Anglophobe and Anglophil", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 291–302, here p. 295.

[163] G.E. Davie, "Hume, Reid, and the Passion of Ideas", *Edinburgh in the Age of Reason* (Edinburgh, 1967) pp. 23–39, here pp. 33 f.

[164] Sir James Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*. In 2 vols. Edited by A.S. Skinner (Edinburgh, 1966); A.S. Skinner, "Sir James Steuart: Economics and Politics", "Money and Prices: A Critique of the Quantity Theory", "Sir James Steuart: Author of a System", all in *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. IX, XIV, and XXVIII respectively.

[165] A.S. Skinner, "Economics and History – The Scottish Enlightenment", Scottish Journal of Political Economy (1965) Vol. XII, pp. 1–22.

[166] A.S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science*. Papers relating to Adam Smith (Oxford, 1979).

(E) THE RÔLE OF NEWTON

Given the overall task of the present study, to establish beyond doubt a strong influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hegel, the Newtonian inspiration behind the achievements of the Scottish philosophers (see above, p. 32) opens up a problem that needs to be discussed here: can Hegel's well-known "thirty-year polemic against Newton"[167] be reconciled with the Scots' admiration of and sympathy for the great scientist? In order to answer this question adequately, it is first of all necessary to introduce some further details of the reception of Newton on the part of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel respectively. How far did Newton's influence on the Scottish thinkers really go? And what were the motives and methodological implications of Hegel's criticism of Newton? Only when these issues have been settled can it be decided whether Hegel was really being inconsistent when he took the Scottish Enlightenment seriously in so many respects, while also polemicizing against Newtonianism in so many fields: mechanics, optics, etc.

In order to document the fact that the Scottish philosophers under consideration shared, to a large extent, the 'deification' of Newton – "the adjectives 'divine' and 'immortal' became practically compulsory"[168] – that was initiated by Voltaire,[169] it is sufficient to quote from Hume's "History of England":

> In Newton this island may boast of having produced the greatest and rarest genius that ever rose for the ornament and instruction of the species . . . he was, from these causes [caution, modesty, superior genius], long unknown to the world; but his reputation at last broke out with a lustre, which scarcely any writer, during his own lifetime, had ever before attained. (DHH2, p. 871)

The subtitle of Hume's "Treatise": 'An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects' may also serve as an example of the Scots' ambition to become Newtons in the study of man and society. In spite of such generous glorification of Newton by the Scottish philosophers, it is by no means certain that they knew Newton's own works intimately. Of course, there were eminent Newtonian pioneers in contemporary Scotland, e.g. David Gregory (1661–1708; pro-

[167] H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development II: Night Thoughts (Jena 1801–1806)* (Oxford, 1983) p. xxxi.

[168] Peter Gay (1973) II, p. 131.

[169] F.M.A. de Voltaire, *Elements de la philosophie de Newton* (London, 1738).

fessor of mathematics at Edinburgh University from 1683, he started lecturing on Newton's "Principia" soon after its publication) and Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746; professor of mathematics at Edinburgh University from 1725 and a personal friend and protégé of Newton). An intimate acquaintance with Newton's achievement is also evident in the writings of the scientists directly belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment, e.g. in the contributions of William Cullen (1710–1790) and Joseph Black (1728–1799) to chemistry, of James Hutton (1726–1796) to geology, and of John Brown (1735–1788) to medicine.[170] But when we turn to those who are credited with applying Newton's ideas to the areas of the human mind and the social structure, in other words, to the leading and central thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, the evidence becomes thin and points in the opposite direction. With respect to Hume, the question has recently been investigated by James Noxon, who doubts "that Hume had mathematics enough to read the 'Principia', if 'reading' includes following the geometrical demonstrations."[171] Characteristically, Hume's single reference to Newton in the "Treatise" is an indirect one, he speaks of "Newtonian philosophy."[172] Even in the case of Adam Smith, whose essay on "The History of Astronomy" displays an extensive knowledge of the relevant literature, W.P.D. Wightman finds it "doubtful whether he [Smith] had ever studied the 'Principia'."[173] It is more probable that he (and Hume) derived his knowledge of Newton from indirect sources. 'Newtonian' rather than 'Newton's' ideas – a qualifying substitution that seems necessary in the light of the above assessment – may still have exerted a strong influence on Scottish philosophy.

But when we search Hume's philosophy for the main features of Newtonian science (the calculus, the nature of colour, the law of gravity), the results, on the surface, are rather disappointing. To the principal achievement of Newtonian science: the subjection of empirical data to mathematical analysis and the resulting mastery of physical problems, for example, no analogy can be found in Hume's writings which are "as unmathematical as Ovid's 'Metamorphoses'."[174] A consideration of the writings of Adam Smith, though the evidence of his "Essays on Philosophical Subjects" (SGE, III) shows him to be better

[170] For a survey of the scientific achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment, see: A.C. Chitnis, *The Scottish Enlightenment* (London, 1976) pp. 124–194.

[171] James Noxon, Hume's Philosophical Development (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1975) p. 69.

[172] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888) p. 639 – henceforth quoted as "Treatise"

[173] In the introduction to his critical edition of Smith's essays, SGE, Vol. III, p. 21.

[174] J. Noxon (1975) p 112

informed, especially in the field of astronomy, yields similar results. Of course, this is not the whole story, for when we leave the contents of Newtonian science and turn to its wider methodological implications, more specific correspondences between Newtonianism and Scottish philosophy are detectable. With regard to David Hume, these correspondences have been the subject of a number of thorough examinations, most notably by James Noxon and Nicholas Capaldi,[175] and the following clarification of these parallels builds on their results. Most important is the analogy between Newton's law of attraction or gravity and Hume's principle of the association of ideas. In a revealing passage from the "Treatise", Hume seems to be suggesting this analogy himself – "Here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms" ("Treatise", op. cit., pp. 12 f) – and his suggestion has not been overlooked by such Hume scholars as John Passmore and T.E. Jessop.[176] Newton's law of gravity is a fruit of his methodological principle of parsimony or simplicity, as it is formulated at the beginning of book III of the "Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica":

> We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for nature is pleased with simplicity and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.[177]

In order to explain how isolated bodies are related to each other, the general law of gravitation or attraction is, according to Newton, sufficient in the sense that any further 'causes' are not required and would, indeed, appear superfluous. According to N. Capaldi, Hume's notion of association has the same function: "The principles of association are Hume's great theory or general principle in terms of which he hoped to explain everything."[178] In this interpretation, Hume's principle is used like a "comprehensive law"[179] in order "to account for the formation of

[175] J. Noxon (1975); Nicholas Capaldi, *David Hume* (Boston, 1975).
[176] John Passmore, *Hume's Intentions* (Cambridge, 1952) especially p. 43; T.E. Jessop, "Some misunderstandings of Hume", V.C. Chappel (Ed.), *Hume* (London, 1968) pp. 46 f.
[177] Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (London, 1687). I have used the German edition: *Mathematische Prinzipien der Naturlehre*, edited by J. Ph. Wolfers (Berlin, 1872). The English translation is quoted from N. Capaldi (1975) p. 61.
[178] N. Capaldi (1975) p. 67.
[179] T.E. Jessop (1968) p. 47

complex ideas, and to explain the mechanics of emotions in general and, in particular, of the sympathetic response which is fundamental to the moral theory of the third book [of Hume's 'Treatise']."[180] Capaldi's belief that Hume's principle of association succeeds in explaining the mental world and in providing a basis for his moral theory, could be confronted with the conviction of Norman Kemp Smith that Hume's explanation has many "loose ends"[181], but this dispute is largely irrelevant to the purposes of the present study. What matters, however, is that Hume soon had second thoughts about the Newtonian intentions of his "Treatise". The most obvious sign of Hume's change of mind is the fact that the principle of association has lost its crucial rôle in the "Enquiries," a fact that has been expounded carefully by James Noxon:

> When he [Hume] wrote the 'Treatise', he hoped to derive passion and action, love, pride, compassion, benevolence, hatred, malice, resentment, and the sense of justice, obligation, law, and property from the elemental forces of pleasure and pain and the principle of association taken to be analogous to the axioms of motion and the forces of gravity. Apparently he emerged from that strenuous and disappointing exercise with the realization that in the human sciences the time was not yet ripe for a Newtonian synthesis . . . 'An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' depends upon no psychological theory of mind or emotion. It is written on the supposition that moral feelings, attitudes, and judgements constitute a distinct class of phenomena open to independent investigation. (J. Noxon, 1975, pp. 120 & 189)

Another sign of Hume's different attitude to Newtonianism is the changed function and indeed new definition of the concept of sympathy. In the "Treatise", sympathy is defined as "that propensity . . . to receive by communication . . . [the] inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to our own" ("Treatise", op. cit., p. 316). In the "Enquiries", sympathy "declines from a genuinely explanatory psychological principle to an unanalysable ('original') quality of human nature, indistinguishable from benevolence or the sentiment of humanity."[182] The questions of when and why

[180] J. Noxon (1975) p. 21.
[181] Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume* (London, 1941) p. 59.
[182] J. Noxon (1975) p. 24 – The same distinction between Hume's concepts of sympathy is made by D.G.C. Macnabb, *David Hume. His Theory of Knowledge and Morality* (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1966) p. 191.

Newtonianism became a "recessive factor"[183] of Hume's thought are complicated and go beyond the scope of the present study,[184] but the fact of Hume's departure from Newton is significant and beyond doubt. It should be noted, moreover, that this departure implies a rejection of the methodological principle of parsimony: after an early enthusiasm, Hume no longer tried to reduce the phenomena of the 'moral sciences' to a single cause.

What, then, remains of the alleged Newtonianism of the Scottish Enlightenment? The subtitle of Hume's "Treatise" that was mentioned above provides a further clue, but it needs to be deciphered: what did Hume mean by "experimental method" and its introduction into moral subjects? One of the compliments which Hume paid to Newton in his "History of England" reads as follows: "Cautious in admitting no principles but such as were founded on experiment . . ." (DHH2, p. 871) Newton's constant usage of controlling and verifying experiments has indeed been celebrated by the history of science. Newton's discovery of the nature of colour, for example, relied on a number of ingenious experiments. Newton changed the conditions of his experiments in order to isolate the phenomenon under scrutiny, and he devised, with the occasional help of Robert Hooke (the demonstrator of the Royal Society), experiments in order to test his explanations. In other words, Newton's 'experiments' were experiments in the modern scientific sense of the word or, at least, closely approaching it. But, taken in this sense, Hume's attempt to introduce Newton's method into moral subjects is anything but 'experimental'. None of Hume's so-called 'experiments' – which are, in fact, nothing but illustrations or references to his readers' experience, intended to affirm whatever theory Hume had expounded in the preceding passage – isolates the phenomenon under consideration, or falsifies his theory. As may be gathered from his introduction to the "Treatise", Hume did not even intend to imitate the exact experiments of contemporary scientists, for:

> Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. ("Treatise", op. cit., pp. xviii f.)

Rather, what Hume means by "experimental method", a conclusion

[183] N.K. Smith (1941) p. 76.
[184] Cp.: J. Noxon (1975) pp. 16–26; 108–123; 188–192.

equally supported by the introduction to the "Treatise" and by the lucid interpretation of Norman Kemp Smith,[185] is the provision of a solid empirical foundation for the moral subjects, an insistence on and an appeal to experience and observation, a bulwark to ward off 'a priori' speculation and, to use Hume's own formulation, those philosophers "who consulted their Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue and of Happiness, without regarding human Nature."[186] This emphasis on empirical evidence, then, is the first area of valid agreement between Newtonianism and the Scottish Enlightenment.

Secondly, the Scottish Enlightenment authors adopted the analytic/synthetic method of Newton. In order to help the comparison, Newton's own account of this method, given at the end of his "Opticks", should be quoted:

> . . . the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition . . . Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths . . . if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally . . . By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: and the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations.[187]

The same two-phase pattern (analysis/synthesis) can be discovered in the general structure of many writings of the Scottish philosophers.

[185] "Treatise", op. cit., p. xvi: ". . . the only solid foundation we can give to this science [of man] . . . must be laid on experience and observation." – N.K. Smith (1941) p. 62: ". . . for Hume, the term 'experimental' is virtually equivalent to the term 'empirical', but is a stronger term, carrying with it the suggestion of a deliberate collecting of observations, sufficient in number and more especially in variety, to serve as a reliable basis for generalization."

[186] *The Letters of David Hume*. In 2 vols., edited by J.Y.T. Greig (Oxford, 1932) Vol. I, p. 16.

[187] Isaac Newton, *Opticks, Or a Treatise of the Reflections, Inflections and Colours of Light* (London, 1704), quoted from J. Noxon (1975) pp. 63 f.

With respect to David Hume, for example, the distinction between an analytical stage, which culminates in a knowledge of the principles of human nature, and a synthetic stage, in which he intends to use the acquired knowledge of human nature to investigate more complex phenomena like the family and social life, can already be detected in the very outline of his programme, as given in the introduction to the "Treatise":

> Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. ("Treatise", op. cit., p. xvi)

With regard to Adam Smith, too, an adoption of the analytical/synthetic method is clearly perceptible in the "History of Astronomy" as the general editors of Smith's essays, D.D. Raphael and A.S. Skinner, have argued:

> . . . partly by virtue of passing in review a series of models which had a historical existence, and partly by explaining their appearance, development, and replacement by reference to a number of principles of human nature whose manifestations could be empirically verified . . . Smith's methodology would seem to conform to the requirements of the Newtonian method properly so called in that he used the techniques of analysis and synthesis in the appropriate order. (SGE, Vol. III, pp. 11 f)

Having shown that Hume and Smith followed the Newtonian pattern in two significant areas – in their evaluation of empirical evidence and in their two-phase method – the qualification must be made that, although these points were systematically expounded and clarified by Newton, they were by no means exclusively Newtonian. Within the British context, the emphasis on empirical evidence can be traced back to Bacon. With respect to the analytical/synthetic method, as modern historians of science like J.H. Randall have stressed,[188] Newton built on

[188] J.H. Randall, "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua", *JHI*, Vol. I (1940) pp. 177–206; J.H. Randall, *The School of Padua* (Padova, 1961).

the resolutive/compositive method of Galileo and the School of Padua. Moreover, Newton's indebtedness to Galileo was known to and stated by Adam Smith (SGE, III, p. 83).

Before comparing this evidence with Hegel's reception of Newton, two special aspects of Adam Smith's discussion of Newton, in his "History of Astronomy", deserve some further attention. Firstly, Smith's account of the principles behind Newtonian and, indeed, any scientific enquiry needs to be considered.[189] What, according to Smith, ultimately motivates scientific explanation is the human craving for order: at all stages of history, humanity is confronted with a mass of apparently "disjointed and discordant phaenomena of nature" (SGE, III, p. 105). This situation gives rise to a feeling of unease and discomfort, a psychological need by which human beings are impelled to find an explanation of what they perceive but are unable to account for. The perception of a chaotic reality consisting of a disconnected mass of events incoherent in themselves is painful to humanity and induces man to find the causes of individual events and to detect how individual events are interconnected. When these needs are satisfied, the human mind is at rest and its imagination a source of pleasure. All science, according to Smith, originates in this manner. The particular achievement of Newton is evaluated by Smith in accordance with these general principles. Newton is thus praised for discovering a principle (gravity) which made it possible to account for the motions of the planets, including those motions observed which, to the previous systems of astronomy, had appeared to be 'irregularities'. In more general terms, then, Newton developed a perspective which allowed humanity to perceive order behind apparent disorder, an "immense chain" (SGE, III, p. 105) rather than a disconnected mass of events. In this respect, Smith appears to have aspired to become a Newton of the social sciences, to find the laws that govern the confusing variety of economic life. Secondly, one implication of Smith's evaluation of Newton needs to be emphasized. Newton's system is admired because it satisfies the needs of human imagination, but there is no guarantee that Newton's system expounds "the real chains which Nature makes use of to bind together her several operations" (SGE, III, 105). Smith's readers are warned against confusing a convincing *account* with the objective *truth* of nature's operations and they are even induced to conclude, by Smith's presentation of a succession of theories of astronomy, that, one day, Newton's system may also be doomed and give way to another

[189] The following discussion uses the results of A.S. Skinner (1979) and Richard Olson, *Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750–1880* (Oxford, 1975).

paradigm. Thus, in spite of the "superior genius and sagacity" (SGE, III, 98) of Newton's system, his results remain hypothetical.

Although it has been shown that the simple thesis of Newton's influence on the Scottish Enlightenment has to be qualified and even corrected in various respects, areas of agreement and inspiration have remained beyond doubt. At first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile this result with Hegel's criticism of Newton. However, a closer examination of Hegel's position reveals that the differences between his and the Scottish reception of Newton are less drastic than might have been assumed at first sight; indeed, there are even a number of parallels. The basic facts of Hegel's preoccupation with Newton have long been known[190] and the recent revival of interest in Hegel's "Philosophy of Nature"[191] has led to a number of detailed examinations of the Hegel-Newton relationship.[192] As it cannot be the task of the present study to give a full account of this growing area of scholarship, a brief summary of its results, as far as they are relevant to the intended comparison with the Scottish Enlightenment, will have to suffice. Evidence for Hegel's early interest in Newton is provided by Karl Rosenkranz, who, while commenting on Hegel's first year at Jena, informs his readers of much earlier excerpts on Newton.[193] The first explicit reference to Newton in one of Hegel's own writings is to be found in the professorial dissertation or 'Habilitationsschrift' which Hegel had to submit in 1801: "De

[190] Cp.: Karl Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 151 ff; Kuno Fischer, *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre*. [1901]. In 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 3rd edition, 1963) Vol. I, pp. 235, 469 ff, 478 f, Vol. II, pp. 583, 585, 605 ff, 1129.

[191] The carefully annotated edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, in 3 vols., edited by M.J. Petry (London, 1970) was crucial in initiating this revival. Henceforth, this edition will be quoted as "MJP".

[192] Cp.: Otto Closs, *Kepler und Newton und das Problem der Gravitation in der Kantischen, Schellingschen und Hegelschen Naturphilosophie* (Heidelberg, 1908); Erhard Oeser, "Der Gegensatz von Kepler und Newton in Hegels absoluter Mechanik", *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, Vol. III (1979) pp. 69–93; M.J. Petry, "Hegels kritiek op Newton", *Wijsgerig Perspectief*, Vol. 22 (1981/1982) pp. 103–111 and his forthcoming "Hegel's Criticism of Newton", will appear in *Clio*, Vol. 12, 4 (1985); Hans-Jürgen Treder, "Hegel zu den Begriffen 'Schwere', 'Trägheit', 'Masse' und 'Kraft'", *Vom Mute des Erkennens*. Beitrage zur Philosophie G.W.F. Hegels. Ed. by M. Buhr & T.I. Oisermann (Frankfurt, 1981) pp. 204–211; Henry Paolucci, "Hegel and the Celestial Mechanics of Newton and Einstein" & M. Capek, "Hegel and the Organic View of Nature", both in: *Hegel and the Sciences*, ed. by R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, 1984) pp. 55–85 & 109–121.

[193] Rosenkranz (1844) p. 151; this evidence can now be supplemented by the data from the auction catalogue of Hegel's library according to which Hegel possessed the following Newton editions: Isaaci Newtoni, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (Amsterdam, 1714); *Optice* (London, 1719); MacLaurini, *Expositionae philosophiae Newtoniae* (Vindobonae, 1761), cp.: HBibl, p. 53, No.: 1299, 1301, 1302.

Orbitis Planetarium." From that period onward, Newtonian science remained a constant topic of Hegel's work, receiving special attention in the three editions of his "Encyclopaedia" (1817; 1827; 1830). We shall begin with a consideration of Hegel's responses to the three principal aspects of Newton's scientific achievement: (i) the laws of planetary motion; (ii) the theory of light and colours; (iii) the calculus. The 1812/13 and the 1832 editions of his "Logic" provide evidence that Hegel admired certain parts of Newton's mathematics,[194] but there can be no doubt that he rejected the first and second of Newton's discoveries. However, since the Scottish philosophers were mainly influenced by the *methodological implications* as opposed to the *contents* of Newtonian science, it is necessary to look beyond Hegel's responses to the contents and investigate the methodological and other motives behind the responses. Prior to a discussion of the methodological issues, the patriotic motive for Hegel's opposition to Newton deserves some attention. Hegel's polemic against Newton, as Rosenkranz was the first to show, displays "all the bitterness of injured patriotism" (Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 152). Two passages from the "Philosophy of Nature" make it obvious that Hegel's national pride was offended when Newtonianism "obscured the glory of Kepler", his Swabian compatriot:

> It is well known that the immortal honour of having discovered the laws of absolutely free motion belongs to Kepler. Kepler *proved* them in that he discovered the *universal* expression of the empirical data (§ 227). It has subsequently become customary to speak as if Newton were the first to have discovered the proof of these laws. The credit for a discovery has seldom been denied a man with more unjustness. (MJP, § 270 Remark, Vol. I, p. 263)

> The honour of having discovered the law of universal gravitation has been attributed to Newton, who, by catching the popular imagination, has won the greatest applause, and obscured the glory of Kepler. The Germans have often looked on impassively while the English have assumed authority in this way. (MJP, § 270 Addition, Vol. I, p. 272).

Three aspects of this motive behind Hegel's response to Newton call for comment: (a) modern historians of scientific thought confirm Hegel's views that the contemporary reaction to Kepler was too hostile,[195] and

[194] Cp.: HGW, Vol. XI, pp. 166 f.; Vol. XXI, pp. 252 f.

[195] Cp.: J. Russel, S.J., "Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion, 1609–1666", *British Journal of the History of Science*, Vol. II (1964) pp. 1–24.

that Newton's originality was overemphasized,[196] at the expense of Kepler's claim to fame,[197] by mid-eighteenth-century writers; (b) although it implied conflicting evaluations of Kepler and Newton respectively, patriotism *unites* Hegel with the Scots, whose praise of Newton contains as much national pride, a fact documented by Hume's assessment: "In Newton *this island may boast* of having produced the greatest and rarest genius that ever rose for the ornament and instruction of the species" (DHH2, p. 871, my own emphasis, N.W.); (c) as patriotism was a contributing factor in Hegel's revaluation of the Kepler–Newton relationship, it may also have influenced – in this case reinforced by personal friendship – Hegel's preference of Goethe's over Newton's theory of light and colour.

Of course, beside such patriotic and personal motives, there are other causes for Hegel's responses to Newton. The most important of these causes, and one that is vitally connected with a profound assumption of Hegel's philosophy, relates to the conception of matter. According to Newton, planetary motion can be accounted for by means of two types of motion: fall and impulse, caused by two distinct forces (centripetal and centrifugal). On the one hand, planets move like apples that fall to the ground (centripetal force); on the other hand, planets fly outwards like stones swung in a sling (centrifugal force). In planetary motion both types of motion are said to co-operate in the following manner: they increase and decrease their magnitude in proportion to their respective distance from the sun, an explanation that distinguishes the spheres of perihelion (close to the sun) and aphelion (remote from the sun). According to Newton, though he does not pretend to know how, the centrifugal force springs directly from God, whereas the immediate source of the centripetal force is matter itself, which, in turn, is also created by God.[198] Hegel criticizes this distinction between centripetal and centrifugal forces as "a product of abstractive reflection . . . which fails to get to the bottom of things" (MJP, § 266 Remark and § 270

[196] In his summary of developmental studies of Newton, Preserved Smith concludes, *A History of Modern Culture*, in 2 vols., with an introduction by Crane Brinton (New York & London, 1962) Vol. II, p. 40: ". . . the reading of Kepler's *Optics* opened his [Newton's] mind to the wonders of physics. The acquisition of this book was the crucial date in his development. From the German scientist, whose influence over him can hardly be exaggerated, he obtained the starting-point for his investigations . . ."

[197] Adam Smith's comment that the " . . . generous and magnificent Dane [Tycho Brahe] invited the *obscure* and *indigent* Kepler . . ." (SGE, Vol. III, p. 85, my own emphasis; N.W.) provides a suitable example of this tendency.

[198] For scientific discussions of Newton's conception of matter, see: A.J. Snow, *Matter and Gravity in Newton's Physical Philosophy* (Oxford, 1926); A.R. and M.B. Hall, "Newton's Theory of Matter", *Isis* (1960) pp. 131–144.

Remark, Vol. I, pp. 250 and 269). To him, it is a distortion to conceive of the two forces as 'distinct and independent, as existing *outside* one another and influencing independently, and as only meeting contingently and externally in their effects" (MJP, § 270 Remark, Vol. I, p. 266). The underlying assumption is a conception of matter that differs radically from Newton's, as H.S. Harris has spelt out convincingly:

> Newton seeks to explain an organism with mechanical assumptions, and is therefore driven to ascribe the force of gravity and the origin of the mysterious centrifugal force to a God of whose creative activity he can give no account. The mechanical approach assumes that matter is an inert 'stuff' to which contrary impulses are somehow imparted. Instead, Hegel thinks, we must assume that the contrary impulses that God is said to have imparted to matter, really express the nature of matter. We must conceive matter itself as a unity of opposite forces. Only on *this* assumption can we construct a properly *physical* theory." (H.S. Harris, 1983, p. 85)

Thus, Hegel's views on this issue go back to and extend the Aristotelian conception of matter, a topic beyond the scope of the present study, and they are also linked with what was to become one of the cornerstones of his dialectic: the identity of opposites. This connection becomes obvious in one of the Latin theses which Hegel wrote at the time of his first explicit discussion of Newton ("De Orbitis Planetarum", 1801): "Contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi."[199] As opposed to Newton, who posited two *independent* forces, Hegel conceived that tensions and conflicts belong to the essence of matter as well as of human life. And yet, according to Hegel, the contradiction is never absolute: as the tensions of human life can be reconciled eventually, the tension of the apparently independent centripetal and centrifugal forces is united in planetary motion. This response to Newton is uniquely Hegelian and no corresponding doctrine is to be found in the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment.

However, a number of significant parallels can be found between Hegel and the Scottish philosophers when those specific methodological issues are considered in which, as has been shown, the Scots were stimulated by a tradition of scientific thought that they labelled 'Newtonian'. To claim that Hegel shared the Scots' *insistence on empirical*

[199] G.W.F. Hegel, *Dissertationi philosophicae de orbitis planetarum praemissae theses* (Jena, 1801). Now accessible and quoted from Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 156–159, here: Thesis I, p. 156.

evidence touches upon a fiercely contested battleground of Hegelian and anti-Hegelian literature. The wider implications of this dispute cannot here be entered, though it seems beyond doubt that Hegel appreciated the value of experience and empirical evidence, but resisted the temptation of treating it as the exclusive source of truth about reality.[200] In the present context, it is sufficient to ward off the polemic that Hegel's views on astronomy deny empirical evidence by means of 'a priori' speculations.[201] Towards the end of his professorial dissertation ("De orbitis planetarum"), where he discusses the distances between the planets and of the planets from the sun, Hegel seems an easy target for such charges. Contemporary astronomers like J.D. Titius (1729–1796) and J.E. Bode (1747–1826) had tried to express the proportional distances of the planets from the sun in terms of an arithmetical progression according to which Mercury corresponded to 4, Venus to 7, Earth to 10, Mars to 16, Jupiter to 52, Saturn to 100, and Uranus to 196. The considerable distance between Mars and Jupiter induced many astronomers to search for a planet to fill the gap. As Hegel disapproved of Bodes' arithmetical series – which did, indeed, become obsolete with the discovery of other planets (e.g. Neptune in 1846)[202] – he suggested, perhaps with some irony, that one might consider the numerical sequence mentioned in Plato's "Timaeus" as an alternative. Plato's sequence of numbers took account of all planets known to the eighteenth century and did not leave a gap to be filled with hypothetical planets. However, by the time Hegel underwent the various stages of his 'Habilitation' (August–October 1801), the Italian astronomer Giuseppe Piazzi

[200] Cp.: J.N. Findlay, *Hegel – A Re-Examination* (London, 1958) p. 348: . . . despite much opinion to the contrary, Hegel's philosophy is one of the most anti-metaphysical of philosophical systems, one that *remains* most within the pale of ordinary experience . . ."; Duncan Forbes in HBN, p. xiii: ". . . the philosophy of the Absolute is absolutely open to experience . . . as empirical as any empiricist should wish . . . but sense experience, in itself and as such, cannot be the full truth about reality, and if one tries to make it so, the result is self-contradiction . . . nevertheless all the rungs on the ladder of experience which ends with philosophy are rungs *in* the ladder of philosophy, and that means that they are in themselves perfectly valid, necessary aspects of truth.

An exposition of the opposing view can be found in Prof. A.R. Manser's forthcoming review of *Hegel and the Sciences*, op cit. I am grateful to Prof. Manser for making his article available to me.

[201] In his forthcoming article "Metaphysik in den Naturwissenschaften", will appear in *Natur und Subjektivität*. Ed. by R. Heckmann et al., Wolfgang Neuser defends Hegel's position in greater detail.

[202] For an assessment of Bode's "law" by modern scientists, see: Hannes Alfvén & Gustaf Arrhenius, *Evolution of the Solar System* (Washington, D.C., 1976) chapter 2.6, p. 33, where further references can be found.

(1746–1826) had discovered (in January 1801) the large asteroid 'Ceres', which appeared to fit into the gap of Bode's scheme. The fact that Piazzi's discovery antedated Hegel's 'Habilitation' by seven to nine months gave rise to much gloating among Hegel's enemies, who claimed that Hegel denied or interpreted away the existence of the recently discovered asteroid.[203] The truth of the matter is, of course, that Hegel, in August 1801, had not yet learnt of Piazzi's discovery. Indeed, as the researches of M.J. Petry suggest, he cannot even be blamed for paying insufficient attention to the observations of Piazzi, for the Italian astronomer only published his findings in August 1801 and early 1802.[204] Far from concealing this evidence when he had learnt of it, Hegel, it appears, helped to spread the discovery of 'Ceres': according to Rosenkranz, Hegel's lectures at the University of Jena already contained a reference to 'Ceres',[205] and, in the first edition of his "Encyclopaedia", Hegel duly corrected his former views on the proportional distances of the planets from the sun:

> What I have tried to do in an earlier dissertation, I can no longer regard as satisfactory[206]

an example of his commitment to revising his philosophical system in the light of fresh evidence. Moreover, Hegel's opponents failed to realize the true status of his argument: his reference to the arithmetical series of Plato's "Timaeus" is no dogmatic assertion against empirical evidence, but simply a hypothetical explanation of the facts that were known at the time. That his hypothesis was refuted by the discovery of 'Ceres' – and later of 'Pallas' (1802), 'Juno' (1804), and 'Vesta' (1807) –

[203] H.E.G. Paulus, for example, thought it proper to ridicule the deceased Hegel, his former friend, in this manner: *Entdeckungen über die Entdeckungen der neuesten Philosophen* (Bremen, 1835) pp. 23 ff.

[204] Giuseppe Piazzi, *Risultati delle osservazioni della nuova stella scoperta il primo gennajo 1801* (Palermo, August 1801) and *Della scoperta del nuova pianeta Cerere Ferdinandea* (Palermo, 1802); cp.: MJP, Vol. I, pp. 370 f. In his recent investigation: "Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zu Hegels Planetenschrift", *Hegel-Studien*, Vol. XVIII (1984) pp. 65–137, T.G. Bucher comes to a different result. I cannot here enter into a full-length critique of Bucher's article, but the fact that he neither mentions Piazzi's own writings nor Prof. Petry's seminal research does not inspire much confidence in his work.

[205] Karl Rosenkranz (1844) p. 155. In my reading of Hegel's later Jena lectures – the best and most complete edition is HGW, Vols. VI, VII, VIII – I have not come across a reference to 'Ceres', but Rosenkranz was able to consult manuscripts that have been lost since then.

[206] G.W.F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Heidelberg, 1817) § 224, p. 159.

cannot be held against Hegel, since it is the nature of hypotheses to be subjected to trial and error. Even though Hegel's hypothesis was soon outdated, it was, when it first appeared, more cautious and more in line with the results of contemporary observation than the astronomers' intuitive search for planets. "The vanity," to sum up the issue with Karl Rosenkranz, "of wanting to know and possess in speculation something different from what has to be known empirically, never entered Hegel's mind" (1844, p. 155).

A comparison of the Scot's adoption of the Newtonian-inspired method of analysis and synthesis with Hegel's methodology has to clear up, first of all, a possible misunderstanding of § 270 of the "Philosophy of Nature". The distinction drawn between Kepler and Newton in this paragraph (MJP, Vol. I, pp. 263 ff) implies not only Hegel's view that Newton followed the analytical method, whereas Kepler used the synthetic method, it also expressed great admiration for Kepler ("immortal honour"; ibid., p. 263) and sharp criticism of Newton ("perverts the truth"; ibid., p. 269). The passage could thus be read as a one-sided option for the synthetic method. However, as soon as one turns to Hegel's systematic discussions of the methods of cognition,[207] it becomes obvious that he not only accepts the validity of both methodological approaches, but even constructs his "absolute method" as a combination of the analytical and synthetic procedures (TWA, Vol. VI, p. 557). Moreover, Hegel's combination of the two approaches is not restricted to his general discussion of methodology. In a recent article,[208] M.J. Petry analyses Hegel's method "with reference to Hegel's famous defence of Goethe's theory of colours"[209] and establishes beyond doubt that, in spite of his criticism of Newton, the structure of Hegel's arguments contains an analytical as well as a synthetic stage.[210] In this manner, Petry's detailed examination of Hegel's method at work confirms his earlier conclusion on Hegel's approach to the issues of the philosophy of nature.[211]

[207] TWA: Vol. VI, pp. 502–541; Vol. VIII, §§ 226–231, pp. 379–385.

[208] M.J. Petry, "Hegel's Criticism of the Ethics of Kant and Fichte", in: L.S. Stepelevich & David Lamb (Eds.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Action* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983) pp. 125–136.

[209] Petry (1983) p. 131.

[210] Petry (1983) pp. 132 f.

[211] MJP, Vol. I, p. 114: "For Hegel . . . the Idea of Nature involves a combination of the Baconian and the Boehmian attitudes to natural phenomena. Despite the searching criticism of Newtonian mechanics and optics contained in these lectures [sc.: the lectures of the philosophy of nature], the *basic* inspiration of the work may therefore be regarded as differing little, if at all, from that of the 'Principia Mathematica'."

Finally, Hegel's position may be compared with the two special aspects of Adam Smith's discussion of Newton that were outlined above (p. 45). Of Newton's greatest discoveries, the calculus is the only one for which Hegel felt genuine admiration. Characteristically, Hegel never disputed Newton's priority over Leibniz,[212] though he must have known of the controversy. But Hegel warned against confusing the mathematical account with the physical reality of the phenomena under consideration (MJP, Vol. I, p. 250). Although that warning may not have been entirely fair to Newton,[213] it implies the very point which Adam Smith emphasized, namely the strictly hypothetical character of Newton's mathematical solutions. A comparison of the psychological motives which Smith perceived to be at work in economic analysis with Hegel's views on the issue reveals a further, highly suggestive parallel. What Smith considered as the ultimate stimulus that Newton's work on planetary motion gave to his own enterprise of creating the *science* of economics: the determination to find the laws behind a mass of apparently irregular phenomena, is exactly what Hegel admires about modern (Smithian) political economy; indeed, the parallel to astronomical inquiry is repeated by Hegel: both sciences detect the inherent rationality, the '*cosmos*' in what appeared to be '*chaos*':[214]

> Its development [sc.: of political economy] affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it."(TMK, §189, pp. 126 f)

> . . . this medley of arbitrariness generates universal characteristics by its own working; and this apparently scattered and thoughtless sphere is upheld by a necessity which automatically enters it. To discover this necessary element here is the object of political economy, a science which is a credit to thought because it finds laws for a mass of accidents . . . it has a parallel in the solar system which displays to

[212] Cp.: MJP, Vol. I: pp. 250, 265, 272 and see Petry's notes: ibid., pp. 329 f., 351 f., 362 f.)

[213] Though Newton tended to disregard the distinction between the mathematical representations and the physical problems when he entered his subject matter, a mistake made more obviously by later Newtonians, he did draw the distinction himself in an early methodological section of his "Principia", Def. 8.

[214] Cp.: Ludwig Siep's forthcoming "Hegels Theorie der Gewaltenteilung", in: Hans-Christian Lucas & Otto Pöggeler (Eds.), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1986). Prof. Siep argues convincingly that Hegel's views ought to be seen as a conscious revision of the ancient correspondence between 'cosmos' and 'polis'.

the eye only irregular movements, though its laws may none the less be ascertained.[215]

The reception of Newton by Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment respectively, it may finally be concluded, is no obstacle to the ultimate thesis of the present study.

(F) THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

> . . . if one is to learn from the study of an old battle or campaign, one must recreate its every detail with the utmost care and precision, no matter that the uniform, weapons, formations and tactics are wholly outmoded and 'irrelevant'. Failure to account for any of these 'irrelevant' matters may make a useless nonsense of the whole.[216]

Considering that the ultimate task and the very title of the present study is "The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'", some of the subject matter dealt with, e.g. the bibliographical work on contemporary German translations and reviews of the Scottish movement may appear too preparatory, as if stuck in the 'Hilfswissenschaften'. It has to be admitted that the present study has a somewhat 'pyramidal' structure, starting with the very wide topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany, then moving on to the smaller but still considerable issue – interwoven as it is with the more general biographical Hegel research – of Hegel's contacts with Scottish philosophy, and culminating in quite specific points of Hegel's political philosophy: such as the division of labour. The most obvious reason for this structure is that much of the necessary 'groundwork', which is essential if one wants to get to the bottom of any intellectual influence, has not yet been dealt with satisfactorily. And if these foundations of the present study are rather wide for its more specific later purposes, it is hoped that they will also be helpful to other scholars approaching these fundamental problems from other angles and with different purposes. Another conviction inducing the present writer to opt for the 'pyramidal' approach is that

[215] Although this quotation is taken from Gans' addition to §189 (TMK p. 268), it has been confirmed by the edition of von Griesheim's lecture notes: VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 486 f.
[216] Duncan Forbes, *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge, 1975) p. viii.

writers on political theory and philosophy are often too light-minded with regard to the allegedly 'petty' details. If, for example, the finances of the canton Berne mattered for Hegel, surely they must also concern the modern historian of Hegel's thought, no matter how 'irrelevant' such details may be for other purposes. In the present study, therefore, an attempt has been made to provide a solid empirical foundation – with respect to the general availability of the materials in Germany (chapter two and 3 bibliographical appendices) and to Hegel's contacts with these materials (chapter three and 2 bibliographical appendices) – before entering the more speculative discussion of specific influences. Among the numerous specific aspects of the relationship between the Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's political philosophy that could have been investigated, the following three have been selected for being both promising and highly relevant: (a) the principal elements – such as needs, labour, exchange – of Hegel's economic model (chapter four); (b) Hegel's stand on the liberalism-interventionism issue (chapter five). More precisely, a consideration of (1) the flaws to which, according to Hegel, the 'liberal' economic model is prone, if left alone, and (2) of the interventionist measures by which Hegel intends to remedy these problems; (c) the operation of the model, problems, and remedies are then exemplified with regard to the division of labour, an acute issue because of the question of 'alienation' that lurks in the background of it (chapter six). The conclusion sums up the evidence presented and points to research areas that have thus been opened up.

CHAPTER TWO

The Scottish Enlightenment in Germany – Stages of Reception

The aim of the present chapter is to document and analyse some crucial elements of the general influence of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany. An overall account of the reception of Scottish thought in Germany would be a full-blown topic in its own right and cannot be given here,[1] but a number of aspects of this reception can be dealt with briefly: (A) the contemporary translations; (B) the reviews; (C) the popularizations; (D) the impact on teaching. Although these aspects may be no more than case studies, their choice is not arbitrary: taken together, they provide an outline of the increasingly strong influence of the Scottish authors. Needless to say, not every book occurs at each level, and often, the four stages overlap chronologically, but, by and large, they constitute a valid pattern. In conclusion, this pattern is then complemented by examples of the contacts which eminent individual thinkers had with Scottish philosophy. Thus, a wider framework for Hegel's intellectual contacts with Scottish social philosophy may be provided. The three initial sections (A), (B), and (C) consist of evaluations of the actual data collected and should be read side by side with the bibliographical appendices I–III.

(A) EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN TRANSLATIONS OF THE WRITINGS OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT[2]

Although certain German journals and indeed some individual members of the scholarly community – for examples see sections (B) and (E)

[1] An important example of the aspects that had to be excluded is the direct communication as documented in the records of German visitors to Scotland (e.g.: Johann Albert Heinrich Reimarus) and of Scottish visitors to Germany (e.g.: Sir James Steuart).

[2] The original compilation of data was done using the facilities of the Computing Service, University of Cambridge. My thanks are due to Mr. S.J. Love (Department of Computer Science), who kindly helped me to solve my frequent problems. I should also

respectively – paid attention to the writings of the Scottish Literati when they were first published in the original English, a wider reception was not possible before the texts were available in German translations. It is thus appropriate to start the present account with a survey and evaluation of the contemporary translations. By documenting how quickly and how widely the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment were translated into German, the following bibliography (Appendix I) adds further support to the reputation which the Scottish Enlightenment has gained over the last two or three decades as a movement of European significance. It also shows that the present fame of Scottish philosophy has to be seen as the rehabilitation of an insight which the Germany of the Goethe and Hegel period had already achieved.

I. *Method and Procedure*

It may not be out of place to explain the method and procedure followed in compiling the following bibliographical data. The first problem consisted in the choice of Scottish Enlightenment authors. To include the major representatives of the movement (Hutcheson, Hume, Kames, Smith, and Ferguson) was of course obvious, but where was one to draw the line between so-called 'minor' figures that were still to be included and those who were neither sufficiently original nor important to justify swelling the list? Considerations of space, of the relative significance of the writers, and of Hegel's knowledge of the movement, led to the selection of the following fourteen figures: Beattie, Blair, Burnet (Lord Monboddo), Ferguson, Home (Lord Kames), Hume, Hutcheson, Millar, Oswald, Reid, Robertson, Smith, Sir James Steuart, and Dugald Stewart. To these eminent Scots, Abraham Tucker (alias Edward Search) has been added because of Hegel's (mistaken!) reference to him in his section on Scottish philosophy.[3] In this choice of authors, as in any other, there remains an element of compromise and even arbitrariness, but the scope should be sufficiently wide to provide the basis for further research into this area of eighteenth-century cultural links between Britain and Germany. All contemporary translations that have been found of the writings of these fifteen thinkers have been listed. 'Contemporary' has been defined quite broadly in this context: all translations

---

like to acknowledge the help of Prof. Dr. H.C. Recktenwald (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg); Frau Ewald (Librarian, Philosophical Institute, Ruhr University of Bochum); and the University Libraries of Leipzig, Vienna, Copenhagen, and Bern.

[3] TWA, Vol. XX, p. 285; for details, see below: chapter three, section C, III.

that appeared up to 1831, the year of Hegel's death, have been included.

Although, by a process of checking and cross-examination, a bibliographer can erase many mistakes, the correctness of his findings will ultimately depend on his sources and the use he made of their respective data. The sources are listed below (Appendix I, C), but a brief evaluation of them and a description of the method used may here be appropriate. The first step consisted in compiling the relevant material from Heinsius (three consecutive editions) and Kayser. Heinsius, a leading figure in the book trade, decided to help his business colleagues by providing, for the first time in Germany, a printed catalogue of all available books. With this intention he got in touch with the major publishers throughout Germany. The demand for such a catalogue must have been great, and the commercial interest of being included in this general catalogue certainly provided the publishers with a further incentive to respond. But, whatever their motives may have been, judging from the result rather than from Heinsius' complaint about poor correspondents (in his preface), he got the replies he needed and the catalogues – published in 1793, 1798, and 1812 – must be described as a major achievement. Kayser basically followed the same pattern, included books beyond the period covered by Heinsius, and was able to correct and improve upon his predecessor's data. As a result, his catalogue is better than the earlier one, but not to the extent of justifying the scientific airs displayed in his preface and his frowning on the petty bookseller [Heinsius]. As many of the translations recorded have become rare and are difficult to trace in German libraries, the data provided by Heinsius and Kayser are indispensable. On the other hand, the information given bears the stamp of the book-trade: titles are drastically shortened, translators and other details are often omitted, and, most important, one edition of one translation was normally considered sufficient (though there were, at times, several editions of various translations). In order to deal with these difficulties, I extended and corrected my compilation from Heinsius and Kayser with the help of several specialist sources (Ersch, Jessop, Lehmann, Recktenwald, Chamley) and the Prices' general work of reference.[4] For a further check and in order to complete the shortened titles and to supply other

[4] The latter deserves special praise: in spite of occasional mistakes [e.g.: the 'Witchcraft' essay is not by Hutcheson, but by Hutchinson; it was not James Oswald of Dunnikier (1715–1769) who wrote an 'Appeal to Common Sense', but James Oswald of Dunnet and Methven (1703–1793)], insufficient attention to second and later editions, and some arbitrariness in scope [the writings of Sir James Steuart are not considered 'Humaniora'], their work is still excellent.

missing data, such reliable catalogues as BM 1 + 2, BLC, and NUC were then consulted. With regard to the identification of anonymous translators, the DAL was found helpful. Finally, various individuals and libraries were asked to clarify remaining difficulties (compare note 1); the libraries at Bochum, Leipzig, and Hanover were particularly helpful in this respect. There remain some question-marks and, no doubt, other corrections will become necessary, but most of the data is sufficiently reliable to allow the following conclusions.

II. *Evaluation*

One reaction which immediately arises from any consideration of the bibliography is surprise at the enormous number of translations. Not only the important works, but even comparatively 'minor' ones, were soon available in German translations. The frequent re-publications and the occasional re-translations of the Scots' writings underline this impression of the wide-spread fame and popularity of the Scottish writers in Germany. By eighteenth century standards, the German translations appeared remarkably quickly: the average period between the publication of the original and the translation being about 8.5 years. And even that figure is somewhat misleading as it is considerably augmented by half a dozen writings like Hume's "Treatise" (its belated recognition in Britain was thus echoed in Germany) and Robertson's "Christ" (which was translated only after the major histories had made the author famous). If that half-dozen special cases is excluded from the calculation, an average of 3.8 years is reached. Another conclusion that may be drawn from the chronology of the translations is the fact that the process of translating and publishing the Scottish writings really took off in the 1760s and 1770s. Hutcheson's "Inquiry" [1725], for example, did not appear in German translation for 37 years; whereas the translations of Ferguson's "ECHS" [1767], Millar's "Ranks" [1771], and Smith's "WN" [1776] all appeared within one year of their original publication. As regards the order in which the translations were published, it was Hume ["Enquiries" 1755 and "Essays" 1756], Hutcheson ["System" 1756], Home ["Essay" 1756 and "Elements" 1763], and Robertson ["Scotl." 1762] who took the lead.

With regard to the translators and the standards of their work, the following observations can be made: our list includes the considerable number of 58 different translators (plus 7 translations the authors of which could not be identified) – in other words, there was no shortage of translators. The majority of these translators appear to have been

young academics who translated in order to improve their insufficient or unsteady incomes. As was to be expected under these circumstances, the translations are not always of a high standard: the first translation of Smith's "WN" (by J.F. Schiller and Chr. A. Wichmann), for example, was so bad that it was sometimes held responsible for the slow introduction of Smith's economics into Germany.

Some of the translators deserve a special mention: most of all Christian *Garve* (1742–1798),[5] who, in general, did more than anyone else to spread the fame of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany. A native of Breslau, Garve was educated at the Universities of Frankfurt/Oder, Halle (from which, in 1766, he received his M.A. degree), and then Leipzig, where he lodged with and continued his studies under the personal supervision of Prof. Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715–1769). In 1768, Garve defended his professorial thesis ('Habilitation'), on the proper method of conducting the history of philosophy,[6] at the University of Leipzig. Thus qualified, he started to lecture as Gellert's successor. Only four years later, in 1772, Garve resigned, on account of his poor health, from his lecturing post and retired to Breslau, where, free from teaching duties, he lived the scholarly life of a productive philosophical author. Garve died in 1798, having acquired, by then, through his numerous writings,[7] popular acclaim as well as the esteem of some of the most eminent of his contemporaries: Schiller admired him greatly;[8] Goethe, though less enthusiastic, praised his clarity;[9] Frederick II [the Great] sought his acquaintance and urged him to translate and annotate

[5] Cp.: Friedrich Schlichtegroll, *Nekrolog auf das Jahr 1798*. Vol. IX, 2 (Gotha, 1803) pp. 237–298; Daniel Jacoby, "Christian Garve", *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. VIII (Leipzig, 1878) pp. 385–392; Kurt Wölfel, "Christian Garve", *Neue Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. VI (Berlin, 1964) pp. 77 f.

[6] Christian Garve, *De ratione scribendi historiam philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1768). Some parts of this study were translated into German by G.G. Fülleborn, *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*. Part IX (Jena and Leipzig, 1798) pp. 148–163.

[7] There is no complete edition of Garve's writings and manuscripts but even a collection of his main publications, under the misleading title: *Sämtliche Werke* (Breslau, 1801–1804) runs to 18 vols.; cp.: Annalisa Viviani, "Christian Garve-Bibliographie", *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. I (1974) pp. 306–327.

[8] Schiller's acquaintance with and admiration for Garve's writings, as is indicated by various authorities, go back to his student days and many allusions to Garve's views in Schiller's own writings show that they made a lasting impression on him. The biographical and other evidence is brought together in the following studies: Daniel Jacoby, "Schiller und Garve", *Archiv für Literaturgeschichte*, Vol. VII (1878) pp. 95–145; "Schiller und Garve", *Euphorion*, Vol. 12 (1905) pp. 262–271; G. Schulz, "Schiller und Garve", *Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau*, Vol. III (1958) pp. 182–199; Reinhard Buchwald, *Schiller. Leben und Werk* (Wiesbaden, 5th edition, 1966) pp. 182–186.

[9] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Dichtung und Wahrheit", Part II, Book 7; here

Cicero's "De officiis".[10] To sum up, it is no exaggeration to say that Garve, though he was unfortunate enough to outlive his fame, was one of the most highly respected and influential German philosophers in the 1770s and '80s or, to be precise, until the impact of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (published in 1781) swept through the universities and put a new face on German philosophy, and even Kant paid tribute to Garve.[11] Given the significance of Garve, his literary campaign on behalf of the Scottish Enlightenment was likely to be of great consequence in contemporary Germany. Garve's keen interest in and deep sympathy with the Scots' ideas – an interest that came to be extended to Hutcheson, Reid, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and even to some minor Scottish thinkers (e.g.: Alexander Gerard and John Macfarlan) – appear to have arisen during his years at the University of Leipzig.[12] His first-class translations of Ferguson's "Institutes of Moral Philosophy" and of Home's "Elements of Criticism" (for details see appendix I) are among the first fruits of Garve's efforts to spread the views of the Scottish philosophers. They were later complemented by Garve's translation of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" and by various expositions of the Scots' ideas in Garve's own writings, which will be discussed below. Garve's translations, all that concerns us here, not only made the Scots' writings available to those unable to read the originals but contained explanatory notes which promoted their acceptance in Germany. The notes to Ferguson's "Institutes of Moral Philosophy" are the

---

quoted from *Goethes Werke*. In 12 vols., edited by Heinrich Kurz (Leipzig and Wien, n.d.) Vol. IX, p. 240.

[10] For Garve's contact with Frederick the Great, cp.: F. Schlichtegroll (1803) pp. 267 ff; K. Ed. Bonnell, *Friedrichs des Großen Verhältniß zu Garve und dessen Uebersetzung der Schrift Ciceros von den Pflichten nebst einer Betrachtung über das Verhalten der Schule gegen die Uebersetzung der alten Classiker* (Berlin, 1855); Hans Jessen, "Der Philosoph Christian Garve und der König", *Schlesien*, Vol. VIII (1963) pp. 89–90. The Cicero edition which Frederick II thus encouraged, if not ordered, occupied Garve for several years and proved, on publication, highly successful: *Abhandlung über die menschlichen Pflichten* (Breslau, 1783; 2nd ed. 1787; 3rd ed. 1788; 4th ed. 1792; 5th ed. 1801).

[11] Apart from Kant's correspondence with Garve - cp.: *Briefe von und an Kant*. In 2 vols., edited by Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, 1918 and 1921) Vol. I, pp. 218–230; Vol. II, pp. 138 f., 349–352 - his own writings contain numerous references to Garve. In his essay on theory and practice, for example, which was even, to some extent, occasioned by one of Garve's articles, Kant calls Garve an "estimable writer." *Kant's Political Writings*. Ed. by Hans Reiss, translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1977) pp. 64 & 194; cp.: Dieter Henrich (Ed.), *Kant. Gentz. Rehberg. Über Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfurt, 1967) pp. 45–57; 133–159. See also: Albert Stern, *Über die Beziehungen Christian Garves zu Kant* (Leipzig, 1884).

[12] A private letter from that period (dated, to be precise, 13th March 1770) contains the information that Garve recommended Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* to

most extensive (together more than 120 pp.) and the most influential[13] of Garve's comments; they must thus serve to illustrate the manner in which Garve approached and re-presented the Scottish thinkers. To begin with, Garve characterizes his motives for the translation:

> I have translated it [i.e. Ferguson's "Institutes"; N.W.] because I consider it to be the work of an honest and great man and because I believe that it shows traces of these qualities. There are books which merely reveal what the author has learnt: most compendia are of this type. There are others which, at the same time, show what the author is, how he himself thinks and feels and how he is likely to act. The first type of books may instruct but only the latter type may educate ['bilden'] or improve the spirit ['Geist'] of its readers: this [treatise on] morals appears to belong to the latter class."[14]

Garve then describes the various purposes of his notes: he intends to direct his readers' attention to what he considers the principal weaknesses and strengths of the book. Moreover, he wants to use certain of Ferguson's ideas as stimulus and starting-point for his own reflections. To the latter intention he adds a statement characteristic of his didactic interest: this is "how I should have liked to read it with my young friends."[15] In the execution of this threefold programme, the last aspect receives the most extensive treatment. In this respect, Garve frequently begins with a presentation of his translation problems: his search for the proper German equivalent of Ferguson's technical terms opens up a more fundamental conceptual clarification. Among the concepts discussed in this manner are: ridicule, public spirit, interest, emulation, probity, candour, pleasure and enjoyment, duties, tendency, pride and vanity, moral approbation, etc. Of greater significance for the present attempt to analyse Garve's attitude towards Ferguson than the somewhat disjointed remarks upon Ferguson's concepts are the instances

---

one of his students; cp.: *Christian Garve's Briefe an seine Mutter.* Edited by Karl Adolf Menzel (Breslau, 1830) p. 40. This is the earliest evidence of Garve's sympathy with an author of the Scottish Enlightenment which I have been able to find.

[13] Friedrich Schiller, for example, is said to have known Garve's notes by heart, cp.: D. Jacoby (1878) p. 97, R. Buchwald (1966) p. 183.

[14] Adam Ferguson, *Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie.* Translated by Christian Garve (Leipzig, 1772) p. 287.

[15] Ibid., p. 288. The expression "young friends" I take to refer to his students. Garve formulates "I should have liked" as he had retired from his university post earlier that year (1772).

where Garve praises Ferguson or where he claims to have found flaws in Ferguson's study.

Among the flaws, with which he begins, Garve regards the following four as most serious: (1) Ferguson tells us little about freedom. Garve's attempt to remedy this flaw (pp. 288–298) is executed in the spirit of true humility: he considers the problem at hand to be "one of the limits of our understanding" (p. 289). Initially, he distinguishes a mechanical reaction ("the machine responds because it is pushed"; p. 291) from animal and human action based on mere sense perception and on thinking respectively. Seen from this perspective, the human being is less dependent upon merely physical phenomena. The problem for Garve, then, consists in the question of how free the human being really is from the sense perception of the external world. According to Garve, this question splits the philosophical community into two schools: the first believes that human action is determined by perception while the second insists on the human capacity of generating independent action ("ich bin selbst der Urheber meiner Handlungen"; p. 295). Garve does not really offer a way out of the dilemma but hopes that a mediation between the two positions will be possible eventually. (2) Another gap which Garve perceives in Ferguson's study relates to domestic and educational matters – the duties of parents and children, etc. – and the origin and nature of the institution of marriage (p. 298). (3) Garve also criticizes the classification of what Ferguson calls the animal and rational propensities:

> The animal propensities are the appetites to food, sleep, and the propagation of the species . . . The rational propensities lead to self-preservation, to the care of our children, to the union of the sexes, to society, and to excel. (AF2, p. 66)

This classification appears to Garve to be somewhat arbitrary: "Had more general terms been used, less propensities would have resulted; had more specific terms been chosen, it would have meant more propensities" (Garve, pp. 315 f.). Moreover, Garve thinks that each object of an animal propensity can also become an object of a rational propensity (p. 316). Among Ferguson's class of 'rational propensities', Garve is only prepared to accept the desire to excel as a rational propensity in the pure and full sense (pp. 317 f.). In the end (p. 319), Garve would have preferred a developmental account of how the rational propensities have grown from the animal propensities. (4) The last major criticism which Garve directs against Ferguson is concerned with the existence of God and the human conception of it. Garve refers disapprovingly to

Ferguson's statement – "This belief [in the existence of God] does not imply any adequate notion of the Supreme Being." (AF2, p. 115) – for, to quote Garve's own formulation of the objection, "we have no idea of God left at all, if we do not consider Him the most perfect being" (Garve, p. 357). Of those aspects of Ferguson's "Institutes" which Garve finds particularly praiseworthy, two deserve to be mentioned here: to begin with, Garve appreciates Ferguson's "history of the species" (AF2, pp. 15–45), a chapter much more fully developed in Ferguson's "Essay", as being highly original, and considers it to be "an important introduction to moral theory" (Garve, p. 300). The other chapter which Garve admires greatly contains Ferguson's discussion of enjoyments and sufferings, of perfections and defects, of happiness, and of the opinions productive of happiness and misery (AF2, pp. 135–159). The ideas expressed in this part of the book seem "excellent" to Garve and he adds enthusiastically: "My soul is elevated when I read them. I perceive their truth and I realize that I can be happy too." (Garve, p. 402).

With regard to the other translators, the following comments should be made. That the young *Lessing* translated Hutcheson's "System" guaranteed, in the long run, the attention of a wide readership, which the work deserved.[16] *Herder*'s introduction to Schmid's translation of Lord Monboddo's work had a similarly beneficial effect. J.N. *Meinhard* (1727–1767), who did the bulk of the translation of Home's "Elements", should be mentioned because of the excellence of his work, which gained the approval of the most distinguished and most competent readers (Herder, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Hamann, Gerstenberg, and others).[17] Finally, W.G. *Tennemann* (1761–1819) and Chr. G. *Rautenberg* (1728–1776) stand out from the majority of translators. Tennemann, who later became an eminent historian of philosophy,[18] helped Hume's fame as 'philosopher', rather than 'historian'. Rautenberg's translations [Smith's "TMS", Home's "Essay"] may serve as an example of the links which the house of Braunschweig-Lüneburg provided with Britain, for his family was connected with the court and he himself

[16] Cp.: Curtis C.D. Vail, *Lessing's Relation to the English Language and Literature* (Columbia, 1936), especially pp. 25–40.

[17] Cp.: Franz Muncker, "Joh. N. Meinhard", *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. 21 (Leipzig, 1885) pp. 232–234; Helmut Rehder, "Johann Nicolaus Meinhard und seine Übersetzungen", *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*. Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (Urbana, 1953) pp. 1–95.

[18] W.G. Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*. In XI vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819); *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie für den akademischen Unterricht* (Leipzig, 1812); cp.: O. Liebmann, "W.G. Tennemann", *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. 37 (Leipzig, 1894) pp. 566 f.

preached at St. Martin's church in Braunschweig.[19]

In terms of centres of publication, the leading rôle of Leipzig in the contemporary German book trade is clearly reflected in our field: 53 editions show Leipzig on their title pages, on which we have here to base our assessment.[20] Not unexpectedly, Leipzig was followed by the towns of the Hanoverian sphere of influence (Braunschweig, Göttingen, Hanover, Lüneburg), in which, taken together, 14 translations were published. Other towns of some importance were Hamburg (seven editions), Berlin and Vienna (six editions each), Frankfurt (five editions), and Breslau (four editions).

(B) CONTEMPORARY REVIEWS

> Indeed, a consideration of the means that were available to the Enlightenment for the dissemination of learning and knowledge, of ideas and moral principles, for the instruction and entertainment of the various social strata, any such consideration will have to emphasize the rôle of the journal in the eighteenth century, for it was the most flexible medium known prior to the Industrial Revolution.[21]

In the second half of the eighteenth century, university based scholarship and research flourished in Germany,[22] and the subsequent output of books increased drastically. Under these circumstances even the emerging type of specialized scholar, let alone the more old-fashioned 'Universalgelehrter', found it difficult to discover and read the many new titles in his field: there was a need for a medium that would help him cope with the flood of books.[23] Since the end of the seventeenth century, learned review journals had emerged to fill that gap; they provided the scholars with announcements of forthcoming titles,

[19] Cp.: Johann Georg Meusel, *Lexikon der teutschen Schriftsteller* (Leipzig, 1811) Vol. XI, pp. 63 f.

[20] In order to avoid censorship, publishers would occasionally use "Leipzig" on their titles rather than the real place of publication. Cp.: PPH, p. XXXII.

[21] Paul Raabe, "Die Zeitschrift als Medium der Aufklärung", *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. I (1974) pp. 99–112, here p. 100.

[22] The foundation (in 1737) and rise of the University of Göttingen with its 'libertas philosophandi' has rightly been stressed as the signpost of future development. Cp.: Friedrich Paulsen's classical account: *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten*. In 2 vols. (Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1897) Vol. II, pp. 9ff.

[23] On the relation of book production and the emergence of the review journals, cp.:

summaries of their content, and indeed, critical comments on their merits and shortcomings. Although there were journals which specialized in one academic discipline,[24] the more typical product had a broad scope, covering most subjects, e.g.: GGA and ADB (both of which will be commented on below). The development, as it has been presented so far, had emerged out of the needs of the scholarly community and remained within the academic framework, but a second process succeeded in breaking through those barriers and opened up new opportunities to the journals: a wider audience had grown up beyond the universities. To account for this rise of an enlightened set of citizens ('die Aufklärungsgesellschaft') – a combination of the scholars *and* of those wishing to participate in the results of scholarship and 'Bildung' in general – goes beyond our present scope,[25] but it is to this wider development that the journals owe their great chance of 'spreading light', of popularizing knowledge among a large readership. The rise, peak, and decline of the 'Aufklärung' at large are interrelated with corresponding developments in one of its most typical tools and products: the general 'Literaturzeitung'. For the central years of the German Enlightenment (1763–1789), the crucial significance of the journals can hardly be over-estimated: they sprang up by the thousands,[26] they were run by men like Lessing and Nicolai, they received contributions from even greater men like Kant and Herder, and they were read by everybody,[27] including the rising generation of Goethe and Hegel. When, with the aftermath of the French Revolution, the 'Aufklärung' lost out against a combination of political and intellectual reaction, the journals were struggling too: the first generation of editors, like Nicolai, were old, even if they were not tired of their periodicals; the more ambitious schemes of the rising Literati no longer fitted into the old journals; and, most important, the minds of the general reading public were preoccupied with the more pressing problems of the day. Apart

---

Gerhard Menz, *Die Zeitschrift.* Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Lebensbedingungen. Eine wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studie. (Stuttgart, 1928) almost passim.

[24] For example, Johann Christian Gottsched's pioneering Germanist journal: *Beyträge zur Kritischen Historie der Deutschen Sprache, Poesie und Beredsamkeit* [1723–1744].

[25] For a lucid introduction to these problems, see: Rudolf Vierhaus, "Zur historischen Deutung der Aufklärung: Probleme und Perspektiven", *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. IV (1977) pp. 39–54, especially pp. 47–49 to which I am indebted.

[26] Cp.: Joachim Kirchner's extensive compilation: *Die Zeitschriften des Deutschen Sprachgebietes von den Anfängen bis 1830* (Stuttgart, 1969).

[27] Compare Johann Heinrich Campe's contemporary observation: "At a time when the principal reading matter of the public consists of journals . . .", *Braunschweigisches Journal*. Vol. I (1788) pp. 16–44; quoted from the reprint attached to Raabe (1974) pp. 112–136, here p. 117.

from this general connection with the 'Aufklärung', another main problem of the journals resulted from the fact that their two functions – an internal medium of the scholarly community, and a means of communication between the academic sphere and the wider public – were bound to collide. The popularizations of the journals implied risk of trivialisation, the boundary was easily crossed with the inevitable result that the scholarly élite withdrew their support.[28] The compromise between entertaining the many and instructing the few was a short-lived one: with the beginning of the nineteenth century the two functions disentangled, leading to the emergence of the illustrated magazine ('Familienzeitschrift') on the one hand and to the consolidation of specialized scholarly periodicals on the other. With this disentanglement, the old journals sank into obscurity and even modern research, as Paul Raabe rightly stressed,[29] is still far from offering a systematic survey and analysis of the field.

It remains to apply the above made observations to our particular problem and to develop a strategy – given the somewhat unsatisfactory state of research – which will allow us to draw valid and useful conclusions on the rôle of the journals in spreading word about the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany. Given the facts that the writings of the Scottish philosophers were originally published in a foreign language and (by the standards of the day) comparatively remote places: London and Edinburgh, there was at first a considerable and not solely geographical distance between them and the average German academic (not to mention the general public). In defending the journals, a contemporary editor expressed this distance quite aptly: "How few readers of the journals get such a book immediately after its publication?"[30] With respect to the English first editions, therefore, the reviews and book notes in the journals were an indispensable source of information for any German scholar aspiring to European standards. Moreover, if the reviewer of a foreign book was sympathetic and

[28] The ambiguity of the popularization is expressed very well in the imagery – used sympathetically by a contemporary defender and, more critically, by a modern historian – of a mint which recasts the crowns ('Thaler') of the spirit into small coins, J.H. Campe/P. Raabe (1788/1974) p. 122; R. Vierhaus (1977) p. 49.

[29] Paul Raabe (1974) p. 103. Among the literature that there is, Joachim Kirchner's older study still deserves attention: *Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen*. Seine Geschichte und seine Probleme. In 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 2nd edition, 1962). For a bibliography of more recent research, see: E.D. Becker & M. Dehn (Eds.) *Literarisches Leben* (Hamburg, 1968) pp. 79–93.

[30] Heinrich Wilhelm von Archenholtz, "Gedanken über die Journallectüre", *Neue Literatur und Volkerkunde* (1788) Vol. II, p. 9, here quoted from the reprint that is attached to Raabe's article (1974) p. 132.

stressed the qualities of the publication, he would not seldom recommend translation,[31] thus providing the book-sellers with valuable business intelligence. Once a book was translated and available in the bookshops, the scholarly community required less guidance and the second principal function of the journals – popularization of research for the non-academic reader – became more significant. If one compares the reviews of the original English editions with those of the German translations, this shift of the audience addressed is clearly detectable: the former presuppose some acquaintance with the subject,[32] and they abound with comments on the value of the books for *teaching* purposes;[33] whereas the latter often imply an answer to the question of why the book under consideration should matter for the reader,[34] and they bring points of immediate utility to the reader's attention.

Since there is no reliable compilation of the contents of eighteenth century German journals yet,[35] our search for Scottish Enlightenment items had to be restricted to a few important and representative journals. From the dozen or so of well-known periodicals that stand out from the vast sea of thousands of others (often short-lived and regional), the following two have been selected for investigation: (a) the time-honoured "Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen" (GGA);[36] (b) Nicolai's "Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek" (ADB).[37] The main

[31] See, for example, Feder's review of Ferguson's "Institutes of Moral Philosophy", GGA (1771) Supplement, pp. CXIII–CXV, here p. CXV.

[32] There are frequent allusions to previous works of the author and references to related technical discussions that would be meaningless to an outsider.

[33] For example, GGA (1771) Supplement, p. CXV [Feder reviewing Ferguson's "Institutes"].

[34] There are many formulations of the following type: 'Those who look for instruction on . . . , will turn with benefit to the present book.'

[35] There is a contemporary, inadequate index: *Allgemeines Sachregister über die wichtigsten deutschen Zeit- und Wochenschriften*. Ed. by J.H.C. Beutler & J.C.F. Guts-Muths (Leipzig, 1790). The index to 18th-century German periodicals currently in progress at Göttingen has not been available to me. I understand, however, that the projected index will not include review articles.

[36] The GGA, founded in 1753, goes back to an older predecessor called "Göttingische Zeitung von gelehrten Sachen" (1739–1752) and is the oldest still *existing* German review journal. The rise of the GGA accompanied the success of the newly founded Univesity of Göttingen. For the first two decades, Albrecht von Haller dominated the journal, though he had left Göttingen for Berne, and the official editors were Michaelis (1753–1770) and Heyne (1770–1812).

[37] The ADB was founded by Friedrich Nicolai in 1765 and he edited the journal for 27 years, till the censorship in Prussia induced him to sell to a bookseller in the free town of Hamburg: C.E. Bohn, who published in Kiel, since 1793, under the title: "Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek." For a few years, Nicolai was no longer editor, though he

reasons[38] behind this choice can briefly be summarized: (a) they are general, national journals of some continuity, high quality, and independent spirit; (b) they have been the subject of historical research[39] and we know much about the identity of their reviewers;[40] (c) they are 'operational' for our purposes, because of their contemporary indices; (d) at least one of them (ADB) was read by Hegel (for details, see chapter three).

The *method* of our compilation is straightforward: the contemporary indices of the two journals formed the starting point of our bibliography. By checking under the names of the fifteen philosophers selected above, and by following up these references in the actual volumes, the reviews[41] of the Scots' writings have been distinguished from various other mentions of and comments on the Scottish thinkers.[42] On the basis of the actual reviews, the editions under consideration (English, German, or French; number of edition) have been identified and the correct page references supplied.[43] With the help of Fambach and Parthey, the identity of many reviewers, who had remained anonymous in their own lifetime, could be revealed. The data collected from these two journals have then been augmented by a number of reviews from other journals, but, in this latter respect, completeness cannot be claimed and it is indeed likely that a systematic search would uncover many more reviews.

First of all, an *evaluation* of the data has to emphasize the multitude of contemporary reviews: not only did practically all writings of the

---

continued to contribute, until, in 1800, he returned to run the journal till failing health forced him to resign and to terminate the journal.

[38] A more practical reason shall not be concealed, namely that the Library of the University of Cambridge has almost complete sets of these journals.

[39] GGA: Gustav Röthe, "Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen", *Festschrift zur Feier des hundertfünfzigjährigen Bestehens der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (Berlin, 1901) pp. 567–688; J. St. Pütter, *Versuch einer akademischen Gelehrten-Geschichte von der Georg-Augustus Universität zu Göttingen.* In 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1765 + 1788). ADB: Günther Ost, *Friedrich Nicolais Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* (Berlin, 1928).

[40] GGA: Oscar Fambach, *Die Mitarbeiter der Göttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen, 1769–1836* (Tübingen, 1976). ADB: G.C.F. Parthey, *Die Mitarbeiter an Friedrich Nicolai's Allgemeiner Deutscher Bibliothek nach ihren Namen und Zeichen in zwei Register geordnet* (Berlin, 1842) = [Reprint: Hildesheim, 1973].

[41] 'Review' has here a flexible meaning and varies between announcements of a few lines and lengthy discussions printed in several parts.

[42] Such other references were of two principal types, they were either comparisons made in the review of a different book, or they occured in what we would call survey articles, discussing a certain problem that arose in many recent publications.

[43] Unfortunately, the indices often show only the page on which the review begins. This

Scottish Enlightenment receive the attention of German reviewers, but the journals even pursued the various editions, both English and German. Admittedly, the items of no more than one page (37 out of 109), would, on modern standards, hardly qualify as 'reviews' proper, but they are balanced by a fair number of lengthy treatments: out of 109 reviews (total), 23 had to be split into two or more parts to prevent them from dominating a single issue of the respective journal. Due to the many different reviewers, it is hard to generalize on the quality as well as the tendency of the reviews. Their character, on the whole, was synoptic, but there was no shortage of laudatory and censorious comments and a wealth of historical and philological notes. Among the critics of the GGA, two Göttingen academics, Johann Georg Heinrich *Feder* (1740–1821) and Christian Gottlob *Heyne* (1729–1812) stand out with 19 and 7 reviews respectively. However, since both of them were regular and plentiful contributors,[44] their numerous reviews of Scottish items do *not* signalize any particular preoccupation with the Scottish Enlightenment. Georg *Sartorius* (1766–1828), who contributed two reviews (1793+1794) of Smith's "Wealth of Nations" for the GGA, deserves a special mention for the pioneering spirit of his critical work, in which he challenges the academic establishment to tackle "the immortal work" (GGA, 1793, p. 1660); in due course, Sartorious became one of the most successful early followers of Adam Smith in Germany.

An identification of those who reviewed the Scottish Literati for Friedrich Nicolai shows the same mixture of professors, librarians, and civil servants that was characteristic for the ADB in general. The most numerous contributors: H.A. *Pistorius* (1730–95) and J.A. *Eberhard* (1739–1809) – 5 reviews each – belonged to the core of Nicolai's reviewers, i.e. to those who, according to Günther Ost (pp. 44f.; 49f.), contributed more than a hundred reviews. J.C.E. *von Springer* (1727–98), the journal's principal economist (Ost, p. 54) contributed the two lengthy reviews of Steuart's "Principles of Political Economy", but, curiously enough, he did not handle Adam Smith's work. Whether this was due to von Springer's unwillingness or to Nicolai's anticipation of an improperly hostile criticism – Nicolai's editorial instinct was rather good – remains a matter of speculation. It is also noteworthy that the review of Hume's "History" was by Johann Matthias *Schroeckh* (1773–1808),

---

can be rather misleading: what appears to be a short book note (according to the index), is frequently a full-length review.

[44] Cp.: Fambach (1975) pp. 455–462. It should also be remembered that Heyne was the editor of the GGA.

whose "Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte" betrays parallels to Hume and was eagerly studied by the young Hegel (cp.: chapter three).

Finally, among the reviews from other journals, *Herder*'s reviews of Millar and Beattie (for the FGA) should be singled out because of their excellence, their relevance for his own work (there are a number of contacts, for example, between his review of Millar's "Ranks" and his "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit" [1774]), and, of course, because of Herder's later significance and influence. Since some of Isaak *Iselin*'s (1728–1782) own writings bear strong affinities with the Scots' interest in historical development,[45] his long review of Smith's "Wealth of Nations" (in his own journal "Eph") also deserves a special mention.

(C) THE POPULARIZATIONS

> The principles of Adam Smith have to be *disseminated* to a greater extent and, if they are false, they have to be refuted thoroughly. Neither of these things has been achieved yet and, with us, they have not even been attempted. Sartorius [1794][46]

There was a considerable gap between the short, synoptic reviews in the journals and some of the highly technical books of the Scottish philosophers: there appear to have been readers whose interest had been aroused by the reviews or other communications, but who, for various reasons, found it beyond them to cope with the genuine materials. A number of popular summaries and explanations appeared on the German book market to meet this demand for simplified information, thus providing further evidence of the growing fame of the Scottish School in Germany. Without claiming completeness, we have collected a total of 14 such popularizations (cp.: Appendix III). A 'popularization' is here defined quite narrowly as a publication, based explicitly or obviously on one or more Scottish work, with the intention of explaining and conveying its content to the general public. Contemporary histories of philos-

[45] For example: Isaak Iselin, *Philosophische Mutmassungen über die Geschichte der Menschheit* [1764].

[46] Georg Sartorius [in his review of Adam Smith's "WN"] GGA (1794) p. 1903; my own italics, N.W.

ophy as well as more specialized treatments, e.g.: critical discussions of Hume's scepticism,[47] have on the whole *not* been included.[48]

Among the popularizations collected, three principal groups can be distinguished. The first one, dealing with *aesthetics*, consists of rather clumsy accounts of Henry Home's "Elements of Criticism", especially those of Christian Heinrich *Schmid* and Friedrich Justus *Riedel*.[49] Both authors admit their debt to Home freely – expressions like 'favourite author' and 'eternal work' abound[50] – but defend their plagiarism with the need for a popular exposition of Home's principles, to quote from Riedel's preface:

> Mr. Home's 'Elements of Criticism', which the present author has adopted universally, is certainly not written for beginners. (Riedel, 1767, p. iv)

As was to be expected, perhaps, those scholars and men of letters who knew Home's book well, despised these compilations and they have duly sunk into obscurity. At the time, however, they were popular, as may be taken from the facts that Riedel's compilation went into a second edition (Vienna and Jena, 1774), that Schmid reproduced similar views in a later book,[51] and, indeed, that men like Gerstenberg took them seriously enough to criticize them in public.[52] The second group of popularizations is of a *historical* character: freely rendered extracts from Hume and Robertson, often with the expressed intention of providing travellers with a historical sketch of *practical utility* (places of interest are indicated, etc.). An anonymous publication of 1767 may serve as the prime example of the group,[53] its subtitle reads: "Ein vollständiges Handbuch für Reisende, aus dem Englischen des Herrn Hume."

[47] In this context, C.F. Stäudlin's *Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus*. In 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1794) as well as F.H. Jacobi's *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus* [1787] should be mentioned.

[48] An exception is J.G. Buhle's work, described below.

[49] For details of their works, see appendix III.

[50] Schmid (1767) pp. 21, 32, 107; Riedel (1767) pp. IV, 194. - On Riedel's general indebtedness to Home, see: Richard Wilhelm, *Friedrich Justus Riedel und die Aesthetik der Aufklärung* (Heidelberg, 1933) pp. 34–42.

[51] C.H. Schmid, *Anweisung der vornehmsten Bücher in allen Theilen der Dichtkunst* (Leipzig, 1784).

[52] Heinrich Wilhelm Gerstenberg reviewed Schmid critically, in: *Hamburger Neue Zeitung* [1768], though this review has not been available to me.

[53] Anon., *Abriss des gegenwärtigen Zustandes von Grossbritannien* (Copenhagen, 1767).

The third and most important group consists of popularizations of Scottish, especially *Smithian economics*. In the context of the wider question of the introduction of Adam Smith's doctrine into Germany, a topic to which we shall return in the following section, most of the relevant compilations have already been collected and evaluated.[54] The first popularizations of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" were by Georg *Sartorius* (1766–1828), whose early review had already stressed the need for such a treatment (Cp. the motto of the present section). Two years later, in 1796, he provided the public with a clear and well-written summary: "Handbuch der Staatswirthschaft . . ." (for details, see Appendix III). The continued success of this publication induced him to publish, in 1806, a revised edition under the title: "Elemente des National-Reichthums . . ." (see Appendix III). Apart from being clear and shorter than Smith's original, the merits of these books lay in their very unpretentiousness: Sartorius never confused exposition and criticism, but remained faithful to the original (even when he felt it was wrong),[55] leaving his critical assessment to a separate book.[56] When he did go beyond summarizing Smith, it was to bring in his own historical interest in order to illustrate a given principle. One methodological point of great consequence deserves a special mention: Sartorius clearly distinguished between 'Volkswirtschaft' and 'Staatswirtschaft', the former deals with the sources of elements of national wealth, the latter is concerned with the rôle of government and public finance. Although there were additional reasons, both academic and political, behind the later institutional split of 'Volkswirtschaft' and 'Verwaltungswissenschaft' in the German university system, the work of Sartorius points in that direction. The next textbook based on Smith to be published in Germany was August Ferdinand *Lueder*'s (1760–1819) "Über Nationalindustrie und Staatswirthschaft" [1800–1804], which he

[54] The most thorough accounts are by W. Roscher, "Die Ein- und Durchführung des Adam Smith'schen Systems in Deutschland", *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*. Vol. 19 (1867) pp. 1–74; slightly shortened, this paper became part of his later book: *Geschichte der National-Oekonomie in Deutschland* (Munchen, 1874) pp. 593–625. Among other studies, the following should be mentioned : C.W. Hasek, *The Introduction of Adam Smith's Doctrines into Germany* (New York, 1925); Hugo Graul, *Das Eindringen der Smithschen Nationalokonomie in Deutschland und ihre Weiterbildung bis zu Hermann* (Halle/Saale, 1928); Melchior Palyi, "The Introduction of Adam Smith on the Continent", *Adam Smith, 1776–1926*. Lectures to commemorate the sesquicentennial of the publication of "The Wealth of Nations" [1928] = (Reprint: New York, 1966) pp. 180–233.

[55] Cp.: Sartorius (1806) p. 5.

[56] Georg Friedrich Sartorius, *Abhandlungen die Elemente des National-Reichtums und die Staatswirthschaft betreffend* (Göttingen, 1806).

followed up by a whole series of similar publications.[57] Like the work of Sartorius, Lueder's book is primarily a paraphrase of the "Wealth of Nations", but the illustrations which he added were mainly from the field of *popular ethnology*, i.e. travellers' tales. The next popularization of Adam Smith's principles, which none of the above mentioned studies has even mentioned, is Johann Gottlieb *Buhle*'s (1763–1821) "Geschichte der Theorie der Staatswirthschaft in England" [1803/04]. This neglect of an extremely well-informed and thorough presentation, surprising as it may appear in the light of Roscher's otherwise profound scholarship, is probably due to the fact that Buhle's treatment is buried in his vast "Geschichte der neuern Philosophie",[58] and men like Roscher, though they were well-read in the beginnings of their own science (economics), were less familiar with the roots of their science in 'practical philosophy' and especially with the continuation of that tradition well into the nineteenth century. In the present context, a proper appreciation of Buhle's work cannot be achieved,[59] but apart from its general virtue of being thorough and intelligent, some of its other merits should briefly be mentioned: the exposition begins very aptly with David Hume's economic essays (Vol. V, pp. 500–602) and shows, when going on to Smith, the debt which the latter owed to the former (Vol. V, pp. 602–3); on such matters as money and coinage, once again very appropriate, the position of Sir James Steuart is introduced; there is a fair and remarkably balanced comparison between Steuart and Smith: while it is stated that Smith was the more original genius, Steuart's advantages, notably his more systematic presentation, are fully recognized (Vol. VI, pp. 4–5). One year later, in 1805, the next important popularization appeared: L.H. *Jacob*'s (1759–1827) "Grundsätze der Nationaloekonomie". Like Buhle, Jacob was originally a philosopher. His sympathies were strongly Kantian and, in line with Kant's own appreciation of Hume, Jacob had attached critical and explanatory essays to his German translation of Hume's "Treatise" (cp.: Appendix I). In spite of his modest claim, "to have merely presented Smith's industrial system and to have made it better known",[60] his popularization of the "Wealth of Nations" shows strong efforts to put Smith's

[57] For details, see: Roscher (1867) pp. 38–43; Hasek (1925) pp. 78–84; Graul (1928) pp. 61–71.

[58] Of the six volumes which appeared at Göttingen between 1800 and 1804, the chapter on political economy makes up pp. 481–768 and pp. 3–50 of Vols. V and VI respectively.

[59] I hope to be able to write a short rehabilitation of Buhle's achievement in the not too distant future.

[60] L.H. Jacob, *Grundsätze der Nationaloekonomie* [1805]. Here quoted from the third edition: Halle, 1825, p. 23.

doctrines into a more systematic shape. Beside his own labours, these efforts betray the influence of Say – whose "Traité d'économie politique" Jacob was translating at about the same time[61] – an influence that is most obvious in Jacob's adoption of Say's tripartite structure: of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods. The last popularization to be considered here, is C.J. *Kraus*' (1753–1807) "Staatswirthschaft" which was published posthumously (between 1808 and 1811) but which builds on his highly successful Königsberg lectures, delivered from the 1790s till his death. His 'Staatswirthschaft' is little more than a free rendering of Smith's "Wealth of Nations", but like Buhle, he knew Steuart well and had a keen interest in Hume's "Political Discourses", which resulted in a translation (published in 1800; cp.: Appendix I). The most significant achievement of Kraus was that he applied Smithian principles to a number of practical problems. In the published version of his lectures, this application shows only in book V: "angewandte Staatswirthschaft" ('applied political economy'), but his students appear to have profited greatly from it and came to play an important rôle in the Prussian reform movement associated with Stein and Hardenberg.[62]

(D) THE IMPACT ON TEACHING

> Adam Smith's work on national wealth is my main source. This work is certainly one of the most important and beneficial that have ever been written . . . For us Prussians of today a deeper study of state economy is more necessary than ever . . .' C.J. Kraus [1795][63]

The large number and the variety of German universities around 1800 reflect the well-known political fragmentation of the country. Another aspect that makes it difficult to generalize, is the growing 'Lehrfreiheit' ('libertas philosophandi' or teaching freedom) of the individual

[61] J.B. Say, *Abhandlung uber die National-Oekonomie*. In 2 vols. Translated by L.H. Jacob (Halle, 1807).

[62] To show this influence of Smith's German followers on the Prussian reform work is the merit of Hasek's (1925) otherwise unoriginal study.

[63] C.J. Kraus in a letter to a friend, dated 1795. The letter is published in: J. Vogt, *Das Leben des Professor C.J. Kraus* (Königsberg, 1819) p. 358, the English translation is quoted from Hasek (1925) pp. 86–7.

professors.[64] Though there were eclectic teachers of philosophy who included the positions of Hutcheson, Smith, and Ferguson in their lectures on ethics,[65] the Kantian revolution, which swept through the departments, worked against them.[66] The methodological problems of finding them and of evaluating their comparative significance have proved insurmountable: even if it had been possible to inspect the lecture lists of an adequate sample of German universities, the titles of the lectures could not be relied upon to assess their contents and very rarely provide a guide to such specific subject matters as the 'moral sense'. With respect to the aesthetic inquiry of the Scottish Enlightenment, most notably Home's "Elements of Criticism", a direct influence on contemporary university teaching is practically non-existent, due to the slow acceptance of modern philology as an established academic subject. The social and economic theory of Adam Smith, however, had a noticeable impact on the German university system, an impact, moreover, which has been the subject of a number of scholarly investigations,[67] and it is thus appropriate that this institutional influence is briefly summed up. Since a number of relevant university teachers (e.g. Sartorius and Kraus) have already been commented upon, we may here concentrate on their lecturing activities.

[64] The newly founded University of Gottingen profitted from the infringements upon the 'libertas philosophandi' which had occurred at Halle (it may here be sufficient to recall the expulsion of Christian Wolff).

[65] The most prominent example is Christian Garve who had been mentioned above as the most distinguished translator. He lectured at the University of Leipzig (1768–72), but soon found the teaching beyond his poor health and retired to Breslau.

[66] J.G.H. Feder, the leading reviewer of the GGA and one of those eclectic philosophers, for example, was thus forced into retirement; cp.: Paulsen (1897) Vol. II, pp. 11 f.

[67] Beside the above mentioned studies of Roscher (1867 + 1874), Palyi (1928), and Graul (1928), and the relevant sections of the following general studies – Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Geschichte der ökonomischen Analyse*. In 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1965) Vol. I, pp. 615–625; Horst Claus Recktenwald, *Adam Smith*. Sein Leben und sein Werk (München, 1976) pp. 277–287; Hermann Lehmann [u.a.], *Grundlinien des ökonomischen Denkens in Deutschland*. Von den Anfängen bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Ost, 1977) pp. 312–328; Harald Winkel, *Die deutsche Nationalökonomie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1977) pp. 7–20 – a recent international research project: "The Institutionalization of Political Economy: its Introduction and Acceptance into European, North-American, and Japanese Universities" has thrown new light on the issue at hand. The results of this project were presented at a conference in San Miniato, near Florence, in April 1986, and will be published in 1988. Among the German contributors to the project, the following scholars dealt with the introduction of Smithian doctrines into German Universities: Hans Erich Bodeker (with regard to Göttingen), Klaus Hinrich Hennings (with respect to Leipzig), Volker Hentschel (Heidelberg), Harald Winkel (Königsberg).

According to their own claims,[68] both Sartorius (at Göttingen) and Kraus (at Königsberg) started to lecture on Smithian principles in the early 1790s. Although it appears that Kraus' Königsberg lectures on Smith began one year earlier (in 1791) than those of Sartorius, it is appropriate to concentrate on the university of *Göttingen*, since, as will be shown, most early followers of Smith in Germany (including Kraus), were associated with that university in one way or another. The reason behind Göttingen's early assimilation of British ideas is well-known, though sometimes stated incorrectly:[69] the personal union of the Georges who were Electors of Brunswick-Lüneburg and Kings of Great Britain. As Göttingen developed into the leading Protestant university of the time, it was able to become the institutional seed-bed of Smithian economics: Sartorius lectured there (1792–1828); Kraus had studied there (1779–80), left with "a predilection for statistics and state economy"[70] and then lectured at Königsberg (1780–1807), a leading Prussian university; Lueder, after studying at Göttingen, lectured at Brunswick (1786–1810), Göttingen (1810–1814), and Halle (1816–17), another important Prussian university; Buhle, too, was a student and professor at Göttingen (lecturing from 1794 to 1804), before leaving for a chair in Moscow. The indicated later spheres of activity, which these successful lecturers chose, show already how the new Smithian spirit began to spread from this most advanced university to other progressive institutions of higher education. The connection, mentioned above, between some of these academics (Kraus, Lueder) and the Prussian reform movement[71] – incidentally, one of the principal examples of the lasting influence of the Enlightenment (Cp.: R. Vierhaus, 1977, p. 50) – added special momentum to the distribution of Smith's ideas in that part of Germany. But even the more old-fashioned universities, most notably in the Catholic south, followed slowly but steadily: in Landshut, for example, a disciple of Lueder, Oberndorfer, was active in the 1820s (Palyi, 1928, pp. 211–2). It is thus no exaggeration to describe the introduction of Smithian doctrines as a main watershed in the development of the teaching of political economy in Germany.

[68] Sartorious' claim is to be found in the preface of his popularization (1796) p. XLIV; for the claim of Kraus, see: J. Vogt (1819) p. 388, where a letter of January 1797 is quoted, saying that he has taught Smith for six years.

[69] When Palyi (1928, p. 210) says: ". . . one of the leading German universities, Göttingen, came under English influence", he makes it sound as if the university had been there before the Elector gained the British Crown. In reality, it was the other way round; cp.: Paulsen (1897) Vol. II, p. 9.

[70] J. Vogt (1819) p. 306 – English translation quoted from Hasek (1925) p. 86.

[71] Cp.: Hasek (1925) pp. 84 f., 95 ff. and Lehmann (1977) 313–322.

(E) CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

> Ferguson's 'Essay on the History of Civil Society' . . . is now generally regarded as a classic . . . although its reputation as such was established very much earlier in *Germany* and America that in this country. (AF1, p. XIII; my own italics)

> "It seems clear . . . that Kames won greater honor in Germany than in his own country."[72]

> . . . it is rather surprising, and at the same time a proof of the might of ideas . . . that the resistance against the "Wealth of Nations" [in Germany] did not last longer than some twenty years . . . (Palyi, 1928, p. 196)

Although, for a precise dating, one would need to distinguish between the various Scottish authors – the choice of the mottos quoted above shows, for example, that the reception of Smith's "WN" was slower than those of Home and Ferguson – the evidence provided in sections A–D leads to the conclusion that the Scottish Enlightenment had a very wide and marked reception in eighteenth century Germany. With respect to the geographical distribution of this reception, the following conclusions can be drawn: (a) As the traditional seat of the German book-trade, *Leipzig* opened itself early to the new ideas from Scotland: it was there that most translations were published. Having said that, it must be added that it was the emerging set of 'men of letters', who existed on the fringes of the publishing industry (e.g.: Meinhard), rather than the representatives of the university establishment, who took the lead. Christian Garve's lecturing spell at Leipzig (1768–1772) was too short to have a lasting impact. (b) The rôle of the realm of Brunswick-Lüneburg has to be emphasized strongly: *Brunswick* itself contributed to the translations (e.g.: Rautenberg) and its 'Collegium Carolinum', the predecessor of the modern university, shows Scottish influences on its teaching (e.g. the lectures of Lueder). More significant was *Göttingen*, the newly founded university of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Apart from some translations, the University of Göttingen distinguished itself by spreading the fame of the Scottish School through its teaching

[72] H.W. Randall, "The Critical Theory of Lord Kames", *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*. Vol. XXII (1940/41) p. 81.

as well as its important review journal: GGA. (c) The *Prussian* sphere of influence is also noteworthy: beside the 'Berliner Aufklärung' (Nicolai), both Königsberg and Halle have been mentioned above. (d) From these early centres: Saxony, Brunswick, Prussia, the reception appears to have spread to the northern towns (Hamburg, Bremen)[73] but also, even if not before the early nineteenth century, to the Catholic south (Cp.: Vierhaus, 1977, pp. 50 f).

It should also be noted that a number of pioneering individuals appeared on more than one level of our reconstruction, most notably: H.A. Pistorius, who translated and reviewed; C.J. Kraus, who contributed, besides his influential teaching, a translation and a popularization; and G. Sartorius, who reviewed, popularized, and taught. But the most important of all was Christian *Garve*. His very readable translations (with lengthy notes) and his Leipzig lectures have already been mentioned, but, within our four categories (A–D), it has not been possible to describe his achievements fully. In a number of his many writings, though they are not 'popularizations' in the narrow sense used above, he adopted and disseminated the views of the Scottish philosophers who were his favourite masters. The following examples may here stand for many others: (1) Garve's early article, "Betrachtung einiger Verschiedenheiten in den Werken der ältesten und neuern Schriftsteller, besonders der Dichter"[74] appears to take up a topic of Ferguson's "Essay", namely the negative impact of the division of labour on the creation and reception of poetry;[75] (2) his essay: "Einige Beobachtungen über die Kunst zu denken"[76] discusses the method and style of Hume's moral and political essays, a discussion which culminates in Garve's admission that, in his own writings, he aspired to resemble the works of Hume more than those of any other author (Garve, 1796,

[73] Due to their political independence as free Hansa towns, Hamburg and Bremen would require special study, which, within the context of the present study, I have not been able to pursue.

[74] First published in: *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste*. Vol. 10 (1770) pp. 1–37; 189–210; here quoted from the following collection: Christian Garve, *Sammlung einiger Abhandlungen aus der Neuen Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* (Leipzig, 1779) pp. 115–197.

[75] I have developed this argument further in my paper: "The Division of Labour and the Fate of the Poet", read to the German Society, University of Cambridge, February 1984, and to the Philosophical Society, University of Auckland, New Zealand, July 1984; to be published shortly.

[76] Published in: Christian Garve, *Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Litteratur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben*. In 5 vols. (Breslau, 1792–1802), here Vol. II (1796) pp. 245–430.

p. 427); (3) in his extensive survey of ethical systems,[77] he devotes considerable space to the views of Hutcheson, Ferguson, and Adam Smith and his treatment abounds in laudatory comments, e.g.: "Hutcheson . . . an excellent man and a truly great philosopher"; "Ferguson and Smith . . . have enriched the moral and political sciences with true masterpieces" (Garve, 1798, pp. 153 + 157).

The present exposition of the Scots' reception in Germany has concentrated on a reconstruction of its first stages (translations, etc.), often associated with comparatively minor figures. Although we had occasion to comment on Lessing and Herder (pp. 64 + 71) and, at greater length, on Christian Garve (pp. 60 ff), a discussion of the Scots' influence on the leading writers and philosophers of the day has not been provided. The obvious reason for this gap is that any such discussion would lead far beyond the scope of the present study and constitute a whole series of topics in their own right. This does not mean that the influence did not exist. To show that the reverse was the case, i.e. that most eminent German thinkers of the day had made themselves familiar with the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment – without raising the more ambitious question of how this acquaintance affected their own thought – a selection of references, supported by information on specialist studies, may here be appropriate. It is proper to begin with those authors who were able to read the Scots in the original English: Lessing, Herder, Hamann, Mendelssohn, and Jacobi. In his "Laokoon", Lessing quoted (in his own translation) from Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments";[78] he refers to Adam Ferguson in two letters of 1770 and 1771,[79] and there are various references to Home's "Elements of Criticism".[80] Herder's critical writings contain numerous remarks on Home,[81] and his "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit" includes a number of footnotes referring to the histori-

[77] Christian Garve, *Übersicht der vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre* (Breslau, 1798).

[78] G.E. Lessing, *Laokoon oder Uber die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (Berlin, 1766) IV.3; here quoted from the following edition: *Lessings Werke*. In 5 vols. Edited by Karl Balser and Heinz Stolpe (Berlin & Weimar, 6th ed. 1971) Vol. 3, pp. 191 f.

[79] *Lessings Briefe*. Edited by Herbert Greiner-Mai (Berlin and Weimar, 1967) pp. 221 + 229.

[80] *Lessings Werke*. In 25 vols. Ed. by Julius Petersen and W.v. Olshausen (Berlin, 1925–35) Vol. XII, p. 525; cp.: Vail (1936).

[81] *Herders sàmmtliche Werke*. 33 in 25 vols. Ed. by Bernhard Suphan (Berlin, 1877–1913) Vol. IV, pp. 170 ff; Vol. V, pp. 150 ff; cp.: L.D. Shaw, "Henry Home of Kames: Precursor of Herder", *Germanic Review*, Vol. 35 (1960) pp. 16–27.

cal writings of Hume and Robertson.[82] Hamann's letters show that he admired Steuart and Ferguson, describing the latter's "History of Rome" as being as nutritious to his soul as beef with horseradish sauce to his stomach.[83] Jacobi's indebtedness to the Scots is acknowledged in his "Woldemar" and his dialogue "David Hume"; a number of more specific parallels between his philosophical writings and those of Thomas Reid have recently been pointed out by Günther Baum.[84] Finally, Mendelssohn's writings contain so many relevant points that he has been interpreted as an 'agent' of British philosophy in Germany.[85]

But even those authors who had to rely on German translations made frequent use of them. Within the context of their Shakespeare criticism, both Gerstenberg and Lenz refer to Meinhard's translation of Home's "Elements of Criticism."[86] Novalis, as has recently been suggested by Nicholas Saul, derived his concept of 'geistige Gegenwart' from Home's 'ideal presence'.[87] It is well known that it was Hume who aroused Kant from his 'dogmatic slumber', but Kant knew and appreciated Hutcheson and Smith too, calling the latter his 'favourite'.[88] And Schiller's reading of Ferguson and Home, it has been claimed, left traces in his early writings.[89]

[82] J.G. Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* [1774]. Ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Frankfurt, 1967) pp. 69, 90–92, 94 f., etc.; cp.: Roy Pascal, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School", *Publications of the English Goethe Society*, New Series: Vol. XIV (1939) pp. 23–42.

[83] Johann Georg Hamann, *Briefwechsel*. In 7 vols. Ed. by Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel (Wiesbaden & Frankfurt, 1956–65) Vol. II, p. 418; Vol. VII, p. 33.

[84] F.H. Jacobi, *Woldemar*, and *David Hume über den Glauben*, here quoted from: *Jacobis Werke*. In 6 vols. Ed. by Friedrich Roth and Friedrich Köppen (Leipzig, 1820) Vol. V, pp. 68–74, 166 f. and Vol. II, pp. 127–288; cp.: Günther Baum, *Vernunft und Erkenntnis*. Die Philosophie F.H. Jacobis (Bonn, 1969) pp. 17–22, 42–49, 164–173.

[85] Ludwig Goldstein, *Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik* (Königsberg, 1904) p. 121; cp.: Fritz Pinkuss, "Moses Mendelssohns Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft* (Fulda, 1929) Vol. 42, pp. 449–490.

[86] Heinrich Wilhelm Gerstenberg, "Briefe über Merkwürdigkeiten der Literatur"; J.M.R. Lenz, "Anmerkungen übers Theater"; both quoted from: Hansjürgen Blinn (Ed.), *Shakespeare-Rezeption*. Die Diskussion um Shakespeare in Deutschland. In 2 vols. (Berlin, 1982) Vol. I, pp. 80–81 (Gerstenberg); 128 (Lenz).

[87] Nicholas Saul, "Novalis's 'Geistige Gegenwart' and his Essay 'Die Christenheit oder Europa'", *The Modern Language Review*. Vol. 77, Part 2 (1982) pp. 361–377.

[88] Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*. Edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences at Berlin (Berlin, 1900–1955) Vol X, p. 126; cp.: Vol. VI, p. 289; Vol. VII, p. 209 – Dieter Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant", *Kant-Studien* (1957/58) Vol. 49, pp. 49–69; for Kant's contacts with Beattie: W.B. Piper, "Kant's Contact with British Empiricism", Eighteenth-Century Studies (1978/79) Vol. XII, pp. 174–189.

[89] Friedrich Schiller, *Philosophische Schriften*. Ed. by Helmut Koopmann (München, 1968) pp. 862–863, 866, 870, 877; cp.: Buchwald (1959) pp. 182–183, 191–192, 223.

These references are incomplete: they could be complemented by including further German thinkers, and they would anyway have to be deepened with respect to individual thinkers. Leaving these questions to Germanists and other specialists, it is obvious that, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Scottish Literati were recognized as a major intellectual force of the day, a recognition which implies the double awareness of the Literati's being Scottish and being an intellectual group or school. A few quotations may suffice to document this awareness:

> The spirit of British philosophy seems to be situated beyond Hadrian's Wall and to have gathered around itself at present a little group of its own adherents in the Scottish mountains. Ferguson, Robertson, Home, and in this case, Millar are, it seems to me, people who easily outvote the only and mostly dull Search. Through the field which they have all chosen in unanimous concert, their philosophy becomes even more estimable, namely for the most part the philosophy of the states and changes of the human race according to history and experience. Herder (1772)[90]

> He [Hutcheson] is the first among the Scottish philosophers [who are based], in particular, at the two universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow [. . .] Adam Smith, the foremost among my Scottish teachers and friends [. . .] is a highly original mind. Garve (1798, pp. 154 + 160)

> English philosophers can no longer be spoken of. Those that there still were move within the confinements of a very common metaphysics of the understanding ['Verstandesmetaphysik']. The Scottish philosophers, however, as thinking and educated men, have considered the moral nature of man, how it is reflected in a cultivated mind. Many of their moral [enquiries] have been translated into German. Hegel (1825/26)[91]

[90] *Herders sämtliche Werke*. 33 in 25 vols. Ed. by Bernhard Suphan (Berlin, 1877–1913); here Vol. V (Berlin, 1891) p. 452.

[91] MS, Hegels Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie [1825/26], according to the lecture notes taken by Löwe. Quoted by kind permission of the present owner: Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin) Ms. germ. oct. 764, p. 289.

> We Germans, well-disposed towards all sides, striving for the most universal education ['Bildung'], we have known and appreciated the merits of dignified Scotsmen for many years. Goethe (1830)[92]

To sum up, a considerable proportion of the responses which the Scots evoked in Germany were sympathetic and, even when men like Herder, Kant, and Schiller left Scottish philosophy behind in their later achievements, they seldom betrayed the ingratitude of disciples who despise their former masters as soon as they have outgrown them, in other words, even when they became more critical over the years, the prevailing tone remained one of respect.

[92] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Einleitung zu Thomas Carlyle: Das Leben Schillers", here quoted from *Goethes Werke*. In 12 vols. Ed. by Heinrich Kurz (Leipzig and Wien, n.d.) Vol. 12, p. 475.

CHAPTER THREE

Hegel's Contacts with and Knowledge of the Scottish Enlightenment

The aim of the present chapter is to bring together and evaluate the evidence of Hegel's direct and indirect contacts with Scottish philosophy. This task will be dealt with in three stages: (a) the question of Hegel's knowledge of English is examined; (b) the dates and extent of Hegel's reading and indirect knowledge of the Scottish Literati are reconstructed; (c) Hegel's explicit references to the Scots are collected and scrutinized.

(A) HEGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH

> . . . to comprehend English is no longer a sin in Swabia . . . *Schwäbisches Museum* (1786)[1]

As it has been shown in chapter two that all the important works of the Scottish Enlightenment had promptly been translated into German and were certainly available in Hegel's youth, the question of Hegel's knowledge of English may appear negligible. However, for the extent and dates of Hegel's contacts with British sources, and to compare and identify them with certain passages from Hegel's writings, the question is of considerable importance, rather than being a matter of mere biographical curiosity.

That the Hegel of the Berlin years knew English and used English material extensively is now an accepted fact, based on various pieces of evidence. To begin with, a letter to his son Karl (dated October 12, 1822) shows that Hegel's English was so proficient that he could check and correct Karl's translation exercises (HBr, Vol. II, p. 363 – HL,

[1] *Schwäbisches Museum*. Edited by J.M. Armbruster, Vol. II (Kempten, 1786) p. 154.

p. 600). In another letter to his wife (dated September 19, 1827), Hegel writes that he "understood most of it [i.e.: the English Company's performance of Othello at the Odéon, Paris], since I read along every word in my little book" (HL, p. 656 – HBr, Vol. III, p. 190). Moreover, a number of Hegel's extracts from British newspapers (Quarterly Review, Edinburgh Review, Morning Chronicle) have survived in manuscript and are now being kept at Berlin and Harvard.[2] J. Hoffmeister published some of these extracts in his collection of Hegel's "Berliner Schriften" (HBS, pp. 718–724), M.J. Petry provided a critical edition of all surviving extracts from the "Morning Chronicle" with an introduction and a wealth of notes,[3] and the present author has recently given the same treatment to the excerpts from the other two journals.[4] In his article on the Reform Bill, Hegel obviously drew on such extract material and he also used it in some of his lectures for illustrative purposes. Apart from these extracts, Hegel's knowledge of English is also documented by English quotations and his *own* translations of passages from British authors; an example of the English quotations is Hamlet's

> The spirit that I have seen
> May be the devil: and the devil, hath power
> To assume a pleasing shape; yea and perhaps
> Out of my weakness and my melancholy
> (As he is very potent with such spirits)
> Abuse me to damn me. I'll have grounds
> More relative than this: the play's the thing
> Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.[5]

The German allusion – "einer Liebe . . . die so tief und weit ist als die unbegrenzte See" – to Juliet's "my bounty is as boundless as the sea, my love as deep"[6] may serve as an example of his own translations. That Hegel knew English can therefore not be doubted, but when did he start

[2] Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, and Houghton Library, Harvard.

[3] M.J. Petry, "Hegel and 'The Morning Chronicle'", HS (Bonn, 1976) Vol 11, pp. 11–80.

[4] Norbert Waszek, "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Edinburgh Review' 1817–1819", HS (Bonn, 1985) Vol. 20, pp. 79–112; "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Quarterly Review' ", will appear in HS (Bonn, 1986) Vol. 21

[5] G.W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*. TWA, Vol. XII, pp. 300 f. – The quotation is from Hamlet II.1.

[6] Ibid., p. 310; the Shakespeare quotation is from *Romeo and Juliet* II.2: I am indebted to Dr. H.C. Lucas (Bochum) for pointing out to me that Hegel did not follow the Schlegel translation in this case, cp.: H.C. Lucas, "Shakespeare", Otto Pöggeler (Ed.), *Hegel in*

learning the English language and when did he achieve proficiency in it?
Before going through the various stages of Hegel's education consecutively, let us first consider a piece of evidence which, at first glance, appears to settle the question beyond doubt, i.e. the draft version of a curriculum vitae which he wrote for an application in September 1804:

> My parents . . . provided for [my] education in the arts and sciences [Wissenschaften] by means of private tuition as well as the public schooling of the Gymnasium at Stuttgart, where ancient and *modern* languages were taught. (HTJ, pp. VIII f; my own italics; N.W.)

As Hegel uses the plural he seems to refer – apart from the obvious French, which certainly was *the* foremost modern language taught[7] – to English and/or Italian, as any other languages hardly come into question. However, in the section on Hegel's Stuttgart years, a number of serious reasons will be presented which cast doubt on the accuracy of Hegel's dating. What may, nevertheless, be concluded with great certainty, is that Hegel knew English by the time he wrote the curriculum vitae, i.e. in 1804. That Hegel would claim a knowledge he did not have is highly improbable. Pretending to have a qualification – a claim that could, at any time, be checked upon – and thus risking exposure, would not only be inconsistent with Hegel's profound 'Rechtschaffenheit', but even with the most obvious calculations of prudence. But we need not rely on arguments based ad hominem or conclusions based on probability, as there are at least two further pieces of evidence for Hegel's knowledge of English during his early *Jena* years:[8]

(a) the famous reference to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in the *Jenaer Systementwürfe I* which has now been proved to be based

---

Berlin (Wiesbaden, 1981) pp. 246–253, here p. 248. Since it is distinguished in the text, by quotation marks, where Hegel follows (he uses, for example, the Schlegel translation of the next line: ' Je mehr ich gebe, je mehr auch hab ich: beides ist unendlich.") and where he alters Schlegel's rendering, it seems to be obvious that the changes are consciously made and not mere failings of his memory. The obvious reservation about this argument is that we cannot be sure how and to what extent Hegel's original lecture notes corresponded to this difference in Hotho's edition of them.

[7] Not only was France the most powerful neighbour, but Württemberg actually held, at that time, a small French speaking territory, the 'Grafschaft Mömpelgard', on the other side of the Rhine. These circumstances may here be sufficient to explain the priority of French.

[8] With the publication of the early Jena fragments, which are due to appear in Vol. V of the new critical edition, more evidence may come to light. – I understand that Prof. Manfred Baum (GH Siegen) has important work in progress on the relation of Hegel's

upon the English edition, rather than on the Garve translation.[9]

(b) Hegel's scrap-book, the so-called 'Wastebook' of 1803–1806, now lost, which contained, according to Rosenkranz' testimonial, excerpts from German, French, and *English* books. (Rosenkranz, 1844, pp. 198 ff.)

For 1804, we may thus take Hegel's proficiency in English for granted. This date therefore defines the end of the period we shall now have to investigate.

I. *Stuttgart*

In our critical assessment of Hegel's claim that "modern languages" were taught at his Gymnasium, let us first consider the general situation of Württemberg's secondary education.[10] The main emphasis was on Latin to the extent that the Stuttgart 'Untergymnasium' and its equivalent in 54 other towns and villages were known as 'Latein-Schulen'.[11] The second language was certainly Greek, and some basic Hebrew was also taught. Modern languages came only later and on rather a voluntary basis. Evidence for this state of affairs can firstly be found in the legal framework, the 'Schulgesetze' of Württemberg which clearly prescribe these general points: Latin was *the* main subject ('Hauptfach'), followed by Greek and Hebrew, French only became obligatory long after Hegel's time, and, as far as the eighteenth century is concerned, other modern languages are not even mentioned.[12] Further evidence is

---

professorial thesis [Habilitationsthesen] to Shaftesbury. An examination which might also throw light on Hegel's English.

[9] HGW, Vol. VI, pp. 323 & 384 f; cp.: H.S. Harris, "The Social Ideal of Hegel's Economic Theory", L.S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Eds.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Action* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983) pp. 49–74; See below (section C of the present chapter), where I spell out Hegel's various references to Adam Smith's 'pin factory'.

[10] The term 'secondary' is not quite correct here as it refers to the higher level of a strictly two-class system rather than to an age group. Cp.: Balthasar Haug's contemporary study *Das gelehrte Wirtemberg* (Stuttgart, 1790) pp. 17 f.

[11] On the 'Latein-Schulen' in general, see: *Geschichte des Humanistischen Schulwesens in Württemberg*. Edited by the 'Württembergische Kommission fur Landesgeschichte', Vol. III, Part I: *Geschichte der Lateinschulen* (Stuttgart, 1927). For a more vivid account, several Schiller biographies may be consulted, as Schiller attended the Lateinschule in Ludwigsburg. – There can be no doubt that the 'Untergymnasium' was equivalent to the 'Lateinschulen' in other towns, cp.: B. Haug (1790) pp. 18 & 21; F. Nicolin, (1970) p. 129.

[12] Carl Hirzel, *Gesetze für die Mittel- und Fachschulen* (Tübingen, 1847) Vol. XI, 2 in the series: A.L. Reyscher (Ed.), *Vollständige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen Gesetze* (Tubingen & Stuttgart, 1838–1850) especially pp. 285, 348, 455, 512, 680.

provided by the examinations which the pupils had to pass before proceeding from the Latin schools to either the 'Klosterschulen',[13] the 'Carlsschule',[14] or the 'Obergymnasium' at Stuttgart: they were examined in Latin language and versification, history and geography, the rudiments of logic and rhetoric, and music (Haug, 1790, p. 22). And Hegel's own school clearly reflects this general situation:

> The study of the ancient languages . . . formed the centre of tuition . . . Hegel was fed, first and foremost, on the marrow of classical antiquity. (Haym, 1857, p. 24)

Friedhelm Nicolin lists all of Hegel's teachers (Professors as they were called) at the 'Obergymnasium' and gives their respective teaching specialties.[15] From that list we can easily reconstruct the syllabus of the school: *Latin* (taught by Profs. Haug, Offterdinger, Kielmanns, and Rektor Tafinger); *Greek* (Prof. Kielmanns); *Hebrew* (Prof. Cless); *Rhetoric* (Prof. Haug); *Philosophy* (Profs. Cless and Kielmanns); *Theology* (Prof. Haug, Prof. Cless for New Testament exegesis, Rektor Tafinger for Church History); *History and Geography* (Prof. Schmidlin); *Mathematics and Physics* (Prof. Hopf). The *French* teaching mentioned is clearly classified as 'voluntary' and was done, at least at Hegel's time, by a French priest rather than one of the regular professors.[16] And, within the official syllabus, there is no evidence of any other modern language teaching.[17] An entry in Hegel's diary, dated January 1, 1787, further confirms this situation:

> My main attention is still directed to the languages, i.e. Greek and Latin. (DHE, p. 38)

Until further evidence is found, we have to conclude that Hegel's reference to the teaching of *several* modern languages at his Gymnasium is inaccurate. If English was not one of the official subjects at the

[13] There were four of these 'Klosterschulen' in Württemberg: Denkendorf and Blaubeuren being more elementary; Maulbronn and Bebenhausen being more advanced. An ordinary student would spend two years at either of the two elementary cloisters and then proceed, for another two years, to the advanced cloister that was linked with the elementary one he attended. Denkendorf was associated with Maulbronn – Hegel's friend Hölderlin was educated there – and Blaubeuren was connected with Bebenhausen.

[14] Cp.: Anon., *Beschreibung der hohen Karls-Schule zu Stuttgart* (Stuttgart, 1783).

[15] F. Nicolin (1970) pp. 18–20; cp.: Carmelo Lacorte, *Il primo Hegel* (Florence, 1959) pp. 65–69.

[16] F. Nicolin (1970) p. 20.

[17] According to the *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Stuttgarter Gymnasiums* (Stuttgart,

Gymnasium, one could think he might have learned it through the above mentioned private tuition. Additional, privately paid teaching was certainly common in Hegel's time:

> The daily routine at the school bore the imprint of a strange co-existence of private and public tuition . . . The attendance of the private classes, for which the teachers had to be paid separately . . . was generally voluntary . . . At the 'Obergymnasium', the arrangements were similar: beside their regular morning and afternoon lectures the professors offered 'Collegia publica' (within the school building) and 'Collegia privata' or 'privatissima' (in their own homes). (Nicolin, 1970, p. 12)

We know from various sources[18] that Hegel attended the private tuition of 'Präzeptor' Löffler and Professor Hopf at the 'Unter-' and 'Obergymnasium' respectively, as well as the more practical instruction of Colonel Duttenhofer.[19] But, on a closer look at the detailed evidence available, it appears that the private tuition was clearly modelled on the official syllabus, shows the same priority of classical learning, and contains no mention of modern language teaching. According to Hegel's own summary (diary entry of July 6, 1785) Löffler's tuition covered Curtius, Aesop, Cicero, Vida, the New Testament and the Psalms (DHE, pp 11 f.). For the later period, we have another entry in the diary and we can also take the subject matters taught from Hegel's timetable: Cicero's *De Officiis* and Longinus' *De Sublimitate*.[20]

To sum up, therefore, it must be stressed that, in spite of a careful search, neither the official course at the Gymnasium nor the private tuition Hegel attended provide evidence for an early acquaintance with the English language. How then are we going to explain Hegel's claim about modern languages? From the available evidence, it seems not unlikely that he had learned English later and in other circumstances, but thought this qualification best included amongst the basic scholarly skills and therefore antedated its acquisition. In the context of an application, such slight manipulations of biographical data, done for the sake of a clear presentation, are certainly common. In the case of

---

1834) pp. 36 + 49 f by J.W. Camerer, a former principal ('Rektor'), English first entered the syllabus in 1794 when F.J. Ströhlin started to teach at the Gymnasium.

[18] Cp.: the above quoted curriculum vitae, Hegel's diary, and the accounts of Christiane Hegel: DHE, pp. 392 ff. & Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 6 f, 10.

[19] Duttenhofer taught the boy some land surveying, cp.: Rosenkranz (1844) p. 6.

[20] See: Hegel's diary, entry of January 1, 1787, DHE, pp. 38 f; cp.: F. Nicolin (1970) pp. 61 f, 135 f.

Hegel's curriculum vitae, it seems all the more likely, as Prof. Harris gives good reasons for suspecting a similar, though less important, inaccuracy with respect to some of the Tübingen information given (Harris, pp. 77 f., 58).

II. *Tübingen*

When we turn to Hegel's years at *Tübingen*, there is again no evidence of and indeed no plausibility for assuming any modern language instruction within the official course at the protestant 'Stift'. Due to its eminent students (Schelling, Hölderlin, Hegel), the 'Stift' has attracted a lot of research interest and we now possess a wealth of detailed studies and general assessments of the life, teaching, atmosphere and spirit of the 'Stift'. In particular, it is possible to reconstruct Hegel's programme of studies with great accuracy.[21] A brief summary of the findings of this research may here be sufficient: On entering the 'Stift', the students were examined in Latin and Greek, History, Logic, Arithmetic and Geometry and subsequently received the initial bachelor's degree ('Baccalaureus'); then followed a two-year philosophical course, concluded by an examination for the Master's degree ('Magister') and leading on to the final three-year course in theology, to be completed with the 'consistorial' examination which fully qualified the candidates for the ministry.[22]

(a) within the two-year philosophical course, apart from the introductory lectures on theological matters, Hegel attended classes in philosophy, history, empirical psychology, natural law, theoretical physics, ontology and cosmology, and on recent political affairs. This list in-

[21] For the 'Stift' in general, see: Julius Klaiber, *Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling in ihren schwäbischen Jugendjahren* (Stuttgart, 1877); Karl Klüpfel, *Geschichte und Beschreibung der Universität Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1849) pp. 260–275; Martin Leube, *Das Tübinger Stift, 1770–1950* (Stuttgart, 1954); the lecture lists of the relevant years are reprinted in: HBr, Vol. IV.1, pp. 23–25 & 37–39. For Hegel in particular, see: Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 25–41; C.P.F. Leutwein, "Über Hegels Stift-Zeit", *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart* (1844) pp. 675–678; compare with: Dieter Henrich, "Leutwein über Hegel. Ein Dokument zu Hegels Biographie", HS, Vol. III (1965) pp. 39–77; Martin Brecht & Jörg Sandberger, "Hegels Begegnung mit der Theologie im Tübinger Stift", HS (1969) Vol. V, pp. 47–81.

[22] A vivid contemporary account of the Stift's teaching may be found in: A.F. Boek, *Geschichte der Herzöglich Wirtenbergischen Eberhard Carls Universität zu Tübingen im Grundrisse* (Tübingen, 1774) pp. 298–301. A.F. Boek, incidentally, was one of Hegel's professors at Tübingen and wrote the 'Magister' dissertation which Hegel, Hölderlin and two others had to defend.

cludes private classes ('Collegien'),[23] as the 'Stift' shows the same mixture of public and private teaching that we found at the Stuttgart 'Gymnasium'. In all probability, the above description of Hegel's philosophical course is complete, we can therefore be quite sure that it did not include the teaching of English or any other modern language. Moreover, from all we know of the teaching staff, none of them had a special interest in British affairs or a related qualification, save Prof. Schnurrer.[24]

(b) with regard to the three-year theological course, we can exclude any instruction in modern languages with even greater certainty. To begin with, this course was one of increased specialization in theology, which makes the introduction of further basic skills – and languages were certainly regarded as rather basic skills – at this stage altogether unlikely. We also have a pretty clear idea of the general structure of the course and of the classes which Hegel attended in particular,[25] and again, there is no trace of modern language classes.

Although the theological faculty and the 'Stift' generally dominated the University,[26] Tübingen as a whole provided a wider intellectual life than the 'Stift' which aimed at educating the future ministers and schoolmasters of Württemberg. Within this wider intellectual life of town and University, there is some evidence of modern language teaching, namely the presence of the 'Sprachmeister'.

These teachers of modern languages operated at the margins of the University: they were subject to the jurisdiction of the University[27] and

[23] The 'Collegien' were privately given by the ordinary professors; they were 'voluntary' and the students had to pay for them.

[24] Compare their characterizations in: Klüpfel, pp. 208 ff; Lacorte, pp. 127–135; H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 78–81. For Prof. Schnurrer, the 'Ephorus' of the 'Stift', see: C.F. Weber, *Christian Friedrich Schnurrers Leben, Charakter und Verdienste* (Kannstadt, 1823). Schnurrer was an exception as he had spent some time in England (Weber, pp. 32–34; Klüpfel, p. 213 note) and appears to have increased his small salary as a young academic ('Repetent' since 1770) by giving 'privatissime' English classes (Cp.: Boek, pp. 267, 295; Weber, p. 50). However, as Schnurrer had been promoted to a regular professorial chair (in 1775) and, in addition, to the position of 'Ephorus' (in 1777) – a well-paid and demanding, time-consuming job – it seems improbable that he would have continued with the English teaching and there is no evidence that he did.

[25] For the course, see: Klüpfel (1849) pp. 216–247; Brecht & Sandberger (1969) passim; the lecture lists as reproduced in HBr, Vol. IV.1, pp. 37–39. For a clearly arranged summary of Hegel's attendance of courses, see: Harris (1972) pp. 88–96.

[26] Klüpfel, p. 216.

[27] See: H.W. Thümmel, *Die Tübinger Universitätsverfassung im Zeitalter des Absolutismus* (Tübingen, 1975) p. 446.

received a basic salary from it[28] (which had to be augmented by fees from the students[29]), but they did not get the title or privileges of either 'Professor' or 'Extraordinarius' (Thümmel, p. 274), and they did not even belong to any of the faculties, but were directly subject to the senate (Boek, p. 273; Thümmel, p. 244). The University seems to have considered and treated them as semi-academic personnel, providing 'extra-mural' services to the student body, a rôle comparable to the instructors of such gentlemanly skills as fencing.

Beside the University, such 'Sprachmeister' could also be attached to the 'Collegium illustre', a legally independent institution which originally educated young aristocrats.[30] However, since 1688, throughout the eighteenth century and until its closure in 1817, the 'Collegium' had a modified function: it now served exclusively to educate the Princes of Württemberg, whenever there was one of appropriate age.[31] To fulfill that function, the 'Collegium' constantly employed between three and six professors and a number of other instructors, including 'Sprachmeister'.[32] As it happened often enough that no Prince was in residence, the teaching staff tended to accept additional appointments at the University – there was no legal obstacle involved – and even if they did not, the University students were still allowed to attend any teaching at the 'Collegium' (Thümmel, pp. 446 & 439). We may therefore consider the 'Collegium' an integral part of the educational facilities and cultural life of Tübingen.[33]

From the account of A.F. Boek, writing in 1773/74, it appears that the

[28] The documents quoted by Thümmel (p. 104 note) specify the payments of the 'Sprachmeister' for the years 1725 and 1753.

[29] A.F. Boek, p. 325.

[30] For the 'Collegium illustre' in general, see: A.F. Boek, pp. 64–73; Eugen Schneider, "Das Tübinger Collegium illustre", *Württembergische Vierteljahreshefte für Landesgeschichte*. New Series 7 (1898) pp. 217–245; August Willburger, *Das Collegium illustre zu Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1912); W.F. Thümmel, pp. 434–480. For the 'Sprachmeister' at the 'Collegium', in particular, there is a thesis: Gerhard Rauscher, *Das Collegium illustre zu Tübingen und die Anfänge des Unterrichts in den neueren Fremdsprachen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Englischen (1601–1817)*. Diss. Phil. (Tübingen, 1957). This thesis has not been available to me, but Dr. Volker Schäfer (Oberstaatsarchivrat Tübingen) has kindly provided me with a summary of its results.

[31] This happened about five times in the eighteenth century. The 'Collegium' was then formally opened and admitted other noblemen as well. Cp.: Thümmel, p. 442.

[32] Originally, one of the professors taught modern languages, but during the reign of Duke Carl Eugen, the regular chairs at the 'Collegium' were otherwise filled and languages became the responsibility of more basic instructors. Cp.: Thümmel, p. 447. For the exception of Prof. Emmert see below.

[33] Indeed, the University seems to have referred to the facilities of the 'Collegium' in its advertisements abroad, i.e. outside Württemberg; cp.: Thümmel, p. 445.

University, by the middle of the eighteenth century, considered three 'Sprachmeister' (for Italian, French, and English) as regular posts,[34] but, frequently, one or more of these positions would not be filled, due to financial problems of the University. According to Klüpfel, Rauscher, and Thümmel, there was normally one 'Sprachmeister' at the 'Collegium'.[35] Considering that a diplomatic career would normally be open to the young noblemen attending the 'Collegium', it may also be presumed that the study of languages there was a more respectable activity than at the University proper. As a consequence of this significance, some of the 'Sprachmeister' at the 'Collegium' had been given the title of Professor.[36] When University and 'Collegium' are taken together, it seems a fair estimate that, while allowing for double employment and vacancies not immediately filled, an average number of 2–3 'Sprachmeister' were provided. There is also evidence that these 'Sprachmeister' achieved perceptible results: when Duke Carl Eugen attended the University's anniversary (in 1777) – an opportunity for the University to display its academic achievements – it is reported by Kugler and Klüpfel that lectures were delivered in various languages and both sources mention English as the *first* of the modern languages (except German of course).[37] With regard to Hegel's Tübingen years, we can be certain about the teaching of English at both 'Collegium' and University, as Johann Heinrich *Emmert* occupied both positions simultaneously, starting in 1792. Emmert was so highly respected a foreign language teacher that he was given the title of 'Professor'.[38]

There is no direct proof that Hegel attended the classes of Prof. Emmert or any other 'Sprachmeister'[39] but there is the indirect evidence of Hegel's 'Stammbuch', three entries of which are made in English:

[34] A.F. Boek, p. 295; Thümmel, pp. 104, 244, 274.

[35] Klüpfel, pp. 105 ff, 166 ff; Rauscher, passim: provides a complete list of the 'Sprachmeister' at the 'Collegium', dating from 1601 to 1817; Thümmel, pp. 434–448, especially pp. 446 f.

[36] See: Klüpfel, p. 107 & Thümmel, pp. 440 & 447.

[37] Klüpfel, p. 194; Bernhard Kugler, "Die Jubiläen der Universität Tübingen nach handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universität Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1877) p. 69.

[38] My knowledge of J.H. Emmert is based on information kindly provided by Dr. Volker Schäfer (Oberstaatsarchivrat, Tübingen). The professorship was, at the time of Duke Carl Eugen, an unusual honour to be bestowed upon a 'Sprachmeister'; cp.: Thümmel, p. 447.

[39] Dr. Schäfer has kindly informed me that no records of student attendance have survived.

I pray thee, peace; I will be flesh and blood;
For there was never yet a philosopher,
That could endure the tooth-ache patiently;
However they have writ the style of gods,
And made pish at chance and sufferance.

Shakespeare

Stuttgart
Im Apr. 1791

Von deinem Freund
M. Seiz.[40]

There is Good and Bad everywhere; a good and a bad side; all the art is to find it out. This is the reason, there are some, who are always content, and others, who are never satisfied.

Stuttgart
the 16. of May 1791

That you may find every where the good side, wishes You heartily, Your true friend,
C.H. Kaufmann.
(HBr, IV.1, p. 145)

If, my Dear! you return the true Friendship and great esteem I feel for you, we will be united not only in this Life, but find one another in Eternity. Let the sweet band of consanguinity serve to ennoble our mutual sentiments of Love, and our Friendship grow to the highest possible degree.

Stuttgart, the 3rd August 1791

In remembrance of your true
Friend and Cousin
Charles August Goeriz.
(HBr, IV.1, pp. 146 f.)

From the nature of a 'Stammbuch' we can conclude that the authors of these entries were Hegel's friends, at least in the sense of close acquain-

[40] The 'Stammbuch' is reprinted in: HBr, Vol. IV.1, pp. 135–164, here p. 143; the quotation is from *Much Ado About Nothing* V.1. Both Quarto (1600) and Folio (1623), as well as the *New Variorum Shakespeare*. Ed. by H.H. Furness (Philadelphia, 1899) Vol. XII, p. 243 show "push" (to make a push = to make light of) instead of "pish". There were, however, old editions which showed "pish", e.g.: *Shakespeare's Works*. Ed. by N. Rowe. In 8 vols. (London, 1714).

tance and social intercourse.[41] Moreover, Karl. A. *Goeriz* was also Hegel's cousin, the son of Christian Friedrich Goeriz, brother in law of Hegel's mother, to be precise (HBr, IV.2, p. 180). An entry in a 'Stammbuch' is, of course, no proof of the author's proficiency in the language and an element of boyish show-off may also be involved,[42] but two conclusions may legitimately be drawn from these entries: (a) it clearly emerges that three of Hegel's friends had at least started to learn English;[43] (b) it seems unlikely that three persons would independently choose a foreign language for making an entry, unless they knew that the recipient could understand it or had made some effort – comparable to their own – towards acquiring such understanding. To sum up, it seems highly likely that Hegel had begun to learn English during his Tübingen years; a seed the growth of which would greatly be encouraged at the next stage of his career.

III. *Bern and Frankfurt*

The older view of Hegel's *Bern* period as unworthy circumstances[44] or years of drudgery[45] has been criticized by Glockner[46] and, in greater detail and with the support of new documentary evidence, effectively been overcome by Hans Strahm.[47] Apart from two drawbacks that often accompanied the position of a private tutor ('Hofmeister') – (a) the pleasures of previous socializing with fellow-students were no longer

[41] For brief biographical notes on W.F. Seiz, C.H. Kaufmann, and K.A. Goeriz, see: HBr, Vol. IV.2, pp. 275, 211 f, and 180 respectively.

[42] Although I have not been able to identify the entries of Kaufmann and Goeriz, it seems possible that they are also copied from a literary source. I would be grateful to receive any communications on the identification of the two passages.

[43] Apart from the 'Sprachmeister', it is possible that C.H. Kaufmann taught the others some English. He was educated at the 'Carlsschule' between 1782 and 1790, when English was already taught there by Prof. F.F. Pfeiffer. Kaufmann himself certainly took his study of English seriously, as he emigrated to North America in 1793, compare Hegel's own addition to Kaufmann's entry: HBr, Vol. IV.1, p. 145. This supposition could be supported by two considerations: (a) all three entries were written while Hegel was on vacation in Stuttgart, though Seiz was a fellow student at Tübingen; (b) Kaufmann's dedicatory sentence "That you may find . . ." is independently composed, rather than merely quoted. – Until further evidence crops up, all this is mere guesswork, which does not affect, however, the main conclusions drawn.

[44] Rudolf Haym (1857) p. 63.

[45] Hugo Falkenheim, "Eine unbekannte politische Druckschrift Hegels", *Preussische Jahrbücher*. Vol. CXXXVIII (1909) pp. 193–210, here p. 208.

[46] Hermann Glockner, *Hegel*. In 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1929 + 1940) Vol. I, p. 271.

[47] Hans Strahm, "Aus Hegels Berner Zeit", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* Vol. 41 (1932) pp. 514–533.

within easy reach;[48] (b) the remoteness of Bern from such focuses of cultural activity as Jena;[49] – Hegel's years in Switzerland should not be characterized in too gloomy colours: the duty of teaching an eight year old girl (who had an additional governess to look after her) and a six year old boy (Strahm, p. 524), cannot have been all that strenuous and time-consuming. In Hegel's letters to Schelling, we occasionally find him complaining that his time was somewhat limited[50] or that his studies were frequently interrupted.[51] But these utterances must be seen in their context – i.e. Hegel is addressing Schelling – and they may then well be interpreted as over-modesty towards this young genius, whose early literary activities and wide, fertile projects appear to have made Hegel shy about his own efforts.[52] Considering the evidence which Strahm puts forward it seems fair to conclude with him: "Hegel had enough spare time to educate himself further."[53]

Another of Hegel's complaints seems, at first glance, to have been more serious; he appears to have lacked the scholar's 'bread and wine', i.e. books.[54] But again, Hans Strahm's article is an efficient corrective against jumping to false conclusions: (a) Hegel *could* have used the famous 'Stadtbibliothek' in Bern, where the Steigers were living during the winter, although it cannot be checked nowadays whether he did (Strahm, p. 526); (b) at Tschugg, the main residence of the Steigers, Hegel had the use of an impressive library which contained, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, the learning of the age.[55] Bearing this evidence in mind, Hegel's complaint must again be qualified by its context and the lack of books Hegel had spoken of must then be restricted to, as Prof. Harris puts it, "the current works that Schelling and Hölderlin were excited about" (1972, p. 156). To sum up, Hegel's period in Switzerland, far from depriving him of the chances of further self-education, gave him the time, the means, and the stimuli (especially

[48] Cp.: H.S. Harris (1972) p. 155.

[49] Compare Hegel's complaint in a letter to Schelling, dated Christmas Eve 1794, HBr. Vol. I, p. 11 – HL, p. 28.

[50] HBr, Vol. I, p. 17 – HL, p. 31.

[51] HBr, Vol. I, p. 11 – HL, p. 28.

[52] Hans Strahm, p. 514, interpreted Hegel's utterances in this way. For further support, one should consider the formulations Hegel used in some other letters to Schelling, for example, HBr, Vol. I, pp. 32 + 59 – HL, pp. 42 + 64; see also Harris (1792) p. 157 note.

[53] Strahm, p. 524; see also Harris (1972) p. 156.

[54] HBr, Vol. I, p. 17 – HL, p. 31.

[55] The library was later sold and there exists an auction catalogue: *Catalogue de la Bibliotheque de Tschougg* (Bern, 1880) which contains 1389 items. Hans Strahm's article (pp. 527–531) includes a list of selected items. Dr. Helmut Schneider (Hegel-Archives, Bochum) is preparing a reprint of the catalogue and has kindly allowed me to use his copy. – An extract from the auction catalogue forms appendix V of the present study.

a close acquaintance with a different political system) to enrich and deepen his previous theological studies with historical and political inquiries.

With regard to Hegel's study of the English language, his period in Switzerland certainly provided various stimuli which appear to have encouraged his efforts. First of all, Bern's cultural ties with England were of paramount importance, easily exceeding all the links with Weimar-Jena, Berlin, and Vienna, and even surpassing the manifold contacts with France, especially after the Revolution.[56] Secondly, the Steigers of Tschugg, Hegel's Swiss employers, cultivated, amongst other contacts abroad, various English connections and frequently undertook educational trips there.[57] Finally there was the above mentioned Tschugg library: Christoph Steiger von Tschugg (1725–1785), the grandfather of Hegel's pupils,[58] had spent some time in London, and he quasi-institutionalized his family's affinity with Britain by collecting a library with strong leanings towards Britain's intellectual life, thus providing a treasure-vault of the British 'Geist' from which Hegel could benefit when he came to Tschugg. In the Tschugg library we find many important political and historical authors: Bolingbroke, Gibbon'[59] Harrington, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Robertson, and others, but also the great men of letters: Addison, Dryden, Fielding, Gay, Goldsmith, Gray, Johnson, Milton, Pope, Shakespeare, Smollett, Steele, Swift, Thomson, Young, and the aesthetic theories of Kames and Shaftesbury.[60] Almost all of these authors were not represented by translations, but by original editions, many of which Ch. Steiger may have bought during his stay in England. In quantitative terms, the Tschugg library contained 190 volumes (85 catalogue numbers) of English books.

That Hegel used the Tschugg library extensively can hardly be doubted, considering Hans Strahm's general characterizations of Hegel's Swiss circumstances, as well as the reports of Rosenkranz, Haym, Rosenzweig, Hoffmeister, Haering, Harris, and others, which have shown that much of Hegel's reading and writing – of both excerpts

[56] Cp.: Hans Strahm, p. 532.

[57] Ludwig Hasler, "Aus Hegels Philosophischer Berner Zeit", HS, Vol. XI (1976) pp. 205–211, here p. 205.

[58] Strahm, p. 523 corrects Franz Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 47 and Hugo Falkenheim (1909) p. 206 who both confused Christoph von Steiger with Niklaus Friedrich von Steiger.

[59] Gibbon is not to be found in the auction catalogue, but appears to have been in the library; cp.: Strahm, p. 531.

[60] For a complete list of English books in the Tschugg library, see: Appendix V.

and original manuscripts (in the form of references, quotations, and allusions) – can be traced back to materials in the Tschugg library. That Hegel also used part of the extensive collection of English books in that library, and thus practised and improved his English, may with great certainty be concluded from an analysis of the list of English books in his own library. (An edited extract of the English books in Hegel's library forms appendix IV of the present study). A number of British authors that were held in the Tschugg library reappear in contemporary English editions (published in Switzerland) in Hegel's own library. In spite of the fact that all of these authors (e.g. Bolingbroke, Gibbon, Locke, Robertson, Shakespeare) were generally known, some of them, especially Bolingbroke and Robertson, had not crossed the path of Hegel's education before and it therefore seems likely that Hegel read or skipped through the library copies first and then decided they were so important that he soon purchased them for his own library. But Hegel's library allows further conclusions: According to the auction catalogue,[61] Hegel's library included nineteen items of English works, a total of 58 numbers and 59 volumes.[62] Six of these items, a total of 29 volumes, were published in Basel – Bolingbroke, Clarendon (2), Robertson (2), Smith – so that this place of publication easily outnumbers any other, not only Leipzig and Frankfurt, the traditional centres of the book trade in Germany, but even London. All of these Basel editions were published in the 1790s and thus, during Hegel's Swiss period (October 1793 – January 1797), were either already available or, in the case of the two Clarendon editions, under preparation, so that Hegel would have known of their forthcoming appearance through advertisements, subscriptions, and other communications. Also the number of Hegel's English books published in the 1790s exceeded any other period, including his Berlin years. It therefore seems obvious that Hegel used his stay in Switzerland, partly induced by circumstances there, like the composition of the Tschugg library, to buy English books and to improve his English. From the English books in Hegel's own library and the likely date of their purchase, it seems fair to assess that, by the end of his Swiss period, Hegel's knowledge of English, at least his receptive competence, had developed to such an extent that he could read English books.

[61] *Verzeichniß der von dem Professor Herrn Dr. Hegel und dem Dr. Herrn Seebeck hinterlassenen Bücher=Sammlungen* (Berlin, 1832). Prof. Friedhelm Nicolin (Düsseldorf) is preparing an annotated reprint of this catalogue. For an extract from the catalogue, see: Appendix IV.

[62] Normally each volume had a separate number in the catalogue. The paperbound copies of *Othello* and *Romeo and Juliet*, however, appear together under No.: 945.

A final glance at Hegel's *Frankfurt* years confirms this conclusion, for in two writings of this period, Hegel's allusions to certain points of Britain's political life bear witness to his reading of English sources. In one of the notes he attached to his translation of Cart's letters [1798], Hegel strongly criticizes the lack of adequate representation of the British people in the House of Commons and the measures of political repression which the younger Pitt had managed to get ratified by Parliament:[63]

> The author has not lived to see how gravely in these latest years the security of property has been compromised in many respects and the rights of domestic privacy restricted by the power conceded to the receivers of the higher taxes, how personal freedom has been limited by suspension of the constitution on the one hand and civil rights limited by positive laws on the other; – how strikingly clear it has become that a minister can scorn public opinion if he has a parliamentary majority at his command; that the nation is so inadequately represented that it cannot make its voice effective in Parliament, and its security depends more upon fear of its unconstitutional might, upon the prudence of the minister, or upon the discretion of the House of Lords. Through this insight and on account of these facts even the respect of the English nation itself of many of its strongest admirers, has fallen.[64]

In his first 'Württembergschrift' of 1798, Hegel appears again to take sides with Charles James Fox rather than Pitt. This time he alludes to the reservations Fox made (in spite of his intention to improve representation) about universal suffrage as a means to increase the number of *independent* electors:[65]

> As long as everything else remains in its old condition, as long as the people do not know their rights, as long as no public spirit has emerged, as long as the power of the civil servants is not restricted,

[63] 'Regulation of Aliens Bill' (1792); 'Suspension of Habeas Corpus' (1794); 'Treasonable Practices Bill', relating to correspondence as well as public meetings (1795). For Britain's political situation at the time and Hegel's assessment of it, compare my articles: "A Stage in the Development of Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. The 1802 Excerpts on Bonaparte and Fox", HS (1985) Vol. 20, pp. 163–172; "Fox und Pitt. Spannungsfeld britischer Politik im Spiegel des Hegelschen Denkens", Hans-Christian Lucas & Otto Pöggeler (Eds.), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1986) pp. 111–128.

[64] Cart, pp. 81 f – The English translation is quoted from H.S. Harris (1972) p. 424.

[65] H.S. Harris (1972, p. 430) suggests that the Fox speech cited was the oration of 26

> general elections would only lead to a complete overthrow of our constitution. The main task would be to grant franchise to a body of honest and enlightened men who are independent of the court. But – irrespective of how franchise and eligibility are defined – I do not see how any method of election could guarantee such an assembly. (TWA, Vol. I, p. 273)

For a definite identification of Hegel's sources, the first allusion is too general and the second one is too freely formulated, but it seems obvious that Hegel, beside German and French reports,[66] also used the excerpts from English newspapers which Rosenkranz still had in his hands when he wrote his *Life of Hegel*:

> It was with close attention, as his excerpts from English newspapers show, that Hegel followed the parliamentary discussions of the poor law. (Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 85)

IV. *Conclusion*

To sum up, no evidence has yet come to light to support Hegel's claim that he had learned English during his Stuttgart schooldays; the entries in his 'Stammbuch' and related evidence allow the assumption that Hegel had begun to study English during his Tübingen period; his stay in Bern provided various stimuli to advance this knowledge and his subsequent purchases of English books make it likely that Hegel had acquired proficiency in English by the time he left Switzerland. From the Frankfurt period onwards Hegel's writings show traces of English sources.

The gaps in this reconstruction are also obvious: in particular, none of Hegel's early excerpts from English newspapers or books have survived; it has neither been possible to link Hegel's social circle at Tübingen with one of the 'Sprachmeister' there, nor has it been possible to identify, with reasonable certainty, the English (newspaper) sources of Hegel's early allusions to the political controversies associated with the names of

---

May 1797; cp.: *The Speeches of the Right Honourable Charles James Fox in the House of Commons*. In 6 vols. (London, 1815) Vol. VI, pp. 339–370. However, the points are also contained in other speeches, e.g.: Vol. V, pp. 108 f, 113, 115.

[66] Both Rosenzweig (1920, Vol. I, pp. 230 f) and Hoffmeister (DHE, p. 463) refer to Posselt's *Europäische Annalen* as a possible source. That Hegel carefully studied French papers may be taken from an excerpt (which has survived) from *Le Moniteur Universel*. I have discussed this excerpt in my article: "A Stage in the Development of Hegel's Theory of the Modern State", op. cit.

Pitt and Fox. These are the fields where future research may bring new evidence.

(B) HEGEL'S READING AND INDIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DATES AND EXTENT

I. *The School-days at Stuttgart*

Hegel's early interest in Britain's cultural life was awakened by his favourite teacher Löffler,[67] who, apart from teaching him at school and providing additional private tuition, also took a personal interest in the young Hegel. There is evidence of social contact between teacher and pupil, which might have taken the forms of common walks and mutual private visits.[68] In the course of these contacts, Löffler aroused Hegel's interest in Shakespeare by making him, as early as 1778, a present of a German Shakespeare edition,[69] inscribed, according to the evidence of Christiane Hegel,[70] "You do not understand them [the plays] yet, but you will soon learn to understand them." As in the case of so many other great German men of letters, Hegel's early acquaintance with Shakespeare was the beginning of a lifelong, though not unqualified admiration. The frequent later references to Shakespeare's plays are beyond our present scope,[71] but, as far as Hegel's youth in Stuttgart is concerned, his reading of Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar" found expression in his "Unterredung zwischen Dreien" (Antonius, Lepidus, Octavius).[72]

[67] For Hegel's views on Löffler see his Latin diary, entries of July, 6 and 7, 1785: in DHE, pp. 11 f; a German translation is to be found in F. Nicolin (1970) pp. 35 f; cp.: Rosenkranz (1844) p. 6; F. Nicolin (1970) p. 19.

[68] See: Rosenkranz (1844) p. 6.

[69] Hegel's diary, entry of July 7, 1785: in DHE, p. 13. – Some confusion has arisen as to which Shakespeare edition Hegel is referring: Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 7 & 434; DHE, p. 13 note; Lacorte, p. 79; F. Nicolin (1970) pp. 116 f; H.S. Harris (1972) p. 3; Lucas (1981) p. 247. In his recent article, "Welche Shakespeare-Ausgabe Besaß Hegel?", HS, Vol. 19 (1984) pp. 305–311, Prof. Nicolin has established beyond doubt that Hegel possessed the Eschenburg/Eckert edition of 1778–1783.

[70] Christiane Hegel's letter to Hegel's widow: in DHE, pp. 392–394.

[71] Cp.: Lucas (1981) pp. 246–253; Wolff/Martini (1949) pp. 120–179.

[72] DHE, pp. 3–6; Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 451–454.

Hegel's early interest in Shakespeare is relevant to our present purposes, for it seems probable that it was via Shakespeare that Hegel found his way to "The Elements of Criticism" by Henry *Home*, Lord *Kames*, apparently the first work of the Scottish School that he took notice of. Home's "Elements" was famous for its exaltation of Shakespeare,[73] its influence on German Shakespeare criticism was considerable,[74] and it has been shown (see above, chapter two), in particular, that it affected the views of Lessing, Gerstenberg, Herder, and Lenz. Given these general circumstances and the biographical evidence that Hegel bought the "Elements" from the library of the late Löffler,[75] Shakespeare appears as the likely link . However that may be, in 1785, Hegel bought the "Elements", in the German translation by Meinhard; it was thus the first work by a Scottish philosopher he acquired, and he kept it in his library till his death (Cp.: Appendix IV). Moreover, during his years as private tutor in Switzerland, Hegel had the opportunity of consulting an English edition of Home's work in the Tschugg Library (Cp.: Appendix V). A late consequence of this early contact with Home is to be found in Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, which include a reference to Home's book (TWA, XIII, p. 32). The briefness of this reference might be seen as playing down the impact which Home's work once had on Hegel; at any rate, the reference would not make that impact obvious to an unprepared reader. This fact can be accounted for by two interrelated explanations: on the one hand, Hegel's contact with Home's "Elements" may be regarded as an example of an influence that was absorbed too early and thoroughly to be conscious and to receive full acknowledgement; on the other hand, when the old Hegel looks back upon the various writers on aesthetics of the Enlightenment period (e.g.: Home, Batteux, Ramler, Sulzer), whose views he has, at the same time, absorbed and recreated afresh in his own specific way (cp.: Helferich, 1979, p. 204), he no longer has the distinctive features of each individual of that broad stream at his fingertips. Nevertheless, a fuller comparison between Home's and Hegel's aesthetic views, obviously beyond the scope of the present study, might still be rewarding.[76]

[73] H.S. Robinson, *English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1930) pp. 103–114: H.W. Randall (1940/41) pp. 60–68.

[74] Hans Wolffheim, *Die Entdeckung Shakespeares* (Hamburg, 1959) pp. 55–57; H. Blinn (1982) Vol. I, pp. 23, 25 f, 80 f, 111, 118, 128.

[75] Cp.: his Latin diary, entry of December 11, 1785: in DHE, p. 24 – for a German translation, see: F. Nicolin (1970) p. 96.

[76] Such a speculative comparison would have to consider the following three characteristics of Home's aesthetics: (1) The systematic structure and comprehensive scope of Home's "Elements". (2) The significance attached to an account of human nature. This

Hegel's early acquaintance with Adam *Ferguson* is already testified to by Karl Rosenkranz (1844, p. 14). In his edition of Hegel's early manuscripts, Hoffmeister provided this well-informed note to the evidence of Rosenkranz; "this can only relate to Ferguson's 'Institutes of Moral Philosophy', translated and annotated by Christian Garve, Leipzig 1772."[77] In spite of this clear evidence, some confusion has arisen in the recent literature, which we can only mention in passing.[78] About the immediate causes of Hegel's interest in Ferguson, we can only offer two speculations: (a) Hegel's contacts with Jakob Friedrich Abel (1751–1829), for which there is some evidence in his diary, in his sister's account, and in Rosenkranz.[79] Abel, who was Professor at the 'Carlsschule' in Stuttgart and Schiller's favourite teacher, mentor, and friend there,[80] popularized, through his teaching and some of his own writings,[81] Scottish philosophy and Ferguson's ideas, in particular, and it is therefore quite possible that Hegel's reading of Ferguson was stimulated and encouraged by him; (b) Hegel's reading of Christian Garve which is documented – by two of Hegel's excerpts, dated 1787 and 1788 (DHE, pp. 115–136, 48–52) – for the following two of Garve's articles: "Versuch über die Prüfung der Fähigkeiten" [1769];[82] "Betrachtungen einiger Verschiedenheiten in den Werken der ältesten und neuern Schriftsteller, besonders der Dichter" [1770].[83] Whether Hegel was led to study Ferguson through his reading of Garve's articles, as H.S. Harris suggested (1972, pp. 50–51 note), cannot be settled defi-

---

aspect is tied up with Home's lengthy "psychology of perception" (2a); with the connection between ethics and aesthetics, virtue and beauty (2b), so typical of the Scottish Enlightenment; and with the glorification of Shakespeare (2c). (3) The social function of art and, in particular, of the reception of art.

[77] DHE, p. 422; for details of the edition concerned, see: Appendix I.

[78] H.S. Harris gets only the English title wrong, probably because Hoffmeister did not give it, and calls it: "Principles of Moral Philosophy" (1972, p. 51 note). Harris seems to be followed by Ripalda (1977, p. 31), who begins by calling it "Principles of Moral Philosophy" but manages to alter this, in the course of one page, to "Principles of Modern Philosophy." – R. Plant, in turn, confuses the "Institutes" (which Garve did translate) with the "Essay on the History of Civil Society" (which was not translated by Garve, but by C.F. Jünger), and his error is repeated by Cullen (Plant, 1973, p. 17; Cullen, 1979, p. 3). – For the bibliographical details, see: Appendix I.

[79] Cp.: DHE, p. 15; F. Nicolin (1970) p. 84; Rosenkranz (1844) p. 6.

[80] Cp.: Buchwald (1966), chapters XI and XII, pp. 154–194.

[81] For summaries of these, see: Buchwald (1966) pp. 172, 175, 181, 203; DHE, pp. 411, 420.

[82] NBSWFK, Vol. VIII (Leipzig, 1769) pp. 1–44, 201–231.

[83] NBSWFK, Vol. X (Leipzig, 1770) pp. 1–38, 189–210; now in: Christian Garve, *Popularphilosophische Schriften*. In 2 vols., edited by Kurt Wölfel (Stuttgart, 1974) Vol. I, pp. 24–105.

nitely, but it is beyond doubt that these articles (and the lengthy commentary Garve added to his translation of Ferguson's "Institutes"!) popularized various views which Garve had derived from the Scottish Literati and that Hegel was thus able to assimilate them.[84] An example of such popularizations, in the second of the above mentioned articles, is the parallel drawn between the development of the individual and the history of the species.[85] It has been claimed by Shlomo Avineri (1972, p. 141 n.) that Hegel re-read Ferguson in Berlin, since an excerpt from that period contains a reference to Ferguson's "Essay". However, on closer scrutiny, it appears that this reference was directly taken over from the excerpted book (Johannes von Müller),[86] a fact that speaks against such a re-reading.

It has also been claimed that Hegel had known something about *Hume's* historical work since his Stuttgart period (DHE, p. 401; Harris, p. 8), an indirect knowledge that could be traced back to Schroekh's "Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte" (Lacorte, pp. 75 ff.), but the evidence for this is purely internal – based on Hegel's diary entry on 'pragmatic history' (July 1, 1785; DHE, pp. 9 f.) – and not very specific, for the allusions it contains would fit as well for Voltaire's "Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations."

We must not leave the Stuttgart period without pointing to another indirect source of Hegel's knowledge of the Scots: his reading of *learned magazines* and *review journals* which he began at this time. To begin with, Hegel appears to have read, on a regular basis, and made excerpts from the "Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek",[87] which was subscribed to by Hegel's father (DHE, p. 398). The excerpts which Thaulow was the first to publish and Hoffmeister, in his more thorough manner, edited and annotated critically,[88] show Hegel as a reader of four further journals: "Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung",[89] "Berlinische Monatsschrift",[90] "Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste",[91] and

[84] For the wider impact of the Scottish Enlightenment on Garve see above, chapter two, sections A and E.

[85] Cp.: AF1, pp. 4–5; Garve/Wölfel (1974) Vol. I, pp. 26 f.

[86] Cp.: Christoph Jamme's critical edition of this excerpt: "Hegel als Leser Johannes von Müllers", HS, Vol. 16 (1981) pp. 9–40, here p. 38.

[87] See Hegel's diary, the entries of February 18, 1786 and January 5, 1787 (DHE, pp. 29 + 40 f.) and compare the notes of Hoffmeister (DHE, pp. 406 f.) and F. Nicolin (1970) pp. 131 & 137; see also Rosenkranz (1844) p. 12.

[88] Gustav Thaulow (Ed.), *Hegels Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht.* In 3 parts (Kiel, 1854) Part 3, pp. 33–146; DHE, pp. 54–166.

[89] Thaulow, pp. 127, 129, 135 – DHE, pp. 147–166.

[90] Thaulow, pp. 120, 124, 126 – DHE, pp. 140 ff., 144 f.

"Staats-Anzeigen."[92] In addition to these journals, Rosenkranz mentions the "Schwäbisches Museum" as Hegel's regular reading (1844, p. 12).[93] As has been shown in chapter two, these and other journals – which Hegel kept reading – were effective in spreading the literary achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany and thus, Hegel was able to derive much related information from them.

II. *The Student-days at Tübingen*

Compared with the straightforward evidence of the years at Stuttgart, Hegel's contacts with Scottish philosophy at Tübingen are less obvious, require greater skills of detection, and involve some controversial points. The only relevant direct reading, of which there is external evidence, is David *Hume*, and Rosenkranz, once again, is the principal source:

> Thus, in the course of Hegel's student years, the works of Locke, Hume, and Kant came to be excerpted extensively. At least the study of Kant's 'critique of reason' ['Vernunftkritik'] was definitely first taken up in 1789. (Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 14)

As the excerpts which Rosenkranz mentions are lost, one cannot be sure how much of Hume Hegel really read at that time, but some conclusions can be drawn from the circumstances: the fact that Rosenkranz feels so sure about the year [1789] indicates, in all probability, that the excerpts were dated, as it was indeed Hegel's habit to do so. This supposition is supported by the external evidence that Hegel attended Prof. Flatt's course on "empiricam psychologiam [et] Kantianam Criticam" in the summer term of the same year, surely a topic that would lead to jotting down notes on Kant.[94] A further speculation arises from the context in which Hume is mentioned: as the link between Locke and Kant, a fact that strongly suggests an epistemological content for the excerpts which, we presume, still existed and were in the hands of Rosenkranz when he gave the above quoted account of them. It is hardly surprising, there-

[91] Thaulow, pp. 95, 116 ff. – DHE, pp. 115 ff., 137, 138 f.

[92] Thaulow, p. 33 – DHE, pp. 54 f.; after its editor, this journal was often called "Schlözer's (!) Staats-Anzeigen."

[93] Cp.: F. Nicolin (1970) p. 24; Ripalda (1977) pp. 204 f.

[94] For Flatt's course, see the lecture lists of Tubingen (HBr, IV.1, document 20, p. 24); for Hegel's attendance, see his short c.v., written for the M.A. examination (HBr, IV.1, document 31, p. 34); cp.: H.S. Harris (1972) p. 83.

fore, that later scholars, like Rudolf Haym, understood Rosenkranz in this way:

> We know – which is the main point – that with a characteristically intense eagerness to learn, Hegel read the 'Critique of Pure Reason', excerpting it along the way, and that he read Hume and Locke as well, perhaps directed to them through Kant, since they were his English predecessors. (Haym, 1857, p. 34)

But, perhaps, this conclusion is too obvious to be fully trustworthy. In particular, it looks so much like a backward projection of scholars who knew the mature Hegel to be the culmination of the Kant–Fichte–Schelling 'triumvirate' and then imagined that, as a matter of course, Kant must have been crucial for Hegel's development. Likewise, it evokes the old view of "the Locke–Berkeley–epistemology– only–Hume" (DHH, p. ix) which is so misleading. With respect to the much discussed issue of Kant's early impact on Hegel, it needs to be said that it has certainly been overemphasized by nineteenth century scholars. On closer scrutiny, it appears that Hegel did not get excited in the wake of the first Kant euphoria at Tübingen, and those who did – like the older 'Repetent' Diez, or his contemporary Märklin – were not his closest friends.[95] At the beginning of his University studies, Hegel's main sympathies were with Rousseau, rather than with Kant, and what interest there was in the latter's 'revolution of spirit' was soon overshadowed by that practical Revolution beyond the Rhine. Having made these qualifications, the evidence of Hegel's early acquaintance with Kant (aquaintance rather than any thorough criticism) should not be interpreted away, which is how Lacorte deals with it (pp. 110 & 135). Haering and Harris seem to be nearer the mark when they steer a middle course between the nineteenth century stress on Kantian influences and the other extreme, best represented by Lacorte.[96] With respect to the supposedly epistemological context of Hegel's early studies of Hume, the accounts of Rosenkranz and Haym seem to be reliable. From what we know of Prof. Flatt,[97] it seems highly likely that he did indeed view David Hume (and Locke) through Kantian spectacles. There is a further piece of external evidence to support the assumption that, at this early stage, Hegel's reading of Hume was confined to epistemology, namely

[95] Leutwein's report (DHE, p. 430), if read with caution (Cp.: D. Henrich, HS, Vol. III, pp. 39–77), allows this conclusion. – Cp.: H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 107 f.

[96] Cp.: Haering (1929) pp. 53 + 55; H.S. Harris (1972) p. 83 n.

[97] Little though it is, beyond Flatt's published writings; cp.: Lacorte, pp. 169 ff; Henrich (1965) pp. 70 f. Henrich rightly stresses the need for a full study of Flatt and his influence.

the first of the two lengthy essays Hegel had to submit in accordance with his 'Magister' examination in 1790: "Ueber das Urtheil des gemeinen Menschenverstands über Objectivitaet und Subjectivitaet der Vorstellungen" (HBr, IV.1, p. 34). Of this essay, which had probably emerged from his course with Flatt, only the title has survived, but that title already indicates an epistemological content.[98]

To sum up, there is no reason for doubting the evidence of Rosenkranz that Hegel made excerpts from Hume at Tübingen. Secondly, that Rosenkranz mentions these excerpts in connection with others on Locke and Kant, allows the conclusion, which is supported by some external evidence, that the content for the excerpts was epistemological. Thirdly, due to this connection between Hegel's reading of Kant and Hume, the above–made reservations about a profound Kantian influence on the freshman Hegel also apply to his contacts with Hume; reservations which will be enforced by the comparative lack of allusions to Humean views in Hegel's manuscripts of this period (dealt with in the next section) and which make Haering's assessment appear rather convincing:

> We know . . . of extensive excerpts of Locke, Hume and Kant from this period. Nonetheless, we must make no mistake about the fact that the very real and unique contribution of these thoughts to Hegel's own thought world ['Gedankenwelt'] cannot have already actually begun at that time, but rather, as we shall see, took effect at the very earliest in the Bern period. Prior to then it remained a mere absorption of knowledge. (Haering, 1929, p. 53)

If the evidence of Hegel's direct reading of the Scots during his years at Tübingen is thus rather scanty, there are plenty of indirect sources through which Hegel was able to learn more about Scottish thought. To begin with the impact of the university teaching, we have already mentioned Prof. Flatt's course and the epistemological matters it might have introduced to Hegel. Prof. Roesler's class on universal history (HBr, IV.1, p. 23), which Hegel attended in the autumn/winter term 1788/89, used Schroekh's textbook (Harris, p. 79) and thus renewed Hegel's acquaintance with a work that shows certain parallels with Hume's "History of England" (DHE, p. 401). Four years later, in the summer term 1793, Hegel attended Chancellor Lebret's class on deism and antideism (HBr, IV.1, p. 39; cp.: Harris, pp. 89 f), a context in which Hegel appears to have made further contact with David *Hume*: this time with "The Natural History of Religion". But although this

[98] Cp.: HBr, IV.1, p. 286; Harris (1972) pp. 85 n, 87.

class may well have motivated such reading, the connection might also have been the other way round, so that Hegel would have chosen this class in accordance with his wider interests at the time. In this latter case, the contact between Hume and Hegel might have been mediated by other authors: Hegel's abovementioned reading of the learned journals, which, of course, he continued at Tübingen, was certainly relevant[99] and Herder's "Gott", Hegel's reading of which seems quite likely,[100] might have played a rôle too. However that may be, there are some traces of Hume's "Natural History of Religion" in Hegel's manuscript "Aber die Hauptmasse . . ." (HTJ, pp. 357–8), which will be discussed in the next section.

This brings us to the indirect knowledge of the Scottish Enlightenment which Hegel was able to acquire by his wider reading. Considering the various stimuli which the following thinkers had received from the Scots (see above, chapter two), Hegel, through his reading of Lessing,[101] Herder,[102] Schiller,[103] and Mendelssohn,[104] may well have received some further information on a variety of Scottish thinkers. Due to two principal problems, however, it is impossible to pin down specific points of this transmission: (a) the extent of Hegel's reading of these figures is in itself uncertain and a subject of difficult, controversial reconstructions, into which we cannot enter; (b) thinkers of such power and originality of mind hardly ever reproduce the ideas of their predecessors in a simple and straightforward manner, but transform such influences into interwoven parts of their own complex point of view.

An exception to this difficulty is F.H. Jacobi (1743–1819), for, in his case, it is possible to document a transmission of information on the Scottish thinkers to Hegel. This possibility is opened up by the know-

[99] Cp.: Rosenkranz (1844) p. 14; Ripalda (1973) p. 98 note.

[100] Cp.: H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 188 n, 271 n; for the general influence of Herder on Hegel's Tübingen manuscripts, see: J. Schwarz (1938) pp. 19–30.

[101] Hegel quoted Lessing's "Nathan der Weise" (DHE, pp. 49 + 169) and Schelling would later (February 4, 1795) call him "an intimate of Lessing's" (HBr, Vol. I, p. 21 – HL, p. 32). Cp.: Haym (1857) p. 35; Haering (1929) pp. 19 + 40 ff; Harris (1972) pp. 99–101, 169, 174.

[102] H.S. Harris (1972, p. 271 n.) is probably right in describing Herder's influence on the young Hegel as "the hardest to estimate reliably", but he himself has collected valuable evidence (p. 188 note), such as Hölderlin's letter to Hegel (dated January 25, 1795; HBr, Vol. I, p. 19) from which Hegel's knowledge of Herder can be inferred; cp.: Haym (1857) p. 35; Haering (1929) p. 40; for internal evidence, see: J. Schwarz (1938) pp. 19–30.

[103] DHE, p. 445; Rosenkranz (1844) p. 14 (for Stuttgart); Haym (1857) p. 36; Haering (1929) pp. 53 + 55; Harris (1972) pp. 41 + 43 notes, 81.

[104] DHE, pp. 15, 144 ff; Rosenkranz (1844) p. 15 (for Stuttgart); Haering (1929) p. 54; Harris (1972) pp. 79, 99–101, 140 note.

ledge of the precise extent of Hegel's first (i.e.: Tübingen) reading of Jacobi, to be derived from Rosenkranz:

> With Hölderlin, Fink, Renz, and other friends, Hegel read and discussed, according to reliable sources, . . . Jacobi's 'Woldemar' and 'Allwill' . . .[105]

As opposed to "Allwill"[105a], Jacobi's novel "Woldemar"[106] contains a number of explicit references to and quotations from Ferguson (e.g.: pp. 68 ff, 166 f), Reid (pp. 70 f), Hume (p. 74), and the "situation of philosophy in England on the whole" (p. 70). How, then, do the Scottish thinkers figure in Jacobi's "Woldemar" and what might these aspects, which Hegel was thus able to learn from his reading of Jacobi, have meant for his education as a philosopher? There are indeed some characteristic ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment authors specifically mentioned in the novel – (a) the Scots' emphasis on a 'moral sense' ("sittliches Gefühl"; p. 74); (b) the topic of social corruption and its remedies (p. 75); (c) the analogy between virtue and beauty (p. 78); (d) Ferguson's definition of human felicity (AF1, pp. 35 f, note), which is quoted approvingly[107] – but, unlike Jacobi's principal theoretical writings, the novel does not provide a genuinely philosophical discussion of the above-mentioned ideas. Looked at as a source of Hegel's knowledge of Scottish philosophy, the chief merit of 'Woldemar" is the enthusiasm for the Scots' doctrines and the idea of their significance which the novel conveys. The almost unqualified praise bestowed upon Ferguson, with the marked absence of any critical analysis, illustrates this point nicely: Ferguson is called Woldemar's "favourite philoso-

[105] Rosenkranz (1844) p. 40; cp.: Haym (1857) p. 35. – Moreover, there is an allusion to Jacobi's "Woldemar" in a fragment of slightly later date (1794): HTJ, p. 49; TWA, Vol. I, p. 71; cp.: Harris (1972) pp. 98 n. and 508 f (for an English translation of the fragment).

[105a] F.H. Jacobi, *Eduard Allwills Papiere*. [First published in 1776] = Reprint: (Stuttgart, 1962). In 1792, a revised version appeared under the title: *Allwills Briefsammlung* which is reprinted in: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Werke*. Edited by Friedrich Roth and Friedrich Köppen. In VI vols. (Leipzig, 1812–1825), here Vol. I, pp. 1–226. – Although "Allwill" does not contain any explicit references to the Scottish Enlightenment, there appear to be some affinities, particularly obvious in the 1776 version, with the Scots' views. To follow up these affinities would go beyond the scope of the present study.

[106] F.H. Jacobi, *Woldemar*. Eine Seltenheit aus der Naturgeschichte (Flensburg and Leipzig, 1779). Revised and enlarged editions were published in 1794 and 1796. I have used a reprint of the 1796 edition contained in: *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Werke* (1812–25), here Vol. V (Leipzig, 1820). – The following page references are to this edition.

[107] Jacobi (1820) p. 166. Jacobi gives a page reference to the second English edition of Ferguson's "Essay" and provides his own translation into German.

pher" ("Lieblingsphilosoph", p. 68) and Woldemar himself recalls "that Ferguson's first work, his 'Essay on the History of Civil Society', has constituted an epoch in his life: it encouraged him afresh to re-read the ancients; it put him to a height of reflection and aroused him to such an extent that he still considers this date as the transfer into a better existence" (p. 69). Thus, with respect to the reception of Scottish philosophy, it seems plausible to sum up the impact of Jacobi's novels on Hegel as a confirmation of his previous sympathy for Scottish authors such as Ferguson and an encouragement to pursue his study of them further, rather than inspiring a genuinely philosophical inquiry into and a critical examination of the Scots' achievements. This assessment corresponds with the overall evaluation of Jacobi's contemporary significance, on which a scholarly consensus is beginning to emerge:[107a] although metaphysical speculation did probably strain him, as Goethe acidly remarked,[107b] the majority of his contemporaries regarded him as a leading thinker of the age and the rôle he played in German intellectual life at the end of the eighteenth century can hardly be overestimated.[107c] In other words, it is from an anachronistic perspective that many histories of philosophy devote little or no space to Jacobi: for, though he was not, perhaps, an eminent metaphysician in his own right, he had an almost unrivalled instinct for anticipating the direction in which the philosophical debate of the period was about to move and, as a consequence, he could become a prominent trendsetter himself.

III. *The Tutorships in Bern and Frankfurt*[108]

If the Jena years began to *show* us Hegel as we know him now, it was his years as a tutor which *made* him into that man.[109] It was in Switzerland and Frankfurt that Hegel recast the formative influences on him-

[107a] Cp.: G. Baum (1968) pp. 1–9.

[107b] J.W. Goethe, *Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche*. Edited by Ernst Beutler. In 24 vols. (Zürich, 1948–1954), here Vol. 23 (1950) p. 372; cp.: *Conversations with Eckermann*, being appreciations and criticisms on many subjects by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, with a special introduction by Wallace Wood (New York and London, 1901) p. 190 (conversation of April 11, 1827).

[107c] Cp.: David Baumgardt, *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik* (Leipzig, 1933) p. 284; G. Baum (1968, pp. 2 f.)

[108] Since much of our knowledge of Hegel's Frankfurt and Bern years, especially with respect to his political and historical studies, depends upon manuscripts (such as DHE, pp. 257–277) the originals of which have been lost and cannot therefore be dated with precision, the two periods are here treated together. Cp.: Harris (1972) p. 417 and note; Pöggeler (1974) p. 74.

[109] Cp.: O. Pöggeler (1974) p. 75.

self, that he left some of his intellectual heritage behind while adding to and deepening some other elements of it, and that he emancipated himself from the narrowness of the 'Stift' and sought his own way. With respect to his intellectual pursuits, he was no longer directed by teachers and dependent on the requirements of academic courses, but had become, for the first time in his life, his own master.

For our specific purposes, this development of Hegel's thought implies his growing interest in historical, political, and economic matters, which would lead him almost naturally to study the affairs of Great Britain and to read British authors on history and political economy. As the conditions which Hegel found in Switzerland have already been discussed in so far as they may have motivated Hegel's interest in Britain, a summary of the results of and the evidence for these interests may here be sufficient. According to Rosenkranz and Haym (1844, p. 60; 1857, p. 64), Hegel's historical reading included *Hume's* "History of England", a suggestion that is supported by a short manuscript on Hume 'as a historical writer' (DHE, p. 273) to be discussed in the next section. The bibliographical data, drawn from the catalogues of the Tschugg library and of Hegel's own library (see: Appendices IV & V), show William *Robertson* as the ideal example of an author with whom Hegel was not familiar before, whose works were in the Tschugg library, and later reappear in contemporary editions – published in Switzerland or near-by Austria – in Hegel's own library. In the light of these circumstances, it seems highly likely that Hegel's introduction to Robertson's histories was via the Tschugg library and that his reading of Robertson's principal writings[110] thus began in Switzerland too. With regard to his interest in political and economic matters, Hegel began with detailed empirical studies.[111] According to Rosenkranz, the first effort in this direction was that "Hegel worked through the finances of Bern down to the minutest detail, down to the road toll, etc." (1844, p. 61). These researches soon developed into an interest in Britain, the country most advanced in commerce and industry, and led to the collecting of information from British newspapers.[112] Collecting these empirical data, it appears, led Hegel to look for an analytical framework that would organize the "mass of details." British political economy provided such a framework and it was for this provision of principles that Hegel came to praise the science of 'Staatsoekonomie':

[110] HBibl, p. 44, Nos.: 1101–1111: William Robertson, *History of Scotland*. 3 parts in 6 vols. (Basel, 1791); *An historical Disquisition concerning India* (Basel, 1792); *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V*. In 4 vols. (Vienna, 1787).

[111] Cp.: Haering (1929) p. 592.

[112] Cp.: Rosenkranz (1844) p. 85.

> Its development affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it. (TMK, § 189, pp. 126 f – VRP, Vol. II, pp. 640 f; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 487)

Unfortunately, the precise extent and dates of much of Hegel's economic reading remain matters of estimating from scanty evidence. To begin with Adam *Smith*, there is no 'hard' evidence as to when Hegel read the "Wealth of Nations." As will be shown in the next section, his earliest explicit reference to Smith is to be found towards the end of the first set of the so-called 'Jenaer Realphilosophie' (1803/4; HGW, VI, p. 323). However, Hegel's library contained a Basel edition of the English text, published in 1791 (HBibl, p. 11, Nos.: 239–242; cp.: Appendix IV). That Hegel did not buy the first German translation (by J.F. Schiller and C.A. Wichmann; cp.: Appendix I), may have been due to its poor quality. Since the better translation of Christian Garve appeared between 1794 and 1796 (Cp.: Appendix I), I am inclined to think that Hegel bought his copy before the latter date. Also, I fully agree with Harris that the fact that Hegel's copy was published in Basel suggests that it was purchased while Hegel was living in Switzerland, but I am more doubtful about the second part of his conclusion:

> The only plausible assumption is that he [Hegel] bought the Basel edition for himself while he was a house-tutor in Switzerland (1793–96). Thus he had Smith's "Wealth of Nations" at hand all the time he was working over Steuart, and he had probably read it before he read Steuart (though we cannot be sure of that).[113]

Firstly, it is surely not uncommon among scholars to buy books for later use rather than for immediate reading. Secondly, of course, the extent and the difficulty of the "Wealth of Nations" require considerable time and energy from any reader. Thirdly, that the earliest explicit reference to Smith does not go back before 1804 tends to weaken the claim of an early and thorough study of the "Wealth of Nations" by Hegel. Fourthly, had Hegel read Smith and Steuart side by side, would not his commentary on the latter's book – to be discussed shortly – have contained cross-references to Smith? And is it plausible, given the fame which

[113] H.S. Harris, "The Social Ideal of Hegel's Economic Thought", *Hegel's Philosophy of Action*. Ed. by L.S. Stepelevich & D. Lamb (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983) pp. 49–74, here pp. 53 f. – Henceforth quoted as "Harris (1983a)".

Smith had acquired by then, that Rosenkranz would ignore such references while he was commenting on the commentary? A more cautious conclusion appears therefore appropriate: while it seems highly likely that Hegel bought his copy of the "Wealth of Nations" in Switzerland (1793–96), a thorough reading and subsequent impact did not occur before a couple of years later, probably at the end of his stay in Frankfurt or during his early Jena period.

It is even more difficult to estimate Hegel's reading of *Hume's* political and economic essays. There is no explicit reference to this work of Hume and the affinities between the essays and Hegel's writings overlap with the numerous points that Smith took from Hume – an indebtedness that is best expressed in Dugald Stewart's general assessment[114] – so that it is impossible to argue a case on the basis of internal evidence. What we do know for certain is the availability of the materials to Hegel. The catalogue of the Tschugg library (cp.: Appendix V) shows the third English edition of the "Essays, moral and political" (London, 1748) and a French translation, published in Amsterdam (1754), of the "Political Discourses" (1752).[115] The latter edition is of special importance to our purposes, since it contains the essays dealing with economic matters, such as: "Of Commerce", "Of the balance of trade", etc. (for a full list of the essays included, see: Jessop, p. 23). This availability of the texts, together with Hegel's interest in political and economic subjects and his documented reading of Hume's "History", suggests that Hegel would have made at least some acquaintance with the "Essays" too.

In the case of Sir James *Steuart*, we know through Rosenkranz that Hegel spent three months over the "Principles of Political Oeconomy", studying it carefully and writing a commentary:

> All of Hegel's reflections about the nature of civil society, about need and labour, about the division of labour and resources among the classes, about poor relief and the police, about taxes etc. were concentrated finally in a running commentary on the German translation of Stewart's [!] 'Political Economy', which he wrote between February 19 and May 16, 1799 and which is preserved in its entirety.

[114] DSt, Vol. X, p. 66; also in SGE, Vol. III, iv.24, pp. 320 f.: "The Political Discourses of Mr. Hume were evidently of greater use to Mr. Smith, than any other book that had appeared prior to his Lectures." – Cp.: Smith's own statement about Hume: "by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age" (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 790).

[115] For a full description of these editions, see: T.E. Jessop (Ed.), *A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour* (London, 1938) pp. 17 & 24 f.

> In it there are many impressive views on politics and history, many fine observations. Stewart was still a supporter of the mercantile system. With noble feeling, with a wealth of interesting examples Hegel fought against what was dead in it, as he strove to save the heart [Gemüth] of man amidst the competition and mechanical interaction of labour and commerce. (Rosenkranz, 1844, p. 86 – English translation quoted from Harris, 1972, p. 435)

But alas, this commentary has been lost, an example of how little understanding of the significance of political economy there was among the immediate disciples of Hegel. Rosenkranz, in particular, must be held responsible for a certain amount of carelessness: it would have been easy enough for him, after all, to add this commentary to the other appendices of "Hegels Leben." Having said that, the account of Rosenkranz is not worthless, as Lukács has claimed (1973, I, pp. 16–7; 278–9), but allows, if read with caution, some conclusions about this much missed document. To begin with the obvious, we must appreciate the precise date and the indication that Hegel used a German edition.[116] The summary, too, should not be dismissed offhand; short as it is, it can tell us something about Hegel's intentions and attitude: "he strove to save the 'Gemüth' of man" and the concept of 'Gemüth' is the key to this attitude. Far from being a misleading 'romantic' label, as Lukács thought,[117] recent philological researches (e.g. those of H. Emmel and Otto Pöggeler)[117a] have shown that there was a whole tradition – going back to the mystics (Meister Eckhart, Jakob Böhme) and including such influential thinkers as Kant and Schiller – in which 'Gemüth' is a technical term, not merely a matter of the 'heart' or of 'feeling'. A reference to Schiller's use of the term may cast light on this tradition. As Schiller appears to have been Hegel's guiding light in this matter, this reference may also pave the way towards our consideration of Hegel's

[116] There were two German translations (cp.: Appendix I), but the catalogue of Hegel's library, discovered some years ago, shows the Hamburg edition of 1796 (HBibl, p. 40; cp.: Appendix IV) and thus settles the question. Before the catalogue was found, Paul Chamley had argued quite convincingly that Hegel used the Tubingen edition (HS, III, 1965, pp. 235–39). Rather than dismissing Chamley's reasoning completely, I am inclined to think that Hegel started working with somebody else's Tubingen edition, before buying the Hamburg edition for himself. It is worth recalling, in this context, that the main differences between the two editions are in the first 29 pages.

[117] Lukács (1973) Vol. I, p. 279; with Lukács, incidentally, 'romantic' is often synonymous with 'reactionary'.

[117a] H. Emmel, "Gemüt", *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Ed. by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (Basel and Stuttgart, 1971 ff) 5 vols. have appeared so far, here Vol. 3, pp. 258–262; Otto Pöggeler (1974) pp. 96 f.

use of 'Gemüth' during that period.[117b] Schiller introduces his concept of 'Gemüth', in letters 19–21 of his "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, in einer Reihe von Briefen,"[118] as uniting the opposites of 'sensation' ("Empfindung") and 'thought' ("Denken"), as bridging the gap between 'sensuality' ("Sinnlichkeit") and 'reason' ("Vernunft"). Even more important than this tradition in which the term ought to be seen, is the fact that 'Gemüth' is used in some of Hegel's own manuscripts from the same period (TWA, Vol. I, pp. 274 + 324), a fact which suggests that the term did indeed occur in Hegel's commentary rather than being Rosenkranz' own formulation.[119] A glance at the second of these two surviving manuscripts in which 'Gemüth' is used, throws light on Hegel's intentions: Jesus, it is said, wanted to restore the 'disruption' ("Zerrissensein") of 'Gemüth' to 'wholeness' or 'unity' ("Ganzheit"), a wholeness which implies man's inner harmony as well as man's union with God.[120] Applied to Rosenkranz' summary, this can only mean that Hegel, through his reading of Steuart, perceived man's 'wholeness' being threatened by the unchecked mechanisms of the modern exchange economy ("amidst the competition and mechanical interaction of labour and of commerce"). This perspective is surely in line with Hegel's earlier enthusiasm[121] for Schiller's "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen" (see below) and his later position in the "Philosophy of Right": if left *alone*, 'civil society' has dehumanizing effects.

When we finally scan Hegel's wider reading, during the years of his tutorship, for indirect contacts with the Scottish Enlightenment, Schiller and Emanuel Zeender certainly appear relevant. The above mentioned affinity between Schiller's and Hegel's concept of 'Gemüth' could here be followed up with respect to the question of what threatens the wholeness and harmony of the 'Gemüth' according to Schiller. In his

[117b] In his later years, as a reaction against certain strands of romanticism, Hegel used the term more critically: a development that cannot here be investigated.

[118] J.C. Friedrich Schiller, "Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen" [1795]. I have used the following edition: *Schillers Philosophische Schriften*. Ed. by Jost Perfahl, with notes by Helmut Koopmann (München, 1968) pp. 311–408, here pp. 366–376. The following page references are to this edition. There is also an excellent bilingual edition: *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Ed. by E.M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby (Oxford, 1967).

[119] This is supported by Rosenkranz' general practice: his summaries of Hegel's manuscripts, then unpublished, normally use Hegel's own phrases.

[120] HTJ, p. 266; TWA, Vol. I, p. 324 – for an English translation, see: G.W.F. Hegel: *Early Theological Writings*. Translated by T.M. Knox, with an introduction by Richard Kroner (Chicago, 1948) p. 212.

[121] In a letter to Schelling, dated April 16, 1795, Hegel calls the letters "a masterpiece": HL, p. 36 – HBr, Vol. I, p. 25.

sixth letter, Schiller characterizes the rôle of the division of labour ("Absonderung der Stände and Geschäfte"; p. 324) in his 'description of the age' (p. 322): its results, he sums up, are advantageous to the species, but disastrous to the individual and thus require a higher reconciliation. There are distinct parallels between this position and such Scottish authors as Adam Ferguson: the crucial rôle ascribed to the division of labour (lacking in Kant), the progress which this principle implies (against Rousseau), and the necessity of the emergence of negative side-effects (against the 'vulgar' Enlightenment). If one considers these parallels, together with other evidence of Schiller's indebtedness to the Scottish School (cp.: chapter two, section C) and Hegel's documented reading of Schiller's "Briefe" (HBr, I, p. 25), it would be possible to argue a case of indirect influence. But, of course, there are serious reasons for avoiding such a procedure: (a) who would dare to reduce the original mind of our Schiller to a 'transmitter' of influences? Some of his analytical tools are indeed of Scottish origin, but the challenge which Schiller ultimately meets is Kantian, and his answer, a higher reconciliation through art, is distinctly his own; (b) these internal problems are intensified by the lack of explicit references to the Scottish thinkers in Schiller's 'Letters'; (c) finally, from the Hegelian perspective, little could be gained by documenting such a transmission of influences: whatever Hegel might have learned about Scottish philosophy through his reading of Schiller, would have been familiar to him through other and, in most cases, more direct sources. With Emanuel *Zeender* (1772–1807), on the other hand, things are different again: what Zeender lacks in reputation and originality, compared with Schiller, he gains in utility (for our purposes), since Hegel was able to acquire some new information from him. Zeender was virtually 'terra incognita' in Hegel-research, until Ludwig Hasler succeeded[122] in identifying the 'Zehnter' that is mentioned in one of Schelling's letters to Hegel:

> In Lausanne, a philosophical disputation has appeared by a man from Bern – by the name of Zehnter. The disputation must, at least for that region, be noteworthy. No doubt, you will have read it [!]. Perhaps you could send me a copy of it too. (HBr, Vol. I, p. 36)

The book in question is a study of and attack on scepticism, written in Latin: "De notione et generibus Scepticismi et hodierna praesertim ejus ratione" (Bernae, 1795).[123] Schelling's letter strongly suggests Hegel's

[122] Ludwig Hasler, "Aus Hegels Philosophischer Berner Zeit", HS, Vol. XI (1976) pp. 205–211.

[123] I am grateful to Prof. Ph. Muller (Centre d'Études Hégéliennes et Dialectiques,

acquaintance with the book ('ohne Zweifel'), and, even if Hegel had not been familiar with it by then, Schelling's letter would certainly have aroused his interest. Ludwig Hasler marshals further evidence which makes it quite likely that Hegel and Zeender were in personal contact too (pp. 207–8). Short as it is (67 pages), Zeender's study is a storehouse of information on the topic of scepticism both ancient and modern: besides the contentions of other writers that do not concern us here, the sceptical propositions of Hume are frequently criticized,[124] and there are even references to the writings of the Common-sense School: Reid, Beattie, Oswald (pp. 44–45).

IV. *Conclusion*

Our survey of Hegel's education and early career has brought together the various pieces of evidence for Hegel's reading of and other contacts with the Scottish Enlightenment during his Stuttgart, Tübingen, Bern, and Frankfurt periods. Since our knowledge of Hegel's *later* contacts with Scottish philosophy and his possible re-reading of some of their writings largely derives from the references and allusions contained in his published writings, lectures, and surviving manuscripts, these further contacts will be considered in the following section, which thus complements the external evidence from the early period with a critical survey of the relevant passages from Hegel's texts. What should, by now, have emerged quite clearly is how well-informed Hegel was with regard to the Scottish School, having made first-hand acquaintance with the writings of Kames, Ferguson, Hume, Robertson, Smith, and Steuart, and having gained indirect knowledge of many of the 'minor' figures too. If one wishes to distinguish and evaluate the various subject matters within this general field of interest, four areas play a rôle: aesthetics (Kames), epistemology (Hume, the Common-sense School), natural religion (Hume), and the historical and economic study of state and society. It is no exaggeration to say that the last of these areas dominated and overshadowed the others. Even from our reconstruction of Hegel's reading of the Scottish thinkers, it thus emerges that Hegel's greatest indebtedness to them was to their account of the historical development and political economy of modern society. Before we leave this section, a final word about other secondary sources of Hegel's may here be appropriate. Since Hegel's "insatiable appetite for sheer information"

Neuchâtel) for providing me – through "La Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire", Neuchâtel – with a photocopy of the whole book.

[124] Zeender (1795) pp. 46, 55, 59, 62, 64; there are also a number of notes, mainly to the German translations of Hume's writings by Tennemann and Jacob (cp.: Appendix I).

(HBN, p. xvi) applied to the affairs of Great Britain in particular, he probably knew a multitude of further sources which provided him with information about the distinctly Scottish contribution to British civilization, although their obvious thematic framework was of a different nature. A literary example which nicely illustrates this point is *Smollett's* "Humphry Clinker", to be found in Hegel's library (see: HBibl, p. 31; cp.: Appendix IV). Apart from the amusement which the book may have caused Hegel, it contained a considerable number of shrewd and well-informed observations which Hegel would have noted, and the much quoted passage about the Scottish Literati ("Edinburgh is a hot-bed of genius . . .")[125] is incorporated in a fictional letter (Matthew Bramble writing to Dr. Lewis, dated August 8), from which much more could be learned.

(C) HEGEL'S EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT

Given the evidence that has just been provided of Hegel's extensive contacts with the ideas and writings of the Scottish Literati, Hegel's explicit acknowledgements are remarkably few. Partly, in this respect, Hegel was following the common practice of an age in which philosophical aspirations hardly ever took the shape of footnotes. But more important for an explanation of Hegel's personal habit was his above mentioned (p. 20) reluctance to acknowledge 'extra-mural' sources, such as political economy, in purely philosophical contexts. The general result of our survey of references was thus to be expected: the only acknowledgements to Scottish political economy are in the political philosophy (subsection II), whereas the references in the history of philosophy[126] (subsection III) are restricted to epistemology and ethics. These references in the published writings and public lectures are preceded by some early manuscripts which document Hegel's study of Hume (subsection I).

[125] Tobias Smollett, *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* [1771]. I have used Charles Lee's edition: (London, 1961) pp. 221 f. – For an attempt to relate Smollet to Scottish philosophy, see: M.A. Goldberg, *Smollett and the Scottish School* (Albuquerque, 1959), especially pp. 1–21.

[126] Some references to the Scots in other writings which correspond to Hegel's history of philosophy, e.g. his references to Hume in "Glauben und Wissen" ("Faith and Knowledge"), will also be dealt with in this context.

I. *The Allusions and References to David Hume in Hegel's Early Manuscripts*

In his diary, entry of June 27, 1785 (DHE, p. 7), Hegel is enthusiastic about Schroekh's "Weltgeschichte", a German example of a 'philosophical history' following the model of Voltaire and Hume. Hegel's praise of Schroekh as well as the emerging definition of 'pragmatic history' (DHE, pp. 9–10) emphasize points for which *Hume*'s "History" is justly famous:[127] (a) the comparative neglect "of numerous names . . . kings, wars" (DHE, p. 7); (b) the interest in manners and customs (DHE, p. 10); (c) the integration of cultural history in the overall approach: "he [Schroekh] everywhere carefully highlights the condition of scholars and the sciences" (DHE, p. 7). It is now generally agreed that, at this stage, Hegel had not yet read Hume's "History" itself (Hoffmeister in: DHE, p. 401; Lacorte, pp. 75 ff; Harris, p. 8), but the Humean inspiration behind Schroekh is obvious, and it is significant that Hegel singled out some of the very points in which Schroekh's Humean heritage consisted. Another conclusion is that, although, in the second entry, Hegel still presents his reflections under the heading "pragmatic history" (DHE, p. 9), there is *no* mention of the lessons from history. Hegel is already moving away from pragmatic historiography, and the Humean inspiration is helping rather than hindering this development. The next textual evidence of Hegel's contacts with Hume is to be found in the Tübingen manuscript "Aber die Hauptmasse . . .".[128] According to the analysis of the handwriting, Gisela Schüler estimated the date of this manuscript to be 1792/93;[129] this links in nicely with Hegel's attendance at Lebret's course on deism and antideism (see above). H.S. Harris has therefore suggested early 1793 as the most likely date for this manuscript (p. 519). As our textual comparison will show, Hegel's manuscript is clearly following an argument from Hume's "Natural

[127] A famous example of Hume's own expression of these methodological points is chapter VI (which later became an appendix) of the reign of James I: "It may not be improper, at this period, to make a pause; and, departing a little from the historical style, take a survey of the state of the kingdom, with regard to government, manners [!], finances, arms, trade, learning [!]. Where a just notion is not formed of these particulars, history can be very little instructive, and often will not be intelligible." (DHH, p. 219) – For a highly relevant discussion of Hume's 'philosophical history' and references to further commentators (J.H. Burton, E.C. Mossner), see: Duncan Forbes's introduction to DHH, pp. XIV–XVI.

[128] HTJ, pp. 357–8. – This parallel was suggested, in a passing way, by Ripalda (1973, p. 109 note), but not followed up or fully documented.

[129] Gisela Schüler, "Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jugendschriften", HS, Vol. II (1963) pp. 111–159, here p. 128.

History of Religion", namely his demonstration of the reason behind the apparently different degrees of religious tolerance granted to the classical poets and philosophers respectively: the ancients' conception of their Gods. This parallel is reinforced by the same choice of classical authors, Aristophanes and Plautus.

Hume:

Some writers have been surprised, that the impieties of Aristophanes [!] should have been tolerated, nay publickly acted and applauded, by the Athenians; a people so superstitious and so jealous of the public religion, that, at that very time, they put Socrates [!] to death for his imagined incredulity. But these writers consider not, that the ludicrous, familiar images, under which the gods are represented by that comic poet, instead of appearing impious, were the genuine lights, in which the ancients conceived their divinities. What conduct can be more criminal or mean, than that of Jupiter in the Amphitryon [by Plautus!]? Yet that play, which represented his gallant exploits, was supposed so agreeable to him, that it was always acted in Rome by public authority, when State was threatened with pestilence, famine, or any general calamity. (DHW, IV, Sect.iv, p. 321)

Hegel:

The Greeks (and Romans) permitted Aristophanes (and Plautus) [!] to make fun of their Gods, to attribute to them the most ridiculous acts as long as he did not infringe upon their most peculiar type of imagination. Jupiter is permitted all manner of profligacy, if he is but granted his thunderclaps; he is allowed to appear in Prometheus as a tyrant. In this manner the Greeks did preserve their traditional belief: how they knew their Gods from tradition, from their cyclical popular festivities, from their daily religious customs, from their folk songs, and [how they knew] their Zeuxis from the great public monuments of art. But, at the same time, there was no mercy for a Socrates [!] or Aristotle should he portray 'ton theon' as a pure idea rising above thunderclaps and mistresses. (HTJ, p. 357)

Since Hegel re-formulates Hume's argument and further illustrates the 'familiar images' of those divinities (e.g. their 'thunderclaps'), it cannot be decided whether Hegel used an English Hume edition or the German translation which had been available since 1759 (cp.: Appendix I), but

his dependence on Hume should be obvious. The present point of contact, it must be emphasized, is far from trivial, because it is linked, as H.S. Harris has admirably shown, to the doubts that accompanied, from this very early date, Hegel's admiration of ancient Greece in general and Greek 'popular religion' ('Volksreligion') in particular:

> When we compare this paragraph about Socrates [HTJ, p. 11; TWA, I, p. 20] with Hegel's reflections about the Greek attitude toward atheism in the fragmentary 'Aber die Hauptmasse' we can see that there was an unresolved problem in Hegel's 'Hellenic ideal'. In the light of those notes, furthermore, Hegel's switch here, from the example of Theseus at the beginning of the Athenian experience to that of Socrates at the end of it, seems to indicate that he has already begun to wrestle with the tragic destiny of the Greek religion of beauty. It was, after all, not the Romans or the Christians who put Socrates to death and threatened Aristotle, but those same Athenians who laughed at the gods with Aristophanes at their great festivals (cf. Nohl, p. 357). *Even when he penned his first eulogy of the Greek spirit, Hegel had already recognized that it was self-doomed.* (Harris, 1972, p. 134 n; my own italics, N.W.)

There is finally a most interesting and much neglected fragment on Hume "as a historian of modern times".[130] When this manuscript, the original of which is now lost, was first published by Rosenkranz, he presented it as if it belonged to Hegel's years in Switzerland, but this dating is only his estimate and it has been doubted by Hoffmeister (who placed all 'historical fragments' in his Frankfurt section: DHE, pp. 257–277) and Harris (1977, pp. 113 f), and since the analysis of Hegel's handwriting can offer no help, it seems that there is no ultimate answer to the question of its precise origin. On the basis of my previous discussion of Hegel's interests during his stay in Switzerland, I tend to think that Rosenkranz' dating was right in this particular case. Turning from the problems of dating to the content of the manuscript, it is my conviction that this extremely dense fragment would reward a full length treatment if it were placed in developmental accounts of Hegel's views on the rule of law, the acceptance of the modern world, and world-historical individuals. In the present context, we can, in what follows, only emphasize some of the most significant points.

[130] To be found in Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 529 f; DHE, pp. 273 f; TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – for an English translation, see: Clark Butler, "Hegel's Fragments of Historical Studies", with an introduction by H.S. Harris: *Clio*. Vol. 7, No. 1 (1977) pp. 113–134, here pp. 127–8.

From the very beginning of his manuscript, Hegel is in marked contrast to the traditional English view of Hume: the monarchical, 'Tory', or even reactionary historian. Hegel starts by characterizing Hume as a historian of modern times and of the modern state, defined by the 'legal form' ('die Rechtsform') or, to use Hume's own language, 'regular government' and the rule of law:

> Hume marks himself as a historian of modern times at once by virtue of the character of the historical event itself. The object of his history is a state of modern times whose inner relations are not only, as with the ancients, legally determined, but rather have durability more through legal form than through the unconscious free life inhering in those relations. (TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – Clark Butler translation, 1977, p. 127)

The contrast drawn between the legality, the *explicit* regularity of the modern state and the "*unconscious* free life" of the ancients is of special significance. It not only shows a profound understanding of Hume – to whom the "regular plan of liberty" was a seventeenth-century product,[131] unheard of in classical antiquity[132] – but it points the road to two crucial positions of the mature Hegel: (a) it contains a glimpse of his later criticism of the Greek realm that it is lacking in "the subjectivity of explicitly independent self-consciousness" (TMK, § 356, p. 221); (b) it anticipates his later insistence on "right made determinate in law" (TMK, § 258, p. 158). Thus, the doubts about Greek 'popular religion', which Hume's "Natural History of Religion" had inspired in Hegel, are here complemented by doubt about the idealization of Greek political life. Of course, the crucial shift from an almost unqualified admiration of classical Greece to the more balanced later view was by no means an easy one: the distinct achievements of the modern world had to be reborn in Hegel's thought, a process not without throes. The very manuscript on Hume is an example in which we can find both positions almost side by side. The option for the modern world, implied in the distinction just quoted, is balanced by the following highly critical

[131] This, of course, is the fundamental conviction behind Hume's starting with the accession of the Stuarts in 1603. For an explicit statement of this conviction, see Hume's "My own Life", DHW, Vol. III, pp. 6 f: "It is ridiculous to consider the English constitution before that period [the reign of James I] as a regular plan of liberty."

[132] Hume's "Essays" are full of critical remarks about the deficiencies of Greek 'liberty'; DHW, Vol. III, pp. 403 ff: "These people were extremely fond of liberty; but seem not to have understood it well . . . disorders . . . arose from faction throughout all the Grecian commonwealth . . . the transactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and destructive."

perspective on the modern state: men no longer "act as whole men out of an *idea* which would animate all".[133] They are divided into various estates; the wholeness of any act is fragmented into commanding and obeying with no living unity. The vast majority thus become but 'cogs in the machine' ("Maschinenräder", TWA, I, p. 446), a well-known element of Hegel's early diagnosis of the 'positivity' of the modern state.[134] While some allowance must therefore be made for this synchronism of diverse views, it is nevertheless true and significant that we have here another instance of Hume helping Hegel to appreciate the modern world: in this case, to recognize the distinctly modern, precious, and precarious achievement of the 'legal form' in political civilization.

The fragment on Hume also provides a number of important points with respect to 'great men' in history and can thus be related to Hegel's later views on world-historical individuals and their relation to the philosopher. In line with his previous emphasis on "the character of a whole nation, her customs and manners", at the expense of accounts of "the numerous kings",[135] Hegel appreciates that Hume looks beyond the level of the statesmen, their characters and deeds, and directs attention to the totality of circumstances:

> The men who stand at the top and whose deeds history gives us as events always have the state, with all the manifoldness of its relations, above them and outside them. The state is present in them as thought. It determines them . . . (TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – English transl. C. Butler, 1977, p. 128)

With this shift of emphasis – which distinguishes Hume from most contemporary historians except Voltaire – it appears that political decay is hardly ever caused by deficiencies of the princes' characters; rather the reverse is the case: "'Tis the situation which decides intirely of the fortunes and characters of men" (DHH, p. 381). The point was of great importance to Hume, he was aware of its originality as well as its unpopularity, and he did not fail to deliver his message clearly:

> The philosophy of government, accompanying a narration of its revolutions, may render history more intelligible as well as instructive. And nothing will tend more to abate the acrimony of party-

[133] DHE, p. 273 – the English translation is quoted from Clark Butler (1977) p. 127.
[134] Cp.: TWA, Vol. I, pp. 234 f. For Hegel's authorship of this manuscript, see: Otto Pöggeler, "Hegel, der Verfasser des ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus", HSBh 4 (1968) pp. 17–32.
[135] DHE, pp. 10 and 7 respectively.

> disputes, than to show men, that those events, which they impute to their adversaries as the deepest crimes, were the natural, if not the necessary result of the situation, in which the nation was placed, during any period. (DHH, p. 391)

On the level of empirical particularity, it is exemplified, among many other examples, by Hume's ill-received yet balanced defences of the first two Stuarts (DHH, pp. 389 ff.). James I and Charles I, Hume thought, would have succeeded well under many other circumstances, but not the very ones they found themselves thrown into.[136] Rather than blaming these Kings, Hume emphasizes "how unintelligible the English constitution was" (DHH, p. 111) and that "no one was, at that time, sufficiently sensible of the great weight, which the commons . . . [had acquired] in the balance of the constitution" (DHH, p. 270). In his essay "That Politics may be reduced to a Science", Hume articulated the same point in more general terms: compared with the crucial rôle of the legal and institutional framework, the "personal character", "the humours and education of particular men" (DHW, Vol. III, pp. 109 & 105), are marginal and irrelevant. This marginalization implies that Hume never became what Hegel came to call a "psychologischer Kammerdiener"[137] – "psychological valet de chambre"; or, as Duncan Forbes once put it, Hume's readers are "spared the 'slobbering' of James I" (DHH, p. xvii). Even more important, this emphasis on institutions rather than men opens up a proper understanding of an important aspect of Hegel's philosophy of history: the 'great men', even the world-historical individuals wither and perish, but, if they match the spirit of the age, the institutions will last. Caesar was killed, but Augustus re-installed what the age called for. Napoleon was exiled, but his Code was not forgotten even where, for a spell, it was suppressed. This is the philo-

[136] "His [James I] capacity was considerable; but fitter to discourse on general maxims than to conduct any intricate business: His intentions were just; but more adapted to the conduct of private life, than to the government of kingdoms." (DHH, p. 216) – "Had he [Charles I] been born an absolute prince, his humanity and good sense had rendered his reign happy and his memory precious: Had the limitations on prerogative been, in his time, quite fixed and ascertained, his integrity had made him regard, as sacred, the boundaries of the constitution. Unhappily, his fate threw him into a period, when the precedents of many former reigns savoured strongly of arbitrary power, and the genius of the people ran violently towards liberty . . . Exposed to the assaults of furious, implacable, and bigotted factions, it was never permitted him, without the most fatal consequences, to commit the smallest mistake; a condition too rigorous to be imposed on the greatest human capacity." (DHH, p. 684)

[137] TWA, Vol. XII, p. 48 – The same image occurs in the 'Phenomenology': TWA, Vol. III, p. 489.

sophical truth which Hegel discovered in the well-known phrase of Caesar's ghost: "At Philippi we shall meet again . . ."[138]

Hegel's next comment on Hume's "History" is more difficult to grasp, as he argues that "it is not so much character which we see acting immediately but rather the considerations ["Betrachtungen"] according to which character acts" (TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – C. Butler, 1977, p. 128). In the light of the previous emphasis on the situation and circumstances, Hegel's insistence on 'Betrachtungen' may appear as a misrepresentation of Hume's position. 'Betrachtungen', meaning 'considerations' or 'reflections' – of the agent, one might interpolate – seem to imply a rather subjective perspective, whereas Hume's very words 'situation' and 'circumstances' appear to evoke a socio-economic interpretation of history. Sure enough, Hume does provide social reasons to account for the Civil War: the new opulence and subsequent independence of the gentry, coinciding with the King's greater expenses yet dwindling or, at least, stagnant revenues (DHH, pp. 107–8, 229–30). However, Hume's approach is far from being mono-causal, for the material conditions are only one element of the overall 'situation'; other sets of circumstances are of equal importance, especially the above mentioned institutional framework and the "dispositions of men's minds" (DHH, pp. 108–387), which Hume is always careful to present. In contrast to the former conditions, it is probably fair to describe this set of circumstances as the 'subjective conditions'. However, one ought to be careful not to confuse this aspect with mere attention to private, casual features, as if the characters of the princes, which had just been dismissed as trivial to the "general truths of politics" (DHW, Vol. III, (p. 101), would now re-enter through the back door. When Hume refers to the 'disposition of men's minds', he already has in mind a type of sythesis: the intellectual responses of the various agents to given circumstances. Under this heading, for example, Hume will tell his readers the different manner after which "the partizans of the court' and "the lovers of liberty" reasoned at the time (DHH, pp. 182–3). Due to this perspective, Hume does not need to search for scapegoats; by 1621, Hume's "wise and moderate [men] in the nation" anticipated the tragic flaw: "A civil war must ensue; a civil war, where no party or both parties would justly bear the blame . . ." (DHH, pp. 184–5). When Hegel speaks of the 'Betrachtungen' of the agents, which Hume reveals, he has this

[138] William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar* IV.3 (slightly modified); O. Pöggeler has frequently and rightly stressed this point, for example: "Der junge Hegel und die Lehre vom weltgeschichtlichen Individuum", D. Henrich & R.P. Horstmann (Eds.), *Hegels Philosophie des Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1982) pp. 17–37, here p. 36. However, he makes rather little, in this context, of the fragment on Hume.

synthesis in mind, in other words, the way in which the circumstances are focused in and reflected by the various agents.

This raises the question of the agents' full awareness of their actions, a question which is controversial with respect to Hegel's later doctrine of the world-historical individual,[139] and on which the fragment on Hume, presently under discussion, can throw considerable light. One obvious difficulty, however, must be removed beforehand: Hegel, of course, never chooses any participant of England's seventeenth-century struggle towards 'established liberty' as an example of his doctrine. Though praiseworthy, Hegel would probably have argued, Hume's 'generous patriots' do not rise to the stature of a Napoleon, because, due to a number of 'peculiarities',[140] the whole movement was singular rather than world-historical; in other words, from the European perspective, the events culminating in 1688 were much less of a watershed than the Revolution of 1789 and Napoleon's post-revolutionary settlement. Having made this qualification, it is nevertheless significant and also applicable to such greater men as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, what Hegel says about the relation of the events to the consciousness of the agents:

> . . . no one has *totally* performed any action. Because the whole of an action, of which only a fragment belongs to each actor, is split up into so many parts, the entire work is thus a result [made up] out [of] so many individual actions. *The work is not done as a deed but as a result which is thought*. Consciousness of the deed as a whole is present in none of the actors. The *historian* knows the work by the results and is made attentive to what the deed brings about as something already present in what has preceded. (TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – C. Butler, 1977, p. 128)

Hegel leaves no ambiguity: none of the agents involved was fully aware of or had consciously intended the result as a whole; how then does this match with Hume's "set of men of the most uncommon capacity . . . united . . . by fixed aims and projects" (DHH, p. 260)? The leaders of the Commons, to be sure, had plans and strategies, but they did *not* as it were possess the master-plan. In other words, they did not have a full foresight of what came to happen – on the contrary, at every turn of the

[139] Sh. Avineri (1972) pp. 230–234; Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge, 1975) pp. 392 f.

[140] In this context, Duncan Forbes recalls the insular position of England and quotes very aptly from J.P. Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution* (Cambridge, 1966): ". . . the revolution of 1688 stamped England as a wildly eccentric country outside the mainstream of European political development." (DHH, p. xxiii).

story, their 'ignorance' and 'inexperience' is emphasized (DHH, pp. 108, 113, 132, etc.) – nor are they charged with their lack of foresight, their very inexperience is every where used to excuse the unhappy consequences: the situation was *new* and there was no way they *could* have known better. Since the events turned constantly against his intentions and purposes, the King's lack of understanding is even more obvious. The whole scenario becomes, as Duncan Forbes has aptly put it, "a case of ignorant armies clashing by night."[141] One crucial factor of this ignorance is the rôle of religion, a point on which Hume offers a number of general observations, for example:

> But 'tis an observation, suggested by all history, and by none more than by that of James, and his successor, that the religious spirit contains in it something supernatural and unaccountable; and that, in its operations upon society, effects correspond less to their known causes than is found in any other circumstances of government. (DHH, p. 144)

These observations which, to the superficial reader, may appear to be commonplace generalizations, really pave the way to Hume's analysis of the decisive rôle which religious enthusiasm came to play in the achievement of political freedom and thus exemplify what Hegel considers the historian's early awareness of the ultimate causes of an event "as something already present in what has preceded" (C. Butler, 1977, p. 128). Hume's analysis, then, boils down to as apt an illustration of Hegel's cunning of reason as one is likely to find: all the plans of prudent men would have remained fruitless but for their absorption by an unpredictable religious zeal. The political and religious results and settlement, in so far as they were desirable, owed their origin, as Hume put it in the context of tolerance, "not to reasoning but to the height of extravagance and enthusiasm" (DHH, p. 571). This is the very reason why Hume's appreciation of the result is compatible with his criticism of the policies at the time: "what has been justified by success was not justified at the time" (DHH, p. XXXVII) and this is the very point where Hume consciously parted company with the prevailing flattery to the successful party: his scientific understanding of the result, his knowledge of its hidden causes, enable him to distribute praise and blame in a more detached and judicious manner than the zealots of the various

[141] DHH, p. LII – The phrase "ignorant armies . . ." goes back to Matthew Arnold's poem "Dover Beach", *The Poems of Matthew Arnold*. Ed. by K. Allott, second edition revised by M. Allott (London & New York, 1979) p. 257.

parties. In his own words, Hume "thought [it] proper to indulge [himself in] the philosophy of government" (DHH, p. 391).

Seen in this light, the significance of Hume's "History" for Hegel's own campaign is obvious. The 'great men' follow their own plans and purposes, but the master-plan is hidden from them. Subsequently, the achievement or failure of their own plans is of no direct relevance to the 'Werk', the realization of the master-plan. Napoleon wrestled with Europe: in the end, he stumbled and fell, but he had spread liberal institutions in the process, a 'Werk' that reveals itself to the 'post festum' philosopher. The man of action is necessarily tied down to "violence, usurpation or injustice" (to use Hume's words: DHH, p. 255 n), but he may be sanctified posthumously by the detached men of speculation. Hegel thus acknowledges Hume's historiography as a prophet of his own task: "The work is . . . a result which is thought . . . The historian knows the work by the results (TWA, Vol. I, p. 446 – C. Butler, 1977, p. 128). Compared with this anticipation of the high and necessary office of Hegel's 'philosopher', Hume's occasional ventures into advising the present age, his attempts to outline 'lessons' from history, are marginal and Hegel rightly ignored them.

II. *The Acknowledgements to Political Economy in Hegel's Political Philosophy*[142]

Hegel's earliest explicit reference to *Adam Smith* is to be found in the first set of the so-called 'Jenaer Realphilosophien' (HGW, VI, p. 323). Hegel sums up the example by which Smith illustrates the division of labour: the manufacturing of pins. In a marginal note to this exposition, the name "Smith" appears with a page reference ("S.8").[143] It is already significant that his first reference to Smith is not to some marginal or

[142] 'Political philosophy' is here used as a rendering of 'rechtsphilosophische Schriften', the principal texts of which are the Jena writings, especially the so-called 'Realphilosophien' (now in HGW: Vol. VI and VIII), Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" of 1820, and the various sets of lectures on the philosophy of right, conveniently brought together by K.H. Ilting (VRP: Vol. I-IV). While I was preparing the present study, two additional sets of lecture notes were discovered, covering the 1819/20 and the 1817/18 lectures: (a) Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*. Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift. Ed. by Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt, 1983) – henceforth quoted as "PhRDH"; (b) Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft*. Heidelberg 1817/18 mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818/19. Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannenmann. Ed. by C. Becker [. . . et al.], with an introduction by Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg, 1983) – henceforth quoted as "PhRWa".

[143] In their notes to the new critical edition (HGW, Vol. VI, pp. 384–5) Profs. Dusing and Kimmerle have convincingly argued that the reference is to the English edition of Smith's "Wealth of Nations' to be found in Hegel's library (HBibl, p. 11, No.: 239–42; cp.: Appendix IV).

merely historical point of Smith's analysis, but to the crucial treatment of tne division of labour, upon which, as a modern commentator put it, "the discipline of economics was nurtured."[144] Other indications of the importance which Hegel ascribed to Smith's treatment are:

(a) that he stored it most thoroughly in his memory and, in his own discussions of the subject, he kept reproducing it throughout his career: Smith's pins ("Stecknadeln") reappear in the second set of the 'Realphilosophie' (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 224); the 1817/18 (PhRWa, § 101, p. 127), 1818/19 (VRP, Vol. I, p. 314), 1819/20 (PhRDH, p. 159), 1822/23 (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609), and the 1825/26 lecture course (VRP, vol. IV, p. 502), though Smith's name does not always reappear too.
(b) a statement from the 1822/23 lecture course: "In modern political economy the division of labour is a main aspect" (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609); a statement, incidentally, which suggests the conclusion that Hegel meant Smith and his followers when he spoke of "modern political economy."[145]

In five of the seven instances where Hegel borrows Smith's example of the pin manufactory, he reproduces Smith's numerical calculation of the increase in output. Curiously, Hegel's figures differ in each text and since it is possible to draw some conclusions from the various renderings, it is worth spelling out the actual data and to compare them with Smith's original.

Adam Smith [1776] (SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 14 f.):

> To take an example . . . from a very trifling manufacture . . . the trade of a pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business . . . nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it . . . could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades . . . the important business

[144] Nathan Rosenberg, "Adam Smith on the Division of Labour: Two Views or One?", *Economica* (1965) Vol. XXXII, New Series, pp. 127–139, here p. 127.
[145] A conclusion that is further supported by the 1819/20 lecture course, cp.: PhRDH, pp. 158 f: "*Smith*, in his work on the wealth of nation[s], was the first to draw attention above all to the division of labour."

> of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations . . . I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations . . . they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

Hegel [1803/04] (HGW, Vol. VI, p. 323):

> . . . eighteen men work in an English pin factory . . . Each has a specific part of the work to do and only that. A single man would perhaps not make 20, could not even make one; those eighteen jobs divided among ten men produce 4000 per day. But from the work of these ten in a group of eighteen there would [come] 48000. (English translation quoted from FPS, p. 248)

Hegel [1805/06] (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 224):

> . . . division of labour, – saving – 10 can make as many pins as 100.

Hegel [1817/18] (PhRWa, § 101, p. 127):

> In a trifling manufactory of 10 persons, these [ten] make 4800 pins per day [per person], and an individual, if he makes everything on his own, can make 20 pins at the most.

Hegel [1819/20] (PhRDH, p. 159):

> Example of *Smith* according to which a worker who wanted to make pins on his own, would hardly complete twenty of them in a day. Whereas, when the labour is divided into its various operations (of

> which there were about 10 in Smith's time), one person on an average can complete 4600 pins.

Hegel [1824/25] (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 502):

> A person who makes pins skillfully can, from prefabricated wire, make only 40 to 50 pieces per day, thus 100 persons only 5000. But if the labour is divided, they can produce 20 to 50 times more.

Hegel's first rendering of Smith's pin-factory calculation [1803/04] is erroneous in three respects: (a) Smith's description speaks of 18 operations, not 18 workmen; (b) in Smith's account the figure 4000 gives the number of pins in a pound, it is not an output figure; (c) Smith compares the respective outputs of 10 workmen when they labour independently and when they co-operate and perform, among them, eighteen operations, he does not speculate what output difference it would make if 18 (rather than 10) workmen were to co-operate. In spite of these errors – which may have been due to the fact that Hegel's English, though good, was not yet good enough to reproduce Smith's slightly long-winded argument in an absolutely flawless manner – Hegel's passage contains sufficient details to conclude that Hegel was either studying Smith at about that time, or, at least, that he had the "Wealth of Nations" open before him while writing. The 1805/06 version is much shorter and much less precise: it is hardly more than a vague allusion from memory; a fact which suggests a certain distance from Smith's text and I am inclined to think that the immediate period of Hegel's first reading of Smith was over. Thus, though he repeats the point, Hegel's mind was too busy with other things to worry about getting the figures right. The recently discovered 1817/18 set of notes, taken by P. Wannenmann, is most interesting, because it documents the only time that Hegel reproduces Smith's calculation correctly, provided one relates the figure of 4800 to each workman – which is not spelt out, but it seems fair to interpolate, as I have done. Another point which suggests Hegel's immediate use of the "Wealth of Nations" while preparing his 1817/18 lectures is the somewhat unusual expression "einer *geringeren* Fabrik": no doubt an attempt of rendering Smith's "*very trifling* manufacture." This textual parallel and the comparative accuracy in his figures make it very likely that Hegel had re-read Smith's "Wealth of Nations" before this course of lectures. Considering that, after a long absence from university life, 1817/18 was the first time Hegel lectured on this subject, a particularly thorough preparation, including a re-reading of Smith, also seems highly plausible from the circumstances. Homeyer's notes, the only

document we have on the 1818/19 lectures, provides but three words ("Beispiel von Stecknadelfabrikation"; VRP, Vol. I, p. 314 – "Example of pin manufacture") and does not contain any figures; an absence that is probably due to Homeyer's style of note taking (short summaries rather than full notes). In any case, the notes on the 1819/20 lectures are almost as accurate as (except for replacing 4800 by 4600 – an error that may well be due to the anonymous note-taker), and slightly more detailed than the 1817/18 set. The supposed re-reading of Smith, one could conclude, still exerted its influence on the 1819/20 lectures. In 1824/25, on the other hand, according to the notes of von Griesheim – on the whole a very faithful recorder – there is once again a certain distance from Smith's text: Hegel seems then to have used any numbers that came to his mind. To sum up, the comparison of Hegel's various renderings of Adam Smith's famous example reveals different degrees of closeness to Smith's original, and the instances of close correspondence between Hegel and Smith (especially 1803/04 and 1817/18) are likely to reflect the dates of Hegel's direct contact with the "Wealth of Nations".

Beside the division of labour and its principal example, the pin factory, the other main area in which acknowledgements to political economy occur, is where Hegel introduces his 'system of needs' (VRP, Vol. I, p. 313; PhRDH, pp. 152 f; VRP, Vol. II, § 189, pp. 640 f; VRP, Vol. III, pp. 586–8; VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 486 f. 499). Hegel's published version of this comment deserves to be quoted in full length:

> Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs and labour but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships and mass-movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which have arisen out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it. (VRP, Vol. II, § 189, pp. 640 f – TMK, pp. 126 f).

To my mind, this passage contains four noteworthy points which can be further clarified by looking at the parallel sections of the various sets of lecture notes. Firstly, Hegel provides a definition of political economy as the science of needs, labour, and means of satisfaction: "Here, the individual matters . . . insofar as it consumes and produces."[147] Sec-

[147] VRP, Vol. I, p. 313. This definition goes back to the natural law essay: HGW, Vol. IV, p. 450; cp.: VRP,Vol. IV, p. 499.

ondly, Hegel insists on the modernity of this science ("arisen . . . [in] the *modern* world", TMK, § 189, p. 127); in the 1822/23 lectures, Hegel makes this point even clearer by speaking of "the *modern* political economy" (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609). This explicit emphasis on modernity and innovation should induce those, who consider Hegel's economic views as a remake of Aristotelian ideas, to think again. Thirdly, and in the same vein, Hegel, mentions the names of *Smith*, *Say*, *Ricardo*. The reference to Smith, after what has been said about the division of labour, should be obvious enough to require no further explanation. The mention of Say and Ricardo, however, is more difficult to account for, since we have no other reference to either of them in any of the surviving sets of lecture notes and, indeed, no other evidence of Hegel's contacts with the writings of the two economists. And why, for that matter, is Sir James Steuart, whom we know that Hegel read and digested, not mentioned along with the others? The answer to the latter problem seems to be that, though Steuart was a lasting influence on him, Hegel was aware of the facts that Smith had been the greater innovator, that the "Wealth of Nations", even in Germany (see above, chapter two), had put a new face on the science of political economy, and that the Smithian achievement was recognized, among the learned public, as the great watershed of modern economics. The former problem can be answered in similar terms: though it seems unlikely that Hegel had a noticeable direct knowledge of Say and Ricardo – that is why there are no other references and no identifiable allusions to their writings – he knew of them, probably through the review journals,[148] he perceived them as independent followers of Smith, and he thus appreciates – and one need not read more into the reference – that Say and Ricardo (along with Smith) were the acknowledged leaders of the subject. Fourthly, Hegel bestows that highest praise on political economy that it imposes reason on chaos.[148a] The 1824/25 lecture, in this respect, speaks for itself:

> What is found initially is nothing but coincidences, nothing but arbitrariness, but this medley of arbitrariness generates universal

[148] A review of the German translation of Say's "Traité" appeared, for example, in the "Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung" (Nos.: 139 & 140, June 15 & 16, 1807, pp. 498–510), a journal which, we know, Hegel read regularly. The review presents Say's work as a successful popularization as well as a further development of Smithian principles.

[148a] See above, chapter one, p. 53; cp.: Ludwig Siep's forthcoming article "Hegels Theorie der Gewaltenteilung", will appear in: Hans-Christian Lucas & Otto Pöggler (Eds), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1986).

characteristics by its own working and it is upheld and determined by a necessity which automatically enters it. To discover the necessity it contains is the object of political economy.

It thus appears, for example, that the price of labour, the price of industrial products, and of natural foodstuffs depend upon coincidence alone. Everything appears to be arbitrary in its immediate existence and yet everything is determined in a necessary manner. Political economy is thus an interesting science which is a credit to thought by finding the laws in a mass of accidents. Just as the planetary system displays to the eye only irregular movement, yet the laws behind it have been ascertained. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 487)

III. *Scottish Philosophy in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*[149]

Compared with the early manuscripts and the political writings ('rechtsphilosophische Schriften'), the section on Scottish philosophy in Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy is somewhat disappointing.

[149] Traditionally, the textual basis of the lectures on the history of philosophy is the text which C.L. Michelet edited as part of the so-called 'Freundesvereinsausgabe'. This edition was published in three volumes, between 1833 and 1836, and has now been reprinted, with modernized spelling, as Vol. XVIII-XX of the TWA. The sources, from which Michelet prepared his edition, consisted of a variety of Hegel's own lecture notes, now lost almost completely, and at least three sets of notes – taken by Michelet himself (1823/24), Hauptmann von Griesheim (1825/26), and Dr. J.F.C. Kampe (1829/30) – of which only von Griesheim's set has survived. From these diverse materials, Michelet succeeded in producing one very readable text, sanctified, as it were, by the facts that Michelet was an immediate disciple of Hegel and that he had access to a number of primary and secondary sources that were lost subsequently. Through the latter aspect, Michelet's text has itself acquired the status of an indispensable document. However, the editorial procedure of joining texts from various hands and from a period of nearly thirty years, by no means meets the standards of a critical, historical edition. Ideally, rather than Michelet's text, one would like to have the whole series of Hegel's lectures on the subject (Jena 1805/6, Heidelberg 1816/17 and 1817/18, Berlin 1819, 1820/21, 1823/24, 1825/26, 1827/28, 1829/30, 1831 [begun]) in order to see how his ideas changed and developed over the years. With this aim in mind, the Hegel-Archives are collecting as many surviving sets of notes as possible and, provided a sufficient textual basis can be found eventually, it will be attempted to reconstruct the individual lecture courses of the above mentioned years. So far, the following fifteen sets of notes have been discovered and are here listed with their respective date, author, and present location:

1819 (a) M. Carriere (Bochum); (b) J.B. Meyer (München).
1820/21 (a) Haering (Evanston).
1823/24 (a) Hotho (Berlin); (b) R. Hube (Cracow).

Admittedly, as will be shown presently, the lectures do comment on the historical significance of Hume and the Scottish School, and they contain some flattering remarks on Scottish philosophy in general, but there are also a number of rather dismissive criticisms. Hegel's account of the Scots is by no means original – he acknowledges such secondary sources as Tennemann, Buhle, and Rixner[150] – and his attitude, even where he does not criticize, is one of making concessions to the historical value of a position that has essentially been outdated in the meantime, rather than one of genuine approval. The principal reason behind this, at first glance, surprisingly negative result is to be found in the subject boundaries Hegel ascribes to 'philosophy' and his subsequent exclusion of many of the subject matters (especially political economy and moral theory) dealt with by the Scottish Enlightenment. By showing his awareness of the wider meaning of 'philosophy' which prevails in Great Britain, but which he wishes to exclude from his own treatment, Hegel makes this point frequently,[151] for example in § 7 of his "Encyclopaedia":

> . . . the Newtonian physics was called Natural Philosophy . . . In England this is still the usual signification of the term philosophy. Newton continues to be celebrated as the greatest of philosophers:

1825/26 (a) v. Griesheim; (b) Löwe; (c) Stieve (all Berlin);
(d) Pinder (Bochum); (e) Helcel (Cracow).
1827/28 (a) Diecks (Private Owner); (b) Hück (Leningrad).
1829/30 (a) Werner (Bochum); (b) Anonymous (Berlin).
1831 (a) D.F. Strauss (Marbach am Neckar).

Up to now, therefore, only the 1825/26 lectures are documented sufficiently well to justify their publication. Their edition has just been completed by W. Jaeschke and P. Garniron, and will appear with Felix Meiners Publishers in early 1987.

Since these manuscripts extend the textual basis of the present investigation, I have used them to complement the evidence provided by Michelet's edition. I was able to consult photographs of most of these manuscripts (except for the 1823/1824 lectures) at the Hegel-Archives (Bochum) and Dr. W. Jaeschke has kindly allowed me to use some of his transcriptions too.

[150] W.G. Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*. In 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819); Amadeus Wendt (Ed.), *Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 3rd edition, 1820); J.G. Buhle, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. In 6 vols. (Göttingen, 1800–4); T.A. Rixner, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. In 4 vols. (Sulzbach, 2nd edition, 1829). The specified editions are those that I was able to use.

[151] Apart from the introductory sections of his lectures (cp.: MS, M. Pinder [Hegel-Archives, Bochum] p. 28; MS, Helcel [Polish Academy of Science, Cracow] pp. 15 f), the point is made in the section on Newton (MS, von Griesheim, p. 202; MS Löwe, p. 279; TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 232 f).

> and the name goes down as far as the pricelists of intrument-makers. All instruments, such as the thermometer and barometer, which do not come under the special head of magnetic or electric apparatus, are styled philosophical instruments. Surely thought, and not a mere combination of wood, iron, etc. ought to be called the instrument of philosophy! The recent science of Political Economy in particular, which in Germany is known as Rational Economy of the State, or intelligent national economy, has in England especially appropriated the name of philosophy.[152]

Thus, it needs to be emphasized that the meagre treatment of the Scottish Enlightenment in Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy is not to be considered as a summary of the complete Scottish influence on Hegel, but only as one rather marginal element of this heritage, always to be complemented by the political, historical, and economic influences that are excluded from his history of *philosophy*.

Having made this qualification, Hegel's exposition can briefly be summarized. In Michelet's text as well as in the lecture notes, a section on Hume is distinguished from a section on 'Scottish philosophy', the latter being subdivided into a general introduction and subsections on Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and "Weitere Schottische Philosophen."[153] This structure, which we shall follow in our summary, already betrays Hegel's indebtedness to older histories of philosophy which show the same pattern.[154] Hegel's comments on Hume put the emphasis, from the very first sentence, on the historical rôle of Hume's scepticism either as sparking off Jacobi's attempt to stand Hume's scepticism on its head[154a] or as "arousing" Kant "from his dogmatic slumber":

> We must add to what has preceded an account of the Scepticism of Hume, which has been given a more important place in history than it

[152] WW, § 7, pp. 13 f – TWA, Vol. VIII, pp. 50 f.

[153] TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 285 f – LHP, Vol, III, pp. 375–379.

[154] Cp.: Josef Socher, *Grundriss der Geschichte der philosophischen Systeme von den Griechen bis auf Kant* (München, 1802) pp. 263–267; Tennemann/Wendt (1820) pp. 340–345; D.F. Ast, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 2nd edition, 1825) pp. 354–359; Rixner (1829) Vol. III, pp. 249–264.

[154a] The line from Hume to Jacobi to German Idealism is drawn most clearly in Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen", HGW, Vol. IV, pp. 315–414 (for the Hume-Jacobi relation, in particular, see pp. 346–349, 375 f) – for an English translation, see: G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*. Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (New York, 1979) pp. 97–100, 137 f.
See also Hegel's 1819 lectures on the history of philosophy: MS Meyer [University Library, München] pp. 309 ff; MS Carriere [Hegel-Archives, Bochum] pp. 24c ff.

> deserves from its intrinsic nature; its historic importance is due to the fact that Kant really derives the starting point of his philosophy from Hume. (LHP, Vol. III, p. 369 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 275)

Hume's significance is defined in terms of a consequent completion of the positions of Bacon, Locke, and Berkeley and thus paving the way for Jacobi, Kant, and the German Idealists in their wake: (TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 276–81; LHP, Vol. III, pp. 370 ff). This Kantian perspective was, of course, quite conventional in Germany: to be found in Kant's own writings and diffused through the standard textbooks.[155] It is in line with this Kantian perspective that Hegel criticized Hume's exposition for its essayistic form and lack of system:

> In his 'Essays', which contributed most to his fame as far as the philosophic side is concerned, he treated philosophic subjects as an educated, thoughtful man of the world would do – not in a systematic connection, nor showing the wide range which his thoughts should properly have been able to attain . . .[156]

The content of Hume's writings is then characterized and dismissed as the sceptical negation of "universality and necessity" (LHP, Vol. III, p. 371 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 277); causal necessity is nothing but an accidental association of ideas, sanctified through habit:

> Hume regards necessity, the unity of opposites, in an entirely subjective manner, as resting on custom; one cannot decline further in thought.[156a]

The next point of Hegel's discussion is the application of this scepticism to "law and morality" (LHP, Vol. III, p. 373 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 279: "Recht und Moralität"). According to Hume, moral and legal principles are based on a moral sentiment, which is subjective and dependent on time and place. Consequently, sceptical doubts are cast upon the absolute validity of such principles, a challenge which Kant set out to meet:

[155] For Kant's comments on the Scots, see above, chapter two, p. 81; among the textbooks, Rixner (1829, Vol. III, p. 250) is a good example, as he starts his Hume section by quoting Kant's famous words that it was Hume who aroused him from his dogmatic slumber.

[156] LHP, Vol. III, pp. 369 f – TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 275 f; cp.: Rixner (1829) Vol. III, p. 250.

[156a] TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 278 f. I have altered the English translation of E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (LHP, Vol. III, p. 372) in this case as their rendering "we cannot get any deeper in thought" does not appear to match Hegel's "herunterkommen".

> What is by one nation called immoral, shameful and irreligious, is by another not considered so at all. Thus because such matters rest upon experience, one subject has such and such an experience . . . while another subject has different experiences altogether. We are in the habit of allowing one thing to be just and moral, others have another mode of regarding it. Hence if the truth depends upon experience, the element of universality, of objectivity, etc., comes from elsewhere, or is not justified by experience. Hume thus declared this sort of universality, as he declared necessity, to be rather subjectively than objectively existent; for custom is just a subjective universality of this kind. This is an important and acute observation in relation to experience looked at as the source of knowledge; and it is from this point that the Kantian reflection now begins. (LHP, Vol. III, pp. 373 f – TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 279 f)

A further application of Hume's scepticism, which Hegel mentions rather approvingly,[156b] is directed towards the existence of God and the immortality of the soul: "in fact scepticism here possesses a wide field" (LHP, Vol. III, p. 374 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 280). "The result which Hume arrives at", Hegel sums up, "is necessarily astonishment regarding the condition of human knowledge, a general state of mistrust, and a sceptical indecision", and he adds quite critically, "which indeed does not amount to much" (ibid.). This concluding criticism of Hume's scepticism: the emptiness of its mere negativity, points to Hegel's treatment of scepticism in the "Phenomenology" (HGW, Vol. IX, pp. 119 ff) and it is, once again, in agreement with other contemporary historians of philosophy, e.g.: Rixner: "The result of Hume's investigations . . . was thoroughly negative, namely, that there is no objective knowledge at all" (Rixner, 1829, Vol. III, p. 251).

Turning to the other Scottish philosophers, Hegel begins by making three general points. Firstly, they are united by their opposition to Hume's scepticism. Their rejection of Hume makes them comparable to Kant, though it is based on different principles:

> To the scepticism of Hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for all that pertains to religion and morality. This coincides with Kant, who also maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception; but in the case of Kant this has quite

[156b] Hegel's approval seems to stem from his dislike of those contemporary "theologians of feeling" that had not even grasped the achievements of the Enlightenment exegesis (see above, chapter one, pp. 9 f). Of course, Hegel's own philosophy of religion leaves Hume's scepticism behind.

> another form than that which it possesses with the Scottish philosophers. To them this inward independent source is not thought or reason as such, for the content which comes to pass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature, and likewise demands for itself the external matter of experience. (LHP, Vol. III, p. 375 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 281)

Secondly, Hegel describes how the Scots developed their ethical ideas on this basis, throwing light on their method as well as results. With respect to method, Hegel emphasizes their empirical starting-point:

> This sort of reasoning starts from experience and expresses the necessity of it as an inner moment, as a force. Sociability, for example, is a moment to be found in experience; the most numerous advantages accrue to men in society. In what, then, is the necessity of society based? In the social propensity. (TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 282–3)

This method of tracing principles behind the facts of human conduct, leads to the multiplication of underlying principles, a problem that is particularly obvious in Hutcheson who, throughout his life, kept extending his scheme of internal senses, and Hegel is well aware of this difficulty.[157] The obvious answer was to discover a hierarchy of principles, to reduce a plurality of principles to the meta-principles of moral sentiment and common sense (". . . moralisches Gefühl und der gemeine Verstand", TWA, Vol. XX, p. 283). According to Hegel, their subsequent ethical ideas are the real strength of the Scottish School, a point that is made in Michelet's edition and, perhaps, even more strongly in some of the lectures:

> . . . a whole succession of Scots . . . in this way . . . frequently made sagacious observations (LHP, Vol. III, p. 376 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 283).

> On this path . . . especially the Scottish moral philosophers; translated by Garve. In the particulars much sagacity, cultured reflections, much instruction.[158]

Thirdly, the Scottish philosophers have tried to define the epistemological principle ("Das Prinzip des Erkennens", TWA, Vol. XX, p. 283): ". . . they represented the so-called healthy reason, or common-sense

[157] TWA, Vol. XX, p. 282: "Their principles are moral sense, benevolent propensities, sympathy, etc."
[158] MS, Carriere [Hegel-Archives, Bochum] p. 24 g.

(sensus communis), as the ground of truth" (LHP, Vol. III, p. 376 – TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 283 f). In their detailed execution of this programme, Hegel adds, the Scots differ and he goes on to characterize, in all brevity, the individual contributions of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald (TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 284 f – LHP, Vol. III, pp. 376 ff). Very little of these neutral summaries of basic points requires special attention. But in the comment on Oswald, perhaps, an undercurrent of hostility is detectable where Hegel mentions the alleged facts of "an inward revelation" ("innere Offenbarung"; LHP, Vol. III, p. 378 – TWA, Vol. XX, p. 285). An audience familiar with Hegel's system might have associated Hegel's attack on those who applied to science the principle that "he giveth to his own in sleep" (TMK, p. 5). If the same criticism had here been intended the motive would be obvious enough: "The same principle was likewise established in Germany at this time . . ." (LHP, Vol. III, p. 378 – TWA, Vol. XX, pp. 285).

The concluding subsection lumps together Dugald Stewart, Edward Search, Adam Ferguson, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith:

> . . . in them all there is the same ground-work to be found, the same circle of reflection, namely, an a priori philosophy, though not one which is to be pursued in a speculative way. The general idea which pervades their principle is that of common sense; to this they have added benevolent desires, sympathy, a moral sense, and from such grounds composed very excellent moral writings.[158a]

This lumping together shows Hegel's awareness of the fact that Scottish philosophy was not only an achievement of Scottish individuals, but also a communal achievement; in other words, Hegel is aware of the group or School character of Scottish philosophy, a point that is made particularly clear in the 1827/28 lectures:

> The manner of reflection which these Scots have in common, is usually called Scottish philosophy. The universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow are abounding in men belonging to it. Ed. Sartach = Search, Stuart = Stewart, who is still alive, etc.[159]

[158a] TWA, Vol. XX, p. 286 – LHP, Vol. III, pp. 378 f; I have replaced "healthy human understanding" by the more appropriate "common sense".

[159] MS, Diecks [1827/28] p. 129. Photographs of the original manuscript, marked "Privatbesitz" have reached the Hegel-Archives (Bochum) via Johannes Hoffmeister's estate. Since the owner and the location of the original manuscript are no longer known (it has to be feared that the manuscript was destroyed during the last war), I have quoted from the surviving photographs by kind permission of the Hegel-Archives (Bochum).

That Edward Search, an Englishman with no contacts and little affinity to the Scottish Enlightenment, is listed among the Scottish philosophers is a somewhat curious mistake and I have not been able to trace Hegel's source in this respect; but perhaps, one should not attach to much significance to this slip of the tongue, since it happened in only one [1827/28] of the lecture courses. A more noteworthy point to observe is the way in which Hegel ranks the Scots: "Of these Scots, Adam Smith is the best-known, Dugald Stewart appears to be the last and least significant" (TWA, Vol. XX, p. 285). Finally, Hegel points to the influence of the Scottish School in France and he mentions, in particular, the impact on Royer-Collard and Jouffroy.

On inspecting all sets of lecture notes hitherto found, it emerges that Hegel extended his treatment of Scottish philosophy considerably over the years; in other words, in the early lectures (e.g. 1819), the sections on Scottish philosophy are much shorter than Michelet's published text. Given the dependence of Hegel's ultimate exposition on older historians of philosophy (e.g. Rixner), it might be suggested that Hegel read up the secondary literature some time after 1819 to be able to cover the ground better. Another observation which impresses itself strongly on any reader of the manuscripts, is that the historical structure of the lectures is much less rigid than Michelet's text suggests. In particular, Hegel was often prepared to break through the strict chronology when he felt that a more liberal treatment of the dates would be more appropriate to the ideas that are being dealt with. Considering the position of Hume and the other Scottish philosophers in relation to French and German philosophy, Hegel kept experimenting: in 1819 and 1820/21, the brief note on Scottish moral philosophy, precedes the French philosophers, Hume, and the Germans (who follow in that order); in 1825/26 the French precede the 'minor' Scots, who are followed by Hume and the Germans; in 1827/28, Hegel uses the order that was adopted by Michelet; Berkeley, Hume, other Scottish philosophers, the French, and the Germans beginning with Jacobi and Kant; however, in 1829/30, he parts again from that order: the Scots are now followed by the French and Hume, who paves the way to Kant. Taken together, therefore, Michelet's structure is rather untypical: in most cases, Hegel wanted to use Hume as the immediate predecessor of Kant and thus discussed the other Scots beforehand, even though many of them have to be seen as reacting against Hume. Finally, the very fact that there is a section on Scotland in Hegel's history of philosophy, shows that Hegel appreciated a distinctly Scottish contribution to the shaping of the modern mind.

CHAPTER FOUR

Hegel's Account of the Market Economy

> In political economy [Volkswirtschaft] everything is done out of personal interest, but nature arranges it in such a manner that it serves ethical purposes. [. . .] Ethical life is the higher reason which, as Hegel expresses it, possesses enough cunning to create an ethical purpose behind the backs of men, a purpose which they neither anticipated nor intended. C.L. Michelet (1866).[1]

(A) SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS

The aim of the present chapter is to consider some basic elements of Hegel's views on economic matters in the light of the Scottish influence on him. Before beginning the account of a market economy which Hegel gives in his "System of Needs", it is necessary to bring to mind that he had previously provided – in his section on 'Abstract Right' (§§ 34–104) – some of the very presuppositions which Smith's and Steuart's models of economic life required for their proper functioning, most notably, private property, the existence of money as a general means of exchange, and an elaborate system of private law, centring on the law of contract. These presuppositions, though not always explicitly re-stated, are supposed to be effective throughout the "System of Needs". Likewise, these pre-conditions of the 'system of needs' are later complemented in his 'Rechtspflege' ('The Administration of Law'; §§ 209–229), an account of the means by which abstract right is enforced. A detailed consideration of these features goes beyond the scope of the present

[1] Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Naturrecht und Rechtsphilosophie als die praktische Philosophie enthaltend Rechts-, Sitten- und Gesellschaftslehre*. In 2 vols. (Berlin, 1866) Vol. I, pp. 6 f.

work,[2] but it will be shown briefly that the institutional, jurisprudential framework of Hegel's economic model already betrays significant parallels with the Scots' views. However, the parallel between Hegel and the Scottish thinkers in maintaining such presuppositions as private property has to be qualified in two ways: firstly, considering the presuppositions individually, by the differences between the respective contexts of discourse. Although, with respect to the necessary existence of private property, Hegel is in agreement with the Scots,[3] his justification of this conclusion – derived, as it is, from his conception of 'Person', whose inner freedom has to be externalized and, in its external shape, recognized by others – is, of course, distinctly his own.[4] This qualification also holds true for the other presuppositions; for example, Hegel's account of the law of contract,[5] which is equally tied up with his notion of 'Person': the contract implies the mutual recognition of persons as property owners,[6] and the relationship of property owners (ownership being defined quite widely, as including every alienable thing *and* service) becomes the paradigm of the so-called 'real' contracts, as opposed to merely 'formal' contracts (e.g. gifts; VRP, Vol. II, § 76, p. 304). Secondly, some of the presuppositions which Hegel appears to have taken over from the Scots, are not exclusively 'Scottish', but are part of a wider eighteenth century idiom. Nevertheless, the parallels between specific points and formulations – to be revealed by close textual comparison – make it likely that the Scottish authors were his most immediate source. Having made these qualifications, it is legitimate to point out that a number of the basic components of economic analysis, which form the building blocks of Hegel's discourse, closely resemble certain elements of the different discourses of the Scottish social philosophers. To begin with *property*, there is not only the above mentioned agreement with regard to "the sacred rights of private

[2] See: Joachim Ritter, "Person und Eigentum", and Peter Landau, "Hegels Begründung des Vertragsrechts", both in Manfred Riedel (1975) Vol. II, pp. 152–175 and 176–197 respectively.

[3] VRP, Vol. II, § 46, p. 216 – TMK, p. 42: "Since my will, as the will of a person, and so as a single will, becomes objective to me in property, property acquires the character of private property."

[4] This difference has recently been clarified by Christopher Berry, "Property and Possession: Two Replies to Locke – Hume and Hegel", J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman (Eds.), *Property* (New York, 1980) pp. 89–100; a comparison which throws light on both accounts.

[5] Cp.: Landau/Riedel (1975) Vol. II, pp. 180 f.

[6] VRP, Vol. II, § 71, p. 296 – TMK, p. 57: "Contract presupposes that the parties entering it recognize each other as persons and property owners. It is a relationship at the level of mind objective, and so contains and presupposes from the start the moment of recognition."

property" (Smith, SGE, Vol. II. 1, p. 188), but, we intend to argue, there is also a certain parallel with respect to the value-producing function of labour. At first glance, this parallel is easily overlooked because of Hegel's well-known adoption of Aristotle's manner of linking needs and value,[7] and his supposed ignorance of the 'Gebrauchs–' and 'Tauschwert' distinction.[8] But, firstly, there can be no doubt about Hegel's awareness of the rôle of labour in creating value: "Now this formative change [i.e.: labour] confers value on means . . . (VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 645 – TMK, p. 129). Secondly, although Hegel does not have an equivalent to Smith's crystal clear definitions of 'value in use' and 'value in exchange' (SGE, Vol. II. 1, p. 44), rudiments of this distinction are to be found in Hegel's own notes to § 63: "What is for me – in use, is the distinctly immediate quality of the thing; the universal [is] – possibility of use."[9] Thirdly, while it has to be admitted that there is a gulf between Hegel's views and Ricardo's rigorous definition of the value of an object in terms of the time it has taken to produce,[10] it has also to be realized that, on this particular point, there is a noticeable difference between Smith and Ricardo too,[11] and, of course, an even greater distance between Ricardo and Steuart. The latter strongly qualified his 'real' or 'useful value', which "must be estimated according to the *labour* it has cost to produce it" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 312), by an 'intrinsic worth', which "must be estimated according to its usefulness after the modification it has received is entirely destroyed,"[12] and by a 'subjective value' into which *demand* enters prominently.[13] Fourthly, since demand as well as labour play indispensable rôles in Steuart's and in Hegel's account of value, one ought to re-consider whether the significance which Hegel attributed to demand, was really stimulated by his undisputed familiarity with Aristotle or by Steuart's modern and

[7] VRP, Vol. II, § 63, p. 260 – TMK, p. 51; for Aristotle's own exposition see: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book V.8. I have used the German edition: *Die Nikomachische Ethik*. Translated and edited by Olof Gigon (Zürich, 2nd edition, 1967) pp. 163–166.

[8] Peter Landau, I think, makes this point in too sweeping a manner: Landau/Riedel (1975) Vol. II, p. 182.

[9] VRP, Vol. II, pp. 261 f; cp.: Hegel's early distinction between 'ideal' and 'empirical measure' of goods (SdS, p. 437).

[10] A gulf, incidentally, which supports our previous claim that Hegel's direct knowledge of Ricardo was rather limited.

[11] A point which Paul Chamley (1969, p. 157) has rightly stressed.

[12] This definition is illustrated with the example of "silver-plate curiously wrought" of which "the intrinsic worth subsists entire" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 312).

[13] SJS, Vol. II, p. 409: "The value of things depends upon many circumstances, which however may be reduced to four principal heads: First, The abundance of the things to be valued. Secondly, The demand which mankind make for them. Thirdly, The competition between the demanders; and Fourthly, The extent of the faculties of the demanders."

decisively qualified recasting of Aristotelian principles. The next prerequisite of the market economy of which there are echoes in Hegel is the existence of *money*. According to the Scottish authors, money is the most convenient means of exchanging the various products of labour,[14] and is thus indispensable for a modern commercial society. Hegel's early definitions of money are rather abstract,[15] but in the simplified account of the Nuremberg 'Rechtslehre' and the texts of the Berlin period, the parallel emerges more clearly:

> *Money* is the universal commodity which thus, as the abstract value, cannot be used itself in order to satisfy any particular need. It is only the *universal means* in order to obtain the particular needs in exchange. The use of money is only an indirect one. A matter is not in and for itself, as having such qualities, money, rather is held as such by convention only." (TWA, Vol. IV, p. 240)

> "What money is, can only be comprehended, if one knows what value is – . . . *value* [is] the maintained possibility to satisfy a need – *value* expressed in money – represented for itself – money cannot be used as itself immediately, but has to be transformed – into specific things . . ."[16]

If one compares the above quoted definition from Hegel's Nuremberg manuscript with certain passages from Sir James Steuart,[17] it seems fair to estimate that Steuart was the most immediate source; a supposition that is supported by the general observation that Steuart had more to

[14] About this general point, there is agreement among Hume, Steuart, Ferguson, and Smith, cp.: DHW, Vol. III, p. 312: "It is indeed evident, that money is nothing but the representation of labour and commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or estimating them." – SJSW, Vol. II, p. 270: "Money, which I call of account, is no more than an arbitrary scale of equal parts, invented for measuring the respective value of things vendible." – AF2, p. 248: "Money is considered as the equivalent of all commodities . . ." – SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 47 f: "They [money or goods] contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity."

[15] SdS, pp. 32 + 66; HGW, Vol. VI, p. 324; HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 225.

[16] VRP, Vol. II, note to § 63, p. 263; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 240 f; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 229; and Hegel's aphorism of the Berlin period: "Money is the abbreviation of all external need" (TWA, Vol. XI, p. 565).

[17] SJSW, Vol. I, p. 42: "By Money, I understand any commodity, which purely in itself is of no material use to man for the purposes above-mentioned, but which acquires such an estimation from his opinion of it, as to become the universal measure of what is called value, and an adequate equivalent for any thing alienable." See also: SJSW, Vol. II, pp. 270–278.

say about monetary matters than any other Scottish Enlightenment author, including Adam Smith.[18] Finally, both Hegel and the Scottish philosophers under consideration stress the need which modern commercial society has for an elaborate system of *private law* (especially laws of contract), and the proper administration of it, though Hegel, in comparison with the explicit statements of Adam Smith,[19] for example, makes the point more implicitly: through the position of 'contract' and 'the administration of law' in the structure of his philosophy of right, and also, through the unique way in which the content of Hegel's section on the law of contract – imbued as it is with contracts of exchange – points to the specific requirements of the market economy.

Taken in isolation, this agreement between Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers on what they consider to be necessary conditions of a market economy would be too general to constitute a basis for documenting any close affinities, but they will now be complemented by more specific parallels in such crucial areas as needs, labour, exchange, and classes.

(B) HUMAN NEEDS

The few paragraphs (§§ 182–188) which prepare the ground for the "System of Needs" express a specific point, which Hegel shared with Steuart[20] and Smith,[21] about the concrete, self-interested person that is brought into focus: "In this sphere, the individual, as the concrete whole of his particularity and his need, sets himself as his end";[22] it is the

[18] This point has been stressed by George E. Davie, "Anglophobe and Anglophil", SJPE, Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 291–302, here p. 296.

[19] SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 910: "Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a *regular administration of justice*, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which *the faith of contracts* is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government." (my own italics); see also: SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 687 + 708 f; SGE, Vol. V, p. 91.

[20] SJS, Vol. I, p. 20: "Man we find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of self-interest . . ."

[21] For Smith, there is not only the famous passage in the "Wealth of Nations", on the butcher, brewer, and baker whose self-interest makes them provide our dinner (SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 26 f), but also a number of passages from the "TMS": SGE, Vol. I, pp. 85 f, 135, 173.

[22] VRP, Vol. I, p. 308 – Cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 182, p. 633 – TMK, p. 122: "The concrete

sphere of "particular interests",[23] of "self-interest" ("Eigennutz"; VRP, Vol. I, p. 308) and "selfishness" ("Selbstsucht").[24]

However, self-interest as an element of Hegel's notion of the individual needs to be qualified in two ways: Firstly, it is no 'anthropologenum' or universal trait of human nature, and must not be confused with any type of psychological egoism; in line with the Scots' well-known opposition to any 'selfish system', Hegel leaves ample space for altruism and public spirit in human behaviour, indeed his preceding section centres on love within the family, and the following one culminates in the conscious furtherance of the universal end in the state. According to Hegel, 'Eigennutz' is a characteristic corresponding to an institutionalized abstraction: 'civil society', which is, in turn, historically defined, an "achievement of the modern world" (TMK, § 182+, p. 266). Secondly, though self-interested, Hegel's individual is not alone, but is, indeed, by its own aims and wants related to other individuals. An 'asocial sociability', to use the Kantian phrase,[25] emerges in Hegel as well as the Scots. The particular purposes are "interwoven with the subsistence and well-being of all the others".[26] There is thus created "a system of complete interdependence" (TMK, § 183, p. 123), as Hegel puts it, or, to use the formulations of the Scots, "a mercenary exchange of good offices" (Smith; SGE, I, p. 86), "a general tacit contract from which reciprocal and proportional services result" (Steuart; SJS, I, p. 88). From the very outset of his economic analysis, therefore, Hegel shared the crucial premise of the Scots, an interdependent system of self-interested individuals; but on studying more closely his account of human needs, the parallels become more striking.

The basic elements of Hegel's analytical model of economic life are man's particular needs, the equally particular means to satisfy them, and human labour as the dialectical mediation between needs and means;[27] the further specifications like money and exchange, and a social stratification corresponding to the respective rôles in the system of exchange, emerge out of those basic elements. The account of human needs, to begin with the first element of Hegel's exposition, was gradually developed

person, who is himself the object of his particular aims . . ."; VRP, Vol. II, § 187, p. 636 – TMK, p. 124; TWA, Vol. VII, Addition to § 182+, p. 339 – TMK, p. 267:" In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him."

[23] VRP, Vol. III, p. 472: "The particular interest of individuals".

[24] VRP, Vol. II, § 183, p. 633 – TMK, p. 123: "selfish ends"; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 569; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 473.

[25] Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", Hans Reiss (Ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge, 1970) p. 44.

[26] My own translation of: VRP, Vol. I, p. 308.

[27] VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 644 – TMK, p. 128.

in his Jena writings and manuscripts,[28] but is most fully expressed in the 'Philosophy of Right' and the various sets of corresponding lectures (VRP, Vol. I-IV), and it is on this highest level of Hegel's exposition that we shall primarily focus. Although, according to Hegel, the needs belong to the sphere of the will and thus to particularity and arbitrariness,[29] there are generalizations to be gained from the development and the collective experience of the human species. These generalizations from the history of man are clarified through comparisons with animal nature. First of all, it needs to be noted that this procedure of considering human needs in the context of a 'natural history' of man, is not only a characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment especially Ferguson,[30] but is one of the very aspects for which Christian Garve, the German editor of Ferguson's 'Institutes', praised the Scot in his lengthy commentary, carefully studied by Hegel, Schiller and others.[31]

Secondly, Hegel's comparison itself, between the needs of man and animals, is, both in structure and formulation, reminiscent of Ferguson's 'Institutes':

Hegel:	*Ferguson*:
An animal's needs and its ways and means of satisfying them are both alike restricted in scope. Though man is subject to this restriction too, yet at the same	Men have not, like the other animals a fixed and determinate choice of external objects and pursuits . . . (AF2, p. 26)

[28] In his "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts", the sphere of needs and their satisfaction is only mentioned briefly, in the context of the Romans' degeneration into private life (HGW, Vol. IV, pp. 450–458); in the "System der Sittlichkeit", more space is devoted to the system of needs, but the form of exchange described is still rather rudimentary; from the so-called "Jena Realphilosophien" onwards, we find an elaborate account of human needs and labour which shows most of the characteristics of the mature system, the principal difference being that the sphere of 'civil society' is later more clearly separated and distinguished from the family and the state; the term 'civil society' finally emerged via his Nürnberg concept of 'Staatsgesellschaft" (TWA, Vol. IV, p. 62).

[29] TWA, Vol. VII, § 189+, p. 347: "dieses Wimmeln von Willkür – TMK, p. 268: "this medley of arbitrariness". Cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 576 & Vol. IV, pp. 486, 491 f.

[30] The whole purpose of AF1 could be described as a 'natural history of man' and Ferguson is highly explicit about this methodological feature (AF1, pp. 4 f); see also AF2, pp. 15–75, and compare Smith's 'Lectures on Jurisprudence' (SGE, Vol. V, pp. 333 ff & 487 ff).

[31] Adam Ferguson, *Grundsatze der Moralphilosphie*. Uebersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Garve (Leipzig, 1772) pp. 300 f.

time he evinces his transcendence of it and his universality, first by the multiplication of needs and means . . .[32]

". . . man has very numerous [needs] and multiplies them by dividing the general needs according to particular sides and aspects. We know of the animal that it is limited with regard to the scope of its needs. There are animals which can only live on a certain tree; others only in a certain climate; others again, like the dog, are not quite so restricted. None of them, however, can be compared with the diversity of needs and the numerous ways to satisfy each need which we find with man."[33]

"[man] appears equally fitted to every condition [. . .] Man finds his lodgement alike in the cave, the cottage, and the palace; and his subsistence equally in the woods, in the dairy, or the farm. (AF1, pp. 6 f)

"Man's residence, and manner of subsistence.

Other animals have their ranges on the earth, beyond which they do not willingly stray, or beyond which they are not qualified to subsist. Some subsist only in the hot climates, others in the cold or the temperate; but man resides equally in every climate, and can subsist on great varieties of food, both animal and vegetable. He either accommodates himself to the inconveniences of his situation, or learns to surmount them." (AF2, p. 18)

A number of important characteristics of man's needs emerge out of this initial comparison; their significance and the necessity of showing, one by one, their origin in the Scottish Enlightenment, require a detailed discussion of them. The first step in the comparison contrasts the animals' restricted scope of wants (restricted, according to the various species, to a certain region, climate, or a somewhat wider set of living conditions) with man's universality which first manifests itself in the *multiplication of needs*. The larger number of wants, which might, at first glance, be considered a greater dependence, on the contrary, constitutes man's independence in the sense of not being dependent on the satisfaction of any particular want. The multiplication of human

[32] VRP, Vol. II, § 190, p 641 – TMK, p. 127; cp.· VRP, Vol. I, p. 311 & Vol. III, p 576.

[33] VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 488 f; cp : TWA, § 190+, p 348 – TMK, pp. 268 f.

needs, Hegel agrees with Smith[34] and Steuart,[35] "goes on 'ad infinitum'" (TMK, § 191, p. 127), the needs are insatiable.[36] "This quantitative boundlessness"[37] of human as distinct from animal needs, is complemented by qualitative differences: The animal's desire is immediately aroused by the perception of an object – the dog desires and chases after the hare it sees – the same immediacy is found in the satisfaction of the animal's desire – once caught, the hare is torn apart and eaten raw. With man, however, and in this respect Hegel and the Scots are again in agreement,[38] the immediate desire is differentiated and particularized,[39] in other words, man's needs are subject to *refinement* ("Verfeinerung"):

> [The concrete need] is differentiated into various parts and these, as particularized, become abstract [needs . . .] This multiplication of distinctions, which can be applied to the various sides of the needs, is called *refinement*. This refinement is thus related to the needs in general. A refined individual will know how to make considerable distinctions with regard to the satisfaction [of the needs].[40]

It is no longer the game in sight which man desires, but a particular piece of meat with a selection of such and such side dishes – and behind this *particularisation* emerges the *abstraction*[41] – man wants food, clothing, housing, etc. The same holds true of the corresponding consumption, the animal's immediate satisfaction is delayed, man no longer eats his meat raw:

[34] SGE, Vol. II, 1, p. 181: ". . . the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary . . . those desires as opposed to the desire of food . . . cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether endless."

[35] SJS, Vol. I, p. 139: "there are no bounds to the consumption of *work* . . ."

[36] VRP, Vol. III, p. 576. In his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" Smith actually uses the very formulation "insatiable desires" (SGE, vol. I, p. 184).

[37] Marginal note to Hotho's lecture notes; according to Ilting, this note was dictated by Hegel's assistant, Leopold von Henning (VRP, Vol. III, p. 574 and cp.: pp. 81 ff.

[38] Especially Smith: SGE, Vol. V, pp. 333 f & 487 f.

[39] VRP, Vol. II, § 190, p. 641 – TMK, p. 127: ". . . by the differentiation and division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particularized and so more abstract." Cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 590 f, Vol. IV, p. 489.

[40] VRP, Vol. III, pp. 591 ff (my own italics; N.W.); cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 243; VRP, Vol. I, p. 311 & Vol. II, § 191, p. 542 – TMK, p. 127 & Vol. III, p. 588 (L.v. Henning). – Man's *refinement* of desires and corresponding skills is equally stressed by Smith and Ferguson: AF1, pp. 6 f & 168; SGE, Vol. II, 1, p. 181 & Vol. V, p. 335.

[41] VRP, Vol. II, § 192, p. 642 – TMK, p. 127; cp.: Vol. III, pp. 591 f & Vol. IV, p. 489.

Hegel:	*Smith*:
In addition, man has the need of food and, as he is no longer at the level of the animals, he cannot leave his food raw, but has to adapt it to himself. (VRP, Vol. III, pp. 589 f)	All other animals find their food in the state they desire it . . . But man, . . . meet[s] with nothing so adapted to his use that it does not stand in need of improvement and preparation to fit it for his use. All other animals are content with their food in the state it is produced by nature . . . [But man] applies fire to the preparation of his food . . . (SGE, Vol. V, p. 334 and cp.: pp. 487 f)

Due to this restraining of human desire,[42] most objects are not consumed in their natural condition, but have first been improved, transformed, and laboured upon:

'What is thus consumed, is mostly made by men.'[43]

It is here that human labour first emerges in the twofold sense in which it 'bildet': it transforms the natural objects, and it guides man's desire for refinement, thus training and extending his capabilities to meet the requirements of his refined needs. (A topic to which we shall partly come back in due course and which, in a wider sense, goes beyond the scope of the present work.)[44]

The multiplication and refinement of human needs are interrelated and may indeed be considered as two aspects of one process, each multiplication implies and fosters further refinement, and the other way round. Like multiplication, refinement is infinite and when Hegel stresses this point, his statement seems to imply an indirect reference to the British Economists:

[42] VRP, Vol. III, p. 592; cp.: TWA, Vol. VII, § 190+, p. 348 – TMK, p. 269.

[43] VRP, Vol. I, p. 311; cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 645 – TMK, p. 129; TWA, Vol. VII, § 196+, p. 351 – TMK, p. 269; HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 224. – Cp.: SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 37.

[44] Compare the growing literature on Hegel's concept of labour: Ivan Dubsky, *Hegels Arbeitsbegriff und die idealistische Dialektik* (Prag, 1961); Bernhard Lakebrink, "Geist und Arbeit im Denken Hegels", *Philosophisches, Jahrbuch* Vol. 70 (1962/63) pp. 98–108; Sok-Zin Lim, *Der Begriff der Arbeit bei Hegel.* Versuch einer Interpretation der Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn, 2nd ed. 1966).

"What the English call 'comfort' is something inexhaustible and illimitable. [Others can discover to you that what you take to be] comfort at any stage is discomfort, and these discoveries never come to an end."[45]

Moreover, when Hegel discusses the cause of these perpetual refinements, he clearly echoes Steuart:[46]

Steuart:	*Hegel*:
refinements . . . which the ingenuity of manufacturers, and their desire of getting money, may have suggested to their invention. . . . these refinements seem more generally owing to the industry and invention of the manufacturers (who by their ingenuity daily contrive means of softening or relieving inconveniences, which mankind seldom percieve to be such, till the way of removing them be contrived). (SJS, I, p. 157)	Incidentally, the invention of so many needs and the means to satisfaction is not so much initiated by those who are supposed to have these needs, but by others who find the discomfort and try to relieve it. Manufacturers and craftsmen, therefore, are the inventors. One cannot say that the needs arise from the effeminacy of [the individuals] in need, but from the desire to gain of those who draw attention to the discomforts which the former had overlooked. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 593)

The next stage in Hegel's account of needs is brought about by the interplay of man's desires for *equality*, on the one hand, and for *distinction* on the other. According to Hegel, man is always trying "to assert himself in some distinctive way" (TMK, p. 128). As soon as such distinction is reached by one individual, i.e. as soon as he is recognized by others, these others will imitate him as they want to be equal. However, the aim of equality is never reached as new distinctions constantly appear. This interplay between the assertion and negation of originality explains how human needs are multiplied further:

[45] TWA, Vol. VII, § 191+, p. 349 – TMK, p. 269; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 593. – Adam Smith does indeed use the word "comfortably" in a passage which distinguishes 'necessaries' from 'luxuries' (SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 869 f).

[46] Paul Chamley (1963) tentatively suggested this parallel (pp. 88 f), but as the Berlin lectures were not available to him, his case was less convincing.

> The need for this equality and for emulation, which is the equalizing of oneself with others, as well as the other need also present here, the need of the particular to assert itself in some distinctive way, become themselves a fruitful source of the multiplication of needs and their expansion.[47]

A closer look at the individual components of Hegel's discussion makes the writings of Steuart, Ferguson, and Smith – which Hegel knew for certain – a very likely source. Firstly, those characteristics of man by which Hegel explained the multiplication of needs were equally insisted upon by the Scots. Hegel's "Bedürfnis der Besonderheit" may well be compared[48] to what Smith had called "the love of distinction so natural to man" (SGE, I, p. 182), and to two propensities of man which Ferguson had presented: (a) the desire "to excel"[49]; (b) the fondness of decoration.[50] Hegel's insistence on "Sich-gleich-machen" and "Nachahmung" finds its equivalent in Smith's "disposition . . . to imitate" (SGE, Vol. I, p. 64) and in Steuart's "taste for imitation" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 244).

Secondly, Hegel was able to learn the wide economic consequences of this imitation from the Scots. The dynamic extension of wants and consumption ("So treiben sich die Bedürfnisse"; VRP, IV, p. 49) was emphasized not only in the famous "invisibile hand" passage from Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (SGE, I, pp. 181–5), but also in a lesser known passage from Steuart:

> Were it not for imitation, every age would seek after, and be satisfied with the gratification of natural desires. Twenty-five might think of dress, horses, hunting, dogs, and generous wines: forty, of a plentiful table, and the pleasures of society: sixty, of coaches, elbow-chairs, soft carpets, and instruments of ease. But the taste of imitation blends all ages together. The old fellow delights in horses and fine clothes; the youth rides in his chariot on springs, and lolls in an easy chair, large enough to serve him for a bed. (SJS, I, p. 244)

[47] VRP, Vol. II, § 193, p. 643, – TMK, p. 128; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, pp. 243 f; VRP: Vol. I, p. 312; Vol. III, pp. 595 f; and especially, Vol. IV, p. 490.

[48] Of course, the implication that the positions of Smith and Ferguson are identical, and indeed that Ferguson's two propensities are identical, is only valid in general terms. A specialist study of this aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment would reveal significant conceptual differences in these areas.

[49] AF2, p. 66; cp.: AF1, p. 7: Even "naked in the woods" man finds a "badge of superiority" in "the strength of his limbs and the sagacity of his mind"; Hume, "Essays", p. 309, note 1.

[50] AF2, p. 31: "Men, in all ages, are fond of decoration."

Thirdly, even the fine psychological insights included in the Scots' accounts re-emerge in Hegel's discussion. Thus, the *symbolic value* of any object: the distinction it may grant, is often more important than its "frivolous utility". Such badges of distinction, as Smith puts it, are frequently "more troublesome to the person who carries them about with him than all the advantages they can afford him are commodious" (SGE, I, p. 181). The *recognition* of being original, the awareness of being imitated ("man will etwas Besonderes haben . . . [welches] die Anderen . . . nachahmen"; VRP, IV, p. 491) is often a stronger motive than any real convenience; to quote Smith's formulation of the same phenomenon:

> . . . we constantly pay more regard to the sentiments of the spectator, than to those of the person principally concerned, and consider rather how his situation will appear to other people, than how it will appear to himself. If we examine, however, why the spectator distinguishes with such admiration the condition of the rich and the great, we shall find that it is not so much upon account of the superior ease or pleasure which they are supposed to enjoy, as of the numberless artificial and elegant contrivances for promoting this ease or pleasure. He does not even imagine that they are really happier than other people: but he imagines that they possess more means of happiness. (SGE, I, p. 182)

Indeed, Hegel explains, there are objects of man's desire which have no utility at all, like "*Schnitt* der Kleidung, *Art* des Ameublements" (HGW, VIII, p. 243). Their sole function is to be seen, admired, or envied ("will Trieb, Begierde erregen"; HGW, VIII, p. 244), in other words, to be recognized by others. Ferguson and Smith made the same point:

> The means of decoration are such things as please the fancy, without being necessary or useful.[51]

This dependence of the objects of desire on "the fancy" (Ferguson), "the imagination" (Smith), "opinion and imagination" (Hegel),[52] rein-

[51]AF2, p. 31; cp.: SGE, Vol. V, p. 335: "The same temper and inclinations which prompted him to make these improvements push him to still greater refinements. This way of life appears rude and slovenly and can no longer satisfy him; he seeks after more elegant niceties and refinement. Man alone of all animals on this globe is the only one who regards the differences of things which in no way affect their real substance or give them no superior advantage in supplying the wants of nature. Even colour, the most flimsy and superficial of all distinctions, becomes an object of his regard."

forces the *infinite* extension of needs previously indicated, and thus implies the *absence* of a final *satisfaction*: "man ist damit nicht zufrieden . . . und so geht es ins Unendliche fort."[53]

The distinction between useful and purely ornamental objects, led Hegel almost naturally on to a classification of natural, mental, and social needs (VRP, Vol. II, Paragraph 194, p. 643 – TMK, p. 128), an exposition with consequences highly critical of Rousseau's state of nature with its simple necessities ("einfache Naturbedürfnisse"; § 194). On the surface, Hume, Ferguson, Steuart, Smith, and Hegel, all agree in their opposition to the Rousseauesque black-and-white contrast of a simple, paradisiac, 'natural' life, on the one hand, and a civilized, 'corrupted' condition on the other. Neither minimum subsistence nor extravagancies are absolute standards, they depend on social and historical conditions and are thus relative; examples from Ferguson and Hegel may here stand for fuller textual evidence:

> The *necessary of life* is a vague and a relative term: it is one thing in the opinion of the savage; another in that of the polished citizen: it has a reference to the fancy, and to the habits of living.[54]

> For the necessary in the satisfaction . . . [of the needs] has no determined scope. (VRP, Vol. I, p. 312)

Like Hegel,[55] Ferguson and Smith make this point with explicit reference to Rousseau. Smith's early review of Rousseau criticized his account of the state of nature for presenting "only the indolent side of it" (SGE, III, p. 281), and Ferguson exclaimed "if the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less" (AF1, p. 8). There is also a certain detachment in their evaluation of luxury common to Hegel and the Scots. They are, at least in certain phases of their inquiry, no longer moralists lamenting the manners of the age, but political economists primarily considering causes and effects; the slight difference lies in the fact that Steuart and Smith still felt the need to apologize for this method,[56] while Hegel already uses the modern perspective as the obvious one.

[52] AF2, p. 31; SGE, Vol. I, pp. 181 f; VRP, Vol. III, p. 596.

[53] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 491; cp.: SGE, Vol. I, p. 181; AF1, p. 7.

[54] AF1, p. 142; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 269 ff & SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 870.

[55] VRP, Vol. I, p. 312; VRP, Vol. II, § 194, pp. 643 f & § 187, p. 637 – TMK, pp. 128 & 125.

[56] SJS, Vol. I, p. 44 note 2: "As my subject is different from the doctrine of morals, I have no occasion to consider the term *luxury* in any other than the political sense . . .";

The distinction, too, between necessaries (according to the standards of age and class) and imagined needs or luxuries is clearly made by Smith,[57] and is implied by Hume and Ferguson (DHW, III, p. 289; AF1, p. 244), but only Steuart seems to pave the way towards Hegel's triadic classification. Hegel's "social needs", what Steuart had called "political necessaries" (SJS, I, pp. 269ff), are not only the type of needs characteristic of man as opposed to animals, but they are the *only* concrete type of human needs: they alone are demanded by men in the empirical world. "Natürliche und geistige Bedürfnisse", what Steuart had called "natural" and "rational desires" (SJS, I, p. 266) are nothing but abstractions, components of the theorist's analytical reconstruction of the real thing. It is solely on this analytical level that 'social needs' can be described as a combination, a function of natural necessity and any degree of 'geistige', 'eingebildete', and 'imaginaire Bedürfnisse'.[58] Only on this abstract level – significantly, Hegel criticized the demand to confine oneself to necessities as "merely abstract"[59] – can 'natural necessity' be defined:

> It is ample subsistence where no degree of superfluity is implied, which communicates, an idea of the physical-necessary. (SJS, I, p. 269; Steuart's italics are omitted)

On the empirical level, this definition is restricted to "animal oeconomy":

> however easy it may be to conceive an accurate idea of a physical-necessary for other *animals*, nothing is more difficult, than to prescribe the proper limits for it with regard to *man*. (SJS, I, p. 271)

The 'rational desires', on the other hand, are of *infinite variety*, as they "proceed from the affection of the mind, [and] are formed by habit and education" (SJS, I, p. 270), in other words, they depend on historical,

---

cp.: SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 870: "Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things, I call luxuries; without meaning by this appelation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them."

[57] SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 869 f: "By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without."

[58] VRP, Vol. II, § 194, p. 643 – TMK, p. 128; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 598; Vol. IV, p. 493.

[59] VRP, Vol. I, p. 312.

social, and individual factors and will differ from age to age, from one country to another, from one class to another, and even from one individual to another.

Behind the individual elements of needs, to be found in Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment – multiplication, particularisation, refinement, fashion (originality and emulation), and the classification of needs – there emerge for Hegel the two aspects that are crucial for his philosophy in general and his understanding of man in particular: Geist (Vernunft) und Freiheit, spirit (reason) and freedom. Man's transcendence of the animal's needs, his going beyond 'natural necessities', his longing for distinction and originality, etc., are to Hegel, to echo his own formulation, like numerous imprints of the "seal" of *reason* and *freedom* (TMK, § 187, p. 125). Hegel's expressions of this conviction are legion; to quote but one example:

> The animals, like they are, have their clothing [already]; man has to provide his clothing for himself . . . This lack of comfort is a credit to thought ["geistige Ehre"].[60]

There is no full equivalent of this position in Scottish Philosophy, and yet the way in which the distinctively Hegelian point of view emerges out of the details at hand, provides a prime example of Hegel's 'Aufhebung' of the Scottish analysis. The wider conclusions Hegel drew were occasionally touched upon by the Scots themselves – examples are: reason as the 'anthropologenum' or universal trait of human nature seems to lurk behind their distinction of animal and human wants; an awareness seems to be present that the multiplication of wants implies man's freedom (in the sense of a liberation from nature)[61] – the very way in which Garve, Ferguson's sympathetic German editor, for example, complains that the book tells the reader very little about freedom (Garve, p. 288), makes clear how ripe the time was for Hegel's 'Aufhebung'. And yet, it is only after Hegel drew the conclusions that they appear to be obvious: what may now appear a little step was nothing short of a revolution of spirit.

(C) FREE LABOUR AND EXCHANGE

Hegel's account of needs, and the consequences of that account are then

[60] VRP, Vol. III, pp. 589 f; cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 194, p. 644 – TMK, p. 128.

[61] AF1, p. 7: "The occupations of men, in every condition, bespeak their *freedom of choice*, their various opinions, and the *multiplicity of wants* by which they are urged . . ."

complemented by his explicit[62] introduction of 'labour' which, in the present context, is defined in a comparatively narrow manner: "Labour is the *mediation* through which he [man] satisfies his needs . . ."[63]

The first implication of this definition – a point previously explained – is that "man in what he consumes is mainly concerned with the products of men. It is the products of human effort which man consumes." (TMK, § 196, p. 129) Then, as labour is initially developed in response to man's needs, Hegel can now apply the results of his previous analysis: as the needs have been extended, refined, and particularized, labour has to undergo a corresponding particularisation. "This means of acquiring and preparing the particularized means appropriate to our similarly particularized needs is work."[64] The wider consequences of this particularisation of labour deserve close attention: to begin with, the two-fold process of '*Bildung*' emerges.[65] The multiplied needs require a multiplicity of working activities: a wealth of objects and of situations to labour upon them. This multiplicity forms "the stage on which *theoretical education* develops." (TMK, § 197, p. 129) In order to meet the many tasks which the needs have set, imagination and knowledge have been fostered. Apart from the mere quantitative extension of knowledge, the large number of needs enforces a frequent change of situation, thus demonstrating the "flexibility and rapidity of mind, [and the] ability to pass from one idea to another."[66] This flexibility of mind which characterizes men of "gebildetem Geist" and "Weltbildung" ("cultivated mind" and "cosmopolitan education"; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 501), is lacking in the peasantry (ibid., pp. 500 f). Further, the experience of numerous situations leads to an insight into complex phenomena, "das Concrete Auffassen eines Verwickelten" (VRP, Vol. III, p. 606) and to the attainment of wider perspectives: "allgemeine Gesichtspunkte der Betrachtung" or "allgemeine Beziehungen."[67] Theoretical 'Bildung', Hegel sums up, furthers "the understanding in every way". (TMK, § 197, p. 129) The *practical* side of '*Bildung*' through labour consists at first in "the habit of simply being busy" (TMK, p. 129), an aspect which Hegel clarifies by means of a contrast drawn between a "barbarian" and a "cultivated" or "educated" person ("Gebildeten").[68]

[62] As opposed to his implicit use of the concept of 'labour' in his discussion of property.

[63] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 496 (my own italics; N.W.) – cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 196, p. 644– TMK, p. 128.

[64] TMK, § 196, p. 128; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 601.

[65] For the wider implications of 'Bildung' in the 'Phenomenology', compare: I. Dubsky (1961); B. Lakebrink (1962/63); S.-Z. Lim (1966).

[66] TMK, § 197, p. 129; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 605 f & Vol. IV, p. 500.

[67] VRP, Vol. III, p. 602 (L.v. Henning); VRP, Vol. II, § 197, p. 645 – TMK, p. 129.

[68] VRP, Vol. III, p. 607; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 501.

Secondly, it implies a restriction in the scope of man's activity: man is conscious of his labour and learns to adapt it according to the materials he works upon and according to the needs of others.[69] This attention to the materials creates an increased awareness of the relationship between the means (the materials) and the ends they are supposed to serve,[70] a certain dexterity thus arises[71] and makes further divisions of labour – a topic so important that it will be treated in a separate chapter[72] – appear palatable. The adaptation of man's labour to the needs of others (VRP, Vol. III, p. 608) paves the way towards the social dimension of labour which will soon be considered in greater detail. The final implication of practical 'Bildung' is that the dexterity or aptitude, caused by the restriction of activity, becomes objective and universal ("objektive Thätigkeit und allgemeingültige Geschicklichkeit").[73] The individual achievement of inventing a new skill, for example, can be copied by others and is thus turned to the advantage of the community – a notion to be found in the writings of Steuart and Ferguson[74] and emphasized by Hegel since his early Jena writings.[75]

A further consequence of the particularisation and specialisation of labour is that man no longer produces any object in its totality, but constantly labours upon one side of a multitude of such objects. His labour no longer mediates between his own particular desire and its satisfaction, but participates in the satisfaction of general needs: labour thus becomes *social labour*. Time and again, this crucial notion – surely a remarkable example of the continuity of Hegel's thought – re-occurs almost literally from the early Jena writings onwards.[76]

This reciprocity of social labour always presupposes a system of exchange, an implication which raises Hegel's analysis – as Paul Chamley

[69] VRP, Vol. II, § 197, p. 645 – TMK, p. 129; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 607.
[70] VRP, Vol. III, p. 607.
[71] TWA, Vol. VII, § 197+, p. 352 – TMK, p. 270.
[72] See below, chapter 6, pp. 205–228.
[73] VRP, Vol. II, § 197, p. 645 – TMK, p. 129.
[74] Hegel's remark (cp. the following note) comes closer to Steuart than to Ferguson; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, p. 274: "Let a particular person fall upon an ingenious invention . . . if the invention be such as may be easily copied, he will quickly be rivalled . . . his *ingenuity* disappears, because it ceases to be *peculiar* to him." AF1, p. 169: "Inventions, we frequently observe, are accidental; but . . . where circumstances are favourable, and where a people is intent on the objects of any art, every invention is preserved, by being brought into general practice; every model is studied, and every accident is turned to account."
[75] HGW, Vol. VI, p. 320; cp.: SdS, p. 428 & VRP, Vol. III, p. 608.
[76] HGW, Vol. VI, pp. 321 f & Vol. VIII, pp. 224 f & Vol. IX, p. 195; VRP, Vol. II, § 199, p. 646 – TMK, p. 129.

was the first to show[77] – above the level attained in the Tübingen manuscripts (HTJ, p. 28) and their jurisprudential framework of 'labour' and 'property': 'labour' is no longer seen as a mere transfer of the subject's talents and efforts into the object, it is always *labour in order to exchange.*[78] Hegel's Frankfurt fragments struggle towards this insight which found its first explicit and clear statement in the various sets of Jena manuscripts (HGW, Vol. VI, p. 332 & Vol. VIII, p. 227). What Hegel here reproduces is the socio-economic model of universal interdependence of particularized labour and the free exchange of its products, as it was put forward by Steuart *and* Smith:[79]

> The principal object of this science [political economy] is . . . to employ the inhabitants (supposing them to be free-men) in such a manner as naturally to create *reciprocal relations* and *dependencies* between them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one another with reciprocal wants.[80]

> He [man] supplies the far greater part of them [his wants] by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such part of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a *commercial society*. (SGE, Vol. II. 1, p. 37 – my own italics; N.W.)

Hegel thus reformulates his preceding notion of "a system of complete interdependence" (TMK, § 183, p. 123) on the more concrete level of free labour and exchange. What is still misunderstood and stands, therefore, in need of clarification is the character of the dialectical movement from "subjective self-seeking" to "a contribution to the

[77] Paul Chamley, "La Doctrine Economique De Hegel Et La Conception Hégélienne Du Travail", HSBh 4 (Bonn, 1969) pp. 147–159.

[78] Cp.: P. Chamley (1969) p. 155: "Il est donc faux de dire que, dans la doctrine économique hégélienne, le travail joue a lui seul, par lui-même, un rôle mediateur. C'est là le rôle du travail *et de l'échange*, du travail pour l'échange."

[79] In his otherwise brilliant article (Chamley, 1969, pp. 156f.), Chamley restricts this parallel to Steuart and Hegel, and excludes Adam Smith, because of his 'Lockean' theory of value. To me, this seems to confuse two related, but nevertheless separate topics. Universal exchange, all that concerns us here, is not only present in Smith, but vital for his economic model.

[80] SJS, Vol. I, p. 17; cp.: ibid., p. 89: ". . . the best way of binding a free society together is by multiplying *reciprocal obligations*, and creating a *general dependence* between all its members." (my own italics in both quotations; N.W.).

satisfaction of the needs of everybody else." (TMK, § 199, p. 129) For Marxist inspired authors – a recent example is Helmut Reichelt – this advance has remained "a mystery" ('ein Geheimnis'),[81] as they have mistaken the nature of Hegel's asserted result: the common good, the well-being of everybody, as implied in the above quoted phrase, was never intended to depict an egalitarian paradise, a vision that would indeed be vulnerable to the criticism of lacking a sense of conflict.[82] The common good which Hegel and his Scottish predecessors really had in mind is perfectly compatible with inequality of fortunes. The poor at the bottom end of commercial society, of whom Hegel and the Scottish economists were fully aware, are indeed in one sense the losers that provide someone else's gain,[83] however – and this crucial point is all that Hegel claims here – even the poor gain through the "reciprocal production and exchange" (TMK, § 201, p. 130) of commercial society, even they are now better off than in previous times or, to borrow Adam Smith's formulation, there is "superior affluence and abundance commonly possessed even by this lowest and most despised member of civilized society, compared with what the most respected and active savage can attain to." (SGE, Vol. V, p. 564)

For Hegel and the Scots, the socio-economic model of universal interdependence and exchange implies, of course, that *labour is free*. Hegel never tired of stressing this vital principle of his political philosophy and the various ways in which he emphasizes it are most conveniently summarized under the following two headings: (a) his method of contrasting the 'free labour' of his account with other types of labour, examples being drawn from history on the one hand, and from other political thinkers, especially Plato, on the other; (b) his demonstration of how this principle emerged and of its necessary association with 'civil society'. By following these arguments in some detail and by a constant comparison of their components with the corresponding discussions of the Scottish thinkers, it will become clear that Hegel's assimilation of

[81] Helmut Reichelt's introduction to his edition of: G.W.F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt, 1972) p. xxxvi.

[82] A criticism frequently directed against Adam Smith as well as Hegel. With regard to Smith, this criticism can be found in: G. Myrdal, *Das politische Element in der nationalökonomischen Doktrinbildung* (Hannover, 2nd edition, 1963) pp. 158 f; Lucio Coletti, "Mandeville, Rousseau è Smith", *Ideologia è Societa* (Bari, 3rd edition, 1972) pp. 288 ff. Helmut Reichelt (1972) may serve as an example of the application of this criticism to Hegel.

[83] My formulation here echoes Ferguson (AF1, p. 183). This point will be considered more fully, when I look at Hegel's discussion of the flaws and remedies of his economic model; see below, chapter five.

Scottish political economy enabled him to go far beyond the scope of Greek economic thought.[84]

(a) In order to clarify the quality of his 'free labour', Hegel compares it with 'imposed' or 'enforced labour' and with various types of allotment of individuals to classes, the examples he mentions are Plato's "Republic", where "the Guardians are left to allot individuals to their particular classes and impose on them their particular tasks,"[85] Lycurgus' Sparta,[86] "the feudal monarchies" of medieval Europe,[87] the empires of Egypt and the East,[88] and the "Indian caste-system" in particular.[89] As he had discussed the institution of slavery before (§ 57), Hegel probably did not think it necessary to explicitly mention it again in this context, but it is of course obvious that slavery is also incompatible with "the choice of a social position"[90] that is given with 'free labour'.

Even on this level of merely comparing 'free labour' with other types of economic activity, most of Hegel's arguments can be found in the Scottish writers too: to begin with, they clearly realized the new quality of modern commercial society and its characteristics of free labour and exchange. 'Slavery', the first type of 'enforced labour' to come into focus, is not only distinguished from 'free labour', but it is condemned by the Scottish Enlightenment authors – with the exception of Lord Monboddo – on grounds of humanity ("slaves have a right to be treated like men"; AF1, p. 185) as well as efficiency ("from the experience of our planters, slavery is as little advantageous to the masters as to the slave, wherever hired servants can be produced . . ."; DHW, Vol. III, p. 390). In spite of this seeming agreement in rejecting slavery, it is important to differentiate between the various forms of their rejection.

[84] Karl-Heinz Ilting and others have rightly stressed that the systematic shape of Hegel's early economic views, as contained in the "System der Sittlichkeit" (1802/3), follows the first book of Aristotle's "Politics"; cp.: K.-H. Ilting, "Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*. Vol. 71 (München, 1963/64) pp. 38–58. However, the Aristotelian frame soon proved inadequate for the integration of the modern materials, as derived from the Scottish economists, and thus sank to the position of a dwindling influence.

[85] TMK, § 299, p. 195; see also TMK, §§ 185, 206, 262+; pp. 123 f, 133, 280 & VRP, Vol. III, pp. 634 f & 722; Vol. IV, pp. 523 & 637. A worthwhile, though partly dated, treatment of Hegel's criticism of Plato is to be found in M.B. Foster, *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford, 1935) Chapter III, pp. 72–98; appendix E, pp. 101–109.

[86] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 263; cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 206, pp. 651 f – TMK, p. 133.

[87] TMK, § 299, p. 195; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 523.

[88] TMK, § 299, p. 195; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 634.

[89] TMK, § 206, p. 133; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 523.

[90] TMK, § 185, p. 124; cp.: ibid., § 262, p. 162.

Francis Hutcheson's early, powerful, and influential criticism of the so-called 'classical' justification of slavery emphasizes the humanitarian grounds and shows a blend of motives highly characteristic of his wider philosophical position: the dominant motive of altruism inspired by Lord Shaftesbury on the one hand,[91] and the remnants of the older, essentially 'a priori' tradition of 'Naturrechtlich' thinking on the other hand.[92] Adam Ferguson's stand on the slavery issue is still much in line with Hutcheson's position.[93] It is in the wake of their "attempt to give natural law more solid, truly empirical foundations"[94] that Hume and Smith – though they repeat Hutcheson's humanitarian formulations to some extent – emphasize the efficiency argument against slavery.[95] Efficiency consists in a function of means and ends, a function influenced by the conditions of time and place. Thus, by emphasizing the efficiency argument, they introduce an element of historicity and development into the slavery issue to which Hegel must have been highly responsive. The antinomy at the beginning of Hegel's treatment of slavery,

> The alleged justification of slavery (by reference to all its proximate beginnings through physical force, capture in war, saving and preservation of life, upkeep, education, philanthropy, the slave's own acquiescence, and so forth), as well as the justification of a slave-ownership as simple lordship in general, and all historical views of the justice of slavery and lordship, depend on regarding man as a natural entity pure and simple, as an existent not in conformity with its concept (an existent also to which arbitrariness is appropriate). The argument for the absolute injustice of slavery, on the other hand,

[91] In this context, Hutcheson appeals to pity, "the sentiments of compassion and humanity, . . . even tho' it [slavery] could be vindicated by some plea of external right [this is alluding to the case of captives]." Francis Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosphy* (London, 1755) Vol. II, p. 203 – Cp.: Wylie Sypher, "Hutcheson and the 'Classical' Theory of Slavery", *Journal of Negro History* (1939) Vol. XXIV, pp. 263–280.

[92] In this context, Hutcheson refers to "the natural rights of mankind" and appeals to his readers' "sense of natural justice": Hutcheson (1755) Vol. II, pp. 201 & 85. – Cp.: T.D. Campbell, "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightenment", R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (Eds.), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Englightenment* (Edinburgh, 1982) pp. 167–185, here pp. 177 f.

[93] AF1, p. 185: "We feel its injustice [of slavery]; we suffer for the helot, under the severities and unequal treatment to which he was exposed . . ." & AF2, p. 201: "No contract or forfeiture can deprive a man of all his rights, or render him the property of another. No one is born a slave; because every one is born with all his original rights."

[94] Duncan Forbes, "Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment", R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (1982) pp. 186–204, here p. 193.

[95] DHW, Vol. III, p. 390 – SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 98 f, 389; Vol. II.2, p. 684; Vol. V, pp. 185 f, 453, 523, 526, 579.

> adheres to the concept of man as mind, as something inherently free. This view is one-sided in regarding man as free by nature, or in other words it takes the concept as such in its immediacy, not the Idea, as the truth.[96]

can be deciphered in terms of the opposition between the 'classical' (Plato, Aristotle, et al.) justification of slavery and the 'a priori' rejection of slavery (i.e. the natural law tradition up to Hutcheson and Kant). By going beyond Hutcheson, the later generation of Scottish social philosophy prepares the ground for Hegel's solution of the antinomy: freedom, the abolition of slavery, has to be fought for and achieved in the realm of history, man is thus casting his own frame and realizing the 'speculative concept' of human freedom. Steuart's views on 'slavery' deserve a special mention, as they have often been misunderstood. Steuart, too, is acutely aware of the difference between 'free labour' and 'slavery' and expresses this distinction in his own technical terms, "industry" and "labour":

> *Industry*, as I understand the term, must be voluntary; *labour* may be forced . . . *Industry*, therefore, is applicable to free men only; *labour* may be performed by slaves. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 146)

But not only is he aware of the difference – and this has been mistaken by most of the contemporary reviewers, by many of the older textbooks of economic thought, and even by a Hegel scholar of the eminence of Johannes Hoffmeister[97] – there can be no doubt about the fact that he rejected slavery on the same grounds as his Scottish fellow literati: humanity ("every modification of slavery is quite contrary to the spirit of modern times"; SJS, Vol. I, p. 148) and efficiency ("Set a man to labour at so much a day, he will go on at a regular rate, and never seek to improve his method: let him be hired by the piece, he will find a thousand expedients to extend his industry. This is exactly the difference between the slave and the free man." SJS, Vol. I, p. 169). However, the efficiency argument led Steuart to a rather detached view of slavery, seeing it as a technical device adequate to certain historical conditions,

[96] TMK, § 57, p. 48 – VRP, Vol. II, pp. 240+242.

[97] For contemporary critical reaction, see: *The Critical Review*. Vol. 23 (1767) p. 413 & *The Monthly Review*. Vol. 36 (1767) p. 465. Both reviews disapproved of Steuart's example of slavery: Lycurgus' Sparta, an example which will soon be commented upon in greater detail. – Johannes Hoffmeister, in his notes to DHE (P. 467), misrepresents Steuart's position as recommending slavery ("empfiehlt . . direkte Sklavenhalterei").

and some of the unfortunate formulations he used in this context[98] have later provided the basis for the abovementioned distortions of Steuart's theory.

The second type of 'imposed labour' which Hegel mentions: the medieval conditions – both on the level of the villeins ("Leibeigene"; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 523) and of the vassals obliged to services (§ 299) – are equally distinguished from 'free labour' by the Scots. Adam Smith gives detailed accounts of "villenage" (SGE: Vol. II.1, pp. 389 & 405; Vol. V, pp. 187 ff), "tenants at will",[99] "steel-bow tenants" (SGE: Vol. II.1, p. 391; Vol. V, p. 189), the French "Metayers" (SGE: Vol. II.1, p. 389; Vol. V, p. 189), "colliers and salters",[100] etc., and how all these fall short of the "freeman who works for days wages (SGE, Vol. V, p. 453). Sir James Steuart, too, is very clear about the distinction of dependent services under feudalism and free labour for an equivalent.[101] Adam Ferguson's "Essay", it is no exaggeration to say, was in one way inspired by the great contrast between the Clan system and modern commercial society (AF1, pp. XXXVIII ff). David Hume, in his "History", is also keen to distinguish the freemen from the villeins,[102] and to describe the incompatibility of villenage and free economic activity in terms of a vicious cirle: no freedom, no commerce, and 'vice-versa'.[103]

Egypt and India, Hegel's examples of allotment of individuals to classes can likewise be traced back to Smith's "Wealth of Nations":

> Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan, the whole body of the people was divided into different casts or tribes, each of which was confined, from father to son, to a particular employment or class of employments. The son of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a taylor, a taylor; etc.[104]

[98] SJS, Vol. I, pp. 168 f: "Where hands therefore are principally necessary, the slaves have the advantage; where heads are principally necessary, the advantage is in favour of the free."

[99] SGE: Vol. II.1, pp. 386 & 414 f; Vol. V, p. 520.

[100] SGE, Vol. V, p. 191; cp.: ibid., pp. 453 & 579.

[101] SJS, Vol. I, pp. 208 f; cp.: ibid., pp. 261 & 310.

[102] David Hume, *The History of England*. In 8 vols. (Oxford, 1826) Vol. I, chapter 3, Appendix, Section 5: "The Several Orders of Men", pp. 186–189.

[103] Cp.: Duncan Forbes, *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge, 1975) p. 311.

[104] SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 681; cp.: SGE, Vol. V, p. 192 and Vol. II.1, p. 80: ". . . Indostan or antient Egypt (where every man was bound by *a principle of religion* to follow the occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed it for another). . . " (my own italics; N.W.) – Hegel also refers to "a religious authority" (TMK, § 206, p. 133).

Interestingly, both Smith and Hegel refer in this context to the great public works that were executed in those countries.[105]

Slavery, 'imposed Labour', and the allotment of individuals to classes are united in Hegel's references to Plato's ideal republic and to the Sparta of Lycurgus. With regard to Plato, of course, Hegel's classical learning did not need the Scots to inspire his discussion: although the Scots, especially Smith and Steuart do mention Plato in the same context,[106] it seems obvious that Hegel's comments on and criticism of Plato are the result of his own independent study. Moreover, Hume's classification, in his essay "Idea of a perfect Commonwealth", of Plato's "Republic" as a mere ideal, "plainly imaginary" to use his own formulation (DHW, III, p. 481), neatly characterizes a position which to Hegel was a half-truth: Plato's "Republic" has indeed to be criticized, but it is more than "an empty ideal" as it expresses "the nature of Greek ethical life" (TMK, Pref., p. 10) and is thus a tremendous achievement which, however – and this is where Hegel's higher criticism of Plato sets in – by necessity falls short of the 'absolute Sittlichkeit' embodied in the modern state. Therefore, Hegel's evaluation of Plato, both encomium and rejection, can be seen as the prime example of Hegel applying his ideas about the relationship of philosophy and time to a particular figure and period in the history of philosophy,[107] as well as providing us with another example of his 'Aufhebung' of the Scottish, in this case the distinctly Humean position.

The distinction just made between Hume and his fellow Literati also matters with respect to their and to Hegel's usage of the example of Sparta. In line with his above quoted opinion of Plato's "Republic", Hume critically views Sparta as an unnatural peculiarity,[108] whereas Ferguson and Steuart, measuring it according to the standards of its age, were prepared to praise it (AF1, pp. 155–161; 185 f. & SJS, I, pp. 218–227). Again, this type of historical evolution would have ap-

[105] Compare VRP, Vol. II, § 299, p. 766 – TMK, p. 195 with SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 681.

[106] SJS, Vol. II, p. 381: "We see by the works of Xenophon, of Plato, of Aristotle, and of many other writers of merit, that, in their age, all professions which were calculated to gain money, were regarded as unworthy of a freeman . . . Plato would have a citizen punished who should enter commerce." Cp.: SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 388.

[107] This has convincingly been demonstrated by H.F. Fulda, *Das Recht der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts* (Franfurt, 1968), pp. 48 f.

[108] DHW, Vol. III, p. 291: "It is well known with what peculiar laws Sparta was governed, and what a prodigy that republic is justly esteemed by every one, who has considered human nature as it has displayed itself in other nations, and other ages. Were the testimony of history less positive and circumstantial, such a government would appear *a mere philosophical whim or fiction*, and impossible ever to be reduced to practice." (my own italics; N.W.)

pealed to Hegel and, as soon as we turn to a closer consideration of Steuart's and Ferguson's discussion, this general affinity can be complemented by more specific parallels. Admittedly, Sparta was well trodden ground in eighteenth-century philosophy and Plutarch's "Life of Lycurgus", an acknowledged source of Steuart and Ferguson,[109] was also used by Hegel (TWA, XII, p. 320). Nevertheless, the way in which Steuart (and to a lesser extent Ferguson as well) concentrates on the economic aspects of Lycurgus' Sparta,[110] the way in which he brings together and emphasizes the elements which were incompatible with free labour and exchange, is unique and original.[111] When Hegel, therefore, uses Sparta (see above, note 86) as an example of a state in which "subjective particularity" was denied, it seems highly likely that he also used Steuart's account from which some references, that would have interested Hegel, shall now be quoted:

> He [Lycurgus] destroyed all inequality at one stroke. The property of all the lands of the state was thrown together, and became at the disposal of the legislator. Every branch of industry was prescribed to the citizens. And a monied interest was made to disappear, by the introduction of iron coin. The lands he divided into equal lots, according to the number of citizens . . . The lands were cultivated by the Helotes, who were obliged to deliver the surplus, that is, a determinate quantity of fruits, to the proprietor of the lot. Every necessary mechanic art was likewise exercised by this body of slaves . . . Every freeman in the state was bred up from his infancy to arms . . . there were not two employments for a free man; there was neither orator, lawyer, physician, or politician, by profession to be found.[112]

Obviously, these parallels are inconclusive, but there is further evidence: there are two early fragments which deal with Lycurgan Sparta.[113] Although it has not yet been possible to date these fragments with

[109] SJS, Vol. I, p. 218: "Of this plan [of Lycurgus' republic] we have a description in the life of this legislator written by Plutarch . . ." – AF1, pp. 62, 157, 196, 229.

[110] SJS, Vol. I, p. 220: "Whatever regards any other object than his plan of political economy, shall here be passed over in silence."

[111] S.R. Sen came to a similar conclusion: *The Economics of Sir James Steuart* (London, 1957) p. 133.

[112] SJS, Vol. I, pp. 220–223; compare those aspects with Hegel's fullest treatment of Sparta, in the "Lectures on the Philosophy of World History", TWA, Vol. XII, pp. 319–323.

[113] These fragments were first edited by Karl Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 520 f & 525 and are now conveniently to be found in DHE, pp. 263 f, 268 f and TWA, Vol. I, p. 434.

certainty, it is very likely that they are from Hegel's Frankfurt period, i.e. from the time when Hegel was reading Steuart.[114] Moreover, one of these fragments contains a formulation which appears to use the term 'Industrie' in the rather technical sense – previously outlined[115] – of Sir James Steuart's 'industry':

> In the constitution of Sparta the safety of property and *industry* ['Industrie'] was a point almost nowhere taken into account; one might say, these aspects have been forgotten.[116]

(b) The parallels between Hegel and the Scottish social theorists become more striking when we turn from the arguments, which merely compare 'free labour' with other types of economic activity, to those that show the development of the principle and its connection with 'civil society'. "The choice of social position", a crucial characteristic of 'free labour', is described by Hegel as an element of the "subjective freedom" which "dawned in an inward form in the Christian religion and in an external form (and therefore in one linked with abstract universality) in the Roman world. It is historically subsequent to the Greek world . . ."[117] Moreover, just as the freedom of personality, which Christianity had begun to introduce, required private property for its full realization (§ 62), 'free labour' requires civil society because of the full emancipation from and rational domination of nature that is given with modern society,[118] and because of the advanced type of 'Rechtspflege' ('administration of justice') that is achieved in civil society: for the first time in history, "a man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc."[119] The connection of 'free labour' with this latter point is made particularly clear when Hegel criticizes the economic restrictions imposed on the Jews: they, like everybody else, have a right to choose their profession freely (VRP, Vol. III, p. 599). To sum up this association of free labour and civil society, I would interpret Hegel's famous § 238, following Joachim Ritter, by interpolating 'free':

[114] According to Rosenkranz, they belong to Hegel's Bern period, but Hoffmeister, Lukács and others consider them to be from the Frankfurt years.

[115] See above, p. 164; cp.: Sen (1957) p. 131.

[116] DHE, p. 268 (my own italics; N.W.) – TWA, Vol. I, p. 439; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 169 & 221.

[117] TMK, § 185, p. 124; cp.: TWA, Vol. VII, § 185+, p. 343 – TMK, p. 268; VRP, Vol. III, p. 578.

[118] See above; cp.: Ritter (1972) pp. 107 f; Riedel (1975) pp. 161 f.

[119] TMK, § 209, p. 134; cp.: Riedel (1975) pp. 154 f.

> Thus the [free] individual is a son of civil society . . .[120]

Obviously, via its necessary connection with civil society, free labour – and the specific points we tried to make about it – is but a small section of Hegel's wider historical perspective, aptly described by Seeberger's title as "Die Entwicklung des Geistes zur Freiheit".[121]

Reconsidering the Scots' position with respect to this historical emergence of 'free labour' – some developmental perspectives emerging on the level of comparison have already been indicated, and, indeed, the clear-cut distinction between the two levels (cf. above, p. 161) is more a matter of our presentation than their arguments – it is once more necessary to differentiate between various contributions to the Scottish School. The insistence on the association of *free* labour and the commercial stage of society is most strongly made by Hume and Smith. In Hume's writings we find an abundance of passages pointing to this connection: in his "Essays", especially "Of Refinement in the Arts", the point is articulated as a general principle,[122] and in the "History", it frequently arises out of detailed considerations. In a prominent place, Adam Smith acknowledged this Humean stand as a lasting influence on his social philosophy:

> . . . commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals . . . This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it.[123]

According to Steuart and Ferguson, though they agree that freedom and commerce often go together,[124] the connection is not strictly necessary:

[120] TMK, § 238, p. 148 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 679 (Knox translates the "ist" of the German version as "becomes"); cp.: Ritter (1972) p. 59.

[121] Wilhelm Seeberger, *Hegel oder die Entwicklung des Geistes zur Freiheit* (Stuttgart, 1961).

[122] DHW, Vol. III, pp. 299–309, especially p. 306: ". . . a progress in the arts is rather favourable to liberty, and has a natural tendency to preserve, if not to produce a free government."

[123] SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 412 – The fact that Smith should have singled out Hume in this way has been taken, by his recent editors (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner), as an indication "of the early age of this part of the work" (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 412 note 6). In my opinion, however, Smith is thinking of the subtle difference between Hume and the others which I shall try to characterize below.

[124] Cp.: SJS, Vol. I, p. 217: "When once a state begins to subsist by the consequences of industry, there is less danger to be apprehended from the power of the sovereign." – AF1,

states of high political virtues and civilization may be rather stagnant in commerce and manufactures (e.g.: Sparta)[125] and commercial wealth is not only compatible with political corruption (AF1, pp. 56 f & 184), but, in a certain sense, 'polished nations' are particularly in danger of losing their liberty.[126] However, and this is crucial, there is no disagreement among the Scots about the historical emergence of 'free labour'. Hume led the way, when, in his "History", he described how "villenage gradually went into disuse throughout the more civilized parts of Europe."[127] Likewise, William Robertson, in the general introduction to his "Charles V" (1769),[128] and Sir James Steuart describe 'free labour', which the latter calls 'industry', as the "last refinement" crowning "the abolishing of slavery" and of "feudal government" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 207). Adam Ferguson, again, is to some extent an exception as he is already worrying about the future of this achievement, but even so, he nowhere denies that "liberty, in one sense, appears to be the portion of polished nations [in modern Europe] alone" (AF1, p. 261). Following these predecessors and his own earlier lectures (SGE, Vol. V, pp. 187 ff) Adam Smith sums up the argument in a lengthy passage of his "Wealth of Nations" in which he explains the successive stages through which "the tenants at will, in the antient state of Europe" were transformed into "freemen", "farmers properly so called" (SGE, II.1, pp. 386–91). These significant parallels between Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and the writings of the Scottish social theorists with respect to 'free labour' are further supported by the developmental Hegel research carried out by Paul Chamley, who has shown that the conception of free labour (as contained in the "Philosophy of Right") first emerged in manuscripts from the Frankfurt period, i.e. at a time when Hegel was reading or had already read most of the Scottish authors (Chamley, 1969, pp. 147–159). Also, this specific point neatly fits into the wider simultaneous transformation of Hegel's view on and evaluation of classical antiquity vis-à-vis the modern world.

---

pp. 143 f; 261: "It has been found, that, except in a few singular cases, the commercial and political arts have advanced together."

[125] AF1, p. 160; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 218 ff.

[126] AF1, p. 263; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 70 f.

[127] Hume (1826) Vol. III, pp. 262–270 "Remarks on the Progress of Science and Government."

[128] William Robertson, *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V.* [1769], here quoted from *The Works of William Robertson*. In 12 vols. (London, 1824) Vol. IV, pp. 196–210, 233–240.

(D) SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR: THE CLASSES ('DIE STÄNDE'[129])

Hegel's account of social classes, the subject of the present section, has already been touched upon twice: firstly, Hegel's rejection of any allotment of individuals to classes has been outlined in our section on 'free labour'; secondly, the ground for the topic of classes has been prepared by Hegel's emphasis on the necessary mediation of particularized needs and particularized labour, because, although one could illustrate the required exchange with the example of individual, specialized producers, the macro-economic institutionalisation of this exchange takes the form of interdependent *classes*:

> The infinitely complex, criss-cross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the equally infinite multiplicity of means therein employed, become crystallized, owing to the universality inherent in their content, and distinguished into general groups. As a result, the entire complex is built up into particular systems of needs, means, and types of work relative to these needs, modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which individuals are assigned – in other words, into class-divisions. (TMK, § 201, pp. 130 f)

Thus, as distinct from the other element of the division of labour, specialisation within the professions (to be dealt with in chapter six), we are here dealing with the *social* division of labour: the attachment of individuals to a class as the totality of a certain type of particularized needs and labour, and the differences and interaction of these classes.[130] The principal thesis of the present section is the endeavour to point out that Hegel's tripartite class distinction as well as a number of subdivisions and subsequent definitions show a number of significant affinities with Sir James Steuart's corresponding exposition. In this manner, the two sources to which Hegel's account of classes has traditionally been related in the literature – the constitutional (especially 'Preussisches

[129] The German 'Die 'Stande' implies both 'social classes' and 'estates' (in their political function), see: VRP, Vol. II, § 303, p. 773 – TMK, p. 197 f. Since, in what follows, I am mainly dealing with the social dimension, I have used the rendering 'classes' throughout the present section.

[130] There is no doubt that Hegel clearly distinguished between the two aspects of the division of labour: the 'social' element appears to grow out of the individual's specialisation.

Landrecht') and social conditions of *contemporary* Germany[131] – shall here be complemented, not replaced, by Hegel's reception of political economy, in particular of Steuart. With this perspective in view, a brief developmental account of Hegel's views on classes will now be attempted, commenting on the internal changes of Hegel's classification of the 'Stände', but leaving aside the problem of their various systematic positions; in other words, the present focus is on the content of Hegel's treatment rather than its logical problems.

Hegel's earliest construction of a theory of social classes is to be found in his "System der Sittlichkeit" (SdS-SoEL) of 1802/3, where he distinguishes three categories:

(a) the universal class ('Der absolute Stand');
(b) the class of honesty ('Der Stand der Rechtschaffenheit');
(c) the class of raw ethical life ('Der Stand der rohen Sittlichkeit').

These classes are defined on three levels: firstly, and it is significant that Hegel begins with this aspect, by their 'Gesinnung', best rendered, perhaps, as an ethical and psychological mode of thinking; secondly, by the type of labour that is executed; thirdly, a combination of the first two levels, by its rôle in the operation of the whole. The characteristics of the three classes can thus be summarized in the following manner: The *universal class* – Hegel appears to be thinking of the nobility, though he does not use the word 'Adel'[132] – is initially defined by the principle of an absolutely pure ethical life (SdS, p. 471), which includes, in particular "absolute Uneigennützigkeit" (SdS, p. 465). As opposed to any productive labour, the activities of this class are restricted to "Regierung und Tapferkeit" (SdS, p. 473), in other words, the civil and military services; a restriction which already implies that this class has to be provided with consumer goods by the other classes. Since civil society is dominated by the principle of exchange, an equivalent has to be found for these provisions and this equivalent is of two kinds: firstly, the spiritual equivalent of providing the other classes with a vision of the highest level of ethical life;[133] secondly, the utility of the governmental

[131] See: Franz Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 138; Vol. II, p. 122; and the more recent study by R.K. Hocevar, *Hegel und der Preussische Staat* (München, 1973) pp. 86–90. The implied irrelevance of Hegel's discussion is perhaps the main reason why this aspect of Hegel's thought has received comparatively little attention.

[132] It is disputed, however, whether one should identify the traditional nobility or Napoleon's ennobled military officers with this level of Hegel's account; cp.: Haym (1857) p. 177; Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 135; Lukács (1973) Vol. II, p. 584.

[133] SdS, pp. 472 f – SoEL, p. 153: "The former utility is that the first class is the absolute

and military functions.[134] The ethical mode of thinking of the second class, which Hegel later came to call the *formal class*, is honesty ('Rechtschaffenheit'). The living expression of this honesty is the particular altruism of the family. Beyond the family, the ethical limits of honesty are reached with the proper payment of taxes and the execution of private charity.[135] The type of labour associated with this class – "die Arbeit des Bedürfnisses, der Besitz und Erwerb und Eigentum" (SdS, p. 473) – seems to embrace the wide spectrum of the 'Erwerbsbürger' (craftsmen, industrialists, traders and merchants), but on the latter, the 'Handelsstand', Hegel puts special emphasis (SdS, p. 474). By bearing the costs involved, the second class is exempted from any military service.[136] The class of raw ethical life, finally, is the *class of farmers* ('Bauernstand'). Its ethical life is 'raw' or 'unrefined', because it takes the form of mere confidence ('Zutrauen') in the universal class. Rather than preparing something for the satisfaction of a particularized need (the activity of the 'Erwerbsbürger'), its labour is the more elementary intercourse with 'living' nature.[137] The products of nature that have thus been gained, are exchanged for the more refined products of craftsmen and industrialists. Beside this cash nexus, however, there remains a personal link to the universal class, which implies that they are capable of bearing arms together.[138]

The second set of the so-called 'Jenaer Realphilosophie' [1805/06] contains the next stage of Hegel's thinking about classes. As compared with the "System der Sittlichkeit", the changes of Hegel's account can be summarized under four headings: Firstly, the tripartite structure is replaced by an initial distinction between the lower classes ('Die niedern Stände') and the class of universality ('Der Stand der Allgemeinheit'). Since the lower classes are divided into the farmers, the craftsmen, and the merchants ('Bauernstand, Stand des Gewerbes, *Kaufmannsstand*'), we can now speak of a four-part class division. The previous emphasis on the merchants has thus been strengthened by raising this group to the

and real ethical shape and so, for the other classes, the model of the self-moving and self-existent Absolute, the supreme real intuition which ethical nature demands."

[134] SdS, p. 473 – SoEL, p. 153: "The latter utility, according with the mode of the other classes, lies in the negative [i.e. in labour], and on the part of the first class labour is established likewise, but it is the absolutely indifferent labour of government and courage."

[135] SdS, p. 475 – SoEL, p. 155: "The greatest height which this class can attain by its productive activity is (a) its contribution to the needs of the first class and (b) aid to the needy."

[136] SdS, p. 473 – SoEL, p. 153.

[137] SdS, p. 476 – SoEL, p. 156.

[138] ibid.

level of a distinct class, defined by 'pure exchange'.[139] Secondly, the universal class is no longer equated with the nobility, but is subdivided into the three sections of civil servants, scholars, and soldiers ('Geschäftsmann [der für den Staat arbeitet], Gelehrter, Soldat'). This does not imply that there is no longer room for the nobility within the universal class,[140] but it certainly widens the intake of the universal class beyond the land-owners. Thirdly, the emphasis on the different military functions of the classes is reduced. In particular, the point about the exemption of the business class from military service is not repeated. Fourthly, Hegel has reversed the order of his class division: whereas the "System der Sittlichkeit" began with the universal class and ended with the class of farmers, the present manuscript uses the latter class as the basis of the whole structure which culminates in the universal class. Thus, this change of positions reinforces rather than weakens the view that Hegel held a continuous evaluation of the comparative significance of the classes.

Although Hegel does mention classes in the "Phenomenology" and the Nürnberg manuscripts,[141] the references are too short to consider them as a full stage in the development of Hegel's views on classes. Due to this gap in the records, we do not know precisely when Hegel left behind the four-class division of 1805/06, but in the final version of Hegel's ideas on classes – as represented by the "Philosophy of Right", the corresponding sets of lecture notes, and the "Encyclopaedia" – he returns to the tripartite class division of 1803, while retaining the upwards construction (farmers, business class, universal class) of 1805/06. The three classes are now called the substantial class, the formal class, and the universal class and show a number of differences from the 1803 construction. Before entering into these details, however, a wider change in Hegel's method has to be mentioned: the definitions of the various classes are no longer begun by characterizing the respective 'Gesinnung', but by describing the type of economic activity of each class. The 'Gesinnung' – which includes, this time, a description of the political modes of thinking – remains important, but is now introduced as a secondary result of the economic definitions.[142] Among the differ-

[139] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 269

[140] Rosenzweig thus seems to over-emphasize the difference when he contrasts Hegel's views of 1802, characterized by feudalism and estates ['aristokratisch-ständisch'], with a later level of 'monarchisch-bürokratisch' (1920) Vol. I, p. 189.

[141] TWA, Vol. III, pp. 435 & 513; TWA, Vol. IV, p. 63.

[142] This point emerges particularly clearly from Eduard Gans' additions to the "Philosophy of Right" (TWA, Vol. VII, § 204+, p. 357 – TMK, pp. 270 f: "In the business class, the individual is thrown back on himself, and this feeling of self-hood is most intimately

ences in the details the following points are the most important ones: Firstly, the *substantial* class, which is essentially related to the soil, is now constituted by the landowners as well as the farmers (VRP, Vol. III, p. 624). Since Hegel, when he discusses the income of the universal class, considers landed property as an important source (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 521), this new classification does not prevent the landowners from joining the universal class, it rather provides them with an economic basis from which they can raise themselves all the more easily to the universal class. Secondly, there is now a neat subdivision of the *formal* class into three sections or groups:

> The task of this class [i.e.: the business class] is subdivided into
>
> (a) work to satisfy single needs in a comparatively concrete way and to supply single orders – craftsmanship;
> (b) work of a more abstract kind, mass-production to satisfy single needs, but needs in more universal demand – manufacture;
> (c) the business of exchange, whereby separate utilities are exchanged the one for the other, principally through the use of the universal medium of exchange, money, which actualizes the abstract value of all commodities – trade.[143]

This subdivision of the formal class implies two innovations: (a) a group of manufacturers makes its appearance between the craftsmen and the traders; (b) the merchants no longer constitute a class by themselves: their position is reduced to one section within the second class. Nevertheless, Hegel continues to attribute a special significance to the merchants, since he grants them the highest place in his upwards construction of the formal class: their general considerations point towards the universal interest represented by the third class. Thirdly, building on foundations of the 1805/06 manuscript, Hegel also subdivides the universal class and, although these distinctions are not spelt out equally well, he seems to have three groups in mind:

---

connected with the demand for law and order. The sense of freedom and order has therefore arisen above all in towns. The agricultural class, on the other hand, has little occasion to think of itself; what it obtains is the gift of a stranger, of nature. Its feeling of dependence is fundamental to it, and with this feeling there is readily associated a willingness to submit to whatever may befall it at other men's hands. The agricultural class is thus more inclined to subservience, the business class to freedom." Gans' addition has been confirmed by VRP, Vol. III, pp. 629 f.

[143] TMK, § 204, p. 132 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 650; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, pp. 628–632 & Vol. IV, p. 520.

(a) the administrators or civil servants;
(b) the scholars ('Rechtsgelehrte, Ärzte, Geistliche, Gelehrte", VRP, Vol. IV, p. 521);
(c) the military officers.

If one compares Hegel's account of social classes, as it has just been outlined, with Adam Smith's statements about the different classes of the people – especially his classical tripartite division of those who derive their income (a) from labour (wages) only; (b) from the rent of their landed property; or (c) from the profits of their capital stock [144] – Hegel's theory appears much more hesitant and traditional, and since very few of the scholars dealing with Hegel's account of classes looked beyond the classical economic theory associated with Smith, it appeared that Hegel's reception of political economy did not penetrate his views on classes. However, a comparison of the views of Hegel and Sir James Steuart reveals the following significant parallels: to begin with, Steuart's way of distributing the people into classes closely resembles Hegel's account. He sets out by distinguishing the '*farmers*' from the '*free hands*' and defines the two classes in the process:

> The first [class] is that of the farmers who produce the subsistence, and who are necessarily employed in this branch of business; the other I shall call *free hands*; because their occupation being to procure themselves subsistence out of the superfluity of the farmers, and by a labour adapted to the wants of the society, may vary according to these wants, and these again according to the spirit of the times. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 43)

These two classes are soon complemented by a class of civil and military state *functionaries*. With respect to the section of soldiers and military officers, this completion of the previous class structure is made explicitly. [145] The need for a civil service is emphasized implicitly by ascribing a great many functions to the state, which thus requires a set of men to execute them.[146]

Secondly, Steuart puts special emphasis on the *merchants* too. As in Hegel, the merchants are introduced as the final subsection of the

[144] See: SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 279 & Vol. II.2, p. 927.

[145] SJS, Vol. I, p. 301: "There must be a third class; to wit, those who are maintained and taken care of at the expense of the whole community, in order to serve as a defence."

[146] For my discussion of the functions which Steuart ascribes to the state, see below: chapter five.

second class: the 'free hands'. Steuart begins with the other components of this class, the majority[147] of which is engaged in "industry and manufactures."[148] At the first stage of his analytical abstraction, as George Davie has rightly stressed, Steuart "deliberately keeps out of sight traders and merchants"[149] and constructs a situation in which the various producers and consumers negotiate directly.[150] Only then are the trading middlemen introduced, [151] whom he defines in the following manner:

> Trade is an operation, by which the wealth, or work, either of individuals, or of societies, may, by a set of men called merchants, be exchanged, for an equivalent, proper for supplying every want, without any interruption to industry, or any check upon consumption. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 146; Steuart's italics are omitted)

By means of this analytical device, Steuart succeeds in stressing the significance of the rôle of the merchants in the achievement of economic prosperity. He is able, far better than Adam Smith, to explore the various "specialised branches of middleman activity – banking, debt and credit, paper money" (Davie, SJPE, 1967, p. 293) and to spell out the advantages which society reaps from them (SJS, Vol. I, p. 158).

A third parallel emerges on considering the special position of the *nobility*. As opposed to Hegel, Steuart appears, at times, to present the landowners as a subsection of the 'free hands', [152] but the same passages imply a personal link, rather than a cash nexus, between those who own

[147] For Steuart's occasional inclusion of the land-owners among the 'free hands', see below.

[148] SJS, Vol. I, p. 57 – It ought to be remembered that 'industry' is a technical term for Steuart (SJS, Vol. I, p. 146).

[149] G.E. Davie (SJPE, 1967) p. 292 – My argument is indebted to Dr. Davie's interpretation of Steuart's 'middlemen'.

[150] SJS, Vol. I, p. 149: " . . . the better to simplify our ideas, we supposed the transition to be *direct* from the manufacturer to the consumer, and both to be members of the same society." (my own italics; N.W.)

[151] SJS, Vol. I, p. 149: "Matters now become more complex, by the introduction of trade among different nations, which is a method of collecting and distributing the produce of industry, by the interposition of a third principle. Trade receives from a thousand hands, and distributes to as many."

[152] SJS, Vol. I, p. 58: "These [i.e.: The free hands] I must subdivide into two conditions. The first, those to whom this surplus directly belongs, or who, with a revenue in money already acquired, can purchase it. The second, those who purchase it with their daily labour or personal service."

and those who cultivate the soil, and moreover, as in Hegel, the nobility is particularly well qualified for *armed service*:

> . . . when danger threatens from abroad, and when armies are brought into the field, compare the behaviour of those conducted by a warlike nobility, with those conducted by the sons of labour and industry; those who have glory, with those who have gain for their point of view.(SJS, Vol. I, p. 71)

Steuart's position on this issue contains two aspects of great relevance for the present comparison with Hegel. On the one hand, Steuart records a comparative decline of the nobility over "these last two hundred years" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 29):

> This class of inhabitants remaining inactive in the country . . . have, in consequence of the introduction of industry, trade and luxury, insensibly had the balance of wealth, and consequently of consideration turned against them.[153]

And, speaking in strictly economic terms, this decline of the "rich idle consumers" is justified:

> . . . will it not be found that the diminution of those mouths who do not work, and which appear useful in consideration only of the consumption they make, is no real loss to the nation? . . . I conclude, that there can be no determinate number of rich idle consumers necessary to employ a determinate number of industrious people, no more than of masters to employ a fixed number of menial servants.[154]

To this latter and more specific point, too, there appear to be allusions in Hegel's lectures of 1818/19 and 1824/25; together, indeed, with references to political economy, though Steuart's name is nowhere mentioned explicitly:

> . . . political economy. Here, the individual counts only in so far as it

[153] SJS, Vol. I, p. 71; cp.: Hegel's description of this development (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 519).

[154] SJS, Vol. I, p. 68 f; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, p. 93: "Idle mouths are useful to themselves only, not to the state; consequently, are not an object of the care of the state, any further than to provide employment for them; and their welfare (while they remain useless to others) is, in a free country, purely a matter of private concern."

consumes and produces – [Anyone] who consumes only is regarded as a superfluous part . . . that might also be absent. (VRP, Vol. I, pp. 313 f; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 499)

On the other hand, and again Steuart's answer seems to point towards the Hegelian position, this purely economic argument against the nobility is overruled by taking their *spiritual* qualities into account: "they serve as a bulwark to virtue", and they have "retained the military spirit", "the sentiments you approve of in a soldier" (SJS, I, pp. 70–72). These spiritual qualities of the nobility are emphasized by frequent comparisons with the mercantile spirit of the 'nouveau riche'.[155] With respect to the martial virtues, the sons of the trading classes are no match for the farmers either: the latter's sense of attachment makes the difference (SJSW, Vol. I, pp. 182 f).

The emphasis on the spiritual quality, or 'Gesinnung' of the military nobility leads to a fourth parallel between Steuart and Hegel: as opposed to 'self-interest', which is the ruling principle of all other classes, Steuart's governmental power, or just 'statesman', [156] as well as Hegel's 'universal class' are guided by 'public spirit', their motive is the furtherance of the common good. There is thus an obvious agreement between their fundamental assumptions: "Statesmen . . . do not act for themselves but for the people they govern"[157] – "The universal class has for its task *the universal interest* of the community." TMK, § 205, p. 132 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 650; my own italics; N.W.).

[155] SJS, Vol. I, p. 72: "If these [the sons of the declining nobility] appear to you poor and ragged, while they are wandering up and down their father's lands, chasing a wretched hare or a partridge compare them, when in the troops, with those of your wealthy neighbours, if any such you have."

[156] SJS, Vol. I, p. 16: "The *statesman* (this is a general term to signify the legislature and supreme power, according to the form of government) . . ."

[157] SJSW, Vol. V, p. 227; cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 142–145.

CHAPTER FIVE

Hegel's 'Libéralisme Interventionniste'[1] and the Legacy of Steuart and Smith

> The political organization of the 'ethical community' . . . has to be responsive to the legitimate claims of 'particularity' and 'subjectivity', yet independent and strong enough to resist their excessive pressure and escape the danger of being dominated by them.[2]

(A) INTRODUCTION

In the present chapter, the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hegel is elucidated with regard to his views on what we would call the relation of state and society and what, following Hegel's own terminology, might be described as the rôle of 'the public authority' (PhR, § 235) – as distinct from the state proper (§§ 257 ff) – vis-à-vis 'civil society'. This issue is of great significance for the overall evaluation of Hegel's political philosophy, as it leads right into the fierce battleground of universalist and individualist interpretations[3] of Hegel's system and – although this often implies that the disputed 'liberalism' of Hegel's political philosophy is confused with the question of Hegel's personal stand in politics[4] – it is on this battleground that the views of most hostile readers and interpreters have been formed.[5] In spite of this wide

[1] This appropriate phrase has been coined by Paul Chamley (1963) p. 41.

[2] Z.A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State", Z.A. Pelczynski (Ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1971) p. 23.

[3] For an extensive survey of the various interpretations, see Henning Ottmann (1977) pp. 1–9.

[4] K.-H. Ilting, "The structure of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'", Z.A. Pelczynski (1971) p. 90: "To determine what place he gave to liberalism in his theory should therefore be more important than to decide to what extent he was a liberal."

[5] Cp.: Werner Maihofer, "Hegels Prinzip des modernen Staates", Manfred Riedel (Ed.), *Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1975) Vol. II, p. 361.

relevance, Hegel's views on the conditions and scope, the precise fields and methods of governmental intervention have not yet received sufficient attention. The following attempt to clarify these issues will be trying to reconstruct Hegel's position in greater detail and to throw light on it by frequent careful comparisons with Hegel's foremost masters in matters of political economy: Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith.

Since we have reconstructed (in chapter four) Hegel's account of the market mechanism and some elements of its institutional framework, the obvious steps to be considered now are Hegel's analysis of the inherent problems of this mechanism, leading to the areas and, subsequently, the methods of 'police' intervention, which finally, as such intervention depends on a superior public authority, paves the way towards Hegel's 'political state'. The 'Philosophy of Right' with the various sets of lecture notes must, as Hegel's mature and most extensive exposition, be the principal textual basis of our reconstruction. But as earlier, notably Jena materials will also be used (indicating differences whenever necessary), the present investigation will also throw some light on the development of Hegel's socio-political ideas. In particular, our consideration of the economic 'Realien' (e.g. the precise fields of intervention) behind the changing conceptual structure, will cast doubt on Fetscher's thesis of an *increasingly* liberal standpoint.[6]

The attempted clarification of Hegel's position – by means of frequent comparisons with the views of Steuart and Smith that first inspired and constantly served him as a store of knowledge and a yardstick for his own reasoning on the subject – suffers the drawback that the real theories of Smith and Steuart have been hidden behind a smoke-screen of pre- and misconceptions that sprang from oversimplifying textbooks and other popularizations. Thus, neglecting the many important qualifications which both thinkers had made, it has often happened that Steuart was uncritically identified with earlier mercantilists, whereas Smith was confused with the Manchester Liberalism of later days. The passing tributes, which some Hegel scholars paid to the Scottish economists bear ample witness to the wide-spread confusion, to give but three examples: Sir James Steuart is mixed up with Dugald Stewart by both Bloch[7] and Helferich;[8] another scholar, writing in 1955, classified Steuart as 'an epigone of Smith'[9] and in spite of the plainest facts –

[6] Iring Fetscher, "Zur Aktualität der politischen Philosophie Hegels", Reinhard Heede & Joachim Ritter (Ed.), *Hegel-Bilanz* (Frankfurt, 1973) pp. 193–213, here p. 194.

[7] Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt. Erläuterungen zu Hegel* (Frankfurt, 3rd edition, 1972) pp. 44 + 524.

[8] Christoph Helferich, *G.W. Fr. Hegel* (Stuttgart, 1979) pp. 27, 234.

[9] Haruo Naniwada, "Smith, Hegel, Marx", *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. Vol. 111 (1955) pp. 397–417, here p. 397.

Steuart wrote quite independently in exile and published earlier – no one stood up to refute him. In the light of these circumstances, it seems appropriate to start our analysis with a more adequate presentation of the views of Steuart and Smith, using the results of up-to-date scholarship.

(B) STEUART AND SMITH

> . . .the only way to do justice to Steuart is to regard his work as an attempt to discover a media via between free trade and interventionism . . . What Steuart wanted was the kind of interventionist control which would facilitate free trade with England, by neutralising its abuses, not the sort which cuts trade off entirely and so deprives the Scottish economy of its chief stimulus.[10]

> Adam Smith was not a doctrinaire advocate of laissez faire. He saw a wide and elastic range of activity for government, and he was prepared to extend it even farther if government, by improving its standards of competence, honesty, and public spirit, showed itself entitled to wider responsibilities . . . He did not believe that laissez faire was always good, or always bad. It depended on circumstances.[11]

There are important and substantial differences – which will soon be elaborated – between the functions ascribed to the state (with regard to commercial society) by Smith and Steuart respectively. Nevertheless, the frequent description of the two thinkers as being on different sides of the break that separates mercantilism from 'laissez-faire' capitalism[12] stands in need of various qualifications. By all too often merely reprinting the famous quotations from Steuart and Smith,

[10] G.E. Davie, "Anglophobe and Anglophil", *SJPE* (1967) Vol. XIV, pp. 295+297.

[11] Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith and Laissez Faire", *Adam Smith, 1776–1926*. Lectures to Commemorate the Sesqui-Centennial of the Publication of "The Wealth of Nations" [1928] = [Reprint: (New York, 1966)] pp. 116–155, here pp. 153 ff.

[12] As has been done, for example, by Sigmund Feilbogen, "James Steuart und Adam Smith", *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. Vol. 45 (1889) pp. 218–260.

Steuart:

In treating every question of political economy, I constantly suppose a statesman at the head of government, systematically conducting every part of it, so as to prevent the vicissitudes of manners and innovations, by their natural and immediate effects or consequences, from hurting any interest within the commonwealth.
(SJS, Vol. I, p. 122)

Smith:

The sovereign is completely discharged from . . . the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of society."
(SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 687)

the distinction between them is oversimplified, existing parallels are ignored, and the real contrast obscured. Let us therefore begin by considering their doctrines in turn and by correcting some of the widespread misconceptions.

Steuart's above quoted appeal to an omnipresent 'statesman' was no doubt an unhappy formulation, promptly provoking one contemporary reviewer to retort: "The author, we hope, will pardon us in saying, that we can have no idea of any statesman interfering in the commercial concerns of a free country."[13] In the mind of the reading public in general and the mercantile community in particular, such criticism coincided with the awareness of Steuart's Jacobite connection, which, in turn, was associated with despotic government. It is not surprising, therefore, that Steuart's 'Principles' was not well received at the time (and that its rehabilitation took almost two centuries).

It is worth, however, looking beyond the surface of slogans as it then becomes clear that Steuart's idea of intervention by a ubiquitous 'statesman' is highly qualified by both general principles and a number of particulars: Firstly, Steuart's concept of 'statesman' is not an allusion to an absolute prince, but rather "a general term to signify the legislature and supreme power, according to the form of government" (SJS, I, p. 16). Likewise, Steuart's evaluation of governments, implied in general definitions,

I speak of governments only which are conducted systematically,

[13] *The Critical Review*, Vol. XXIII (1767) p. 411.

constitutionally, and by general laws; and when I mention princes, I mean their councils. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 217)

as well as in passing value judgements (" . . . the slavish form of feudal government"; " . . . the ambition of princes"; " . . . the folly of despotism"; SJS, Vol. I, pp. 148 & 215 f & 279) make it clear beyond doubt that his sympathies are with the spirit of freedom, in the sense of the rule of law, rather than with despotic arbitrariness of any description. Secondly, it is necessary to consider the *general model of economic life* in which Steuart's 'statesman' is located. To begin with, the 'Principles' – in spite of Steuart's own modesty[14] and Smith's more complex model which soon came to supersede it – displays the *scientific* structure of systematically connected investigations (e.g. of the multiplication of the population, of methods of subsistence, of labour, and so on), rather than being a mere collection of individual and ad hoc remedial policies for the use of a ruler. In other words, using the analogy with a better known transformation, Steuart's 'Principles' is as much of a step away from advising princes and towards a science of political economy,[15] as Machiavelli had moved away from merely offering guidance to the mighty Medici and moved towards a science of politics. This scientific nature of Steuart's work was not lost upon his contemporaries: one reviewer characteristically commented that "the whole may not unaptly be compared to a piece of rich embroidery."[16] When we leave behind the method and move on to the contents of Steuart's model, a further and more important qualification to interventionism emerges. What is relevant here,[17] is that his model contains the main characteristics of a market or exchange economy. As opposed to the preceding feudal stage and its system of mutual obligations – the lord providing the land, security from external enemies and internal quarrels (judicial function); the vassal, in turn, providing personal services in war (as soldier) and peace (working the lord's land) – there is now a cash nexus, which means free labour rather than dependent service.

[14] SJS, Vol. I, p. 19: "I pretend to form no system, but, by tracing out a succession of principles . . . I shall endeavour to furnish some materials towards the forming of a good one."

[15] This interpretation may be found in a variety of writers: E.A.J. Johnson, *Predecessors of Adam Smith* [1937] = [Reprint: (New York, 1960)] p. 213; S.R. Sen, *The Economics of Sir James Steuart* (London, 1957) pp. 26–31; P. Chamley (1963) pp. 58–60; A.S. Skinner, "Introduction" to SJS, pp. LX-LXII.

[16] *The Monthly Review* (1767) p. 365.

[17] For a fuller consideration of Steuart's model, see: S.R. Sen (1957); A.S. Skinner, "Introduction" to SJS; A.S. Skinner, "Sir James Steuart: The Author of a System", *SJPE*, Vol. XXVIII (1981) pp. 20–42.

I deduce the origin of the great subordination under the feudal government, from the necessary dependence of the lower classes for their subsistence. They consumed the produce of the land, as the price of their subordination, not as the reward of their industry in making it produce.

I deduce modern liberty from the independence of the same classes, by the introduction of industry, and circulation of an adequate equivalent for every service. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 208 f)

Men were then forced to labour because they were slaves to others; men are now forced to labour because they are slaves to their own wants. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 51)

These crucial references to the transition from feudalism to the modern exchange economy could now be fully complemented by Steuart's definition of the particulars already implied – e.g. interdependence of different classes (landlords, farmers, free hands), industry and trade, income and money, commodity and wants, etc.[18] – and the picture which thus arises of the market economy is "a free and perfect society . . . a general tacit contract, from which reciprocal and proportional services result universally between all those who compose it" (SJS, I, p. 88). In his treatment of prices and allocation, to single out two important examples, Steuart relied quite heavily – at least as long as conditions were 'regular' – on the mechanisms of this market society, rather than the 'statesman'. Not only are prices determined by free bargaining or "double competition",

. . . it is the complicated operations of demand and competition, which determines the standard price of everything.[19]

the same process even ensures 'reasonable' prices:

. . . it is this which prevents the excessive rise of prices; it is this which prevents their excessive fall. While *double competition* prevails, the balance is perfect, trade and industry flourish.(SJS, Vol. I, p. 173)

In allocative terms, the market mechanisms have equally beneficial results:

[18] SJS, Vol. I, pp. 43 & 57 f (distribution of population into classes); Vol. I, pp. 146–149 (trade and industry); Vol. I, p. 44 (money); Vol. I, pp. 53–55 (rent); Vol. II, pp. 400 f (wages); Vol. I, pp. 151 ff & 270–275 (wants).

[19] SJS, Vol. II, p. 344; cp.: Vol. I, p. 174.

> Trade produces many excellent advantages; it marks out to the manufacturers when their branch is under or overstocked with hands. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 158)

Although Steuart does not formulate it as clearly as Smith, his discussions are sufficiently outspoken to allow the conclusion that interventionism only comes on to the scene when the mechanisms of the market have failed; a principle, as we shall see, to which Smith had happily subscribed. Steuart's condition of market failure may be illustrated with two examples which, at first glance, appear to show his readiness to intervene: (a) his proposals for price controls as a means of grain policy. Steuart allows for such controls, but insists that they are only to be used in extreme situations – "No more is required from good government, but to guard against the two extremes of superfluous plenty and pinching want."[20] – and, as S.R. Sen has aptly put it, Steuart "is not trying to fix [corn] prices by mere government fiat" (Sen, p. 146), but by a complicated system of state granaries; likewise (b) his demand for employment policies is always conditioned by the existence of some one "who is willing to work for his bread, but who can find no employment" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 88). The statesman's activity is called for where the mechanisms of the market need mediation, because, by their slowness or suddenness, they might otherwise be hurtful to certain groups of the populace. This conception is illustrated by the analogy with a watch: the statesman does not wind it up, it works according to its own mechanisms, and only when it goes wrong, does the workman have to set it right again (SJS, Vol. I, pp. 217 & 278 f). Steuart even anticipated that the spirit of his times might misunderstand his interventionism and he tried – without success, to judge from the result – to meet any such misunderstanding by emphasizing his condition of market failure:

> From what has been thrown out in this chapter, let no one conclude, that such oeconomical principles would lead to regulations much too minute to be consistent with a just spirit of manly freedom and self-government in the common affairs of life. The regulations I have been recommending, regard only those who cannot support their families without the assistance of the state.
> (SJS, Vol. I, p. 81; Steuart's italics are omitted)

But not only do the mechanisms of the exchange economy remain

[20] Sir James Steuart, "A Dissertation on the Policy of Grain", SJSW, Vol. V, p. 353 – Cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 233, 252–255; Vol. II, pp. 402–404, 696.

fundamentally untouched by the statesman, his own power is limited by the power which the economy sets free and grants to the industrious:

> . . . industry must give wealth, and wealth *will* give power. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 213)

> . . . an opulent, bold, and spirited people, having the fund of the prince's wealth in their own hands, have it also in their power, when it becomes strongly their inclination, to shake off his authority. The consequence of this change has been the introduction of a more mild, and a more regular plan of administration. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 216)

Steuart's analysis is thus supposed to show that the very functioning of the exchange economy will defend human freedom in that it provides "the most effective bridle [that] ever was invented against the folly of despotism." (SJS, I, p. 279) Interventionism is crucially qualified by the fact that the statesman "is bound up by the laws of political economy" (SJS, I, p. 217). The system which he allowed to gain complexity, has finally thrown off the statesman's authority, he is no longer "master to establish what oeconomy he pleases, or, in the exercise of his sublime authority, to overturn at will the established laws of it, let him be the most despotic monarch upon earth."(SJS, I, p. 16)

Thirdly, much of Steuart's interventionism with regard to trade has to be seen within the context of his "evolutionist approach"[21] corresponding to his "acute consciousness of the sheer variety of economic conditions" (A. Skinner, 1981, p. 32) and, in turn, reflecting his wide continental experiences. Steuart distinguished three developmental stages of the exchange economy: infant, foreign, and inland trade, all of them requiring different policies. The *protectionism*, frequently associated with Steuart, is in fact limited to the stage of *infant trade* which may perhaps be clarified with regard to his native Scotland: a comparatively backward country trying to catch up with more competitive neighbours (especially England of course). In this condition, Steuart thought it necessary to rear home industries behind protective shelters "by laying a prohibition upon foreign work", "by excluding all competition with strangers" (SJS, Vol. I, pp. 262 & 263). As soon, however, as home industries start to achieve competitive levels, and *foreign trade*, the second step of the ladder is reached, such protective measures should be replaced by a trading freedom that brings Steuart close to Smith and his

[21] W. Stettner, "Sir James Steuart on the Public Debt", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 59 (1944/45) pp. 451–476, here p. 473.

followers. As long as a country prospers from free trade Steuart saw no need for the statesman to intervene again. Only when foreign markets are about to be lost, did Steuart favour export bounties and other subsidies as a short-term measure. When even these remedies fail, Steuart concluded, "foreign trade is at an end; and out of its ashes arises the third species, which I call inland commerce" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 263). The foremost interventionist measure at the stage of *inland trade* is an active *employment policy*. The conclusion which arises from this consideration of Steuart's stages of trade is one of undogmatic pragmatism rather than stubborn interventionism or, to quote from two intimate connoisseurs of Steuart's economics:

> Free trade or autarky, private enterprise or state planning he was prepared to try impartially provided they were conducive to the 'general good' . . . he was no doctrinaire in the sense Adam Smith and Karl Marx were. (Sen, 1957, p. 152)

> Steuart . . . offered a number of policy prescriptions in the form of a general system which *included* Smith's claim for 'free trade' in particular cases, but which recognised that this claim could *not* be regarded as universally valid – given the premise that growth rates were likely to vary as between different nations. (A. Skinner, 1981, p. 40)

Having made these important and necessary qualifications, it is nevertheless true that there is a *preoccupation* with *interventionist policies* in Steuart's 'Principles'. Steuart did not trespass against the conditions for intervention outlined above, especially the required market failure, but he saw market failure everywhere or, at least, its dangerous possibility. The market mechanisms, like the wheels of a watch, should be left alone as long as they function properly, but, according to Steuart, they "are continually going wrong" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 217).

Before illustrating Steuart's interventionism with three prime examples (population control, employment policies, caring for the poor), let us point to one principle generally present: the problem of adjusting a given economic structure to changed circumstances. Again, we find a strong reliance on the mechanism of the market, "in a little time every thing becomes balanced in a trading nation" (SJS, Vol. I, p. 183), but Steuart, much more than Smith, was concerned with the effect of that 'little time' on the life of the ordinary citizen. According to Steuart, the suddenness of innovations and similar "revolutions are constantly hurtful" and this inherently conservative attitude led him to ascribe the task of necessary stabilization and mitigation to the statesman:

> A government must be continually in action, and one principal object of its attention must be, the consequences and effects of new institutions. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 21)

As population is the first subject of Steuart's analysis, *population control* is the first area of intervention. Before considering Steuart's discussion of over-population and under-population, his ideal of a 'proper' number needs to be presented: it is defined by full employment (which determines the ideal total) and the need of society for any specific good (which determines the ideal size of each class):

> That number of husbandmen, therefore, is the best, which can provide food for all the state; and that number of inhabitants is the best, which is compatible with the full employment of every one of them. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 93; italics ommitted)

The first task of the statesman is therefore to find out how each class and the nation as a whole compare with these ideal numbers (SJS, I, p. 86). This is to be done by compiling "exact lists of births, deaths, and marriages, for every class of inhabitants in a modern society" (SJS, I, p. 81). As over-population could lead to scarcity in food supplies, it ought to be checked and Steuart proposes two means for doing so. Firstly, he is prepared to defend traditional restrictions on marriage – "a parish priest might, properly enough, be warranted not to join a couple unless they could make it appear that their children were not likely to become a burden to the parish" (SJS, I, pp. 77 f) – though he rejects "new limitations" as they "would shock the spirit of the times" (SJS, I, p. 80). Secondly, "colonies are an outlet for superfluous inhabitants" (ibid.). The major drawback of under-population, on the other hand, would be a decline of military power (defence would become more difficult) and the remedies, here, are to help poor families by taking care of their children (SJS, I, p. 79), to establish "hospitals for foundlings" (SJS, I, p. 80), and to lessen the rate of infant mortality.[22] As the ideal number of inhabitants, for Steuart, is tied up with full employment, population control naturally leads him on to *employment policies*. Thus, to increase the rate of employment and industry may also be seen as a means of curing over-population. Steuart's employment policies are too extensive and manifold to be discussed here, but three general principles emerge again: (a) the policy becomes necessary through market

[22] In his suggestions of public health measures Steuart is not very explicit, but see: SJS, Vol. I, p. 82.

failure ("when employment fails in the common run of affairs"; SJS, I, p. 73); (b) this failure is often due to insufficient (too slow) self-adjustment of the labour market; (c) there is a general obligation on the side of the statesman to "provide retreats of all sorts, for the different conditions of her decayed inhabitants" (ibid.). According to Steuart, this obligation is particularly valid towards the "lowest classes" of the community. The conditions of the very *poor* and possible remedies for their suffering are a topic of paramount importance for Steuart. Not only does he discuss their plight again and again, but there always appears in these discussions a tone of profound sympathy and caring for this helpless misery, a tone that becomes particularly marked when applied to his native Scotland, and thus mixed with patriotism. In Lochaber, for example, Steuart observed,

> numbers of idle, poor, useless hands, multitudes of children, whom I have found to be fed, nobody knows how, doing almost nothing at the age of fourteen . . . If you ask why they are not employed, their parents will tell you because commerce is not in the country: they talk of commerce as if it was a man, who comes to reside in some countries in order to feed the inhabitants. The truth is, it is not the fault of these poor people, but of those whose business it is to find out employment for them. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 108)

From this example, as from many others, the noteworthy conclusion may be drawn that material subsistence was not Steuart's only concern, but that he was as much worried about man's dignity in being able to subsist by his own efforts.

Finally, a point that has already been touched upon in our comparison between Steuart's 'statesman' and Hegel's 'universal class' (chapter four, section D), another element of Steuart's interventionism is implied in the above examples and is worthy of emphasis, namely his underlying ideal of a statesman motivated by nothing but public spirit, the common good of his people. Steuart, of course, was not naively assuming that statesmen possessed this quality, but he abstracted from existing statesmen – characteristically, the 'ought to be' here becomes the typical mode of expression – and tried to define a "hypothetical statesman".[23] In this conception of statesman, Steuart is consciously building on an Aristotelian foundation: the 'statesman' in public life is analogous to the head of a private family (SJS, I, p. 15 f & 68), just as 'oeconomy'

[23] Cp.: SJS, Vol. I, pp. 21 & 142 f – I borrow the phrase 'hypothetical statesman' from A.O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, 1977) p. 86.

originates, etymologically, from 'the matters of the household'; a connection to be born in mind when the so-called 'Antikisierung' (Ilting) of Hegel's economic thought comes into focus.

With *Adam Smith*, we approach the whole problem from a different angle. As soon as we stop discussing the systematic analysis of the *Wealth of Nations* in the *abstract* and consider what has aptly been called its "institutional relevance",[24] it becomes obvious that Smith came to grips with all the crucial problems of the economic policies of his age, "namely, bounties, duties, and prohibitions in foreign trade; apprenticeship and settlement laws; legal monopolies; laws of succession hindering free trade in land" (J. Viner, 1928, p. 139) and that, in all these questions, the general conclusion reached by Smith was to take side with the cause of free trade and to attack such infringements on that freedom. *This* was Smith's message, *this* ensured the overwhelmingly favourable reaction which this "publication for the present moment" (Hugh Blair; SGE, Vol. VI, p. 188) received, and *this*, in public opinion, has come to be considered Smith's lasting contribution.[25] This image of Smith as a staunch defender of liberty gains support when his explicit discussion of the proper functions of government is presented, as the scope he there allows for state activities is certainly defined quite narrowly:

> According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to . . . first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain . . . (SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 687 f)

But again, it pays to look beyond this surface, because, as soon as one does, qualifications and exceptions to the above generalization crowd in and even an explicit extension of the scope of government can be seen.

First of all, the principles behind this programme (and its detailed explanation in Book V) need to be considered.[26] The state only acts –

[24] R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner in their introduction to SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 40.

[25] Cp.: R.D.C. Black, "Smith's Contribution in Historical Perspective", A.S. Skinner & T. Wilson (Eds.), *The Market and the State* (Oxford, 1976) pp. 42–63, here pp. 50 f.

[26] For fuller discussions of this issue, see: R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner in their

and this is expressed most clearly with regard to public works – where the gain involved in the project in question is distinctly public gain, so that no single person or corporate body could expect an individual profit sufficiently high to execute that project (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 723). In general terms, *market failure* is the immediate and necessary cause of state initiative. This condition provides the basis for a number of exceptions Smith made in spite of his general reliance on the mechanisms of the market (see below) and it could also be used for a future extension of state activities whenever an increased number of such failures should occur. The same principle, according to Smith, applies to the maintenance of public works (e.g. roads) once executed. Although beneficial to the whole community, Smith argued, on grounds of efficiency and equity, that the expense of keeping the roads (and "the greater part of such publick works" in general; SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 724) in good condition, could be laid on the carriers and travellers in proportion to their usage of it. Only when this method of defraying the costs failed should the public revenue step in.

The consideration of *efficiency* is of special importance as it is often the crucial argument against government intervention, so that Smith's "laissez faire" has to be seen as a generalization of *historical experience* rather than a doctrine applicable to any circumstances. When Smith wrote "I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good" (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 456), it is necessary to look at the low standard of efficiency of the British government of Smith's time or, to borrow a formulation from Jacob Viner:

> He [Smith] in general disapproves of government ventures into business, but solely on the ground that the government is a poor trader and a poor manager . . . Knowledge of the success of some of the German principalities in managing the public domain, and in other phases of public administration, would perhaps have lessened Smith's opposition to government ventures into industry. (J. Viner, 1928, pp. 148 f; cp.: pp. 141 f)

This conclusion is not merely a futile speculation, but may legitimately be drawn from Smith's approval of the few instances where state management had been successful, for example in running the postal services (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 818), and from his laudatory comment on

---

"Introduction" to SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 34–40; A.S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science. Papers relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1979) pp. 211–216.

the administrations of Venice and Amsterdam, incidentally a passage which also documents his evaluation of English conditions:

> The orderly, vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind [public banks]. But whether such a government as that of England; which, whatever may be its virtues, has never been famous for good oeconomy; . . . could be safely trusted with the management of such a project must at least be a good deal more doubtful. (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 818)

Secondly, as soon as he goes beyond his explicit discussion of the rôle of government, Smith allows for a considerable number of government measures. As these departures from "laissez faire" have conveniently been brought together and discussed by Jacob Viner and A.S. Skinner,[27] a classified enumeration may here be sufficient:

(1) a number of government regulations to protect the interest of the wider public (control of the coinage; stamps on linen and plate; registration of mortgages; restrictions on the rate of interest; public works).
(2) a considerable number of restrictions on free trade (notably with regard to corn, wool, and foreign manufactures).
(3) cases in which risky enterprises (in both, trade and industry) are rewarded by temporary monopolies.
(4) taxation as (a) a means of encouraging certain economic activities and of restricting certain others (tax reliefs for improvers, tax penalties for landlords who demand 'rent in kind' or who sell their future revenues).
   (b) means of social policy (higher taxes and tolls on luxury goods, moderate attempts towards progressive taxation).
   (c) public health measures (e.g.: low taxes on 'wholesome' ales, high taxes on spirits).

A lengthy list on any standards but it is necessary to remember that, in this context, Adam Smith had happily subscribed to that healthy paradox often used by grammarians: "the exception proves the rule". The monopoly for innovators, for example, is the exception, Smith's

[27] J. Viner (1928) pp. 150–153; A.S. Skinner (1979) pp. 219 ff.

castigation of monopolies (considered to be unjust and costly to the consumer) is the rule.

Thirdly, Smith's plea for a political reform, removing such obstacles to free trade as legal and institutional anachronisms, needs to be emphasized. As this aspect has also been widely discussed in the literature on Smith,[28] the general comment may be sufficient that the scepticism (as qualified above) with respect to direct government ventures into business, here gives way to a certain confidence in the rationality of government and its beneficial effects on economic life. But again, this confidence is qualified by Smith's awareness of the "prejudices of the publick" (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 473).

Finally, Adam Smith even ascribed a "*cultural purpose*"[29] to the state. Until very recently, this aspect of Smith's thought has either been neglected or misunderstood;[30] as it will also become relevant for Hegel's 'Aufhebung' of civil society, a brief reconstruction of Smith's argument may not be out of place. Smith ascribes this cultural function to the state in the section "Of the Expenses of the Sovereign or Commonwealth" (Book V, chapter 1) – a section which despite its heading does not merely deal with the state's financial rôle. It is here that Smith shows his acute awareness of the social and human costs of the progress of commercial society (as described in his previous books). According to Smith, the price to be paid consists in a decline of the "intellectual, social, and martial virtues" (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 782). The intellectual decline is caused by the division of labour and will therefore be treated in that context;[31] the 'social' virtues decay because the social-psychological processes (the mechanism of the 'impartial spectator' in Smith's terminology) by which a level of decent, 'proper' conduct is normally secured, collapses in large anonymous cities and manufactures;[32] finally, the practice of military exercises, and the martial spirit that goes with it, is reduced in proportion to the progress of improvement (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 786). Before considering the remedies Smith suggested, it is worth emphasizing that he fully holds the government *responsible* for providing such remedial measures: "The education

[28] R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, "Introduction" to SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 36 f; A.S. Skinner (1979) pp. 216 ff.

[29] As far as I have been able to trace it, Glenn R. Morrow was the first to apply this phrase to Smith: G.R. Morrow, *The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith* [1923] = [Reprint: (New York, 1969)] p. 73.

[30] Cp.: Donald Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics*. An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge, 1978) pp. 113 ff.

[31] See below, chapter 6.

[32] SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 795 & Vol. II.1, p. 101.

of the common people", for example, "*requires* . . . the attention of the publick" (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 784). To balance the intellectual decline, Smith suggested the universal introduction of obligatory schooling according to the model of the Scottish parish schools and a system of examinations and probations for all trades and professions.[33] These measures have often been criticized as insufficient, but the critics are normally guilty of anachronistic standards and tend to forget that most of the Scottish Literati were indeed educated at the parish schools, a result that speaks for itself.[34] With regard to the loss of 'social virtues' Smith advocated the diffusion of learning and the encouragement of the arts, together with a generous toleration of religious sects: two complementary remedies, the latter of which provided a substitute for the collapsed mechanism of the 'impartial spectator', the former being an antidote to the "disagreeably rigorous . . . morals of all the little sects" (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 796). The loss of 'martial spirit' could be met by schemes of general military education and exercise. In this context, Smith was even prepared to accept the maintenance of militias, though in strict consideration of efficiency he always thought them inferior to standing armies.[35] That Smith tried to charge the costs of these measures to "those who receive the immediate benefit of such education" (SGE, Vol. II.2, p. 815) rather than to the general public does not minimize the government's ultimate responsibility in these matters; a responsibility that becomes manifest in the government's participation in the costs and in its overall control.

A *final comparison* between the rôle ascribed to the state vis-à-vis economic life by *Steuart* and *Smith* respectively, shows the following result: although Steuart grants the state a wider field of activity than Smith, the conditions and principles behind their respective allowances to economic policies are in agreement. Rather than despotic arbitrariness, Steuart advocated policies in favour of the common good. Smith equally allowed for such policies as long as they met this objective, to borrow from Jacob Viner:

> Government activity is natural and therefore good when it promotes

[33] SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 785 & 796.

[34] Cp.: Marx's "homeopathic doses" [Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Vol. I, quoted from *Marx Engels Werke*, Vol. 23 (Berlin-Ost, 1962) p. 384] and R.L. Heilbronner's contemptuous "trade schools" ["The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in the 'Wealth of Nations'", A.S. Skinner & T. Wilson, *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 524–539, here p. 536]. These two may serve as examples of hostile critics. For a more correct assessment, see D. Winch (1978) chapter 5: "Martial Spirit and Mental Mutilation", pp. 103–120.

[35] SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 786–788; cp.: SGE, Vol. V, p. 251.

> the general welfare, and is an interference with nature and therefore bad when it injures the general interest of society. (J. Viner, 1928, p. 141)

As both thinkers are in agreement about their ultimate criterion for evaluating state activities, namely their efficiency for the benefit of the common good within the framework of modern freedom, the difference between them can be reduced partly to different sets of historical experiences, and partly to different assessments of the same experiences.

(C) HEGEL'S QUALIFICATIONS TO LIBERALISM

> Hegel demands the regulating intervention of the state into economic life. He demands this intervention on behalf of the state as well as on behalf of the helpless individual. Rosenzweig (1920) Vol. I, p. 149.

I

In the light of our previous discussion (Chapter Four), it should be clear beyond doubt that Hegel, in his "system of needs", accepts and reproduces the free market economy in all its basic elements. On turning to Hegel's discussion of necessary interventions, it is worthy of emphasis, he is only adding qualifications to this institution, the continuous operation of which he never questions. This point is clearly expressed by Hegel himself:

> It is correct to say that, on the whole, a proper balance will always come about. But, here, the particular is as relevant as the universal ['das Allgemeine']; matters ought to be solved not only on the general level: the individuals as particulars are a purpose and have a justification. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 699)

Thus, while the 'particular' or the 'individual' deserves and receives Hegel's careful attention[36] – this is why the old view of Hegel's 'State',

[36] VRP, Vol. II, § 260, pp. 701 f – TMK, p. 161: "The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same

as a supreme entity far above the individual and one which can demand obedience and sacrifice from the individual, is so wrong[37] – the balance, which the free operation of the market produces, is the general rule ('das Allgemeine'), the intervention on behalf of the individual is the particular exception ('das Besondere'). The same point emerges from the structure of the "Philosophy of Right': the "system of needs", with all its liberal assumptions, is developed before the "police" with its various functions is introduced.

The aim of the present section is to analyse the principal points of intervention which Hegel considered necessary, to find the underlying principle of these instances, and to compare Hegel's treatment with the positions of Smith and Steuart, bearing in mind the result of section B, i.e. that the distance between Smith and Steuart is smaller than some of the older literature suggests or implies. As Hegel considers the problem of poverty, an important instance of intervention, as a result of the division of labour, this aspect will be discussed in the next chapter. The agent of the interventionist measures, Hegel calls 'Polizei'. In the notes to his translation, Knox clarified that the meaning of this term is wider than that of 'police' in English (TMK, p. 360) – or indeed than that of 'Polizei' in modern German – and suggested the rendering 'public authority'. A further etymological explanation is given in the 1824/25 set of lecture notes:

> Polizei is here the most appropriate term, although, in common use, it has a more restricted meaning. [. . .] 'Polizei' is derived from 'Polis Politia' and has originally meant the whole activity of the state. Now, 'Polizei' is no longer the realization of the ethical universal ['des sittlich Allgemeinen'] as such, but only of the universal with regard to civil society, of the state as external state. The 'Polizei' is the universal which acts with regard to civil society."[38]

Apart from his derivation of 'Polizei' from 'Polis Politia', the above quoted passage reminds us that we are still only dealing with a function of the state *within* civil society[39] – this function is called "Polizeystaat" (VRP, I, p. 321) or "Verstandes Staat" (VRP, IV, p. 587) – far from

---

time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself."

[37] Cp.: Z.A. Pelczynski's discussion of this misconception (1971) pp. 26f.

[38] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 587; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 272.

[39] VRP, Vol. II, § 261, p. 702 – TMK, p. 161: "In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (the family and civil society), the state is from one point of view an external necessity."

exhausting Hegel's conception of the 'state' we have not even reached Hegel's treatment of the 'state' proper (VRP, IV, p. 587).

II

> In this context, it has to be noted that the common interests can be promoted in a communal manner ['auf gemeinsame Weise'] too and that this is highly advantageous. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 597)

> As I am completely interwoven into particularity, I have a right to demand that, within this framework, my particular welfare is promoted too. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 690)

For the sake of a clear exposition, the functions which the public authority executes may be divided into two groups: (a) those that operate continuously and develop institutions through which the 'Polizeystaat' often takes the initiative; (b) those emergency measures which may be taken from time to time as the occasion arises.

To begin with the continuous, institutional functions, the first[40] aspect which Hegel brings into focus is the *'police'* in the narrower modern sense: "Crime . . . is what the universal authority must prevent or bring to justice."[41] This function is distinguished from and restricted by the judicial power,[42] the example of a necessary court appearance in England and France is mentioned,[43] and the rationale behind such measures is insisted upon: "The safeguarding of personal freedom is important." (VRP, IV, p. 593). The second continuous function which Hegel recommends is an institutionalized *control of victuals*[44] (both qualitative and

[40] I follow the order of the "Philosophy of Right".

[41] TMK, § 232, p. 146 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 676; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 692.

[42] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 589: "This operation of the police is not yet legal. Legally, one can only be arrested as punishment, as considered to be guilty. [. . .] The operation [of the police] is concerned with the completely external side that a crime has to be brought into court."

[43] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 593: "In England and France every arrested person has to be brought into court which examines the circumstances exactly and issues an interim court order whether the suspect is really to be arrested or to be released."

[44] VRP, Vol. II, § 236, pp. 677–678 – TMK, p. 147; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 597; HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 272.

with respect to measures and weights)[45] especially meat inspection,[46] and of pharmaceuticals.[47] The next institution under consideration is *school education*. Since it is a vital interest of the general public that its future members are properly educated, public[48] schools ought to be provided[49] and put under the control of the public authority. This control extends to school attendance – which should be enforced by law, if necessary[50] – as well as to the composition of the curriculum.[51] In the context of education, Hegel also insists on an important *public health* measure: the vaccination of children (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 603). A final point, in which, according to Hegel, there has to be public control and initiative, is the construction and maintenance of *public works* such as roads and harbours.[52]

Before going on to what we have called the emergency measures, a first comparison with the Scottish economists is appropriate. It is noteworthy that a number of functions which Hegel ascribes to the public authority are also among the activities which Adam Smith allows the state to undertake: public health measures, education, control of goods in terms of quality as well as quantity (weights and measures); public works (e.g.: roads); the prevention and punishment of crimes. These parallels between Smith and Hegel emerge even more strongly when we turn from the "Philosophy of Right", on which our analysis of Hegel's

[45] VRP, Vol. III, p. 695: "Weight, measures, etc. are prescribed by the police."

[46] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 597: "It is fully appropriate that the police controls the health of cattle for, in recent times, whole districts have been poisoned by the sale of diseased cattle."

[47] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 597: "Medicine is a public ['allgemeines'] need, but whether it [a certain medicine] is good and appropriate, the individual cannot judge: this assessment has to be made by pharmaceutical chemists."

[48] 'Public' is here used as a rendering of "offentlich", not in the technical sense of a fee-paying school.

[49] VRP, Vol. II, § 239, p. 680 – TMK, p. 148: "In its character as a universal family, civil society has the right and duty of superintending and influencing education, inasmuch as education bears upon the child's capacity to become a member of society. Society's right here is paramount over the arbitrary preferences of parents . . ."

[50] VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 602–603: "If it [i.e.: the school attendance of their children] is neglected by the parents [. . .] civil society has to step in. There are thus laws that the children of a certain age have to be sent to school." – Hegel's activities as supervisor ('Schulrat') at Nürnberg (1813–16) might be seen as a practical illustration of this point: he enforced compulsory education and thus annoyed the poorer parents who had relied on their children as an additional source of income.

[51] VRP, Vol. III, pp. 701–702: "society is entitled to act on tested principles and to urge the parents to allow the children to be taught what has been established as necessary for entering [i.e.: becoming a member of] civil society."

[52] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 595; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 695.

position was primarily based, to the writings of Hegel's Jena period. In his "System der Sittlichkeit", Hegel speaks of three 'needs of the government':

> (i) in general, for the first class which, exempt from property and business, [lives] in continual and absolute and universal need, (ii) for the formally universal class, i.e., for that which is the organ of government in the other classes and labours purely in the universal field, (iii) for the need of the community, of the entire people as a universal, e.g. for its [public] dwellings, etc., its temples, streets, and so forth." (SoEL, p. 172 – SdS, p. 493)

If one considers this statement in the light of his definition of classes (as expounded in the same writing; see above; chapter four, section D), it seems obvious that the first two 'needs of government' relate to the expenses of the military and civil services. To illustrate the third point, the need of the general public ('des Allgemeinen'), Hegel mentions 'temples' and 'streets', in other words, public works and institutions. If one accepts that reading,[53] there is a striking parallel between Hegel's "System der Sittlichkeit" and the above quoted programmatic formulation in which Adam Smith expressed 'the duties of the sovereign' (SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 687 f): (a) protection from external oppression or defence; (b) protection from internal oppression or justice; (c) public works and public institutions. Hegel's example of a public institution, 'temple', requires some explanation, as the term seems to call for classical associations, rather than a comparison with Adam Smith. It is worth, recalling, however, that Adam Smith discusses religious sects in the same context (see above, section B of the present chapter). Hegel could have spoken of 'churches', but, by choosing 'temple', he made it obvious that he is now looking at this institution from a political point of view, like an ancient Roman. The somewhat patronizing attitude which Smith expects his 'sovereign' to take towards the sects, is thus in line with one of Hegel's continuous topics: the modern state has to stand above the various churches.[54] The parallel between Hegel's "System der Sittlichkeit" and Book V of Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* is further supported by their subsequent agreement about the public revenue. Immediately after their respective discussions of 'the duties of the sovereign' and 'the needs of the government', both thinkers consider

[53] Franz Rosenzweig reached the same conclusion (1920) Vol. I, p. 152.
[54] VRP, Vol. II, § 270, p. 724 – TMK, p. 173.

how the state ought to find the means to pay for the services. Hegel's treatment is brief but revealing:

> The government must earn [enough for] these needs, but its work can only consist in taking directly into its possession without work the ripe fruits [of industry] or in itself working and acquiring. (SoEL, p. 172 – SdS, p. 493)

In other words, the state has to tax its citizens or to venture itself into business enterprises (Hegel may have been thinking of the manufactories which some German Princes had set up). Though Hegel does not repeat the argument of Adam Smith that most governments are poor managers, he reaches the same result: he recommends the former and dismisses the latter way of raising public funds.[55] It remains to comment on the differences between the "System der Sittlichkeit" and Hegel's mature views. In his "Philosophy of Right", as has been shown above, Hegel does not include the military and judicial services among the functions of the 'Polizei', but, no doubt, they are external functions of the state. The difference between the two writings, it appears, is a matter of presentation rather than fundamental change of view. A brief glance at two texts from the interim years confirm this conclusion. In the second 'Realphilosophie' [1805/6], Hegel ascribes to the 'Policey' the function of preserving "the public security in every respect",[56] a formulation that seems wide enough to include defence as well as justice. In a Nürnberg speech, Hegel refers to two branches of public authority "gute Gerechtigkeitspflege und gute Erziehungsanstalten" (TWA, IV, p. 312) and again, 'Gerechtigkeitspflege' seems to include the executive (police) as well as the judicial functions of justice. Thus, in my opinion, the relationship between the views of the Jena and Berlin Hegel on this issue is essentially one of continuity.[57]

(b) Hegel also makes allowance for emergency measures. According to Hegel, such measures have to be caused by conflicts and urgent problems which endanger the public and, therefore, cannot be left to the mechanisms of the market. The first area of such possible conflicts which Hegel discusses, relates to the "day-to-day needs" or "the

[55] SdS, pp. 493–494 – SoEL, p. 172; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 245.

[56] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 272: "die öffentliche Sicherheit jeder Art."

[57] Iring Fetscher's above quoted thesis (section A, note 6) of an *increasingly* liberal position, in particular, appears to be disproved by the fact that the "System der Sittlichkeit" shows more obvious parallels with the "Wealth of Nations" than the "Philosophy of Right".

commonest necessaries of life" (TMK, §§ 235 + 236, p. 147), i.e. to vital victuals on which the vast majority of consumers relies, e.g. bread. As the need for these necessities is universal, the public authority may intervene and regulate the market, if and when the consumers are not satisfied in the normal run of affairs:

> The differing interests of producers and consumers may come into collision with each other; and although a fair balance between them on the whole may be brought about automatically, still their adjustment also requires a control which stands above both and is consciously undertaken. (TMK, § 236, p. 147 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 677)

When supply and demand, with regard to the 'necessaries', go beyond their ordinary fluctuations and antagonisms threaten the common good, the "police" may and ought to intervene. When a shortage of food-stuffs threatens the subsistence of the public, for example, the 'police' is entitled to *fix the prices of victuals*.[58] Another example which Hegel uses to illustrate the possible antagonisms of the market society, as opposed to the normal fluctuations of supply and demand, relates to the *opening hours* of shops. Normally this question can be left to the shopkeepers who will know when it is profitable to keep their shops open and they will do so from their own self-interest, but exceptions may arise when religious or other motives work against opening hours that are in line with real market conditions. To avoid the embarassment of the public, the 'police' may therefore attach conditions to the right of running a shop:

> Anyone who enters upon a trade offers to satisfy the needs of the public. Thus, the condition may be imposed on him to operate the trade as the need of the public requires it. To the jews one might say: we need merchants for every day; if you do not intend [to satisfy] this [need], you are not at all capable of [this task]. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 599; cp.: Vol. III, p. 697)

For the same reason, i.e. the right of the public to have its vital needs satisfied, Hegel appears to have restricted the freedom of strike in one of his lecture courses [1824/25].[59] The second and more important cause

[58] VRP, Vol. II, § 236, p. 677 – TMK, 147; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 695.

[59] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 598: "At times, it has happened that all journeymen of a trade have refused to work because of discontent with their masters . . . The branch of needs which they have entered upon has to be satisfied; it is their duty to supply; the public has a right to their products and can enforce it."

of urgent problems is the fact that whole branches of industry depend on "conditions abroad and on combinations which cannot be grasped . . . by the individuals" (TMK, § 236, p. 147). In other words, Hegel realizes the enormous potential (for good and evil) that is manifest in the world market and its *international division of labour*.[60] Since we shall come back to this topic in the next chapter, a few indications may here be sufficient. To begin with, Hegel allows for intervention whenever the international situation threatens to harm the common good by ruining whole branches of industry.[61]

Moreover, it is revealing that the dependence on foreign conditions is primarily perceived as a danger: the comparatively backward home industries are put at risk by 'the English machines', a perspective that is in agreement with Sir James Steuart's worries about the fate of backward Scotland. This parallel is supported by Hegel's brief discussion of the 'police' measures appropriate to such situations of crisis. Hegel's treatment is too short to trace specific influences, but the remedies which he mentions (prohibitions, customs, bounties, monopolies,[62] the search for new markets,[63] limited employment policies,[64] and "systematic colonization")[65] are all discussed at great length by Steuart.[66] With respect to what we have called 'emergency measures', it thus appears that Hegel was able to profit from the special emphasis which Steuart had put on this problem.

A final comparison, however, ought to go beyond the individual functions of the public authority and the respective sources which Hegel might have used. Both groups of functions which Hegel expounds, imply an *acceptance of the principle* that unites Smith and Steuart: *market failure* is the cause and condition of any intervention. With public works, education, public health, Hegel insists on this condition again and again: it is when the parents fail to educate their children or to have them vaccinated that the police steps in (VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 602–603). With respect to the second group, Hegel is never weary of stressing that those measures are restricted to emergencies. Under normal circumstances, the market *will* produce a balance that is in

[60] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 601: "An event that happens in South America may lead to changes of significance."

[61] VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 600–601; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, pp. 244–5; VRP, Vol. II, § 236, p. 678 – TMK, p. 147.

[62] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 596; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244.

[63] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 600; cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244; VRP, Vol. III, p. 704 (L.v. Henning's marginal notes).

[64] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 245; VRP, Vol. IV, p. 503.

[65] TMK, § 248+, p. 278 – TWA, Vol. VII, p. 392; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 614.

[66] This point will be dealt with in the following chapter.

agreement with the common good. In the "Philosophy of Right", for example, Hegel makes emergency measures depend on the following two conditions: (a) an iminent danger to the public ("gefährliche Zuckungen"); (b) a violent and prolonged fluctuation of the market (VRP, Vol. II, § 236, p. 678 – TMK, pp. 147 f).

The comparative brevity of Hegel's discussion – both Smith and Steuart argue the question in far greater detail – may lead to a second conclusion. At first glance, Hegel's brief treatment of the interventionist measures may appear disappointing. In the light of some of his own references, e.g. to the millions of inconvenienced Indians – one can hardly blame Hegel for playing down the problem – a closer attention to the possible remedies could have been expected. However, what may appear a weakness, that Hegel is silent about specific rules and regulations, points to the decisive strength of his position: he is extremely flexible, allows for a great variety of circumstances, and never falls into the trap of changing 'ad hoc' measures into doctrines. The example of food prices may illustrate this point. Whenever subsistence is at risk, Hegel thought it proper to fix the prices of necessities. Since Steuart discusses the economic consequences of food prices at great length, he may well have inspired Hegel's views on this matter. However, Steuart went beyond the mere possibility of price controls and argued in favour of uniform food prices.[67] This is the point, where Hegel parts company with Steuart: far from using the measure of price controls excessively, Hegel also presents a situation – a possible allusion to Adam Smith – where the prices can be left to the free competition of the bakers and brewers.[68] Free competition and the fixing of prices may be appropriate as well as inadequate depending on circumstances:

> the spirit of the constitution [and] the danger at the time have to determine the exact circumstances. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 693)

What is to be avoided is to lapse into a doctrine and it is due to his study of Smith and Steuart that Hegel learned this lesson so well.

[67] SJS: Vol. I, pp. 188, 252–255; Vol. II, pp. 402–404, 696. To achieve this aim, Steuart advocated granaries as well as taxes and bounties to support this scheme: SJSW, Vol. V, pp. 332, 355–359.

[68] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 597. Smith uses the 'baker' and 'brewer' in a well-known passage of the "Wealth of Nations"; SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 27.

CHAPTER SIX

The Division of Labour

> In modern political economy the division of labour is a main aspect. (VRP, Vol. III, pp. 609 f)

The aim of the present chapter is to compare Hegel's opinion on the division of labour with the views of his Scottish predecessors. Following Hegel's own definition,

> Division of labour means that a concrete product is not to its full extent created by one individual, [but] that the individual continues to produce one and the same part of it. (VRP, Vol. I, p. 314)

'division of labour' is here understood as specialization within the professions; 'social' division of labour, implying the emergence of social classes, the differing economic functions of which have to be mediated by a market economy, has already been discussed (chapter four, section D).

It could now be argued, with some justification, that Hegel's interest in problems resulting from the division of labour, though he did not use the concept then, can be traced back to the manuscripts of his Stuttgart years. Especially his article "Über einige charakteristische Unterschiede der alten Dichter von den neueren",[1] and the subsequent Tübingen manuscript,[2] contain reflections about the problems modern poetry has to face as a result of the division of labour.[3] Contrary to the wide experiences of the ancient poet – "With them [the ancients], every one

[1] In: DHE, pp. 48–51. There is an English translation of this essay by H.S. Harris, in: *Clio*, Vol. VII.3, pp. 403–407.

[2] "Über einige Vorteile, welche uns die Lektüre der alten klassischen griechischen und römischen Schriftsteller gewährt." In: DHE, pp. 169–172.

[3] Cp. my paper "The Division of Labour and the Fate of the Poet: Ferguson, Garve,

got to know for himself the functions of other classes."[4] – Hegel saw the contemporary poet, due to a more advanced and still increasing division of labour, in a growing danger of losing touch with concrete life, of being restricted to, as Hegel borrows from Lessing, "book learning, which presses on the brain with lifeless signs."[5] Poetical production is not the only thing distorted by the division of labour. According to the young Hegel, the receptive side ("der Wirkungskreis" – 'the sphere of influence'; DHE, p. 48 – *Clio*, VII:3, p. 403) is equally subjected to increasing difficulties:

> One part [of the population] has already far removed itself from the system [of belief] upon which the poem either as a whole, or in its particular sections, is based; the other part is too pressingly occupied with its care for the many and various needs and conveniences of life, to have either the time or the inclination to raise itself and approach the mental world of the higher orders. (DHE, p. 49 – *Clio*, VII:3, p. 404)

In spite of the attention which this discussion doubtless deserves, and not only in the framework of Hegel's intellectual development, it has to be emphasized that Hegel's mature views on the division of labour, at least as far as the surviving evidence is concerned, did not emerge before his Jena writings.[6] The briefest of comparisons between the above mentioned Stuttgart and Tübingen manuscripts on the one hand, and the Jena and later writings on the other hand, clearly shows a remarkable development from some vague indication of the impact of the division of labour on poetry to a precise assessment of its conditions and advantages, to a diagnosis of its inherent dangers and shortcomings,

---

Schiller, and Hegel", read to the German Society, University of Cambridge, February 15, 1984, and the Philosophical Society, University of Auckland, NZ, July 19, 1984, to be published.

[4] DHE, p. 50. I have used my own translation as opposed to the one by Prof. H.S. Harris, *Clio*, Vol. VII.3, p. 405: "Every one learned [. . .] to appreciate the functions of other branches of society for himself."

[5] G.E. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise*. Ed. by E.H. Hutton (London, 1962) Act V, Scene 6, Lines 3534–5, p. 140; English translation quoted from: *Nathan the Wise*. Translated by William Jacks (Glasgow, 1894) p. 227.

[6] That picture could of course be changed by the finding of more manuscripts. Material from the Frankfurt period should, in this context, be of special significance, as recent studies have shown that some figures of the Hegel–Hölderlin circle there did indeed discuss aesthetic questions in connection with economics; cp.: Chr. Jamme and Otto Pöggeler (Eds.), *Homburg vor der Höhe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte*. Studien zum Freundeskreis um Hegel und Hölderlin (Stuttgart, 1981).

and to a view of its further development. Our focus is on this higher level of Hegel's discussion, which we shall try to analyse drawing on a wide range of his writings on political philosophy,[7] from the "System der Sittlichkeit" (1803) to the Berlin Lectures on the "Philosophy of Right". Our presentation, in order to avoid the tiresome repetitions to which a strictly chronological procedure would lead, will treat the relevant passages of the different writings as one variorum text, commenting on changes and alterations whenever it seems necessary.[8]

(A) THE SCOTTISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM

Hegel's views will constantly be compared in our presentation with the theories of the Scottish Enlightenment. To help the comparison, this section will expound some fundamental theses in which the originality of the Scottish contribution to our subject consists. The Scots' innovation can be summarized under three headings which, taken together, constitute a new and higher level of reflection on the division of labour and make it possible to draw a clear distinction between the Scots' views and the comparable contributions of ancient (Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) and modern thinkers (Petty and Mandeville on the English, Rousseau and the authors of the "Encyclopaedia" on the French, and von Justi and Möser on the German side):[9]

(a) the relevance attributed to the division of labour is more far-reaching than in any previous system of economic ideas: the division of labour is seen, to borrow Prof. Recktenwald's formulation, as "*the* driving force behind economic development";[10]

[7] In particular: *System der Sittlichkeit*; the so-called *Jenenser Realphilosophien*; the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* plus the various sets of related lecture notes.

[8] This decision, though primarily based on grounds of presentation, would not have been taken if we were not convinced that Hegel's various treatments of our present topic agree fundamentally. Cp.: the Göhler versus Fetscher controversy on the wider issue of continuity of Hegel's economic thought. Iring Fetscher, "Zur Aktualität der politischen Philosophie Hegels", R. Heede & J. Ritter, *Hegel-Bilanz* (Frankfurt, 1973) pp. 193–213. Gerhard Göhler, "Kommentar zu Hegels frühen politischen Systemen", G. Göhler (Ed.), *Hegels Frühe Politische Systeme* (Frankfurt, 1974) pp. 481 & 545 ff.

[9] The innovation of the Scots, in comparison with the earlier thinkers mentioned above, is spelt out in greater detail in my paper: "The Division of Labour: The Place of the Scottish Enlightenment in the History of an Economic Theory" (to be published).

[10] Horst, C. Recktenwald's "Introduction" to his recent German editon of Smith's 'Wealth of Nations': *Der Wohlstand der Nationen* (München, 1978) p. LII; my own translation of: "der eigentliche Motor der [wirtschaftlichen] Entwicklung."

(b) the division of labour is discussed in the framework of the most advanced technological (beginning of the Industrial Revolution) and trading (world market) conditions of the age;
(c) the obvious advantages of the division of labour (in terms of higher productivity, etc.) and the disadvantages (short-term economic disruptions; social inequality, dehumanizing effects) are seen and described as intrinsically linked.

Ad (a): As the crucial rôle which the division of labour gained in the Scots' overall theory of economic and social development is now widely accepted, we can here deal with it very briefly. In Adam Ferguson's 'Essay' (AF1), the division of labour is not only considered the 'conditio sine qua non' of mankind's progress beyond the primordial stage of rudeness (AF1, p. 180), but also the principle through which, at the later stage of a "polished" or commercial nation, "the sources of wealth are laid open; every species of material is wrought up to the greatest perfection, and every commodity is produced in the greatest abundance" (AF1, p. 181). In Adam Smith's 'Wealth of Nations', this central position of the division of labour in accounting for the progress of society is even more pronounced: it is "the fundamental cause of economic growth."[11] As in Ferguson, the decisive step which takes a nation beyond its original "poor and indigent state" (SGE, V, p. 521) to "superior opulence" is the division of labour (SGE, V, p. 664). On the level of commercial society, though we cannot here go into the technical details,[12] economic growth emerges from the fine interplay of the division of labour, the accumulation of stock, and the extent of the market. It seems fair to conclude with Prof. Rosenberg that Smith nurtured the discipline of economics upon his treatment of the division of labour;[13] a methodological height to which our principle had never aspired before.

Ad (b): The Scots emphasized the technological aspect of the division of labour. Along with "the increase of dexterity" and "the saving of time", "the *invention* of a great number of *machines*" is, for Smith, a fundamental cause of the greater productivity of properly divided labour.[14] To Sir James Steuart, too, the advantages of new machines

[11] R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, "Introduction" to SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 43.

[12] For a good introduction to this topic, see: W.A. Eltis, "Adam Smith's Theory of Economic Growth", A.S. Skinner & T. Wilson (Eds.), *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 426–454.

[13] Nathan Rosenberg, "Adam Smith on the Division of Labour: Two Views or One?", *Economica*, New Series, Vol. XXXII (1965) pp. 127–139, here p. 127.

[14] SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 17 (my own italics; N.W.); cp.: SGE, Vol. V, pp. 345 & 491 & 567.

seemed "so palpable that I need not insist upon them."[15] And yet, to claim originality for the technological and mercantile aspects of the Scots' discussion is controversial as it is well known that earlier publications, like the great "Encyclopédie" of Diderot and d'Alembert, contain many detailed descriptions of the division of labour in contemporary manufactories.[16] There has also been a recent attempt by Dr. Foley to claim that Smith's exposition of the division of labour can be traced back to "Greek anthropological materials."[17] Dr. Foley – to begin with his more specific claim – succeeds in presenting some interesting parallels, like the Platonic and the Smithian "version of the laborer's coat illustration,"[18] but his otherwise stimulating study fails to take sufficient note of the vital contemporary events in Scotland's economic life which are much more likely to have influenced Smith's choice of examples than his reading of classical authors.[19] Moreover, precisely those examples of Smith's discussion which show his modernity, like the references to "iron works"[20] and the "fire engines",[21] are played down by Foley as "exceptions".[22] These references also support the view that Smith used some material not contained in such older publications as the "Encyclopédie". In addition, the Scottish Enlightenment authors clearly recognized the novel conditions of an international market and trade. The trade-links with America and the Indies deeply affected the participating countries' internal division of labour by new opportunities and new risks, and a whole new era had been opened up: the division of labour was now on a world-scale:

> The discovery of America . . . gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the antient commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce.[23]

[15] SJS, Vol. I, p. 123. In passing, he mentions the following examples: watermills and ploughs (Vol. I, p. 121), iron works and saw mills (ibid., p. 256).

[16] A well-known example is the description of pin-making, which Smith may well have used; cp.: Denis Diderot & Jean d'Alembert (Eds.), *Encyclopédie*. 17 vols. (Paris, 1751–1765) Vol. V (Paris, 1755) pp. 804–807.

[17] Vernard Foley, *The Social Physics of Adam Smith* (West Lafayette, 1976) p. 139 – Incidentally,Foley echoes a similar older claim by John Gillies.

[18] Foley (1976) pp. 147 f.

[19] This contemporary "institutional relevance" has rightly been stressed by the editors (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner) of SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 40–50.

[20] SGE, Vol. V, p. 342 – Adam Smith had probably the Carron Iron Works in mind. Founded in 1759, the Carron Company pioneered the Industrial Revolution in Scotland.

[21] SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 20; "fire engine" is the old name for a steam engine.

[22] Foley (1976) p. 155.

[23] SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 448; cp.: ibid., Vol. II.2, p. 626: "The discovery of America, and

> Trade, therefore, and foreign communications, form a new society among nations . . . (SJS, Vol. I, p. 124)

Ad (c): Finally, the Scottish Literati took great pains to show that the advantages of the division of labour are necessarily accompanied by three far-reaching drawbacks: (1) short-term economic disruptions; (2) social inequality; (3) dehumanizing effects. The introduction of new machinery, though it leads to greater productivity, may in the short run upset the economic balance. By the suddenness of such innovations – Smith and Steuart agree on the problem, but differ in their proposals for solving it[24] – people may lose their ordinary employment. Social inequality, as Smith and Ferguson insist, is fostered by the division of labour. The wealth that results from the division of labour is unevenly distributed[25] and "the poor labourer . . . while he affords the materials for supplying the luxury of all the other members of the common wealth, and bears, as it were, upon his shoulders the whole fabric of human society, seems himself to be pressed down below ground by the weight, and to be buried out of sight in the lowest foundations of the building."[26] Although this may sound like an anticipation of Marx's theory of exploitation the Scots were no revolutionaries, but considered the problems as resolvable within the existing social structure: "the good life was still possible."[27] Characteristically, in spite of the serious drawback of "oppressive inequality", even the common labourer, due to the "superior opulence which takes place in civilized society", is still better off than any member of an egalitarian tribe of savages, even though the latter had no landlord, usurer and taxgatherer to support.[28] Moreover, and this leads us to the famous alienation topic, the Scots were not primarily worried about inequality of possession as such, but about the effects of such inequality upon the "national spirit" (AF1, p. 214), the virtues of the soldier and the citizen. The division of labour – through the specialization and inequality it implies – has dehumanizing consequences. The relevant passages from the Scots' writings are too

---

of a passage to the East Indies . . . [is described as] uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world" – See also Hume's essay "Of the Populousness of Antient Nations", in: DHW, Vol. III, pp. 381–443, here p. 410.

[24] SGE, Vol. II.1, pp. 469 f & SJS, Vol. I, pp. 121 ff – For our revaluation of their respective views on the issue, see above, chapter five.

[25] AF1, p. 217; cp.: SGE, Vol. V, p. 563: ". . . with regard to the produce of the labour of a great society there is never such a thing as a fair and equal division."

[26] SGE, Vol. V, p. 564; cp.: AF1, p. 186 & SGE, Vol. V, p. 540.

[27] Duncan Forbes in his introduction to AF1, p. XLI.

[28] SGE, Vol. V, pp. 563 f; cp.: SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 22.

well known to require quotation,[29] but – against some Smith scholars who overlook or deny it[30] – the inner link of the pros and cons in their presentation is worth stressing: The main drawback of the principle – the stultification of the labourer – is not seen as a mere slip in the execution of an otherwise flawless scheme, but as a *necessary* result.[31] The disadvantages are most intensely felt "where the division of labour is brought to perfection" (SGE, V, p. 539). When the opulence of commercial society – derived from the division of labour – is greatest, the weeds of ignorance grow apace. Divided labour succeeds exceedingly well "under a total suppression of sentiment and reason" (AF1, p. 182). Such advantages as increased dexterity are gained "at the expence" of atrophying other talents and abilities (SGE, II.2, p. 782). If the government does not take "very particular pains" (ibid.), the bulk of specialized labourers *inevitably* sinks into a piteous but also disgustingly beastly state.

(B) HEGEL'S DISCUSSION OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR

I

These characteristic features of the Scots' views will be compared, one by one, with Hegel's discussion of the division of labour. Directing our attention first to the relation between the division of labour and economic development, it has to be admitted that Hegel's writings contain no 'prima facie' equivalent to the striking formulations by which Scots like Smith and Ferguson had underlined its all-important function for economic growth and social development. This difference can, however,

[29] SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 781 f & Vol. V, pp. 539 ff & AF1, pp. 182 ff & SJS, Vol. I, p. 71.

[30] In Prof. E.G. West's interpretation, for example, Smith's critical remarks about the division of labour constitute a "striking inconsistency" and are even "incompatible" with the main lines of Smith's economic thought. On the basis of this alleged inconsistency, Smith's comments on the drawbacks are played down as afterthoughts, perhaps a "modish piece of authorship." Cp.: E.G. West, "Adam Smith and Alienation", A.S. Skinner & T. Wilson (Eds.), *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 540–552.

This tendency to play down Smith's discussion of the negative effects of the division of labour seems to result from the interest in defending the free market economy associated with Smith, an interest so strong that it sometimes prevents the acceptance of the many qualifications made by Smith. In this way, however, neither Adam Smith nor the market economy are rendered a good service. The image of Adam Smith that emerges from such interpretations is all too linear, a ghost of the real man and his theoretical depth.

[31] Note that the word "necessarily" is used twice in the passage from the WN: SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 781 f.

be explained in terms of the respective emphasis of the Scots on the one hand and Hegel on the other. In spite of Smith's definition of the philosophers "whose trade it is, not to do any thing, but to observe every thing" (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 21), the authors of the Scottish Enlightenment did not restrict themselves to explaining the superior affluence of modern civilized society – over the more 'primitive' societies of the past – by referring to the division of labour. They went on to use the results of their research for the further advancement of their fellow-citizens and their country. Smith, for example, as his recent editors have rightly stressed, "indicated the areas where growth was to be welcomed and encouraged. That was guidance for the practical man."[32] Part of the book's success may well have resulted from this guidance. One could add that many of the Scots even took a more active part in improvement: Lord Kames, for example, was writing on flax-husbandry and farming,[33] and Adam Ferguson, after retiring from his professorial chair, "interested himself in farming with all the ardour of a young agriculturalist."[34] The catchwords here are 'growth', the achievement of 'opulence',[35] an interest which, in turn, can be explained as the public-spiritedness of an intellectual élite in a backward country.[36] The scope of Hegel's philosophy, on the other hand, is, as he tells us himself, "to comprehend what is" (TMK, p. 11 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 72). Consequently, he considers the division of labour while describing that child of the modern world,[37] called "dïe bürgerliche Gesellschaft" ('civil society'). He deals with the division of labour as an element of that complex whole, describing its operation and its interaction with other elements. The crucial focus here is on the understanding and conceptualization of a given system.

Having thus explained why Hegel did not use such emphatic formula-

[32] R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner in their introduction to SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 44.

[33] Henry Home of Kames, *The Progress of Flax-husbandry in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1766); *The Gentleman Farmer* (Edinburgh, 1776).

[34] John Small, "Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson", *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, Vol. 23 (1864) pp. 599–665, here p. 660.

[35] Cp. Herbert W. Schneider's introduction to his edition of *Adam Smith's Moral and Political Philosophy* (New York, 1970) p. xxiii: "It is important to keep in mind that 'The Wealth of Nations' was conceived not as a treatise on national welfare or the greatest happiness, but merely of 'public opulence' [. . .] for Smith's theory of justice and benevolence we must turn elsewhere."

[36] G.E. Davie has frequently hinted at such an explanation, cp. "Anglophobe and Anglophil", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 291–302; "Hume, Reid, and the Passion of Ideas", *Edinburgh in the Age of Reason* (Edinburgh, 1967), pp. 23–39.

[37] Cp.: TMK, p. 266 – Vol. III, p. 565.

tions of the subject as the Scots had done, we may go on to consider what significance – with regard to economic growth and social development – he attributed to the division of labour, as it will then become clear that Hegel, though he was less outspoken than the Scots, held very similar views. Two aspects of Hegel's discussion deserve our special attention here: beside the obvious point of what he says about the consequences of the division of labour, we have to look at how he places this phenomenon within his 'system of needs'.

Within Hegel's system of needs – and this aspect is best expressed in the Berlin lectures as collected in the Ilting edition – the division of labour is developed in analogy to the multiplication of needs:

> The same abstraction, which causes the specification of needs and means, specifies the production and creates the division of labour. (VRP, Vol. I, p. 314)

As has been shown above (chapter four), Hegel's account of human needs has in itself two elements that bear resemblance to the Scottish Enlightenment. Firstly, the distinct characteristics of human needs (multiplication, refinement, etc.) and the way in which they emerge, in the context of a 'natural history' of man, and through a comparison with animal nature, in other words, both content and method of Hegel's account are reminiscent of the Scots. Their agreement in this respect unites them in opposition to Rousseau's 'state of nature' with its "simple necessities" (TMK, § 194, p. 128 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 643): Smith's criticism was that Rousseau "presents only the indolent side of it" (SGE, Vol. III, p. 281); Ferguson exclaims that "if the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less" (AF1, p. 8) and Hegel refers to this Rousseauesque 'state of nature' as a "false" point of view (TMK, § 194, p. 128 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 644). A second affinity between Hegel's account of human needs and the Scottish Enlightenment consists in their discussion of the causes and consequences of 'fashion', including a parallel insight into the psychological aspects of it, like the symbolic value of the objects concerned.

But more important for our present scope than these affinities between Hegel's system of needs and the Scottish Enlightenment is Hegel's emphasis on the interdependence between the multiplication of needs and the division of labour. Man's nature, qua rational being, causes the multiplication of needs, which, in turn, causes the division of labour. Imitation and fashion foster the multiplication of needs. But once this process has started, the division of labour adds further momentum to it; once moving, the pendulum is being pushed from *two* sides and there is no end to its ever increasing speed:

> The workers have an interest in selling their products; they therefore have an interest in increasing conveniences and enjoyments, in inventing new means to extend the needs and to make consumers attentive to refined needs and distinctions. It is far more the producers than the consumers who multiply the needs, invent new means and force new needs upon the consumers. There is no boundary to it, as there is no boundary between natural and imagined needs, a boundary where the former end and luxury begins. (VRP, Vol. IV. p. 493)

Man's needs call for a division of labour which, in turn, tends to extend the needs; those "refined needs" then require a yet more sophisticated division of labour, and the two elements thus constitute an endless spiral. It may therefore be concluded that the division of labour, in interdependence with the multiplication of needs, is *the* dynamic element in Hegel's 'system of needs' and that by its very position and rôle within the system Hegel attributed the same significance to the division of labour as the Scots.

The same conclusion holds true if we consider Hegel's admittedly brief and passing comments on the economic results of the division of labour: (a) growing production output;[38] (b) the introduction of new machinery: "finally man is able to step aside and install machines in his place".[39] In the next section, we shall discuss the causes of these advantages in greater detail, it may here be sufficient to stress that Hegel understood, as fully as the Scots, the crucial contribution of the division of labour to economic growth.

II

Considering the framework of technological and industrial conditions in which Hegel's discussion of the division of labour is embedded, his dependence on British sources is not only more obvious, but also frequently acknowledged by Hegel himself. It is no exaggeration to claim that his reflections on this subject are primarily based on two sets of data: Firstly, the Scottish contributions to the science of political economy. Secondly, the empirical facts of British social history out of which that science had arisen and to which it frequently referred back for

[38] TMK, § 198, p. 129 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 645. Further references are to be found in the following places: HGW: Vol. VI, p. 323 & Vol. VIII, p. 243; VRP: Vol. I, p. 314 & Vol. III, pp. 609 f & Vol. IV, p. 502.

[39] TMK, § 198, p. 129 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 646. For further references to the rôle of machinery, see below, p. 216, and note 42.

examples and for testing its principles. Before considering the internal evidence of Hegel's indebtedness, let us first bring together his own testimonies on the matter. Apart from Hegel's general acknowledgements to the political economists, which have been presented above (chapter three), there is, with regard to the division of labour, a more precise acknowledgement in the 1822/23 set of lecture notes on the philosophy of right: "In modern political economy the division of labour is a main aspect" (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609). Within the same thematic context, a specific reference to Adam Smith is to be found in the 1803/04 version of the Jena manuscripts (HGW, Vol. VI, p. 323), to our knowledge Hegel's first mention of Adam Smith. Considering Hegel's references (apart from the examples he borrowed from the economists; see below) to empirical facts like the division of labour in contemporary industries, he is making it quite obvious that he is thinking of British industrial conditions:

> This [sc: division of labour] is the great principle behind the factories of more recent times [. . .] This, then, is being refined by the English in particular. (VRP, Vol. III, pp. 609 f)

The obvious reason why Hegel should use British rather than German empirical data is the comparative backwardness of his country's industrial development; in Germany, as Prof. Gebhardt summed it up, there was only "sporadic application of English Technology".[40] The immediate source of Hegel's knowledge of Britain's economic and social life was probably his frequent reading and excerpting of English newspapers and journals, a habit he got into during his Frankfurt, if not his Bern period.[41] With respect to specific examples, one of the most striking instances has already been documented (chapter three): Hegel's borrowing of the 'pin factory'. As has been spelled out, Smith's prime

[40] Jürgen Gebhardt, "Zur Physiognomie einer Epoche", J. Gebhardt (Ed.), *Die Revolution des Geistes* (München, 1968) p. 9. For more detailed information on German social history of the relevant period, compare: Helmut Böhme, *Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 1968); Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Ed.), *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte* (Konigstein/Taunus, 5th ed., 1976) – both books include references to further reading. For Hegel's own awareness of the fact that England had the most advanced social conditions, see: TWA, Vol. IV, pp. 473 f.

[41] Cp.: Rosenkranz (1844) pp. 59–60 & 85. Critical editions of most of Hegel's excerpts from British journals are now available: Michael John Petry, "Hegel and 'The Morning Chronicle'", HS, Vol. XI (1976) pp. 11–80; Norbert Waszek, "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Edinburgh Review' 1817–1819", HS, Vol. XX (1985) pp. 79–112; Norbert Waszek, "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Quarterly Review' 1817–1818", HS, Vol. XXI (1986) pp. 9–25.

example for explaining the division of labour also becomes Hegel's example par excellence. Other examples that Hegel seems to borrow from the Scots are (linen) cloth, "Tuch" (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609), and such power sources for older (water-mills) and more recent machinery (cotton industry) as wind, water, fire, steam, sometimes collectively refered to as "pure movement [. . .] of the external nature".[42] Admittedly, if one separates these examples from Hegel's explicit references to the Scottish economists, it is easy to think of other possible sources: after all, Montesquieu discussed water-mills, the 'Encyclopédie' had an article on pin making and the cloth example could even be traced back to Plato's definition of weaving,[43] but there is additional evidence in the very way Hegel structured his presentation of the division of labour. With regard to this argument let us now turn to the 1822/23 set of lecture notes which is the most extensive of all of Hegel's treatments of our present subject (VRP, Vol. III, pp. 608–613). As we have shown, Smith used "three different circumstances" to account for the higher productivity of properly divided labour: "the increase of dexterity in every particular workman [. . .] the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly [. . .] the invention of a great number of machines" (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 17). In his most explicit treatment, Hegel not only uses the same arguments, but also puts them in the same order; he first mentions increased dexterity or "Geschicklichkeit",

(Main text:)	*(Marginal notes:)*
A pin is a trifle, and yet there are manifold particulars to it. These concrete particulars are now being treated in an abstract manner, so that a number of workmen can create a higher number of products [of the same sort], if each of them takes only such a particular abstract part as his object.	The main aspects of this division [of labour] are: (A) That each workman – through this analysis and abstraction – gains the most precise theoretical knowledge and practical dexterity. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 609)

[42] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 225. Explicit references to wind, water, steam, fire are to be found in the following places: SdS, p. 434; VRP: Vol. I, p. 314 & Vol. IV, p. 503.

[43] Charles-Louis de Secondat et de Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix* (Genève, 1748) Book XXIII, chapt. 15; M. Delaire, "Epingle", Denis Diderot & Jean d'Alembert (Eds.), *Encyclopédie*. 17 vols. (Paris, 1751–1765) Vol. V, pp. 804–807; Plato, *Statesman*, 279 a – 283 b.

he then points to the saving of time – "There is always the same activity to apply, with the same hand, the same material, the same instruments; in this manner much time is being saved." (VRP, III, p. 609) – and finally comments upon the counterpart of the division of labour, mechanization, which on the one hand results from the abstracting process inherent in the division of labour and, on the other hand, drastically increases the output thereby further fostering the division of labour. With regard to the new dynamics introduced by mechanization, Hegel critically refers to those English unemployed who destroyed new machinery, ascribing their deplorable condition to those inventions. Like the Scottish economists, who saw "no solidity in this objection",[44] Hegel humanely argued:

> There are now complaints about the machines: in England, they have been broken by unemployed workmen; but men might be used for something better than for functions, which machines are able to perform.[45]

Leaving the industrial condition behind and turning to world market and trade as the distinctly modern framework of the division of labour, we see Hegel once more following the Scottish economists. He shows the same awareness of the fact that international trade has introduced a new dimension to the division of labour, that it has given rise to a division on a world-scale; he speaks of the world-historical significance of trade and his further remarks closely resemble the previously quoted comments of the Scots:[46]

> Further, the sea is the greatest means of communication, and trade by sea creates commercial connexions between distant countries and so relations involving contractual rights. (TMK, § 247, p. 151 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 684)

Likewise, Hegel often speaks about the necessity by which industrial nations go beyond themselves[47] and, in a passage from the 1822/23 lectures, Hegel makes it particularly clear that the previous national division of labour is extended or rather substituted by a new and wider set of needs and opportunities: it results from the process of going

[44] SJS, Vol. I, p. 256.

[45] VRP, Vol. III, p. 613; compare Hegel's notes on the destruction of steam engines by "the English rabble", HBS, p. 782.

[46] See above, pp. 209 f.

[47] VRP, Vol. II, § 246 ff, pp. 684 f – TMK, pp. 151 f; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 613.

beyond 'civil society' that now "all needy and unsatisfied people constitute a new society." (VRP, Vol. III, p. 705) Again, when Hegel is looking for an example of such an industrial nation extensively carrying on sea-borne trade (and colonization), he often thinks of Great Britain.[48] Hegel is equally aware of the enormous *feedback* of world-trade on the internal division of labour, on the one hand providing it with new chances and the possibility of further specialization, on the other hand endangering its own level of development by foreign inventions and achievements. With regard to this balance of opportunities and risks, Hegel's emphasis is strongly reminiscent of Steuart's arguments in favour of protecting the industries of a backward country, as he, too, is more concerned with the harm that "remote operations" (HGW, Vol, VI, p. 324) and "conditions abroad" (TMK, § 236, p. 147 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 678) might do to home industries. That does not mean that Hegel is overlooking either the advantages – Hegel speaks of "the most potent instrument of culture" (TMK, § 247, p. 151 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 684) – or indeed the necessity of sea-borne trade:

> Inland nations, when their industry is awakening and progressing, and luxury becomes familiar, force their way to the sea. A country that has such industry *necessarily* has to connect itself with the principle of the sea, too; and an industry that does not proceed to bravery and to the self-esteem which emerges from danger, remains dull and stuffy. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 613; my own emphasis, N.W.)

Considering the distinctly modern trading conditions within which the Scottish economists discussed the division of labour, we had quoted some passages showing the Scots' awareness of the difference between contemporary and ancient trade.[49] The same can be done for Hegel who was also keen to distinguish the background of his own reasoning on the subject from Greek and Roman conditions. According to him, modern international trade began in the 15th century.[50] Foreign nations are no longer 'hostes' (enemies), as for the Romans, but trade partners.[51] In this context, one could also mention his critical reference to Horace:

> Rivers are not natural boundaries of separation [. . .] On the con-

[48] VRP: Vol. III, p. 613 & Vol. IV, pp. 705 f.
[49] See above, p. 209.
[50] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 614.
[51] Ibid.

trary, it is truer to say that they, and the sea likewise, link men together. Horace is wrong when he says:

'deus abscidit prudens Oceano dissociabili terras'. (Odes, I. iii, 1. 21–23)	'God of set purpose has sundered the lands by the estranging sea.' (TMK, § 247, p. 151 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 684)

We may therefore conclude that the framework of Hegel's discussion of the division of labour, i.e. his conception of contemporary industrial and trading conditions, is essentially the framework of the Scottish Enlightenment authors, occasionally padded out with empirical material drawn from British newspapers. We could show that Hegel sometimes acknowledged this source and that, in other cases, his views can be traced back to the Scots even if he did not acknowledge his indebtedness.

III

When we finally turn to our claim that Hegel built upon the Scots' thesis of an inner link between the advantages and the disadvantages of the division of labour, we reach a highly controversial issue of Hegel scholarship. Ignoring the fine dialectical structure of Hegel's argument, interpreters have tended to pick up individual strata of Hegel's complex view, isolating them and using them in support of their respective images of Hegel making him either a sort of radical humanist critic of industrialization,[52] or a 'bourgeois apologist' of the same phenomenon.[53] Much of this polemic may be disregarded from the scholar's point of view as having politics rather than hermeneutical concerns as their basis.[54] But there is one aspect which genuinely complicated the issue: that Hegel sometimes presented the advantages and disadvantages of the division

[52] Even Shlomo Avineri's excellent book is not free from this attitude (1972, p. 93): "This analysis undoubtedly reveals Hegel as one of the earliest radical critics of the modern industrial system."

[53] See, for example, Helmut Reichelt's position in the introduction to his recent study edition of Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt, 1972) p. XXXV and passim.

[54] Much of the post-war Marxist discussion of Hegel has to be seen in a political context. The fierce debate of the mid-fifties, for example, between the supporters of Stalin (R.O. Gropp, J. Schleifstein, et al.) on the one hand and those trying to legitimize Hegel as a 'precursor' of Marx (Lukács, Bloch, et al.) was closely linked with such political events as the XX. Congress of the CPSU (1956) and the risings in Hungary (1956) and the GDR (1953). For an introduction into this topic, see: Helferich (1979) pp. 180–189.

of labour in separate places, a manner of representation which has, even to unbiased readers, somewhat obscured the inner link of his argument. We shall comment on this difficulty in due course, but shall begin, constantly comparing his point of view with the Scottish Enlightenment authors, with a reconstruction of what Hegel considered the drawbacks of the principle. Hegel's first concern about the division of labour is the inherent danger of creating unemployment and poverty. The enormous economic force behind a division of labour on a world-scale is, due to its immediate feedback on home industries, not only a new outlet, but at the same time and to the same degree, full of risks and may sometimes prove destructive by its sheer dynamic. If an improvement in cotton mills, for example, suddenly enables one country to cheapen its production and to expand its export of cotton cloth, another country's cotton production is endangered and may even be ruined by this flood of cheap imports. For Hegel, as well as for Steuart and Smith, this drawback springs largely from the suddenness of the innovation, and its disagreeable result is to reduce workmen to the "misery of idleness":[55]

Steuart:

. . . neither can a machine, which abridges the labour of men, be introduced *all at once* into an extensive manufacture, without *throwing many people into idleness*. (SJS, Vol. I, pp. 121 f; my own italics, N.W.)

Hegel [1803/04]:

. . . and the connexion of individual modes of labour with the whole infinite multitude of needs becomes quite incalculable and a blind dependence, so that by a remote operation, *the labour of a whole class of people*, who satisfied their needs through it, *suddenly is* hampered, *superfluous, and useless*. (HGW, Vol. VI, p. 324; my own italics, N.W.)

Smith:

Humanity may . . . require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were those

Hegel [1805/06]:

Whole branches of industry which supported a large class of people *suddenly fold up* because of a change in fashion or because the value of their products fell

[55] My formulation is here echoing Ferguson.

high duties and prohibitions taken away *all at once*, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to deprive all at once *many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and subsistence*. (SGE, Vol. II.1, p. 469; my own italics, N.W.)

due to new inventions in other countries. *Whole masses are abandoned to poverty which cannot help itself.*[56]

In these circumstances, both Hegel and the Scottish economists thought it necessary that the government should intervene in order to prevent, or at least to mitigate the problem of unemployment. In some of his writings, especially the published version of the "Philosophy of Right", Hegel leaves this problem with rather general formulae expressing the need for "public care and direction" (TMK, § 236, p. 147 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 678) and granting the individual something like a right to work.[57] In other cases, especially the 1805/06 manuscripts and some of the Berlin lectures, he offers more specific prescriptions, which could be divided into groups of merely protective measures on the one hand and more active steps on the other hand. In terms of protective measures, Hegel seems to have thought of prohibitions and duties:

> the one [activity] has to be rendered more difficult in so far as it contributes to the disadvantage of the others. (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244)

With regard to active steps, Hegel appears to have reflected upon transferring the unemployed to other industries or public works:

> [one ought] to employ the suffering classes elsewhere. (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 245)

> The workers, especially the factory workers who lost their subsistence due to [new] machinery, easily become malcontent and new outlets have to be opened up to them. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 503)

Another step that Hegel expected from the government was to search

[56] HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244; English translation quoted from Avineri (1972) p. 97, note 44 (my own italics; N.W.).
[57] VRP, Vol. III, pp. 695 f; cp.: the addition to § 236, TMK, p. 276.

for "alternatives, new channels of sale in other countries" (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244), where he may have been thinking of export bounties. According to Hegel, both active steps – the provision of new jobs and the search for new markets – coincide in what he came to call "systematic colonization"[58] which absorbs a surplus workforce *and* provides new export opportunities.[59] Hegel's source for these means of mitigation, if one wants to differentiate here, seems to be Sir James Steuart rather than Adam Smith, considering the latter's reservations about such measures[60] and the affinities with some of the former's arguments:

> A statesman should make it his endeavour to employ as many of every class as possible, and when employment fails in the common run of affairs, to contrive *new outlets* for young people of every denomination [. . .] A state should provide *retreats* of all sorts, for the different conditions of her decayed inhabitants. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 73; my own italics. N.W.)

> Work augments, I shall suppose, and no more demand can be produced; it may then be a good expedient to diminish hands, by making soldiers of them; by employing them in public works; or by sending them out of the country to become useful in its colonies. (SJS, Vol. I, p. 202)

The problem of unemployment may, in a certain sense, lead us, via poverty, to the second drawback of the division of labour which occupied Hegel's mind, i.e. social inequality. Thus, in the 1805/6 manuscripts, he concludes the passage on unemployment saying, "and this whole mass is reduced to poverty, a poverty that cannot help itself. The contrast between great wealth and extreme poverty emerges." (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 244) But Hegel took great pains to show that social inequality, though it may sometimes appear the result of accidental unemployment, is really a *necessary* outcome of two functions of the division of labour. Firstly, some existing but minor differences of possessions are considerably deepened through the enormous economic forces that are revealed by the division of labour: small fortunes grow into an "intensified [. . .] amassing of wealth" (VRP, Vol. II, § 243, p. 682 – TMK, p. 149) and great wealth, as Hegel is keen to stress, soon develops its own dynamics:

[58] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 614; cp. the addition to § 248, TMK, p. 278.

[59] VRP, Vol. II, § 248, p. 685 – TMK, pp. 151 f: "the means of colonization which [. . .] supplies to a part of its population a return to life on the family basis in a new land and so also supplies itself with a new demand and field for its industry."

[60] Cp.: SGE, Vol. II.1+2, pp. 452–472, 499, 505, 647, 723–758.

> Wealth, like any other mass, becomes a power [. . .] It is a point of attraction in a way that throws its glance around the more general and remote, it collects around itself – as a large mass attracts the smaller. To them that have, shall be given. Acquisition becomes a many-sided system, it earns on every side, into which a smaller business cannot enter. Or, the highest abstraction of labour affects more particular types of labour and acquires a wider extent. (HGW. Vol. VIII, p. 244; cp.: VRP, Vol. IV, p. 494)

Secondly, on the side of the labouring poor, the dexterity in a particular job, which the division of labour increases, also creates a growing *dependence*, because it is a *lack* of dexterity in any other job, and dependence often leads to misery ('Not'):

> The further consequence is then that the more abstractly men labour, the more they become tied together by a strong chain. But, thereby, the *misery* is also increased, as a particular worker has only one way of earning his living and, if that fails, he finds himself in need and there is no resort to escape from distress [. . .] thus the *dependence* of men is increased and the *skilfulness* in a particular point is a *lack of skill* with regard to a more concrete form. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 610; my own italics, N.W.)

> Labour becomes simpler and more abstract; the more *skilful* someone becomes in it, the *less skilful* he becomes in general, his dexterity is no longer a living one [. . .] The *dependence* of the workmen is a consequence of factories; they become completely dependent, completely one-sided and, therefore, hardly have another way of earning their living, because they are so absorbed in their job and only used to it, so that they become the most dependent of mankind (VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 502 f; my own italics, N.W. – cp.: VRP, Vol. II, § 243, p. 682 – TMK, pp. 149 f)

In considering the inequality of fortunes an inevitable outcome of industrial society, Hegel is once more in agreement with the Scottish Enlightenment authors:[61]

> With regard to poverty, it will always be in society, and the more, the greater its wealth. (VRP, Vol. III, p. 702)

[61] See above, p. 210.

> If there aren't other outlets, like colonization, poverty increases in the same proportion as riches. (VRP, Vol. IV, p. 494)

Hegel's answers to the problem of poverty have often been found insufficient. Prof. Avineri, for example, quotes a sentence from the "Philosophy of Right": "The important question how poverty is to be abolished is one of the most disturbing problems which agitate modern society", and adds somewhat drily that "On no other occasion does Hegel leave a problem at that." (Avineri, 1972, p. 154) Lukács, Cullen, and other Marxist inspired authors are even more critical about Hegel's attitude towards the poor.[62] In the light of Hegel's above mentioned suggestions to fight unemployment, including colonization, his plans to render extreme profits more difficult,[63] and the room he ascribes to almsgiving, endowments, and other forms of charity ("morality finds plenty to do"; TMK, § 242, p. 149 – VRP, Vol. II, p. 681), and, finally, the mitigating functions of the Corporation,[64] this criticism does not seem to be quite fair.[65] But more important than defending Hegel's proposals to relieve the poor, while admitting that he did not have a ready-made answer to the problem,[66] is to stress that Hegel, like the Scottish Enlightenment figures before him, was not primarily worried about inequality of fortunes: "This inequality of wealth is absolutely necessary."[67] Hegel's main concern, as his fine distinction between poor people and rabble nicely illustrates,[68] is directed towards the dehumanizing effects of such inequalities and this leads us to the third disadvantage that Hegel attributed to the division of labour.

Hegel's views on the *degrading* effects of the division of labour may,

[62] G. Lukács, (^{2}1973); B. Cullen (1979).

[63] SdS, p. 492 – SoEL, p. 171: "The government has to work as hard as possible against this inequality and the destruction of private and public life wrought by it. It can do this directly in an external way by making high gain more difficult . . ."

[64] The wider implications of the Corporation – "The second ethical root of the state" (TMK, § 255, p. 154) – cannot be discussed in the present context, but that it relieves poverty cannot be doubted: "Within the Corporation the help which poverty receives loses its accidental character and the humiliation wrongfully associated with it." (TMK, § 253, p. 154).

[65] A systematic exposition of Hegel's views on poverty is an important gap in recent Hegel-scholarship. In this context, I have recently tried to clarify Hegel's allusion to Scottish beggars (TMK, § 245, p. 150): "Hegels Schottische Bettler", HS, Vol. 19 (1984) pp. 311–316.

[66] As his discussion of poor taxes makes sufficiently clear, compare, for example: VRP, Vol. IV, pp. 611 f.

[67] SoEL, p. 170 – SdS, p. 491; cp.: VRP, Vol. I, p. 315.

[68] VRP, Vol. IV, p. 609; cp.: VRP, Vol. III, p. 703 and the addition to § 244, TMK, p. 277.

for the sake of presentation, be divided into those that consider what happens to the individual gifts and talents of the specialized workman and those that look into the corruption of the citizen and the soldier.

From his Jena manuscripts to his last Berlin lectures, Hegel was always aware of the fact that the division of labour is a two-edged weapon. The very means which increase the output, such as simplification of the working process and mechanization, also tend to make the particular job "more mechanical, dull, spiritless" (HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 243). His very formulations make clear that a price is to be paid for the advantages which accompany the division of labour:

> In the machine man abolishes his own formal activity and makes it work for him. But this deception, which he perpetrates upon nature [. . .] takes vengeance on him. The *more* he takes away from nature, the *more* he subjugates her, the *baser* he becomes himself.[69]
>
> The *more* developed the division of labour is, the *more* spiritless and dull it becomes . . . (VRP, Vol. I, p. 314; my own italics, N.W.)

This reduction and simplification as it applies to a particular job also affects the agent confined to it, the result being, as Hegel is never weary of stressing, the degeneration of the worker: he becomes increasingly one-sided, his spirit is deadened, he is hampered in his participation in cultural life and even in the expression of any noble sentiment. References to this 'Abstumpfung'[70] of the worker can be found in a variety of Hegel's writings, from his Jena manuscripts to his Berlin lectures, and it may again be appropriate to compare some of his formulations with those of the Scottish Intelligentsia:

Ferguson:	*Hegel [1803/4]:*
. . . many parts in the practice of every art, and in the detail of every department, require no abilities, or actually tend to *contract* and to *limit the views of the mind* . . . (AF1, p. 183; my own italics, N.W.)	Work thus becomes absolutely more and more dead, it becomes machine-labour, the individual's own skill becomes *infinitely limited*, and *the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the utmost level of dullness*.[71]

[69] HGW, Vol. VI, p. 321 – English translation quoted from Avineri (1972) pp. 93 f (my own italics, N.W.); cp.: HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 243.

[70] 'abstumpfen' means (fig.) to deaden; 'abgestumpft' means deadened or dull(ed).

Smith:

The torpor of his mind renders him, not only *incapable of* relishing or *bearing part in any rational conversation* but of conceiving any generous, or tender *sentiment*. (SGE, Vol. II.2, pp. 782; my own italics, N.W.)

Hegel [1820]:

[. . .] the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs results in the *inability of sentiments* and the loss of the broader freedoms and especially the *intellectual benefits* of civil society. (TMK, § 243, pp. 149 f; slightly modified; my own italics, N.W.)

Before leaving the level of the individual worker and going on to consider the deleterious effects on communal life, it should be mentioned how Hegel expected that the problem would be solved in the future. As each working process is more and more simplified, Hegel thought that it would finally be possible to install machines in the worker's place and thus release him from the burden of dull labour and enable him to enjoy the sphere of absolute spirit: art, religion, philosophy.

> The abstraction of one man's production from another's makes work more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install machines in his place.[72]

This answer cannot be traced back to the Scottish Enlightenment and has to be seen as Hegel's own contribution.[73] As even now, a hundred and fifty years after his death, Hegel's anticipation has not yet been fulfilled, we might have to put a damper on Hegel's confidence, at least with regard to timing. But apart from that, his analysis may still be called realistic: precisely the industries that first introduced production-lines, for example, are leading towards their abolition. Evil sprang from good, but from the very evil good may spring again.

On the level of communal life, too, the division of labour *necessarily* has unintended and indeed unwanted outcomes: it corrupts the 'sense of

[71] HGW, Vol. VI, pp. 323 f – English translation quoted from Avineri (1972) p. 93 (my own italics; N.W.).

[72] TMK, § 198, p. 129 – VRP, Vol. II, pp. 645 f. This notion re-occurs frequently in Hegel's writings, both earlier and later: SdS, p. 434; HGW, Vol. VIII, p. 225; VRP: Vol. I, pp. 189 & 314; Vol. III, p. 612; Vol. IV, p. 503.

[73] Although Dugald Stewart, the eclectic second generation representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, developed a similar notion independently, which shows that Hegel's conclusion was in the air at the time; cp.: DSt, Vol. VIII, pp. 330 f.

community' which is so essential for the virtues of the citizen and the soldier. In this respect, Hegel is very close to Ferguson.

Ferguson:

the separation of professions, while it seems to promise improvement of skill, and is actually the cause why the productions of every art become more perfect as commerce advances; yet in its termination, and ultimate effects, serves, in some measure, *to break the bands of society* . . . Connections, indeed, or transactions, in which probity and friendship may still take place; but in which the *national spirit . . . cannot be exerted*. (AF1, pp. 218 ff; my own italics, N.W.)

Hegel [1803]:

Next, great wealth, which is similarly bound up with the deepest poverty (for in the separation [between rich and poor] labour on both sides is universal and objective), produces on the one side in ideal universality, on the other side in real universality, mechanically. This purely quantitative element, the inorganic aspect of labour, which is parcelled out even in its concept, is the unmitigated extreme of barbarism [. . .] the bestiality of contempt for all higher things enters [. . .] *The absolute bond of the people, namely ethical principle, has vanished, and the people is dissolved*. (SoEL, pp. 170f – SdS, p. 492; my own italics, N.W.)

With regard to the 'martial spirit' the decline of which was so frequently deplored by the Scottish Literati, Hegel's indebtedness is less obvious. In particular, he does not directly link this decline with the division of labour. But when Hegel comments on war, later on in the "Philosophy of Right", passages which have been the object of gross misconstruction and slander,[74] he is really saying what the Scots knew before him, i.e. that even war has more than one side, that "it cannot be regarded as wholly evil, unnecessary and destructive",[75] as it can also create examples of fortitude, altruism and public-spiritedness. However, we cannot here take that matter further, as it goes beyond the section we were

[74] For a proper reply to some of these charges, see: Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and its Method", in: Walter Kaufmann (Ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (New York, 1970) pp. 137–171, here pp. 165 ff; cp. my article "Fox und Pitt. Spannungsfeld britischer Politik im Spiegel des Hegelschen Denkens", Hans-Christian Lucas und Otto Pöggeler (Eds.), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1986) pp. 111–128.

[75] Duncan Forbes's Introduction to AF1, p. XVIII.

concentrating on, and as it would also involve a number of wider issues such as Hegel's views on Machiavelli's militia arguments, etc.

Finally, after having shown the various disadvantages and how Hegel linked them with the division of labour, let us consider the above mentioned problem concerning the manner in which Hegel presented his arguments. In the published version of the "Philosophy of Right" which is, after all, where most readers have made contact with Hegel's political philosophy, he deals with the division of labour in § 198, whereas some of the drawbacks we tried to reconstruct are not discussed before about 40 paragraphs later, especially §§ 236, 242–47. This fact induced some interpreters, Gerhard Göhler for example,[76] to deny the systematic link, which we have tried to prove, between advantages and disadvantages of the division of labour. Thus, Göhler's view of Hegel resembles Prof. West's view of Smith,[77] and, slightly modified, our criticism of Prof. West may also be directed against Göhler: it is a failure to understand the function of the respective passages. In § 198, Hegel is primarily describing the rôle of labour in modern society and his criticisms are mere asides. In §§ 236 ff., Hegel is bringing together his criticisms in order to pave the way to the next level: the ethical life of the state. Thus, what seems to be an irony, that the same type of misinterpretation can be found for Smith and Hegel, could actually be used as an argument in our favour, that Smith and Hegel structured their arguments similarly.

[76] Though Göhler is presenting this interpretation with reference to the early writings rather than the Philosophy of Right; cp.: Göhler (1974) pp. 508 f, note 19.

[77] See above, p. 211, note 30.

Conclusion and Outlook

The aim of this brief conclusion is to summarize the evidence presented, to show its significance, and to point to research areas that have thus been opened up. In order to discuss the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on Hegel's theory of 'civil society', the ultimate task of the present study, a number of preparatory investigations were found to be necessary. Firstly, through a bibliographical documentation of the impact of the Enlightenment in Germany (Chapter Two), the foundation of an analysis of the Scottish influence on the intellectual life of contemporary Germany and, as a result, a framework for Hegel's relation to the Scottish philosophers had to be provided. It was shown that the Scottish thinkers enjoyed a wide and marked reception in eighteenth-century Germany, a reception which left its traces in terms of contemporary translations, reviews, and popularizations, as well as exerting an influence on the teaching of political economy at German universities. Since the bibliographical documentation (Appendices I–III) of this reception is quite extensive, it should be useful to future researchers in the field of eighteenth-century cultural links between Great Britain and Germany. What remains to be done with regard to the translations (Appendix I) is to complement our compilation, mainly drawn from printed sources, by an inspection of the actual volumes. This is a large-scale bibliographical task, which has now been started by Prof. Fabian (Münster) and his team of assistants. With respect to the examination of the review journals (Appendix II), our sample should grow into a comprehensive catalogue of all relevant material, a project beyond the efforts of an individual.[1] On the basis of our empirical work on the reception of the Scots in Germany, a brief glance at the contacts of other German thinkers (e.g. Schiller, Herder) with the Scottish

[1] Again, such a project has recently been started at Göttingen, where an index of German eighteenth-century journals is under way. Unfortunately, the project is restricted to 'articles' proper and will not include reviews.

Enlightenment has been attempted. It is hoped that these brief references will arouse interest and thus initiate detailed investigations. It appears to the present author that older studies in the field (e.g. Roy Pascal's work on "Herder and the Scottish Historical School"), though they remain valuable, will have to be updated by the use of the growing number of recent studies of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Secondly, the ultimate task of the present study had to be approached from the angle of Hegel's intellectual biography (Chapter Three). By investigating Hegel's early manuscripts and other external evidence, it was possible to document the dates and extent of Hegel's reading and other contacts with the Scottish Enlightenment. The social and political thought emerged as the most important aspect of Hegel's reception of the Scottish thinkers, though other areas of interest have also been traced. Although the principal aim of this chapter was to provide the basis for our discussion of the "Philosophy of Right", we were able to throw light on a number of other texts (e.g. Hegel's fragment on Hume). Again, our scope has been wide enough to prepare the way for further research. Our answer to the question of Hegel's knowledge of English as well as our documentation of Hegel's contacts with the Scots ought to become part of a much needed full-scale study of Hegel and the 'Geistesleben' ("civilization" in the broadest sense) of Great Britain.

Chapters Four to Six show how and to what extent Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" assimilates and reproduces the views of a variety of Scottish Enlightenment authors with respect to the following subject matters: needs, labour, exchange, classes; the interventionist qualifications to the idea of the free market economy; and the division of labour. It has been shown that general questions such as whether Smith or Steuart exerted a greater influence on Hegel oversimplify an issue that can only be settled on the level of particular aspects: for example, with regard to classes, Steuart seems to be more important, whereas, with regard to the division of labour, Smith and Ferguson are more relevant. In this context we were also able to show that a considerable proportion of Hegel scholarship has operated with crude and inadequate conceptions of Smith and Steuart. The significance of these investigations, the full results of which cannot be repeated here, is to add qualified support to the 'liberal' interpretation of Hegel, from which Hegel emerges as *the* philosopher of the modern world. The evidence which we have provided shows clearly that Hegel, through his study and assimilation of the advanced economic theories of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, was able to raise their understanding of the modern market economy to the level of a comprehensive political philosophy. Hegel's modernity and continued relevance is thus vindicated with respect to his account of 'civil society'.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, the obvious should be added: Hegel's political philosophy goes beyond the level of 'civil society' to such wider topics as the ethical entity of the 'state' proper and world history, which this study had to leave unexplored. Similarly, it was not possible to compare Hegel's indebtedness to the Scottish Enlightenment continuously with his possible and probable debts to the French and German Enlightenment, with contemporary German cameralist thought, etc. The relevance of such inquiries and, indeed, of further research into Hegel's account of the state is nowhere denied but it should be emphasized that our task was more restricted as well as more specific: to throw new light on *one* section of Hegel's political philosophy by clarifying an important source of his thought, which, hitherto, has not been treated adequately. Previous and future studies of Hegel's views on the 'state' proper have shown and, hopefully, will analyse in greater detail where and how Hegel goes further than his Scottish predecessors. In the end, no doubt, Hegel's intellectual labour with regard to the Scottish Enlightenment will reveal the well-known stages of the Hegelian 'Aufhebung': (a) an assimilating acceptance ('conservare'); (b) a precise criticism ('negare'); (c) a raising to a higher level ('tollere'). Seen in this light, the scope of this study was almost completely limited to the first of these stages. It is the author's conviction that research is an ongoing process but only in that it focusses upon the details that are vital in order to complement an otherwise sterile and 'speculative' (in the derogatory, not the Hegelian sense) systematic interpretation. Following Hegel's own lead regarding the philosophical truth that can be expressed in its own time, this does not imply relativism but rather a process whereby the truth, which is in itself historical, becomes concrete and is complemented. Though the aim of this study may in this sense be modest, if it has succeeded in establishing beyond doubt the importance of the Scottish Enlightenment for Hegel's views on 'civil society', the work was not done in vain.

Finally, this study must be seen within the context of recent research into Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". In the past, Hegel's political thought has often been related to the contemporary conditions in Prussia. From this tendency resulted the notorious charge that Hegel accommodated his views to repressive political circumstances. Much recent work – most notably the essays of the French-German colloquium held at Bochum in 1984[2] – has, on the contrary, revised this perspective thoroughly. While it seems fair to assume that Hegel hoped for an impact of his thought on the country where he was living and teaching, it has been established

[2] Hans-Christian Lucas & Otto Poggeler (Eds.), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1986).

that he wrote on the basis of wide *European* political and social developments and experiences. As a consequence, all attempts to reduce this broad basis would deprive Hegel of one of the aspects that constitute his very achievement as a political philosopher. This study adds further support to the new approach, as it documents how strongly Hegel was influenced by these Scottish philosophers, who thought and wrote amidst the social developments which made Great Britain the leading industrial and commercial nation. One last illustration may suffice: when Hegel wrote that "all great progressive peoples press onward to the sea" (TMK, § 247, p. 151), the most prominent modern example he might possibly have thought of was the British people. For Hegel, as much as for Joseph Conrad, they – and not the Prussian 'Junker' tied to 'terra firma' – were "the salt of the sea."

> With the sea, trade reaches its climax. The sea widens the breast. In the longing for profit, he who pursues it does equally renounce the selfish purpose. The sea and its navigation constitute the poetry of trade. A bravery does here emerge to which trade proceeds in itself. (PhRHD, p. 200)

Bibliography and Bibliographical Appendices

(I) PRIMARY SOURCES

Editions used and their abbreviations:

(A) *Hegel Editions:*

MS = Some 'Hegeliana' have been quoted from *Manuscript Sources*. They have been used with the kind permission of the respective owners. In each case, the owner (normally a library) and his classification or collection numbers are given.

(1) *Collected Works and Multivolume Collections*

HGW = G.W.F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited for the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" by the "Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften" (Hamburg, 1968 ff.) The following volumes have been published so far.

Vol. IV Ed. by Hartmut Buchner & Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg, 1968)
contains (a) "Differenzschrift" pp. 1–92
(b) Kritisches Journal der Philosophie
(1) "Glauben und Wissen" pp. 315–414
(2) "Naturrechtsaufsatz" pp. 415–485
(c) Various shorter pieces.

Vol. VI Ed. by Klaus Düsing & Heinz Kimmerle (Hamburg, 1975) contains *Jenaer Systementwurfe I. Das System der speculativen Philosophie* (1803/4). This is an improved edition of the so-called "Jenenser Realphilosophie I".

Vol. VII Ed. by R.P. Horstmann & J.H. Trede (Hamburg, 1971) contains *Jenaer Systementwurfe II: Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie* (1804/5).

Vol. VIII Ed. by J.H. Trede & R.P. Horstmann (Hamburg, 1976) contains *Jenaer Systementwürfe III: Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes* (1805/6). This is an improved edition of the so-called "Jenenser Realphilosophie II".

Vol. IX Ed. by W. Bonsiepen & R. Heede (Hamburg, 1980) contains *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807).
Vol. XI Ed. by F. Hogemann & W. Jaeschke (Hamburg, 1978) contains *Die Wissenschaft der Logik I*: Die Objektive Logik (1812/13).
Vol. XII Ed. by F. Hogemann & W. Jaeschke (Hamburg, 1980) contains *Die Wissenschaft der Logik II*: Die Subjektive Logik (1816).
Vol. XXI Ed. by F. Hogemann & W. Jaeschke (Hamburg, 1985) contains *Die Wissenschaft der Logik I*: Die Objektive Logik (1832).

TWA = G.W.F. Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*. In 20 vols. (Frankfurt, 1969 ff). Edited by Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel.

Vol. I : Frühe Schriften
Vol. II : Jenaer Schriften
Vol. III : Phänomenologie des Geistes
Vol. IV : Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften
Vol. V : Wissenschaft der Logik I
Vol. VI : Wissenschaft der Logik II
Vol. VII : Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
Vol. VIII : Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I
Vol. IX : Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II
Vol. X : Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III
Vol. XI : Berliner Schriften 1818–1831
Vol. XII : Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte
Vol. XIII : Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik I
Vol. XIV : Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik II
Vol. XV : Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik III
Vol. XVI : Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I
Vol. XVII : Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II
Vol. XVIII : Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I
Vol. XIX : Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II
Vol. XX : Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III

HBr = Johannes Hoffmeister & Friedhelm Nicolin (Eds.), *Briefe von und an Hegel*. Four Parts in Five Volumes (Hamburg, 3rd edition, 1981)

Part I contains the letters between 1785 and 1812.
Part II contains the letters between 1813 and 1822.
Part III contains the letters between 1823 and 1831.
Part IV,1 contains "Dokumente und Materialien zur Biographie".
Part IV,2 contains "Nachtrage zum Briefwechsel", Indices, etc.

VRP = Karl-Heinz Ilting (Ed.), *G.W.F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie. 1818–1831*. In 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1973 f)
Vol. I contains (a) the "Heidelberger Enzyklopadie" (1817)
(b) C.G. Homeyer's notes (1818/19).
Vol. II contains the published version of the *Philosophy of Right* (1820).
Vol. III contains H.G. Hotho's notes (1822/23).
Vol. IV contains (a) K.G. v. Griesheim's notes (1824/25).

(b) the relevant section of the "Berliner Enzklopädie" (1827 + 1830).
(c) D.F. Strauss' notes (1831).

(2) *Editions of Single Works or Collections in One Volume:*

PhRDH = Dieter Henrich (Ed.), *G.F.W.* [!] *Hegel: Philosophie des Rechts.* Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift (Frankfurt, 1983).

PhRWa = *G.W.F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatsrecht.* Heidelberg 1817/18 mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818/19. Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannenmann. Ed. by C. Becker . . . et al., with an introduction by Otto Poggeler (Hamburg, 1983).

HTJ = Hermann Nohl (Ed.), *Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907) = [Reprint: Frankfurt, 1966].

DHE = Johannes Hoffmeister (Ed.), *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1936) = [Reprint: Stuttgart, 1974].

Cart = Wolfgang Wieland (Ed.), *Hegels erste Druckschrift.* Vertrauliche Briefe über das vormalige staatsrechtliche Verhältnis des Waadtlandes (Pays de Vaud) von Jean Jacques Cart. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt und kommentiert von G.W.F. Hegel. Faksimiledruck der Ausgabe von 1798. (Göttingen, 1970).

SdS = Hegel's "System der Sittlichkeit" (1802/3) is quoted from Georg Lasson's edition *Schriften zur Politik und zur Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1923) pp. 413–499.

HBS = Johannes Hoffmeister (Ed.), *G.W.F. Hegel: Berliner Schriften, 1818–1831* (Hamburg, 1956).

HBZ = Günther Nicolin (Ed.), *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen* (Hamburg, 1970).

HBibl = [Hegels Bibliothek] *Verzeichniss der von dem Professor Herrn Dr Hegel und dem Dr. Herrn Seebeck hinterlassenen Bucher=Sammlungen* (Berlin, 1832).

TMK = T.M. Knox (Ed.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Oxford, 1976)

HBN = G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.* Translated by H.B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge, 1975). Roman page numbers refer to Duncan Forbes's introduction.

AVM = *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.* Translated by A.V. Miller, with a foreword by J.N. Findlay (Oxford, 1977).

WW = *The Logic of Hegel.* Translated from 'The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences' by William Wallace (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1892).

SoEL, FPS } *G.W.F. Hegel: System of Ethical Life; First Philosophy of Spirit [1803/4].* Translated by H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox (Albany, 1979).

F&K = *G.W.F. Hegel: Faith & Knowledge.* Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany, 1977).

HSH = *G.W.F. Hegel: The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy.* Translated by H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, 1977).

HL = *G.W.F. Hegel: The Letters.* Translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, with a commentary by Clark Butler (Bloomington, 1984).

MJP = Michael John Petry (Ed.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.* 3 vols. (London, 1970).

LPR = *G.W.F. Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.* Translated by E.B. Speirs and J.B. Sanderson. 3 vols. (London, 1895).

LHP = *G.W.F. Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Translated by E.S. Haldane & F. Simson. 3 vols. (London, 1892–1896).

(B) *Editions of the Scottish Enlightenment Authors:*

DHH = Duncan Forbes (Ed.), *Hume: History of Great Britain*. The Reigns of James I and Charles I (Harmondsworth, 1970). Our references to Duncan Forbes's introduction are distinguished from those to the main text, by using Roman page numbers for the former.

DHH2 = *David Hume: The History of England, From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688* (London, 1824).

DHW = T.H. Green & T.H. Grose (Eds.), *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*. In 4 vols. (London, 1882) = [Reprint: Aalen, 1964].
- Vol. I contains "A Treatise on Human Nature" Part I
- Vol. II contains Part II of "A Treatise . . ." and "The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion".
- Vol. III contains "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary I"
- Vol. IV contains "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary II"

SGE = *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith* In VI vols. (Oxford, 1976 ff.)
- Vol. I : Ed. by D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976) contains *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.
- Vol. II : Ed. by R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner; textual editor W.B. Todd. In 2 parts (Oxford, 1976) contains *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*.
- Vol. III : Ed. by W.P.D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce, and I.S. Ross (Oxford, 1980) contains *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, Miscellaneous Pieces, and Dugald Stewart's "Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith" [1794].
- Vol. IV : Edited by J.C. Bryce (Oxford, 1983) contains *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (plus: 'Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages').
- Vol. V : Ed. by R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein (Oxford, 1978) contains *Lectures on Jurisprudence*.
- Vol. VI : Ed. by E.C. Mossner & I.S. Ross (Oxford, 1977) contains *Correspondence of Adam Smith*.

SJS = A.S. Skinner (Ed.), *Sir James Steuart: An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy* In 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1966).

SJSW = *The Works, Political, Metaphysical, And Chronological, of Sir James Steuart*. Ed. by his son: General Sir James Steuart. In 6 vols. (London, 1805).
- Vols. I-IV : An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy.
- Vol. V : (a) The Principles of Money Applied to the Present State of the Coin of Bengal [1772]
  - (b) A Dissertation upon the Doctrine and Principles of Money, applied to the German Coin [1761]
  - (c) Considerations on the Interest of the County of Lanark in Scotland [1769]
  - (d) A Dissertation on the Policy of Grain [1759]
  - (e) Various minor pieces.

Vol. VI : (a) Observations on Dr. Beattie's 'Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth' [1775]
(b) Critical Remarks and General Observations upon Mirabaud's 'System of Nature' [1779]
(c) Dissertation Concerning the Motive of Obedience to the Laws of God [1779]
(d) Various chronological dissertations
(e) Anecdotes of the Life of Sir James Steuart.

AF1 = Duncan Forbes (Ed.), *Adam Ferguson: An Essay on the History of Civil Society* [1767] (Edinburgh, 1966). Roman page numbers refer to Duncan Forbes's introduction.

AF2 = Adam Ferguson, *Institutes of Moral Philosophy* [Edinburgh, 2nd ed., 1773] = Reprint (New York, 1978).

DSt = *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*. Edited by Sir William Hamilton. In XI vols. (Edinburgh, 1854–60).

Vol. I : Dissertation, exhibiting a general view of the progress of metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy, since the revival of letters in Europe.
Vol. II–IV : Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.
Vol. V : Philosophical Essays.
Vol. VI+VII : Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers.
Vol. VIII+IX : Lectures on Political Economy
Vol. X : Biographical Memoirs of Smith, Robertson, Reid.
Vol. XI : Supplementary volume which contains translations of quotations in foreign languages and a general index.

(C) *Abbreviations of some Journals which have been used frequently:*

ADB = *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. Edited by Friedrich Nicolai (Berlin & Stettin, 1765–1796).

GGA = *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*.
Vol. I-CCXIV (Göttingen, 1753–1801).
[Since 1802, the title has been: *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* (Göttingen, 1802 ff).

HS = *Hegel-Studien*. Edited by F. Nicolin & Otto Poggeler (Bonn, 1961 ff).

HSBh = *Hegel-Studien: Beihefte*. Edited by F. Nicolin and Otto Poggeler (Bonn, 1964 ff).

JHI = *The Journal of the History of Ideas* (New York, 1940 ff). Now edited by P.P. Wiener.

SJPE = *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* (Edinburgh, 1954 ff). Now edited by L.C. Hunter.

(II) SECONDARY LITERATURE:

Anon., *Abriß des gegenwärtigen Zustandes von Großbritannien* (Copenhagen, 1767).

Anon., "Sir James Steuart: An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy" (Review), In: *The Critical Review*. Vols. 23 & 24 (1767) pp. 321–329, 411–416, 24–32.

Anon., *Beschreibung der hohen Karls-Schule zu Stuttgart* (Stuttgart, 1783).

Anon., *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de Tschougg* (Berne, 1880).
Anon., *Verzeichnis der von dem Professor Herrn Dr. Hegel und dem Dr. Herrn Seebeck hinterlassenen Bücher-Sammlungen* (Berlin, 1832).
Alfvén, Hannes and Arrhenius, Gustaf, *Evolution of the Solar System* (Washington, D.C., 1976).
Archenholtz, Heinrich Wilhelm von, "Gedanken über die Journallectüre" In: *Neue Literatur und Völkerkunde*. Vol. II (1788) pp. 3–9.
Aristotle, *Nicomachische Ethik*. Ed. by F. Dirlmaier (Berlin, 2nd edition, 1960).
[Arnold, Matthew], *The Poems of Matthew Arnold*. Ed. by K. & A. Allot (London & New York, 1979).
Armbruster, J.M. (Ed.), *Schwäbisches Museum*. 2 vols. (Kempten, 1785–1786).
Ast, D.F., *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 2nd edition, 1825).
Avineri, Shlomo, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge, 1972).
Babington, Thomas, Baron Macaulay, *The History of England*. 8 vols. (London, 1858–62).
Barnes, H.E., "Sociology before Comte" In: *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. XXIII (1917) pp. 174–247.
Baum, G., *Vernunft und Erkenntnis* (Bonn, 1969).
Baumgardt, David, *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik* (Leipzig, 1933).
Beck, Heinrich, *Der Akt-Charakter des Seins* (München, 1965).
Becker, E.D. and Dehn, M. (Eds.), *Literarisches Leben* (Hamburg, 1968).
Berry, Christopher, "Property and Possession: Two Replies to Locke – Hume and Hegel", In: *Property*. Ed. by J. Pennock & J. Chapman (New York, 1980) pp. 89–100.
Beutler, J.H.C. and Guts-Muths, J.C.F. (Eds.), *Allgemeines Sachregister über die wichtigsten deutschen Zeit- und Wochenschriften* (Leipzig, 1790).
Bienenstock, Myriam, "Hegel at Jena: Nationalism or Historical Thought?", In: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. Vol. LXI, 2 (1979) pp. 175–195.
Bienenstock, Myriam, "'Macht' and 'Geist' in Hegel's Jena Writings", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. 18 (1983) pp. 139–172.
Bienenstock, Myriam, "Hegel's Jena Writings: Recent Trends in Research", In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*. No. 11 (Spring/Summer 1985) pp. 7–15.
Binder, Julius, *Die Gerechtigkeit als Lebensprinzip des Staates* (Langensalza, 1926).
Blinn, Hansjürgen (Ed.), *Shakespeare-Rezeption* (Berlin, 1982).
Bloch, Ernst, *Naturrecht und menschliche Würde* (Frankfurt a.M., 1961).
Bloch, Ernst, *Subjekt – Objekt* (Leipzig, 1951); 3rd edition: (Frankfurt a.M., 1972).
Böhme, H. *Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a.M., 1968).
Boek, A.F. *Geschichte der Herzöglich Wirtenbergischen Eberhard Carls Universität zu Tübingen im Grundrisse* (Tübingen, 1774).
Bonnell, K. Ed., *Friedrichs des Großen Verhältniß zu Garve und dessen Übersetzung der Schrift Ciceros von den Pflichten nebst einer Betrachtung über das Verhalten der Schule gegen die Übersetzung der alten Classiker* (Berlin, 1855).
Brann, H.W., *Rousseaus Einfluß auf die Hegelsche Staatsphilosophie in ihrer Entwicklung und Vollendung* (Berlin, 1926).
Brecht, Martin and Sandberger, Jörg, "Hegels Begegnung mit der Theologie im Tubinger Stift", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. V (1969) pp. 47–81.
Brinton, Crane, *The Enlightenment 1687–1776* (London & New York, 1966).
Bruaire, C., *Logique et religion chretienne dans la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris, 1965).
Bryson, Gladys, *Man and Society* (Princeton, 1945).

Bucher, T.G., "Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen zu Hegels Planetenschrift", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XVIII (1984) pp. 65–137.
Buchwald, Reinhard, *Schiller – Sein Leben und Werk* (Wiesbaden, 4th edition, 1959); 5th edition: (Wiesbaden, 1966).
Buckle, H.T., *The History of Civilization in England*. 2 vols. (London, 1857–61).
Buhle, J.G., *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. 6 vols. (Göttingen, 1800–1804).
Buhr, M. & Oisermann, T.I. (Eds.), *Vom Mute des Erkennens* (Frankfurt, 1981).
Butler, Clark, "Hegel's Fragments of Historical Studies", In: *Clio*. Vol. VII (1977) pp. 113–134.
Campbell, R.H., *Carron Company* (Edinburgh, 1961).
Campbell, R.H., *Scotland since 1707* (Oxford, 1965).
Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S., (Eds.), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1982).
Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S., *Adam Smith* (London & New York, 1982).
Campbell, T.D., *Adam Smith's Science of Morals* (London, 1971).
Camerer, J.W., *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Stuttgarter Gymnasiums* (Stuttgart, 1834).
Capek, M., "Hegel and the Organic View of Matter", In: *Hegel and the Sciences*. Ed. by R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, 1984) pp. 109–121.
Capaldi, Nicholas, *David Hume* (Boston, 1975).
Carlyle, Alexander, *Autobiography* (Edinburgh, 1860).
Cassirer, Ernst, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1951).
Chamley, Paul, *Economie Politique et Philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel* (Paris, 1963).
Chamley, Paul, "Les Origines de la Pensée Économique de Hegel", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. III (1965) pp. 225-261.
Chamley, Paul, "La Doctrine Economique de Hegel et la Conception Hégélienne du Travail", In: *Hegel-Studien. Beiheft 4* (Bonn, 1969) pp. 147–159.
Chapelle, A., *Hegel et la Religion* 2 vols. (Paris, 1964–1971).
Chitnis, A.C., *The Scottish Enlightenment* (London, 1976).
Closs, Otto, *Kepler und Newton und das Problem der Gravitation in der Kantischen, Schellingschen und Hegelschen Naturphilosophie* (Heidelberg, 1908).
Cohen, R.S. and Wartofsky, M.W., (Eds.), *Hegel and the Sciences* (Dordrecht, 1984).
Coletti, Lucio, *Ideologia e Società* (Bari, 3rd edition, 1972).
Cornehl, Peter, *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung* (Göttingen, 1971).
Cullen, Bernard, *Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy* (Dublin, 1979).
Davie, George Elder, *The Democratic Intellect* (Edinburgh, 1961).
Davie, George Elder, "Berkeley's Impact on Scottish Philosophers", In: *Philosophy*. Vol. XL (1965) pp. 222–234.
Davie, George Elder, "Anglophobe and Anglophil", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 291–302.
Davie, George Elder, "Hume, Reid, and the Passion of Ideas", In: *Edinburgh in the Age of Reason* (Edinburgh, 1967) pp. 23–39.
Davie, George Elder, *The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense* (Dundee, 1973).
Davie, George Elder, "Edmund Husserl and 'the as yet, in its most important respect, unrecognized greatness of Hume'", In: *David Hume. Bicentenary Papers*. Ed. by G.P. Morice (Edinburgh, 1977) pp. 69–76.
Davie, George Elder, "Berkeley, Hume and the Central Problem of Scottish Philosophy", In: *McGill Hume Studies*. Ed. by D.F Norton et al. (San Diego, 1979) pp. 43–62.
Davie, George Elder, *The Scottish Enlightenment* (London, 1981).

Diderot, Denis and d'Alembert, Jean (Eds.), *Encyclopédie*. 17 vols. (Paris, 1751–65).
Dilthey, Wilhelm, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (Berlin, 1905); 5th edition: (Göttingen & Stuttgart, 1974).
Dubsky, Ivan, *Hegels Arbeitsbegriff und die idealistische Dialektik* (Prag, 1961).
Düsing, Klaus, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik* (Bonn, 1976).
Düsing, Klaus, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Darmstadt, 1983).
Düsing, Klaus, "Politische Ethik bei Plato und Hegel", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XIX (1984) pp. 95–145.
Emmel, H., "Gemüt", In: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. 10 vols. Ed. K. Gründer & Joachim Ritter. Vol. III (Basel & Stuttgart, 1971) pp. 258–262.
Enzensberger, H.M. (Ed.), *Gespräche mit Marx und Engels* (Frankfurt a.M., 1973).
Eyck, Erich, *Pitt versus Fox, Father and Son, 1735–1806*. Translated by Eric Nortcott (London, 1950).
Fackenheim, E.L., *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (London, 1967).
Falkenheim, Hugo, "Eine unbekannte politische Druckschrift Hegels" *Preußische Jahrbücher*. Vol. CXXXVIII (1909) pp. 193–210.
Fambach, Oscar, *Die Mitarbeiter der Göttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen, 1769–1836* (Tübingen, 1976).
Feilbogen, Sigmund, "James Steuart und Adam Smith", In: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. Vol. XLV (1889) pp. 218–260.
Ferguson, William, *History of Scotland, 1689–today* (Edinburgh, 1968).
Fetscher, Iring, "Zur Aktualität der politischen Philosophie Hegels", In: *Hegel-Bilanz*. Ed. by Reinhard Heede & Joachim Ritter (Frankfurt a.M., 1973) pp. 193–213.
Findlay, J.N., *Hegel – A Re-Examination* (London, 1958).
Fischer, Kuno, *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre* (Heidelberg, 1901); 3rd edition: (Heidelberg, 1963).
Foley, Vernard, *The Social Physics of Adam Smith* (West Lafayette, 1976).
Forbes, Duncan, *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History* (Cambridge, 1952).
Forbes, Duncan, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott", In: *The Cambridge Journal*. Vol. VII (1953/54) pp. 20–35.
Forbes, Duncan, "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar", In: *The Cambridge Journal*. Vol. VII (1953/54) pp. 643–670.
Forbes, Duncan, "Hegel's Theory of the State" (Review of Avineri), In: *Cambridge Review*. March 1973, pp. 120–122.
Forbes, Duncan, "Sceptical Whiggism, Commerce, and Liberty", In: *Essays on Adam Smith*. Ed. by A.S. Skinner & T.S. Wilson (Oxford, 1975) pp. 179–201.
Forbes, Duncan, *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge, 1975).
Forbes, Duncan, "Hume's Science of Politics", In: *David Hume. Bicentenary Papers*. Ed. by G.P. Morice (Edinburgh, 1977) pp. 39–50.
Forbes, Duncan, "Judith N. Shklar: 'Freedom and Independence'" (Review), *Clio*. Vol. VII:3 (1978) pp. 514–516.
Forbes, Duncan, "Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment", In: *Philosophers of the Enlightenment*. Ed. by S.C. Brown (Brighton, 1979) pp. 94–109.
Forbes, Duncan, "Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment", In: *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. by R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner (Edinburgh, 1982) pp. 186–204.
Foster, M.B., *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford, 1935).
[Fox, Charles James], *The Speeches of the Right Honourable Charles James Fox in the House of Commons*. 6 vols. (London, 1815).

Fritz, P. and Williams, D. (Eds.), *City and Society in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto, 1973).

Fulda, H.F., *Das Recht der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt a.M., 1968).

Gadamer, H.G., *Das Erbe Hegels* (Frankfurt, 1979).

Gans, Eduard, "Nekrolog von G.W.F. Hegel", In: *Vermischte Schriften*. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1834) Vol. II, pp. 242–252. Reprinted from: *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung* (1. Dezember 1831).

Garve, Christian, *De ratione scribendi historiam philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1768) – Translated into German by G.G. Fülleborn, In: *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*. Part IX (1798) pp. 148–163.

Garve, Christian, "Versuch über die Prüfung der Fähigkeiten", In: *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste*. Vol. VIII (1769) pp. 1–44, 201–231.

Garve, Christian, "Betrachtung einiger Verschiedenheiten in den Werken der ältesten und neuern Schriftsteller, besonders der Dichter", In: *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste*. Vol. X (1770) pp. 1–37, 189–210.

Garve, Christian, *Sammlung einiger Abhandlungen aus der Neuen Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* (Leipzig, 1779).

Garve, Christian, *Abhandlug über die menschlichen Pflichten*. [A German translation of Cicero's "De Officiis"] (Breslau, 1783).

Garve, Christian, *Übersicht der vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre* (Breslau, 1798).

Garve, Christian, *Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Literatur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben*. 5 vols. (Breslau, 1792–1802).

Garve, Christian, *Sämtliche Werke*. 18 vols. (Breslau, 1801–1804).

[Garve, Christian] *Christian Garve's Briefe an seine Mutter*. Ed. by Adolf Menzel (Breslau, 1830).

Garve, Christian, *Popularphilosophische Schriften*. 2 vols. Ed. by Kurt Wölfel (Stuttgart, 1974).

Gay, Peter, *The Enlightenment – An Interpretation*. 2 vols. (London, 2nd edition, 1973).

Gebhardt, Jürgen (Ed.), *Die Revolution des Geistes* (München, 1968).

Gethmann-Siefert, Annemarie, "Hegel-Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe", In: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*. Vol. XXX (1976) pp. 609–618.

Glockner, Hermann, *Hegel*. 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1929–1940).

Göhler, Gerhard (Ed.), *Hegels frühe politische Systeme. Texte und Kommentar* (Frankfurt, 1974).

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, *Faust* (Leipzig, 1790).

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, "Einleitung zu Thomas Carlyle: 'Das Leben Schillers'", In: *Goethes Werke*. 12 vols. Ed. by Heinrich Kurz (Leipzig & Wien, n.d.).

Goldberg, M.A., *Smollet and the Scottish School* (Albuquerque, 1959).

Goldstein, Ludwig, *Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Aesthetik* (Königsberg, 1904).

Gottsched, Johann Christian (Ed.), *Beyträge zur critischen Historie der deutschen Sprache, Poesie und Beredsamkeit*. 8 vols. (Leipzig, 1732–1744).

Graham, H.G., *Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1901).

Graul, Hugo, *Das Eindringen der Smith'schen Nationalökonomie in Deutschland und ihre Weiterentwicklung bis zu Hermann* (Halle/Saale, 1928).

Greig, J.Y.T. (Ed.), *The Letters of David Hume*. 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932).

Gründer, Karlfried, "Diskussionsbeitrag zu Karl Löwiths Referat", In: *Hegel-Bilanz*. Ed. by Reinhard Heede & Joachim Ritter (Frankfurt a.M., 1973) pp. 29–30.

Haakonssen, Knud, *The Science of a Legislator* (Cambridge, 1981).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfurt a.M., 3rd edition, 1974)
Haering, Theodor, *Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk.* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1929–1938).
Hall, A.R. and M.B., "Newton's Theory of Matter", In: *Isis* (1960) pp. 131–144.
[Hamann, Johann Georg], *Hamann: Briefwechsel.* 7 vols. Ed. by W. Ziesemer and A. Henkel (Wiesbaden & Frankfurt, 1956–65).
Hanham, H.J. (Ed.), *Buckle on Scotland and the Scottish Intellect* (Chicago & London, 1970).
Harris, H.S., *Hegel's Development. Toward the Sunlight 1770–1801* (Oxford, 1972).
Harris, H.S., "The Social Ideal of Hegel's Economic Thought", In: *Hegel's Philosophy of Action.* Ed. by L.S. Stepelevich and David Lamb (Atlantic Highlands N.J., 1983) pp. 49–74.
Harris, H.S., *Hegel's Development. Night Thoughts (Jena 1801–1806)* (Oxford, 1983).
Hasek, C.W., *The Introduction of Adam Smith's Doctrines into Germany* (New York, 1925).
Hasler, Ludwig, "Aus Hegels philosophischer Berner Zeit", In: *Hegel-Studien.* Vol. XI (1976) pp. 205–211.
Haug, Balthasar, *Das gelehrte Wirtenberg* (Stuttgart, 1790).
Haym, Rudolf, *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Berlin, 1857).
Heckmann, R., Krings, H., and Meyer, R.W., (Eds.), *Natur und Subjektivität* (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1985).
Helferich, Christoph, *G.W.Fr. Hegel* (Stuttgart, 1979).
Henrich, Dieter, "Hutcheson und Kant", In: *Kant-Studien.* Vol. IL (1957/58) pp. 49–69.
Henrich, Dieter, "Leutwein über Hegel. Ein Dokument zu Hegels Biographie" In: *Hegel-Studien.* Vol. III (1965) pp. 39–77.
Henrich, Dieter (Ed.), *Kant. Gentz. Rehberg. Uber Theorie und Praxis.* (Frankfurt, 1967).
Henrich, Dieter and Horstmann, R.-P. (Eds.), *Hegels Philosophie des Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1982).
Herder, J.G., *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit.* Ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Frankfurt a.M., 1967).
[Herder, J.G.] *Herders Sämtliche Werke.* Ed. by Bernhard Suphan. 33 in 25 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913).
Hirschmann, A.O., *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, 1977).
Hirzel, Carl, *Gesetze für die Mittel- und Fachschulen* (Tübingen, 1847).
Hocevar, R.K., *Hegel und der Preußische Staat* (München, 1973).
Höhne, Horst, "Hegel und England", In: *Kant-Studien.* Vol. XXXVI (1931) pp. 301–326.
Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff, M. (Eds.), *Wealth and Virtue* (Cambridge, 1983).
Ilting, K.H., "Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik", In: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch.* Vol. LXXI (1963/64) pp. 38–58.
Iselin, Isaak, *Philosophische Mutmassungen über die Geschichte der Menschheit.* 2 vols. (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1764).
Jacob, L.H., *Grundsätze der Nationalökonomie* (Halle, 3rd edition, 1825).
Jacobi, F.H., *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus* (Breslau, 1787).
Jacobi, F.H., *Woldemar* (Flensburg & Leipzig, 1779); 2nd edition: (Leipzig, 1820).
[Jacobi, F.H.] *Jacobis Werke.* 6 vols. Ed. by F. Roth & F. Köppen (Leipzig, 1812–1825).
Jacobi, F.H., *Eduard Allwills Papiere.* Ed. by Heinz Nicolai (Stuttgart, 1962).
Jacoby, D., "Christian Garve", In: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie.* Vol. VI (Leipzig, 1878) pp. 385–392.
Jacoby, D., "Schiller und Garve", In: *Archiv für Literaturgeschichte.* Vol. VII (1878) pp. 95–145.

Jacoby, D., "Schiller und Garve", In: *Euphorion*. Vol. XII (1905) pp. 262–271.
Jamme, Christoph, "Hegel als Leser Johannes von Müllers", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. 16 (1981) pp. 9–40.
Jamme, Chr. and Pöggeler, Otto (Eds.), *Homburg vor der Höhe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1981).
Jensen, H., *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson* (The Hague, 1971).
Jessen, Hans, "Der Philosoph Christian Garve und der König", In: *Schlesien*. Vol. VIII (1963) pp. 89–90.
Jessop, T.E. (Ed.), *A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour* (London, 1938).
Jessop, T.E., "Some Misunderstandings of Hume", In: *Hume*. Ed. by V.C. Chappell (London, 1968) pp. 35–52.
Johnson, E.A.J., *Predecessors of Adam Smith* (New York, 2nd edition, 1960).
Kaltenbrunner, G.K. (Ed.), *Hegel und die Folgen* (Freiburg, 1970).
Kames, Henry Home of, *The Progress of Flax-husbandry in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1766).
Kames, Henry Home of, *The Gentleman Farmer* (Edinburgh, 1776).
Kant, Immanuel, *Gesammelte Schriften*. Ed. by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 23 vols. (Berlin, 1900–1955).
[Kant, Immanuel] *Briefe von und an Kant*. 2 vols. Ed. by Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, 1918–1921).
[Kant, Immanuel] *Kant's Political Writings*. Ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge, 1977).
Kaufmann, Walter (Ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (New York, 1970).
Kempski, Jürgen von, *Brechungen* (Hamburg, 1964).
Kenyon, J.P., *The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688* (Cambridge, 1966).
Kiesewetter, H., *Von Hegel zu Hitler* (Hamburg, 1974).
Kimmerle, Heinz, "Zur theologischen Hegelinterpretation", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. III (1965) pp. 356–369.
Kimmerle, Heinz, "Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–1807)", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. IV (1967) pp. 21–100.
Kimmerle, Heinz, "Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. IV (1967) pp. 125–176.
Kimmerle, Heinz, "Zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie", In: *Philosophische Rundschau*. Vol. XV (1968) pp. 111–135.
Kimmerle, Heinz, *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens* (Bonn, 1970).
Kirchner, Joachim, *Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen* (Wiesbaden, 2nd edition, 1962).
Kirchner, Joachim, *Die Zeitschriften des Deutschen Sprachgebietes von den Anfängen bis 1830* (Stuttgart, 1969).
Klaiber, Julius, *Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling in ihren schwäbischen Jugendjahren* (Stuttgart, 1877).
Klüpfel, Karl, *Geschichte und Beschreibung der Universität Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1849).
Kroner, Richard, *Von Kant bis Hegel*. 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1921–1924).
Krüger, H.J., *Theologie und Aufklärung* (Stuttgart, 1966).
Küng, Hans, *Menschwerdung Gottes* (Freiburg, Basel and Wien, 1970).
Kugler, Bernhard, "Die Jubilaen der Universität Tübingen nach handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt", In: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universitat Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1877).
Lacorte, Carmelo, *Il Primo Hegel* (Firenze, 1959).
Lakebrink, Bernhard, "Geist und Arbeit im Denken Hegels", In: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*. Vol. LXX (1962/63) pp. 98–108.
Lauer, Quentin, *Hegel's Concept of God* (Albany, 1982).
Lehmann, Hermann et al., *Grundlinien des ökonomischen Denkens in Deutschland* (Berlin-Ost, 1977).

Lehmann, W.C., *Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology* (Chicago, 1930).
Lenz, J.M.R., "Anmerkungen übers Theater", In: *Shakespeare-Rezeption*. Ed. by H. Blinn (Berlin, 1982) pp. 122–143.
Léonhard, A., *La foi chez Hegel* (Paris, 1965).
Lessing, G.E., *Laokoon oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie* (Berlin, 1766).
Lessing, G.E., *Nathan the Wise*. Translated by William Jacks (Glasgow, 1894).
[Lessing, G.E.] *Lessings Werke*. Ed. by Julius Petersen and W. v. Olshausen. 25 vols. (Berlin, 1925–1935).
Lessing, G.E., *Nathan der Weise*. Ed. by E.H. Hutton (London, 1962).
[Lessing, G.E.] *Lessings Briefe*. Ed. by Herbert Greiner-Mai (Berlin & Weimar, 1967).
[Lessing, G.E.] *Lessings Werke*. 5 vols. Ed. by Karl Balser & Heinz Stolpe (Berlin & Weimar, 6th edition, 1971).
Leube, Martin, *Das Tübinger Stift, 1770–1950* (Stuttgart, 1954).
Leutwein, C.P.F., "Über Hegels Stift-Zeit", In: *Jahrbücher der Gegenwart* (1844) pp. 675–678.
Liebmann, O., "W.G. Tennemann", In: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. XXXVII (Leipzig, 1894) pp. 566–567.
Lim, Sok-Zin, *Der Begriff der Arbeit bei Hegel* (Bonn, 2nd edition, 1966).
Löwith, Karl, "Aktualität und Inaktualität Hegels", In: *Hegel-Bilanz*. Ed. R. Heede & J. Ritter (Frankfurt a.M., 1973) pp. 1–24.
Lucas, Hans-Christian, *Wirklichkeit und Methode in der Philosophie Hegels* (Köln, 1974).
Lucas, Hans-Christian, "Das Entstehen der 'Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik'. Die Rezension der Werke Hamanns", In: *Hegel in Berlin*. Ed. by Otto Pöggeler (Wiesbaden, 1981) pp. 104–112.
Lucas, Hans-Christian, "Shakespeare", In: *Hegel in Berlin*. Ed. by Otto Pöggeler (Wiesbaden, 181) pp. 246–253.
Lucas, Hans-Christian, *Spinoza in Hegels Logik*. Mededelingen XLV vanwege het Spinozahuis (Leiden, 1982).
Lucas, Hans-Christian, "'Sehnsucht nach einem reineren, freieren Zustande.' Hegel und der württembergische Verfassungsstreit", In: *"Frankfurt aber ist der Nabel dieser Erde". Das Schicksal einer Generation der Goethezeit*. Ed. by Christoph Jamme & Otto Pöggeler (Stuttgart, 1983) pp. 73–103.
Lucas, Hans-Christian, "Altes und Neues zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XX (1985) pp. 291–302.
Lucas, Hans-Christian, "La Historia universal como Juicio universal", In: M. Foucault, H.-C. Lucas y otros, *La crísis de la razón* (Murcia, 1986) pp. 25–45; German version: "Die Weltgeschichte als das Weltgericht. Zur Modifikation von Hegels Geschichtsbegriff in Heidelberg", In: *Hegel-Jahrbuch 1982* (Roma, 1986) pp. 82–96.
Lucas, Hans-Christian and Rameil, U., "Furcht vor der Zensur? Zur Entstehungs- und Druckgeschichte von Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XV (1980) pp. 63–93.
Lucas, Hans-Christian and Pöggeler, Otto (Eds.), *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1986).
Lukács, Georg, *Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft* (Zürich, 1948); 3rd edition in 2 vols.: (Frankfurt a.M., 1973).
Macfie, A.L., "The Scottish Tradition in Economic Thought", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. II (1955) pp. 81–103.
MacLaurin, Colin, *Expositionae philosophiae Newtoniae* (Vindobonae, 1761).

Macnabb, D.G.C., *David Hume. His Theory of Knowledge and Morality* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1966).
Marcuse, Herbert, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, 1941).
Marsch, W.D., *Gegenwart Christi in der Gesellschaft* (München, 1965).
[Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich], *Marx-Engels Werke*. Ed. by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism. 39 plus 2 supplementary vols. (Berlin-Ost, 1956–68).
[Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich], *Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels: Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. Ed. by D. Riazanov. Vol. III (1932).
McCosh, James, *The Scottish Philosophy* (London, 1875).
Medick, Hans, *Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Göttingen, 2nd edition, 1981).
Meek, R.L., *Economics and Ideology and other Essays* (London, 1967).
Meek, R.L., *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge, 1976).
Menz, Gerhard, *Die Zeitschrift* (Stuttgart, 1928).
Meusel, Johann Georg, *Lexikon der teutschen Schriftsteller*. 15 vols. (Leipzig, 1802–16).
Michelet, Carl Ludwig, *Naturrecht und Rechtsphilosophie als die praktische Philosophie enthaltend Rechts-, Sitten-, und Gesellschaftslehre*. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1866).
Millar, John, *An Historical View of the English Government*. 4 vols. (London, 1803).
Mizuta, Hiroshi, "Moral Philosophy and Civil Society", In: *Essays on Adam Smith*. Ed. by A.S. Skinner and T. Wilson (Oxford, 1975) pp. 114–131.
Mizuta, Hiroshi (Ed.), *Adam Smith's Library* (Cambridge, 1967).
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat et de, *De l'Esprit des Loix* (Genève, 1748).
Morrow, Glenn R., *The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith* (New York, 1969).
Muncker, Franz, "Joh. N. Meinhard", In: *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. XXI (Leipzig, 1885) pp. 232–234.
Myrdal, Gunnar, *Das politische Element in der nationalökonomischen Doktrinbildung* (Hannover, 2nd edition, 1963).
Naniwada, Haruo, "Smith – Hegel – Marx", In: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. Vol. CXI (1955) pp. 397–417.
Negt, Oskar (Ed.), *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels* (Frankfurt a.M., 1970).
Neuser, Wolfgang, "Metaphysik in den Naturwissenschaften", In: *Natur und Subjektivität*. Ed. by R. Heckmann et al. (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1985) pp. 357–365.
Newton, Isaac, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (London, 1687); 2nd edition: (Amsterdam, 1714).
Newton, Isaac, *Opticks, Or a Treatise of the Reflections, Inflection and Colours of Light* (London, 1704).
Newton, Isaac, *Optice* (London, 1719).
Nicolin, Friedhelm, *Der junge Hegel in Stuttgart* (Stuttgart, 1970).
Nicolin, Friedhelm, "Welche Shakespeare-Ausgabe besaß Hegel?", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XIX (1984) pp. 305–311.
Norton, D.F. et al. (Eds.), *McGill Hume Studies* (San Diego, 1979).
Noxon, James, *Hume's Philosophical Development* (Oxford, 2nd edition, 1975).
Oelmüller, Willi, *Die unbefriedigte Aufklärung* (Frankfurt a.M., 1979).
Oeser, Erhard, "Der Gegensatz von Kepler und Newton in Hegels absoluter Mechanik", In: *Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie*. Vol. III (1979) pp. 69–93.
Olson, Richard, *Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750–1880* (Oxford, 1975).
Ost, Günther, *Friedrich Nicolais Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* (Berlin, 1928).

Ottmann, Henning, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel* (Berlin and New York, 1977).
Palyi, Melchior (Ed.), *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie* (München and Leipzig, 1923).
Palyi, Melchior, "The Introduction of Adam Smith on the Continent", In: *Adam Smith, 1776–1926*. Ed. by J.M. Clark et al. (Chicago, 1928) pp. 180–233.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart, "Die Bedeutung des Christentums in der Philosophie Hegels", In: *Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970*. Ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Bonn, 1974) pp. 175–202.
Paolucci, Henry, "Hegel and the Celestial Mechanics of Newton and Einstein", In: *Hegel and the Sciences*. Ed. by R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht, 1984) pp. 55–85.
Parthey, G.C.F., *Die Mitarbeiter an Friedrich Nicolai's Allgemeiner Deutscher Bibliothek nach ihren Namen und Zeichen in zwei Registern geordnet* (Berlin, 1842).
Pascal, Roy, "Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century", In: *The Modern Quarterly*. Vol. I (1938) pp. 167–179.
Pascal, Roy, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School", In: *Publications of the English Goethe Society*. New Series: Vol. XIV (1939) pp. 23–42.
Pascal, Roy, "'Bildung' and the Division of Labour", In: *German Studies. Essays in Honour of W.H. Bruford* (London, 1962) pp. 14–28.
Passmore, John, *Hume's Intentions* (Cambridge, 1952).
Paulsen, Friedrich, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten* (Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1897).
Paulus, H.E.G., *Entdeckungen über die Entdeckungen der neuesten Philosophen* (Bremen, 1835).
Pelczynski, Z.A. (Ed.), *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1971).
Petry, Michael John, "Hegel and the 'Morning Chronicle' ", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XI (1976) pp. 11–80.
Petry, Michael John, "Hegels kritiek op Newton", In: *Wijsgerig Perspectief*. Vol. XXII (1981/82) pp. 103–112.
Petry, Michael John, "Hegel's Criticism of Newton", In: *Clio*. Vol. XIII, 4 (1984) pp. 331–348.
Piazzi, Giuseppe, *Risultati delle osserazioni della nuova stella scoperta il primo gennajo 1801* (Palermo, 1801).
Piazzi, Giuseppe, *Della Scoperta del nuova pianeta Cerrere Ferdinandae* (Palermo, 1802).
Pinkuss, Fritz, "Moses Mendelssohn Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie", In: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Goerres Gesellschaft*. Vol. XLII (1929) pp. 449–490.
Piper, W.B., "Kant's Contact with British Empiricism", In: *Eighteenth-Century Studies*. Vol. XII (1978/79) pp. 174–189.
Plant, Raymond, *Hegel* (London, 1973).
Plant, Raymond, "Hegel and Political Economy", In: *New Left Review*. Nos. 103 & 104 (May & July 1977) pp. 79–92, 103–113.
Plant, Raymond, "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy", In: *Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy*. Ed. by D.P. Verene (Atlantic Highlands N.J. & Brighton, 1980) pp. 59–90.
Pöggeler, Otto, "Hegel als Verfasser des ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus", In: *Hegel-Studien. Beiheft 4* (1968) pp. 17–32.
Pöggeler, Otto, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg & München, 1973).
Pöggeler, Otto, "Comment on Avineri's 'Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's Realphilosophie' ", In: *The Legacy of Hegel*. Ed. by J.J. O'Malley et al. (The Hague, 1973) pp. 216–219.
Pöggeler, Otto, "Hegels praktische Philosophie in Frankfurt", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. IX (1974) pp. 73–107.

Pöggeler, Otto, "Perspektiven der Hegel-Forschung", In: *Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970*. Ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer (Bonn, 1974) pp. 79–102.
Pöggeler, Otto, "Hegels Option für Österreich. Die Konzeption korporativer Repräsentation", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XII (1977) pp. 38–128.
Pöggeler, Otto (Ed.), *Hegel*. (Freiburg and München, 1977).
Pöggeler, Otto, "Hegel et Machiavel. Renaissance italienne et idéalisme allemand", In: *Archives de Philosophie*. Vol. XLI (1978) pp. 435–467.
Pöggeler, Otto (Ed.), *Hegel in Berlin*. (Wiesbaden, 1981).
Pöggeler, Otto, "Der junge Hegel und die Lehre vom weltgeschichtlichen Individuum", In: *Hegels Philosophie des Rechts*. Ed. by Dieter Henrich and R.-P. Horstmann (Stuttgart, 1982) pp. 17–37.
Pütter, J.St., *Versuch einer akademischen Gelehrten-Geschichte von der Georg-Augustus Universität zu Göttingen*. 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1765–1788).
Raabe, Paul, "Die Zeitschrift als Medium der Aufklärung", In: *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. I (1974) pp. 99–112.
Randall, H.W., "The Critical Theory of Lord Kames", In: *Smith College Studies in Modern Languages*. Vol. XXII (1940/41) pp. 1–143.
Randall, J.H., "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua", In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. I (1940) pp. 107–206.
Randall, J.H., *The School of Padua* (Padova, 1961).
Raphael, D.D., *The Moral Sense* (Oxford, 1947).
Rauscher, Gerhard, *Das Collegium illustre zu Tubingen und die Anfänge des Unterrichts in den neueren Fremdsprachen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Englischen (1601–1817)* (Tübingen, 1957).
Recktenwald, Horst Claus, *Adam Smith. Sein Leben und sein Werk* (München, 1976).
Rehder, Helmut, "Johann Nicolaus Meinhard und seine Übersetzungen", In: *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*. Vol. XXXVII (1953) pp. 1–95.
Reyscher, A.L. (Ed.), *Vollständige, historisch und kritisch bearbeitete Sammlung der württembergischen Gesetze*. 19 vols. (Tübingen & Stuttgart, 1828–1851).
Riedel, F.J., *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (Jena, 1767).
Riedel, Manfred, *Theorie und Praxis im Denken Hegels* (Stuttgart, 1965); 2nd edition: (Frankfurt a.M., Berlin and München, 1976).
Riedel, Manfred, *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt a.M., 1969).
Riedel, Manfred, *Burgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat* (Neuwied & Berlin, 1970).
Riedel, Manfred, *Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie*. 2 vols. Ed. by M. Riedel (Frankfurt a.M., 1975).
Ripalda, José Maria, "Poesie und Politik beim frühen Hegel", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. VIII (1973) pp. 91–118.
Ripalda, José Maria, *The Divided Nation* (Assen and Amsterdam, 1977).
Ritter, Joachim, *Hegel und die französische Revolution* (Frankfurt a.M., 2nd edition, 1972).
Ritter, Joachim, *Subjektivität* (Frankfurt a.M., 1974).
Ritter, Joachim, *Metaphysik und Politik* (Frankfurt a.M., 1977).
Ritter, Joachim and Gründer, K. (Eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Basel & Stuttgart, 1971 ff).
Ritter, Joachim and Heede, R. (Eds.), *Hegel-Bilanz* (Frankfurt a.M., 1973).
Rixner, T.A., *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. 4 vols. (Sulzbach, 2nd edition, 1829).
Robertson, William, *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V*. 4 vols. (Vienna, 1787).
Robertson, William, *History of Scotland*. 3 parts in 6 vols. (Basle, 1791).

Robertson, William, *An Historical Disquisition Concerning India* (Basle, 1792).
Robinson, H.S., *English Shakespearean Criticism in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1930).
Roethe, Gustav, "Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen", In: *Festschrift zur Feier des hundertfünfzigjährigen Bestehens der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*. 3 vols. (Berlin, 1901) Vol. III, pp. 567–688.
Rohrmoser, Günther, *Subjektivität und Verdinglichung* (Gütersloh, 1961).
Roscher, Wilhelm, "Die Ein- und Durchführung des Adam Smith'schen Systems in Deutschland", In: *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*. Vol. XIX (1867) pp. 1–74.
Roscher, Wilhelm, *Geschichte der National-Oekonomie in Deutschland* (München, 1874).
Rose, J.H., *Der jüngere Pitt*. Translated by Paul Fohr (München, n.d.).
Rosenberg, Nathan, "Adam Smith on the Division of Labour: Two Views or One?", In: *Economica*. Vol. XXXII (1965) pp. 127–139.
Rosenkranz, Karl, *Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1840).
Rosenkranz, Karl, *Kritische Erläuterungen des Hegelschen Systems* (Königsberg, 1840).
Rosenkranz, Karl, *G.W.F. Hegels Leben* (Berlin, 1844).
Rosenzweig, Franz, *Hegel und der Staat*. 2 vols. (München & Berlin, 1920).
Russel, J., "Kepler's Law of Planetary Motion, 1609–1666", In: *British Journal of the History of Science*. Vol. II (1964) pp. 1–24.
Sartorius, Georg, *Abhandlungen die Elemente des National-Reichthums und die Staatswirthschaft betreffend* (Göttingen, 1806).
Saul, Nicholas, "Novalis' 'geistige Gegenwart' and his Essay 'Die Christenheit oder Europa' ", In: *The Modern Language Review*. Vol. LXXVII, 2 (1982) pp. 361–377.
Say, J.B., *Abhandlung über die National-Oekonomie*. 2 vols. Translated by L.H. Jacob (Halle, 1807).
Schelling, F.W.J., *Philosophie der Mythologie*. 2 vols. Reprinted from the 2nd edition of 1856 (Darmstadt, 1973).
Schiller, Friedrich, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Edited and translated by E.M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby (Oxford, 1967).
Schiller, Friedrich, *Philosophische Schriften*. Ed. by Helmut Koopmann (München, 1968).
Schlichtegroll, Friedrich, "Christian Garve", In: *Nekrolog auf das Jahr 1798* (Gotha, 1803) pp. 237–298.
Schmid, C.H., *Theorie der Poesie nach den neuesten Grundsätzen und Nachricht von den besten Dichtern nach den angenommenen Urtheilen* (Leipzig, 1767).
Schmid, C.H., *Anweisung der vornehmsten Bücher in allen Theilen der Dichtkunst* (Leipzig, 1784).
Schneider, Eugen, "Das Tübinger Collegium illustre", In: *Württembergische Vierteljahreshefte für Landesgeschichte*. New Series: Vol. 7 (1898) pp. 217–245.
Schneider, Herbert W. (Ed.), *Adam Smith's Moral and Political Philosophy* (New York, 1970).
Schulz, G., "Schiller und Garve", In: *Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau*. Vol. III (1958) pp. 182–199.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., *Geschichte der ökonomischen Analyse*. 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1965).
Schwan, Alexander (Ed.), *Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus* (Darmstadt, 1975).
Schwarz, Justus, *Hegels philosophische Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1938).
Schwarz, Justus, "Dokumente zu Hegels Frühzeit. Bemerkungen anläßlich der Veröffentlichung der Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung durch J. Hoffmeister", In: *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie*. Vol. XII (1938/39) pp. 416–423.
Scott, W.R., *Francis Hutcheson* (Cambridge, 1900).

Seeberger, Wilhelm, *Hegel oder die Entwicklung des Geistes zur Freiheit* (Stuttgart, 1961).
Sen, S.R., *The Economics of Sir James Steuart* (London, 1957).
[Shakespeare, William], *Shakespeare's Works*. 8 vols. Ed. by N. Rowe (London, 1714).
[Shakespeare, William], *New Variorum Shakespeare*. Ed. by H.H. Furness Vol. XII (Philadelphia, 1899).
Shaw, L.D., "Henry Home of Kames: Precursor of Herder", In: *The Germanic Review*. Vol. XXXV (1960) pp. 16–27.
Siep, Ludwig, "Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jenaer Schriften", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. IX (1974) pp. 155–207.
Siep, Ludwig, *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie* (Freiburg & München, 1979).
Siep, Ludwig, "Hegels Theorie der Gewaltenteilung", In: *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte*. Ed. by H.-C. Lucas & Otto Pöggeler (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1986) pp. 387–420.
Skinner, A.S., "Sir James Steuart: Economics and Politics", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. IX (1962) pp. 17–37.
Skinner, A.S., "Economics and History – The Scottish Enlightenment", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. XII (1965) pp. 1–22.
Skinner, A.S., "Money and Prices. A Critique of the Quantity Theory", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. XIV (1967) pp. 275–290.
Skinner, A.S., *A System of Social Science* (Oxford, 1979).
Skinner, A.S., "Sir James Steuart: The Author of a System", In: *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*. Vol. XXVIII (1981) pp. 20–42.
Skinner, A.S. and Wilson, T. (Eds.), *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford, 1975).
Skinner, A.S. and Wilson, T. (Eds.), *The Market and the State* (Oxford, 1976).
Small, John, "Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson", In: *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*. Vol. XXIII (1864) pp. 599–665.
Smith, Adam, *Der Wohlstand der Nationen*. Translated by Horst C. Recktenwald (München, 1978).
Smith, Norman K., *The Philosophy of David Hume* (London, 1941).
Smollet, Tobias George, *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* (London, 1771).
Smout, T.C., *A History of the Scottish People 1560–1830* (Glasgow & London, 4th impression, 1972).
Snow, A.J., *Matter and Gravity in Newton's Physical Philosophy* (Oxford, 1926).
Socher, Josef, *Grundriß der Geschichte der philosophischen Systeme von den Griechen bis auf Kant* (München, 1802).
Splett, Jörg, *Die Trinitätslehre G.W.F. Hegels* (München, 1965).
Stäudlin, C.F., *Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus*. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1794).
Steinbüchel, Theodor, "Hegel und Meister Eckhart", In: *Universitas*. Vol. II (1947) pp. 1409–1423.
Steinhauer, Kurt (Ed.), *Hegel: Eine internationale Bibliographie* (München, 1980).
Stepelevich, L.S. & D. Lamb (Eds.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Action* (Atlantic Highlands N.J., 1983).
Stern, Albert, *Über die Beziehungen Christian Garves zu Kant* (Leipzig, 1884).
Stettner, W., "Sir James Steuart on the Public Debt", In: *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. LIX (1944/45) pp. 451–476.
Strahm, Hans, "Aus Hegels Berner Zeit", In: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. Vol. XLI (1932) pp. 414–533.
Sypher, Wylie, "Hutcheson and the 'Classical' Theory of Slavery", In: *Journal of Negro History*. Vol. XXIV (1939) pp. 263–280.
Taylor, Charles, *Hegel* (Cambridge, 1975).

Tennemann, W.G., *Geschichte der Philosophie*. 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819).
Tennemann, W.G., *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie für den akademischen Unterricht* (Leipzig, 1812); 3rd ed., edited by A. Wendt: (Leipzig, 1820).
Thaulow, Gustav (Ed.), *Hegels Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht* (Kiel, 1854).
Theunissen, Michael, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat* (Berlin, 1970).
Thümmel, H.W., *Die Tübinger Universitätsverfassung im Zeitalter des Absolutismus* (Tübingen, 1975).
Treder, Hans-Jürgen, "Hegel zu den Begriffen 'Schwere', 'Trägheit', 'Masse' und 'Kraft'", In: *Vom Mute des Erkennens*. Ed. by M. Buhr & T.I. Oisermann (Frankfurt, 1981) pp. 204–211.
Trescher, H., *Montesquieus Einfluß auf die philosophischen Grundlagen der Staatslehre Hegels* (Leipzig, 1920).
Vail, Curtis C.D., *Lessing's Relation to the English Language and Literature* (Columbia, 1936).
Verene, D.P. (Ed.), *Hegel's Social and Political Thought* (Atlantic Highlands N.J. & Brighton, 1980).
Vierhaus, Rudolf, "Zur historischen Deutung der Aufklärung: Probleme und Perspektiven", In: *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. IV (1977) pp. 39–54.
Viner, Jacob, "Adam Smith and Laissez Faire", In: *Adam Smith, 1776–1926*. Ed. by J.M. Clark et al. (Chicago, 1928) pp. 116–155.
Viviani, Annalisa, "Christian Garve-Bibliographie", In: *Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung*. Vol. I (1974) pp. 306–327.
Vogt, J., *Das Leben des Professors C.J. Kraus* (Königsberg, 1819).
Voltaire, F.M.A. de, *Elements de la Philosophie de Newton* (London, 1738).
Wagner, Falk, *Der Gedanke der Persönlichkeit Gottes bei Fichte und Hegel* (Gütersloh, 1971).
Waszek, Norbert, "Hegels Schottische Bettler", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XIX (1984) pp. 311–316.
Waszek, Norbert, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin", In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. XLV, 4 (1984) pp. 591–606.
Waszek, Norbert, "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Edinburgh Review'", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XX (1985) pp. 79–112.
Waszek, Norbert, "A Stage in the Development of Hegel's Theory of the Modern State: The 1802 Excerpts on Bonaparte and Fox", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XX (1985) pp. 163–172.
Waszek, Norbert, "Hegels Exzerpte aus der 'Quarterly Review'", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. XXI (1986) pp. 9–25.
Waszek, Norbert, *Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting* (Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York, 1986).
Waszek, Norbert, "Fox und Pitt – Spannungsfeld britischer Politik im Spiegel des Hegelschen Denkens", In: *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte*. Ed. by Hans-Christian Lucas & Otto Pöggeler (Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt, 1986) pp. 111–128.
Waszek, Norbert, "Die Hegelsche Schule", In: *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen*. 5 vols. Ed. by Iring Fetscher und Herfried Munkler. Vol. 4 (München and Zürich, 1986) pp. 232–245, 252–254.
Weber, C.F., *Christian Friedrich Schnurrers Leben, Charakter und Verdienste* (Kannstadt, 1823).

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (Ed.), *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte* (Köngistein/Taunus, 5th edition, 1976).
Wilhelm, Richard, *Friedrich Justus Riedel und die Ästhetik der Aufklärung* (Heidelberg, 1933).
Willburger, August, *Das Collegium illustre zu Tübingen* (Tübingen, 1912).
Winch, Donald, *Adam Smith's Politics* (Cambridge, 1978).
Winkel, Harald, *Die deutsche Nationalökonomie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1977).
Wölfel, Kurt, "Christian Garve", In: *Neue Deutsche Biographie*. Vol. VI (Berlin, 1964) pp. 77–78.
Wolffheim, Hans, *Die Entdeckung Shakespeares* (Hamburg, 1959).
Württembergische Kommission fur Landesgeschichte (Ed.), *Geschichte des Humanistischen Schulwesens in Württemberg* (Stuttgart, 1927).
Zimmerli, Walther, "Hegel und die Zukunft der Religion", In: *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. VIII (1973) pp. 267–276.

Bibliographical Appendices

APPENDIX I

A Bibliography of Contemporary German Translations of the Writings of the Scottish Enlightenment.

(All translations that appeared until 1831, the year of Hegel's death, have been included.)

(1) ADVANCE INFORMATION

(A) *Scottish Enlightenment Authors*

Beattie, James (1735–1803)
Blair, Hugh (1718–1800)
Burnet, James Lord Monboddo (1714–1799)
Ferguson, Adam (1723–1816)
Home, Henry Lord Kames (1696–1782)
Hume, David (1711–1776)
Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)
Millar, John (1735–1801)
Oswald, James (1703–1793)
Reid, Thomas (1710–1796)
Robertson, William (1721–1793)
Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
Steuart, Sir James (1713–1780)
Stewart, Dugald (1753–1828)

[Tucker, Abraham = Search, Eduard (1705–1774)]*

(B) *Abbreviations of the Scots' Writings*

Beattie, "Truth" = Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth [1770]

* Although Tucker does not belong to the Scottish Enlightenment, he has been included because of Hegel's reference to him within his section on Scottish Philosophy; TWA, Vol. XX, p. 285.

"Poetry" = Essays : On Poetry and Music [1776]
"Diss." = Dissertations, Moral and Critical [1783]
"Elements" = Elements of Moral Science. 2 vols. [1790–1793]
Blair, "Diss." = A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian [1763]
"Lect." = Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres [1783]
"Sermons" = Sermons [1777–1801]
Burnet, "Language" = Dissertations on the Origin and Progress of Language. In 6 vols. [1773–1792]
Ferguson, "EHCS" = Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767]
"IMP" = Institutes of Moral Philosophy [1769]
"HoR" = History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic [1783]
"PMPS" = Principles of Moral and Political Science [1792]
Home, "Essay" = Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion [1751]
"Elements" = Elements of Criticism [1762]
"Sketches" = Sketches of the History of Man [1774]
Hume, "Treatise" = Treatise on Human Nature [1739]
"Essays" = Essays, Moral and Political [1741]
"Enquiries" = An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [1751]
"Pol. Disc." = Political Discourses [1752]
"History" = History of England [1754–1763]
"Diss." = Four Dissertations: I. The Natural History of Religion; II. Of the Passions; III. Of Tragedy; IV. Of the Standard of Taste [1757]
"Suicide" = Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul [1777]
"Religion" = Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1779]
Hutcheson, "Inquiry" = Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue [1725]
"Essay" = Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections [1728]
"System" = System of Moral Philosophy [1755]
Millar, "Ranks" = Observations Concerning the Origin and Distinction of Ranks in Society [1771]
"Government" = An Historical View of the English Government [1787]
Oswald, "Appeal" = An Appeal to Common Sense on Behalf of Religion [1766]
Reid, "Inquiry" = Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Basis of Common Sense [1764]
Robertson, "Christ" = The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's Appearance [1755]
"Scotl." = History of Scotland [1759]
"Charles" = History of the Emperor Charles V [1769]
"America" = History of America [1777]
"India" = Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India [1791]
Smith, "TMS" = Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759]
"WN" = An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776]
Steuart, "Coin" = A Dissertation upon the Doctrine and Principles of Money applied to the German Coin [1761]

"Inquiry"	= An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy [1767]
Stewart, "Mind"	= Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind [1792]
[Tucker], "Light"	= Light of Nature [1768]

(C) *General Sources and their Abbreviations*

H1 = Wilhelm Heinsius, *Allgemeines Bücher-Lexicon*. In 4 vols. (Leipzig, Heinsius, 1793) [First printed catalogue that aimed at listing all available German books]

HS = Wilhelm Heinsius, *Allgemeines Bücher-Lexicon*. First Supplement (Leipzig, Heinsius, 1798) [Includes the books that appeared between 1793 and 1798 and the corrections to the first edition.]

H2 = Wilhelm Heinsius, *Allgemeines Bücher-Lexicon*. In 4 vols. (Leipzig, Gleditsch, 1812) [Claims to include all German books that appeared between 1700 and 1810.]

K = Christian Gottlob Kayser, *Vollständiges Bücher-Lexicon*. In 6 vols. (Leipzig, Schumann, 1835) [Claims to include all German books that appeared between 1750 and 1832.]

JSE = *Bibliographisches Handbuch der philosophischen Literatur der Deutschen*. Ed. by Johann Samuel Ersch and Chr. Anton Geissler (Leipzig, Brockhaus, 3rd ed., 1850) [Claims to cover the period: 1750–1850]

BM1 = *Catalogue of the Printed Books in the Library of the British Museum*. In 58 vols. (London, 1881–1900) = Reprint: (Ann Arbor, 1946)

DAL = Michael Holzmann & Hans Bohatta (Eds.), *Deutsches Anonymen Lexikon, 1501–1850*. In 4 vols (Weimar, 1902–1907)

TEJ = T.E. Jessop (Ed.), *A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour* (London, 1938)

PPH = M.B. & L.M. Price, "The Publication of English Humaniora in Germany in the Eighteenth Century", *University of California Publications in Modern Philology*. Vol. 44 (1955).

BM2 = *British Museum General Catalogue of Printed Books*. In 263 vols. (London, 1956–1966)

WCL = William C. Lehmann, "Bibliography of Millar's Works", *John Millar of Glasgow, 1735–1801* (Cambridge, 1960) pp. 417 f.

PC = Paul Chamley, "Les Origines de la Pensée Economique de Hegel", *Hegel-Studien*. Vol. III (Bonn, 1965) pp. 225–261 [Contains information on Steuart translations]

NUC = *The National Union Catalogue*. Pre 1956-Imprints. In 685 vols. (Chicago & London, 1968–1980)

HCR = Horst Claus Recktenwald (Ed.), *Adam Smith: Der Wohlstand der Nationen* (München, 1978) pp. 833–838 [A bibliography of editions of 'The Wealth of Nations']

BLC = *The British Library General Catalogue of Printed Books* to 1975 (London, 1979 ff.) [Has progressed to "Godle", Vol. 126 (London, 1982)]

KMU = Karl Marx University at Leipzig, University Library, unpublished catalogue.

RUB = Ruhr University of Bochum, unpublished catalogues of the University Library (UL) and of the Library of the Philosophical Institute (Phil).

NLB = Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek Hannover, unpublished catalogue.

(D) *Structure of References*

The individual references make use of abbreviations for the original titles and for the sources (compare 'Advance Information'). When our sources differed and the respective problems could not be settled definitely, the most probable information has been chosen for the principal reference, with the variants at the end of each item. Additional information and presumptions are given in square brackets. The references to an individual author are structured according to the publication dates of the original writings (e.g. the reference to Hutcheson's "Inquiry" precede that to his "System") and all references to one writing are kept together, rather than scattering them according to the strictly chronological order of the translations (e.g. the references to the third and fourth editions of Home's "Grundsätze der Kritik" precede the references to his "Sketches").

Name of author
Abbreviation of original writing
Title of translation
Translator (surname, first names)
(Place of publication, publisher, date of publication)
Source of information (Abbreviation of source, Vol.: , p.)
Any additional information, etc. are given in square brackets: [. . .]

Example
Ferguson
"EHCS"
Versuch über die Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft
Jünger, Christian Friedrich
(Leipzig, Junius, 1768)
H1, Vol.II, p. 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beattie

"Truth"
Versuch über die Natur und Unveränderlichkeit der Wahrheit; im Gegensatze der Klügeley und der Zweifelsucht.
Rüdinger, Andreas Christoph
(Copenhagen and Leipzig, Faber and Heineck, 1772)
H1, Vol. I, p. 99: refers to the publication date as "1771" – PPH, p. 21 – KMU, Classmark: Phil. 345 – NUC, Vol. 41, p. 433 – H2, Vol. I, p. 204 – K, Vol. I, p. 171 – H2 & K erroneously consider Hans Wilhelm von Gerstenberg as translator and Schubothe as publisher – NLB: P–A 111 – JSE, p. 49: refers to the publisher as "Nitschke".

"Poetry"
Neue philosophische Versuche. In 2 vols.
Meiners, Christoph [with preface]
(Leipzig, Weygand, 1779–80)
H1, Vol. I, p. 99 – H2, Vol. I, p. 204 – K, Vol. I, p. 170 – TEJ, p. 98 – NUC, Vol. 41, p. 432 – JSE, p. 38.

"Diss."
Kritische und moralische Abhandlungen. In 3 vols.
Grosse, Karl
(Göttingen, Brose, 1789–91)
H2, Vol. I, p. 204 – K, Vol. I, p. 170 – H1, Vol. I, p. 99 gives the publication dates as "1789–90" – TEJ, p. 99 gives the publication dates as "1789–90" – NUC, Vol. 41, p. 432 entitles "Moralische und kritische Abhandlungen".

"Elements"
Grundlinien der Psychologie, natürlichen Theologie, Moralphysik und Logik [A translation of the first part of the "Elements"]
Moritz, Karl Philipp
(Berlin, Voss, 1790)
H1, Vol. I, p. 99 – H2, Vol. I, p. 204 – K, Vol. I, p. 170 – TEJ, p. 98 refers to this edition as a translation of "Truth".

Blair

"Diss."
Kritische Abhandlung über die Gedichte Ossians
Denis, Michael
(Wien, ?, 1769)
BLC: Vol. 34, p. 20 and Vol. 243, p. 268

Kritische Abhandlung über die Gedichte Ossians
Oelrichs, Otto August Heinrich
(Hannover and Osnabrück, Hahn and Schmidt, 1785)
H1, Vol. I, p. 171 – H2, Vol. I, p. 345 – K, Vol. I, p. 282 – PPH, p. 27 – NUC, Vol. 60, p. 91 – BLC, Vol. 34, p. 20.

"Lect."
Vorlesungen über Rhetorik und schöne Wissenschaften. In 4 vols.
Schreiter, Karl Gottfried [adds notes]
(Liegnitz and Leipzig, Siegert, 1785–89)
H1, Vol. I, p. 171 – H2, Vol. I, p. 345 – K, Vol. I, p. 282 – PPH, p. 27 – NUC, Vol. 60, p. 102 – BLC, Vol. 34, p. 21.

"Sermons"
Geistliche Reden [a translation of Vol. I]
? [Sack, Friedrich Samuel Gottfried]
(Leipzig, Weidmann, 1777)
PPH, p. 27.

Predigten. In 5 vols.
Sack, Friedrich Samuel Gottfried [Vols. I – IV] and Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel [Vol. V]
(Leipzig, Weidmann and Erben, 1781–1802)
H1, Vol. I, p. 171 – HS, p. 55 – H2, Vol. I, p. 345 – K, Vol. I, p. 282 – PPH, p. 27 – NUC, Vol. 60, p. 98.

Predigten. In 5 vols. [Reprint of the 1781–1802 edition]
Sack, F.S.G. and Schleiermacher, F.E.D.

(Leipzig, Weidmann, 1805)
PPH, p. 27: refers to the translator as "K." Schleiermacher.

Burnet

"Language"
Des Lord Monboddo Werk von dem Ursprunge und Fortgange der Sprache. In 2 vols.
[An abridged translation: Only vols. 1–3 of the original 6 vols.]
Schmid, E.A. [with a preface by J.G. von Herder]
(Leipzig and Riga, Hartknoch, 1784–85)
K, Vol. IV, p. 134 – TEJ, p. 109 – NUC, Vol. 390, p. 484 – H1, Vol. III, p. 82 – H2, Vol. II, p. 1053 – H1 & H2 spell the translator "Schmidt" – BM1, Vol. 8, p. 108 – BLC, Vol. 48, p. 296 – PPH, p. 39 spells the translator "Schmidt" – NLB: La 458.

Ferguson

"EHCS"
Versuch über die Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft
Jünger, Christian Friedrich
(Leipzig, Junius and Gleditsch, 1768)
PPH, p. 68 – H2, Vol. I, p. 869 – K, Vol. II, p. 204 – KMU, Classmark: Rph.u.Stw. 289 e – H1, Vol. II, p. 17 refers to the title as "Versuch einer Geschichte der . . ." – NUC, Vol. 169, p. 608.

"IMP"
Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie
Garve, Christian [adds commentary]
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1772)
H1, Vol. II, p. 17 – H2, Vol. I, p. 869 and JSE, p. 149 refer to the publisher as "Dyk" – TEJ, p. 122 – K, Vol. II, p. 204 – KMU, Classmark: Phil. 1130 – NUC, Vol. 169, p. 606 – BM1, Vol. 18, p. 180 – BLC, Vol. 107, p. 189 – RUB UL: NPA 6552.

Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie [Reprint of the Garve translation of 1772]
Garve, Christian [adds commentary]
(Frankfurt and Leipzig,? [Dyck], 1787)
TEJ, p. 122 – NUC, Vol. 169, p. 606.

"HoR"
Geschichte des Fortgangs und Untergangs der Römischen Republik. Four parts in 3 vols.
Beck, Christian Daniel [adds notes]
(Leipzig, Weidmanns Erben and Reich, 1784–86)
H1, Vol. II, p. 17 – H2, Vol. I, p. 869 – NUC, Vol. 169, p. 606 – NLB: Gb=A 64 – K, Vol. II, p. 204 gives the publication dates as "1784–87".

"PMPS"
Darstellung der Gründe der Moral und Politik
Schreiter, Karl Gottfried [adds an essay on Ferguson]
(Zürich, Orell, 1796)
H2, Vol. I, p. 869 – K, Vol. II, p. 204 – TEJ, p. 122 gives the publication date as "1795" – HS, p. 139 and JSE, p. 126 refer to the title as "Ausführliche Darstellung . . ."

"Essays"
Untersuchung über die moralischen Gesetze der Gesellschaft
? [Macher, Johann Christian]
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1756)
JSE, p. 122.

Versuch über die ersten Gründe der Sittlichkeit und der natürlichen Religion. In 2 vols.
Rautenberg, Christian Günther [adds notes]
(Braunschweig, Meyer, 1768)
H1, Vol. II, p. 283 – H2, Vol. II, p. 420 – K, Vol. III, p. 182 – JSE, p. 121 – BM1, Vol. 25, p. 228 – BM2, Vol. 106, p. 56 – PPH, p. 95 – NUC, Vol. 288, p. 477 – BM2 & PPH refer to the title as "Versuche . . .".

Untersuchung über die moralischen Gesetze der Gesellschaft
Macher, Johann Christian
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1778)
K, Vol. III, p. 182 – H1, Vol. II, p. 283 refers to the publication date as "1777" – H2, Vol, II, p. 420 refers to the title as "Untersuchung über die Moral=Gesetze der Gesellschaft" and calls the publisher "Dyk".

Versuche über die ersten Gründe der Sittlichkeit und der natürlichen Religion. In 2 parts.
Rautenberg, Christian Günther
(Wien, Trattner, 1786)
NUC, Vol. 288, p. 477 – K, Vol. III, p. 182.

"Elements"
Grundsätze der Kritik. In 3 vols.
Meinhard, Johann Nikolaus and Garve, Christian [Third volume]
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1763–66)
K, Vol. III, p. 182 – TEJ, p. 141 – BM1, Vol. 25, p. 228 – BM2, Vol. 106, p. 56.

Grundsätze der Kritik. In 3 vols. [Second edition, with revisions according to the fourth English edition]
Garve, Christian [adds notes] and Engel, Johann Jacob
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1772)
K, Vol. III, p. 182 – TEJ, p. 141 – BM1, Vol. 25, p. 228 – BM2, Vol. 106, p. 56 – BM1 & BM2 refer to this edition as a two vol. set.

Grundsätze der Kritik. In 2 vols. [Reprint of the second edition of 1772]
Garve, Christian [adds notes] and Engel, Johann Jacob
(Frankfurt and Leipzig,? [Dyck], 1775)
TEJ, p. 141 – NUC, Vol. 288, p. 474.

Grundsätze der Kritik. In 3 vols. [Third edition, with revisions]
Schatz, Georg [adds notes]
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1790–91)
H1, Vol. II, p. 283 – H2, Vol. II, p. 420 refer to the publisher as "Dyk" – K, Vol. III, p. 182 – NUC, Vol. 288, p. 474 – NLB: K=A 153.

Grundsätze der Kritik. 6 parts in 5 vols. [According to the title page: "Last improved edition"]
Meinhard, Johann Nicolaus
(Wien, Schrämbl, 1790)
RUB, Classmark: 1696 . . .

"Sketches"
Versuche über die Geschichte des Menschen. In 2 vols.
Klausing, Anton Ernst
(Leipzig, Brockhaus, Junius and Gleditsch, 1774–75)
H1, Vol. II, p. 283 – H2, Vol. II, p. 420 – K, Vol. III, p. 182 – TEJ, p. 142 – NUC, Vol. 288, p. 477 – NLB: P=A 760.

Versuche über die Geschichte des Menschen. In 2 vols. [Second edition]
Klausing, Anton Ernst
(Leipzig, Brockhaus, Junius and Gleditsch, 1783–84)
H1, Vol. II, p. 283 – H2, Vol. II, p. 420 – K, Vol. III, p. 182 – NUC, Vol. 288, p. 477.

Versuch über die Geschichte des Menschen. In 3 vols.
[According to the title page: "Last improved edition"]
Klausing, Anton Ernst
(Wien, Alberti and Schrämbl, 1790)
PPH, p. 95 – RUB Phil: 1696 . . .

Hume

"Treatise"
Uber die menschliche Natur. In 3 vols.
Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich [with critical essays]
(Halle, Hemmerde and Schwetschke, 1790–92)
H1, Vol. II, p. 299 spells the publisher "Schwetke" – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – JSE, p. 48 – TEJ, p. 14 spells "Jacobi" rather than "Jakob" – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 161 indicates 3 vols in 2 – RUB UL: NPA 6837 – H1, H2, K, and JSE date "1790–91".

Über die menschliche Natur. In 2 vols. [according to PPH, a reprint of the Jakob edition]
Jakob, Ludwig Heinrich [with critical essays]
(Göttingen, Feder & Meiner's "Philosophische Reihe" [?], 1791)
PPH, p. 98.

"Essays"
Vermischte Schriften. In 4 vols.
Pistorius, Hermann Andreas and Sulzer, Johann Georg [Edited Vol. II]
(Hamburg and Leipzig, Grund and Heinsius, 1754–56)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – TEJ, p. 9 – H1, Vol. II, p. 299 – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 162 – H1, H2, and NUC date "1754–55"

Vermischte Schriften. In 4 vols. [Reprint of the Pistorius edition of 1754–56]
Pistorius, Hermann Andreas and Sulzer, Johann Georg [Edited Vol. II]

(Leipzig and Hamburg, Hollens Witwe, 1766)
PPH, p. 97 – TEJ, p. 9 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 162.

Sittenlehre der Gesellschaft [Partial Publication of the "Essays"]
Pistorius, Hermann Andreas
(Hamburg and Leipzig, Grund and Holle, 1756)
PPH, p. 97 – KMU, Classmark: Phil. 281 p 3 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 157 – DAL, Vol. II, p. 305.

Die vier Philosophen. Apulejus' Diskurs über die Mittel glücklich zu sein. [A translation of essays 6–9 of vol. II of the 1742 edition of the "Essays"]
Formey, Johann Heinrich Samuel [with notes]
(Golgau, Günther, 1768)
H1, Vol. II, p. 299 – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – TEJ, p. 18.

Das Genie des Herrn Hume; oder Sammlung der vorzüglichsten Grundsätze dieses Philosophen [Selections from the "Essays" and other writings]
Bremer, Johann Gottfried
(Leipzig, Hilscher, 1774)
H1, Vol. II, p. 91 – BM2, Vol. 109, p. 80 – PPH, p. 98.

Beiträge zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis. In 2 vols. [Contains the following "Essays": 1) "Of superstition and enthusiasm"; 2) "Of national characters"]
Pockels, Karl Friedrich
(Berlin and Braunschweig, Vieweg, 1788–89)
H2, Vol. III, p. 213 – K, Vol. IV, p. 367 – TEJ, p. 18.

Humes und Rousseaus Abhandlungen über den Urvertrag. In 2 vols. [Essay "Of original contract"]
Merkel, G.H. [adds "Versuch über Leibeigenschaft"]
(Leipzig, Wienbrack and Gräff, 1797)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – PPH, p. 98 – JSE, p. 140.

"Enquiries"
Über die menschliche Erkenntnis [Identical with Vol. II of the "Vermischte Schriften" of 1754– 56]
Sulzer, Johann Georg [claims to have merely edited an anonymous translation]
(Hamburg and Leipzig, ?, 1755)
PPH, p. 97 – TEJ, p. 9.

Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand
Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb [with an essay on "Skepticismus" by K.L. Reinhold]
(Jena, Akademische Buchhandlung, 1793)
H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – JSE, p. 49 – TEJ, p. 21 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 161 – PPH, p. 97.

"Pol. Disc."
David Humes Geist I: Politik
Fischer, Christian August
(Leipzig, Kühn and Schäfersche Buchhandlung, 1795)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – PPH, p. 98 – RUB Phil: 1711 . . .

Die vollkommene Republik ["Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" only]
Fischer, Christian August
(Leipzig, Kühn, 1799)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – PPH, p. 98 dates "1798".

Politische Zweifel allen Partheien gewidmet [Second edition of the Fischer translation of 1795 under new title]
Fischer, Christian August
(Leipzig, Kühn, 1799)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – PPH, p. 98.

Politische Versuche [New Translation of all 12 discourses and of 7 of the "Essays"]
Kraus, Christian Jakob and Auerswald, Hans von
(Königsberg and Leipzig, Nicolovius and Michelsen, 1800)
H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 spells "Krauss" – TEJ, p. 25 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 157 – PPH, p. 98 – RUB Phil: 1711 . . .

Politische Versuche [Second edition of the Kraus translation]
Kraus, Christian Jakob and Auerswald, Hans von
(Königsberg and Leipzig, Nicolovius and Michelsen, 1813)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 dates "1814" and spells "Krauss" – TEJ, p. 25 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 157 – NLB: S=A 347.

"History"
Geschichte von Großbritannien, mit eines Engländers Anmerkungen. 6 parts in 3 vols.
Dusch, Johann Jakob and Ekkard, Friedrich [according to *Das gelehrte Deutschland*, edited by G. Ch. Hamberger and J. G. Meusel (Lemgo, 5th ed., 1796) Vol. II, p. 188: Ekkard translated the lives of Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth]
(Breslau and Leipzig, Gosohorsky and Meyer, 1762–1771)
H1, Vol. II, p. 299 – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – TEJ, p. 32 – PPH, p. 97 – NLB: Gg A 944 + 951. [Vol. I (parts 1 + 2) and Vols. II & III (parts 3–6) were also sold separately: Geschichte von Großbritannien. In 2 vols. (1762–63). Geschichte von England. In 4 vols. (1767–71)]

Geschichte Englands. In 2 vols. [An adaptation rather than a translation]
Meissner, August Gottlieb
(Leipzig, Dyck, 1777–1780)
K, Vol. III, p. 215 – PPH, p. 98 – NLB: Gg A 596.

Geschichte der Freyheit in England [Excerpt from the "History"]
Hennings, August
(Copenhagen, Proft, 1783)
PPH, p. 98.

Geschichte von England, mit eines Engländers Anmerkungen. In 20 vols. [Reprint of the first edition]
Dusch, Johann Jakob and Ekkard, Friedrich
(Frankenthal, Gegel, 1786–88)
NUC, Vol. 260, p. 145 – PPH, p. 97 – TEJ, p. 33 gives the publication dates as "1787–88".

Karl der Erste, König von England. Ein Vorbild des unglücklichen Ludwigs des Sechzehnten [Extract translation of the section on Charles I]
?
(Leipzig, Weygand, 1793)
NUC, Vol. 260, p. 153.

Elisabeth, Königin von England [Free rendering of the life of Queen Elizabeth]
Pölitz, Carl Heinrich Ludwig
(Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1803)
K, Vol. II, p. 118 – DAL, Vol. II, p. 19.

Geschichte von England. In 2 vols.
Timaeus, Gebhard [adds a long essay: "Brittische Geschichtsschreibung"]
(Lüneburg and London, Merold & Wahlstab and Payne & Mackinlay, 1806–7)
H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 145 – RUB Phil: 1711 . . . – NLB: Gg A 443 – K calls the translator "J.J. Timaeus" and dates "1804–1807".

"Diss."
Vier Abhandlungen: die natürliche Geschichte der Religion; von den Leidenschaften; vom Trauerspiel; von der Grundregel des Geschmacks
Resewitz, Friedrich Gabriel
(Leipzig and Quedlinburg, Biesterfeld, 1759)
H1, Vol. II, p. 299 – H2, Vol. II, p. 457 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 – JSE, p. 38 – RUB Phil: 1711 . . . – TEJ, p. 36 claims that this is the second edition of a 1757 translation, but, as I have found no other evidence of an earlier version and Jessop relied on his German correspondents, I doubt the existence of a 1757 translation.

"Suicide"
Untersuchungen über den Selbstmord
Dörrien, David Ludolf [adds notes and an appendix]
(Hannover, Ritscher, 1781)
K, Vol. III, p. 215.

"Religion"
Gespräche über natürliche Religion [Translates the second English edition]
Schreiter, Karl Gottfried [with a dialogue on atheism by Ernst Platner]
(Leipzig, Weygand, 1781)
JSE, p. 195 – TEJ, p. 41 – NUC, Vol. 260, p. 145 – K, Vol. III, p. 215 entitles "Gespräche über *die* natürliche Religion".

Hutcheson

"Inquiry"
Untersuchung unserer Begriffe von Schönheit und Tugend
Merck, Johann Heinrich
(Frankfurt and Leipzig, Fleischer, 1762)
H1, Vol. II, p. 302 – H2, Vol. II, p. 463 – NUC, Vol. 261, p. 672 – TEJ, p. 144 – K, Vol. III, p. 220 – BM2, Vol. 109, p. 791 – RUB Phil: 1694 . . . – JSE, p. 147.

"Essay"
Abhandlung über die Natur und Beherrschung der Leidenschaften und Neigungen und über das moralische Gefühl inbesonderheit
Gellius, Johann Gottfried
(Leipzig and Liegnitz, Siegert, 1760)
H1, Vol. II, p. 302 – H2, Vol. II, p. 463 – K, Vol. III, p. 220 – TEJ, p. 145 – PPH, p. 100 – JSE, p. 174 – RUB Phil: 1694 . . . – K and JSE entitle: "Abhandlung *von der* Natur . . ." – Johann Georg Meusel's *Lexikon der vom Jahr 1750 bis 1800 verstorbenen teutschen Schriftsteller* (Leipzig, 1804) Vol. IV, p. 79 dates "1759".

"System"
Sittenlehre der Vernunft. In 2 vols.
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim
(Leipzig, Fritsch, Hahn and Wendler, 1756)
H1, Vol. II, p. 302 – H2, Vol. II, p. 463 – TEJ, p. 146 – JSE, p. 149 – PPH, p. 101 – NLB: P=A 790 – K, Vol. III, p. 220 claims that Karl Wilhelm Müller translated the "System".

Millar

"Ranks"
Bemerkungen über den Unterschied der Stände in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft
J.M. [?]
(Leipzig, Schwickert, 1772)
H2, Vol. II, p. 1025 – K, Vol. IV, p. 111 – NUC, Vol. 384, p. 12 – H1, Vol. III, p. 69 entitles "Anmerkungen . . ." – BM1, Vol. 36, p. 95 – BM2, Vol. 160, p. 396 – WCL, p. 417.

Aufklärungen über den Ursprung und Fortschritte des Unterschiedes der Stände und des Ranges, in Hinsicht auf Kultur und Sitten bei den vorzüglichsten Nationen [A translation of the third English edition]
Bergk, Johann Adam
(Leipzig, Weygand, 1798)
K, Vol. IV, p. 111 – WCL, p. 417.

"Government"
Historische Entwickelung der Englischen Staatsverfassung. In 3 vols. (Vol. IV of the original is not translated)
Schmid, Karl Ernst
(Jena, Schmid, 1819–1821)
WCL, p. 418 – DAL, Vol. III, p. 146 – NLB: Gg 528 – K, Vol. IV, p. 111 dates "1819–20".

Oswald

"Appeal"
Appelation an den gesunden Menschenverstand, zum Vortheil der Religion. In 2 vols.

Wilmsen, Friedrich Ernst
(Leipzig, Brockhaus, Gleditsch and Junius, 1774)
H1, Vol. III, p. 209 – HS, p. 108 – K, Vol. IV, p. 283.

Reid

"Inquiry"
Untersuchung über den menschlichen Geist nach den Grundsätzen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes [Translation of the third English edition]
?
(Leipzig, Schwickert, 1782)
H1, Vol. III, p. 320 – H2, Vol. III, p. 328 – NUC, Vol. 486, p. 528 – K, Vol. IV, p. 464 – TEJ, p. 164 – JSE, p. 49.

Robertson

"Christ"
Betrachtung der Lage der Welt zur Zeit der Erscheinung Christi
Ebeling, Johann Dietrich Phillip Christian
(Frankfurt and Leipzig, Schneider and Linke, 1776)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – PPH, p. 152 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526.

Betrachtung der Lage der Welt zur Zeit der Erscheinung Christi
[Second edition of the Ebeling edition of 1776]
Ebeling, Johann Dietrich Phillip Christian
(Hamburg, Herold, 1779)
H1, Vol. III, p. 358 – H2, Vol. III, p. 402 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526.

"Scotl."
Geschichte von Schottland, unter Maria und Jakob VI. In 2 vols.
Mittelstedt, Matthaeus Theodor Christoph
(Braunschweig, Meyer, 1762)
K, Vol. IV, p. 526 – H1, Vol. III, p. 357 & H2, Vol. III, p. 402 refer to the translator as "Mittelstadt".

Geschichte von Schottland, unter Maria und Jakob VI. In 2 vols.
Seiler, Georg Friedrich [with additions, notes and preface]
(Ulm, Stettin, 1762)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – H2, Vol. III, p. 402 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526.

Geschichte von Schottland. In 6 vols.
Vogt, W.H.v. [with a biographical and critical survey of the author's life and work]
(Leipzig, Hartleben, 1829)
K, Vol. IV, p. 526 – NUC, Vol. 498, p. 207 calls the publisher "Hartmann".

"Charles"
Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Carls des V. In 3 vols.
Mittelstedt, Matthaeus Theodor Christoph
(Braunschweig, Waysenhaus, 1770–71)
BM2, Vol. 204, p. 295 – BM1, Vol. 46, p. 275 – NLB: Gd A 1447.

Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Carls des V. In 3 vols. [Second revised edition of the Mittelstedt translation of 1770–71]
Mittelstedt, Matthaeus Theodor Christoph [with notes by Julius August Remer]
(Braunschweig, Waysenhaus, 1778–79)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526 – NUC, Vol. 498, p. 207.

Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Karl V. In 3 vols. [Reprint of the second edition of 1778–79, with additional notes]
Mittelstedt, Matthaeus Theodor Christoph [with notes by Julius August Remer and Johann Martin von Abele]
(Kempten, Dannheimer, 1781–1783)
K, Vol. IV, p. 526.

Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Karl V. In 3 vols. [Third edition; on the basis of Mittelstedt's translation, but completely revised]
Remer, Julius August
(Braunschweig, Schulbuchhandlung vormals Waysenhaus, 1792–96)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – HS, p. 352 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526 gives dates as "1792–94".

Abriß des gesellschaftlichen Lebens in Europa bis zum Anfange des 16ten Jahrhunderts [Separate printing of the first part of the third edition]
Remer, Julius August
(Braunschweig, Schulbuchhandlung vormals Waysenhaus, 1792)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – H2, Vol. III, p. 402 – PPH, p. 152 – NUC, Vol. 498, p. 207.

Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Carls des Fünften. In 5 vols. [revised edition]
Remer, Julius August [adds notes]
(Wien, Härter, 1819)
NUC, Vol. 498, p. 207.

"America"
Geschichte von Amerika. In 2 vols.
Schiller, Johann Friedrich
(Leipzig, Weidmann and Reich, 1777)
NUC, Vol. 498, p. 207 – BM2, Vol. 204, p. 292 – BM1, Vol. 46, p. 273 – NLB: Gp A 622 – H1, Vol. III, p. 358 refers to this edition as a 3 vols. set.

Geschichte von Amerika. In 3 vols. [Second edition]
Schiller, Johann Friedrich
(Leipzig, Weidmann, 1798–1801)
H2, Vol. III, p. 402 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526.

"India"
Historische Untersuchung über die Kenntnisse der Alten von Indien und die Fortschritte des Handels mit diesem Lande
Liebeskind, Doroth. Marg. [with a preface by Georg Forster]
(Berlin, Voss, 1791)
H1, Vol. III, p. 357 – H2, Vol. III, p. 403.

Historische Untersuchung über die Kenntnis der Alten von Indien und die Fortschritte des Handels mit diesem Lande [New enlarged edition]

Liebeskind, Doroth. Marg. [with a preface by Georg Forster]
(Berlin, Voss, 1792)
HS, p. 352 – H2, Vol. III, p. 403 – K, Vol. IV, p. 526 – NUC, Vol. 498, p. 211.

Smith

"TMS"
Theorie der moralischen Empfindungen [Translation of the third English edition]
Rautenberg, Christian Günther
(Braunschweig, Meyer, 1770)
H1, Vol. IV, p. 158 – H2, Vol. III, p. 755 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 344 – K, Vol. V, p. 262 – TEJ, p. 170.

Theorie der moralischen Gefühle. In 2 vols. [Vol. II contains the alterations of the 6th English edition]
Kosegarten, Ludwig Theobul [with preface and commentary]
(Leipzig, Gräff and Wienbrack, 1791–95)
H1, Vol. IV, p. 158 – H2, Vol. III, p. 755 – K, Vol. V, p. 262 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 344 entitles "Theorie der sittlichen Gefühle" – TEJ, p. 171 entitles this edition as "Theorie der sittlichen Gefühle" – HS, p. 416 entitles the second volume "Theorie der sittlichen Gefühle" – JSE, p. 121.

"WN"
Untersuchung der Natur und Ursachen von Nationalreichthümern.
In 2 vols.
Schiller, Johann Friedrich and Wichmann, Christian August
(Leipzig, Weidmanns Erben and Reich, 1776–78)
HCR, p. 838 – NLB: 74/5071.

Historische und politische Betrachtungen über die Colonien besonders in Rücksicht auf die Englisch-Amerikanischen
[Translation of Book IV, Chapter VII: "Of Colonies"]
?
(Bern, Haller, 1779)
NUC, Vol. 550, p. 336.

Untersuchung der Natur und Ursachen von Nationalreichthümern.
In 3 vols. [Second edition of the Schiller-Wichmann translation, with additions and improvements]
Schiller, Johann Friedrich and Wichmann, Christian August
(Leipzig, Weidmann, 1776–1792)
H2, Vol. III, p. 755 – K, Vol. V, p. 262 – HCR, p. 838 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 346.

Untersuchung über die Natur und Ursachen des Nationalreichtums. In 3 vols. [New translation of the fourth edition]
Garve, Christian [adds preface]
(Breslau, Korn, 1794–96)
HS, p. 416 – H2, Vol. III, p. 755 – K, Vol. V, p. 262 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 347 – HCR, p. 838.

Adam Smith: 'Untersuchung über Nationalreichtum' und Th. Paine: 'Sinken und Fall des englischen Finanzsystems, Versuch einer Kritik' [Extracts from Smith and Paine]
?
(Hamburg, Perthes & B. [?], 1796)
K, Vol. V, p. 262.

Untersuchung über die Natur und Ursachen des Nationalreichtums. In 4 vols. [Reprint of the Garve edition of 1794–96]
Garve, Christian [adds preface]
(Frankfurt and Leipzig,? [Korn], 1796–99)
HCR, p. 838 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 346.

Untersuchung über die Natur und Ursache des Nationalreichthums. In 3 vols. [Second edition of the Garve translation, revised by August Dörrien; with Stewart's Life of Smith]
Dörrien, August and Garve, Christian
(Breslau and Leipzig, Korn, 1799)
PPH, p. 165 – HCR, p. 838 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 346.

Untersuchung über die Natur und Ursachen des Nationalreichtums. In 3 vols. [Third edition of the Garve-Dörrien translation]
Dörrien, August and Garve, Christian
(Breslau and Leipzig, Korn, 1810)
H2, Vol. III, p. 755 – K, Vol. V, p. 262 – HCR, p. 838 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 346.

Die neue Staatsweisheit oder Auszug aus Adam Smiths Untersuchungen über die Natur und Ursachen des Nationalreichtums [Extract translation with critical notes]
Cölln, Georg Fr. Willib. Freiherr von [adds notes]
(Berlin, Hayn, 1812)
K, Vol. I, p. 470 – HCR, p. 838 refers to the translator as "F. von Colin".

Untersuchung über die Natur und Ursachen des Nationalreichtums. In 3 vols. [Reprint of the third edition of the Garve-Dörrien translation]
Dörrien, August and Garve, Christian
(Wien, Bauer, 1814)
HCR, p. 838 – NUC, Vol. 550, p. 346 – RUB Phil: 1723 . . .

Steuart

"Coin"
Abhandlungen von den Grundsätzen der Münzwissenschaft, mit einer Anwendung derselben auf das deutsche Münzwesen
[According to the title: "Translated from the original manuscript"]
Schott, Christoph Friedrich
(Tübingen, Cotta, 1761)
NUC, Vol. 568, p. 31 – DAL, Vol. IV, p. 123.

"Inquiry"
Untersuchung der Grundsätze der Staats-Wirthschaft. In 2 vols.

Pauli, Johann Ulrich von
(Hamburg, Typographische Gesellschaft, 1769–70)
NUC, Vol. 568, p. 311 – NLB: 74/5058 – PC, p. 235 entitles ". . . Staats-Wissenschaft".

Untersuchung der Grundsätze von der Staatswirthschaft. 5 vols. in 6 [vol. III has 2 parts; according to PC, apart from the first 29 pages, a copy of the Hamburg edition]
Schott, Christoph Friedrich
(Tübingen, Cotta, 1769–72)
H1, Vol. IV, p. 196 – H2, Vol. III, p. 835 – K, Vol. V, p. 332 – NUC, Vol. 568 – PC, p. 236 – H and K date "1769–79" and misspell "Stewart".

Stewart

"Mind"
Anfangsgründe der Philosophie über die menschliche Seele. In 2 vols.
Lange, Samuel Gottlieb
(Berlin, Maurer, 1793–94)
HS, p. 425 – H2, Vol. III, p. 835 – K, Vol. V, p. 332 – TEJ, p. 177 – NUC, Vol. 569, p. 195 – JSE, p. 82 – TEJ, NUC, and JSE date "1794".

Tucker

"Light"
Licht der Natur. In 2 vols.
Erxleben, Johann Christian Polykarp
(Göttingen and Gotha, Dietrich, 1771–72)
H1, Vol. IV, p. 123 – H2, Vol. III, p. 691 – K, Vol. V, p. 207 – NLB: P=A 1567 (Vol. I only).

APPENDIX II

A Bibliography of Contemporary German Reviews of the Writings of the Scottish Enlightenment

(1) ADVANCE INFORMATION

(A) *Scottish Enlightenment Authors*

Beattie, James (1735–1803)
Blair, Hugh (1718–1800)
Burnet, James Lord Monboddo (1714–1799)
Ferguson, Adam (1723–1816)
Home, Henry Lord Kames (1696–1782)
Hume, David (1711–1776)
Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)
Millar, John (1735–1801)

Oswald, James (1703–1793)
Reid, Thomas (1710–1796)
Robertson, William (1721–1793)
Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
Steuart, Sir James (1713–1780)
Stewart, Dugald (1753–1828)
[Tucker, Abraham = Search, Eduard (1705–1774)]*

* Although Tucker does not belong to the Scottish Enlightenment, he has been included because of Hegel's reference to him within his section on Scottish Philosophy, TWA, Vol. XX, p. 285.

(B) *Abbreviations of the Scots' Writings*

Beattie, "Truth"	= Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth [1770]
"Poetry"	= Essays: On Poetry and Music [1776]
"Diss."	= Dissertations, Moral and Critical [1783]
"Elements"	= Elements of Moral Science. 2 vols. [1790–1793]
Blair, "Diss."	= A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian [1763]
"Lect."	= Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres [1783]
"Sermons"	= Sermons [1777–1801]
Burnet, "Language"	= Dissertations on the Origin and Progress of Language. In 6 vols. [1773–1792]
Ferguson, "EHCS"	= Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767]
"IMP"	= Institutes of Moral Philosophy [1769]
"HoR"	= History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic [1783]
"PMPS"	= Principles of Moral and Political Science [1792]
Home, "Essay"	= Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion [1751]
"Elements"	= Elements of Criticism [1762]
"Sketches"	= Sketches of the History of Man [1774]
Hume, "Treatise"	= Treatise on Human Nature [1739]
"Essays"	= Essays, Moral and Political [1741]
"Enquiries"	= An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals [1751]
"Pol. Disc."	= Political Discourses [1752]
"History"	= History of England [1754–1763]
"Diss."	= Four Dissertations: I. The Natural History of Religion; II. Of the Passions; III. Of Tragedy; IV. Of the Standard of Taste [1757]
"Suicide"	= Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul [1777]
"Life"	= The Life of David Hume [1777]
"Religion"	= Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1779]
Hutcheson, "Inquiry"	= Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue [1725]
"Essay"	= Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections [1728]
"Logicae"	= Logicae et Metaphysicae Institutio Compendia (shortened titles) [1756 + 1742]
"System"	= System of Moral Philosophy [1755]

Millar, "Ranks"	= Observations Concerning the Origin and Distinction of Ranks in Society [1771]
"Government"	= An Historical View of the English Government [1787]
Oswald, "Appeal"	= An Appeal to Common Sense on Behalf of Religion [1766]
Reid, "Inquiry"	= Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Basis of Common Sense [1764]
Robertson, "Christ"	= The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's Appearance [1755]
"Scotl."	= History of Scotland [1759]
"Charles"	= History of the Emperor Charles V [1769]
"America"	= History of America [1777]
"India"	= Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India [1791]
Smith, "TMS"	= Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759]
"WN"	= An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776]
Steuart, "Coin"	= A Dissertation upon the Doctrine and Principles of Money applied to the German Coin [1761]
"Inquiry"	= An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy [1767]
Stewart, "Mind"	= Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind [1792]
[Tucker], "Light"	= Light of Nature [1768]

(C) *Abbreviations of the Review Journals:*

ADB	= *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. Edited by F. Nicolai (Berlin & Stettin, 1765–1796).
ALZ	= *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*. Ed. by C.G. Schütz, F.J. Bertuch, G. Hufeland (Jena & Halle, 1785–1803)
Eph	= *Ephemeriden der Menschheit, oder Bibliothek der Sittenlehre und der Politik*. Ed. by Isaak Iselin [since 1782 ff. by W.G. Becker] (Basel, 1776–78; Leipzig, 1780–84, 1786).
FGA	= *Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen*. Ed. by J.H. Merck, J.G. Schlosser, K.F. Bahrdt (Frankfurt, 1772–1790).
GGA	= *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*. (Göttingen, 1753–1801).
NADB	= *Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. Ed. by Friedrich Nicolai and others (Kiel, 1793–1806).
NBSWFK	= *Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste*. Ed. by Christian Felix Weisse (Leipzig, 1765–1806).

(D) *Structure of References:*

Author of the Reviewed Book
Abbreviation of the Reviewed Book
Author of Review [if known]
Edition of the Reviewed Book [EE=English Edition, GT=German Translation, LE=Latin Edition, FT=French Translation; number of edition, if there are more than one]
Journal (Abbreviation of Journal, Number [if any], Date, Pages)

Example
Ferguson
"IMP"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT First Edition
GGA (1772) pp. 860–863

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beattie

"Diss."
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT
GGA (1789) p. 1433–4; (1791) p. 120

"Diss."
Schatz [in Gotha]
GT
ADB, Vol. XCIV.2 (1790) pp. 467–470; Vol. CI.1 (1791) pp. 136–137

"Elements"
Schatz [in Gotha]
GT
ADB, Vol. CIV.1 (1791) pp. 220–222

"Poetry"
Eberhard [Prof. in Halle]
GT First Edition
ADB, Supplement to Vols. XXXVII–LIII (1785) pp. 1532–4

"Truth"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1771) pp. 91–96

"Truth"
Herder
GT
FGA (1772) No.: LXXXIV, pp. 665–669; No.: LXXXV, pp. 673–677

"Truth"
Pistorious (Praepos. in Poseritz]
GT
ADB, Supplement to Vols. XIII–XXIV (1777) pp. 497–503

Blair

"Diss."
GT Hannover 1785
ALZ, Vol. III (1785) p. 44

"Diss."
Petersen [Hofprediger in Darmstadt)
GT Hannover 1785
ADB, Vol. LXV (1786) pp. 124–126

"Lect."
Eschenburg [Hofrath und Prof. in Braunschweig]
GT
ADB: Vol. LXX (1786) pp. 96–98 [discusses Vol. I of GT];
Vol. LXXV (1787) pp. 445–446 [discusses Vol. II];
Vol. LXXXIX (1789) pp. 404–405 [discusses Vol. III];
Vol. LXXXXVII (1790) p. 156 [discusses Vol. IV].

"Lect."
GT
NBSWFK: Vol. XXXI, 2 (1786) pp. 251–293 and Vol. XXXII (1786) pp. 37–54 [discusses Vol. I]; Vol. XXXIII (1787) pp. 254–276 [discusses Vol. II].

"Sermons"
Koppe, Johann Benjamin [Prof. der Theologie in Göttingen]
EE of 1777
GGA (1778) pp. 170–171

"Sermons"
Koppe, Johann Benjamin [Prof. der Theologie in Göttingen]
GT Leipzig 1777
GGA (1778) p. 171

"Sermons"
Lüdke [Prediger in Berlin]
GT Leipzig 1777
ADB, Supplement to Vols. 25–36, Part I, pp. 244–245

"Sermons"
Lüdke [Prediger in Berlin]
GT Leipzig 1781
ADB, Vol. L (1782) pp. 373–374

"Sermons"
Marezoll, Johann Gottlieb (Universitätsprediger in Göttingen]
GT Leipzig 1781 [Vol. III: 1791]
GGA (1791) pp. 1215–1216

Burnet

"Language"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1774) pp. 505–510

"Language"
Hissman, Michael
GT
GGA (1784) pp. 1325–1326

"Language"
Pistorius [Praepos. in Poseritz]
GT
ADB, Vol. LXV. 1 (1786) pp. 16–22; Vol. LXIX. 1 (1786) pp. 122–123

Ferguson

"EHCS"
GT
GGA (1768) p. 1056

"EHCS"
Iselin, Isaak
GT
ADB, Vol. XI. 1 (1770) pp. 153–168

"EHCS"
Reinwald, W.F.H. [Rath und Bibliothekar in Meinungen]
EE Basel 1789
ADB, Vol. CII. 1 (1791) p. 175

"HoR"
GT
ALZ (1786) Part I, pp. 137–142, 467–470

"HoR"
Meusel [Hofrath und Prof. in Erlangen]
GT
ADB, Vol. LXII.1 (1785) pp. 164–167; LXXII.2 (1787) pp. 533–4;
LXXVIII.1 (1788) p. 182

"HoR"
Reinwald, W.F.H. [Rath und Bibliothekar in Meinungen]
EE Basel 1791
ADB, Vol. CXI.1 (1792) pp. 166–7

"IMP"
GT First Edition
ADB, Vol. XVII.2 (1772) pp. 319–342

"IMP"
[?] Reinwald, W.F.H. [Rath und Bibliothekar in Meinungen]
EE Mentz and Francfort [!] Edition of 1786
ADB, Vol. LXXXVI.1 (1789) pp. 151–2

"IMP"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1771) Supplement pp. CXIII–CXV

"IMP"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT First Edition
GGA (1772) pp. 860–863

Home

"Elements"
EE First Edition
GGA (1765) pp. 89–96; pp. 113–115

"Elements"
GT First Edition
GGA (1763) p. 1200; (1767) pp. 516–519

"Elements"
GT First Edition
NBSWFK, Vol. III (1766) pp. 275–285; Vol. IV (1767) pp. 85–99

"Elements"
Ebeling, M. [in Hamburg]
GT Second Edition Leipzig 1772
ADB, Vol. XXI.2 (1774) p. 542

"Elements"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
GT Third Edition
GGA (1792) pp. 398–400

"Elements"
Resewitz [Abt in Klosterbergen]
GT First Edition
ADB, Vol. II.2 (1766) pp. 1–36; Vol. IV.1 (1767) pp. 188–207

"Elements"
Wacker [in Dresden]
GT Third Edition
ADB, Vol. XCVIII.1 (1791) pp. 122–125; Vol. CVIII.1 (1792) pp. 133–134

"Essays"
GT Leipzig Edition of 1778
ADB, Vol. XXXVI.2 (1778) pp. 490–500

"Essays"
Pistorius [Praepos. in Poseritz]
GT Braunschweig Edition of 1768
ADB, Vol. XII.2 (1770) pp. 301–307

"Sketches"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1774) pp. 1066–1076; pp. 1193–1198

"Sketches"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT First Edition
GGA (1774) p. 1198

"Sketches"
Witte [Hofrath in Rostock]
GT First Edition
ADB, Vol. XXIX.2 (1776) p. 596

Hume

"Diss."
EE First Edition
GGA (1758) pp. 401–403

"Diss."
GT 1759 Edition
GGA (1759) pp. 38–39

"Enquiries"
EE First Edition
GGA (1753) pp. 540–544; (1754) pp. 313–318

"Enquiries"
FT Amsterdam
GGA (1758) pp. 1177–1181

"Enquiries"
GT Jena Edition of 1793
NADB, Vol. VII (1793) pp. 54–66

"Essays" [Only: Vol. II, Essays 6–9]
GT Golgau 1768
ADB, Vol. XII.2 (1770) pp. 297–8

"History"
EE
GGA (1765) pp. 50–55; 59–63

"History"
EE Edinburgh Edition 1755
GGA (1755) pp. 1350–1354

"History"
FT Paris Edition of 1761
GGA (1763) pp. 9–15; pp. 17–21; (1764) pp. 25–32; pp. 50–55

"History"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
EE Basel Edition
GGA (1790) p. 736

"History"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
EE London Edition
GGA (1794) pp. 1395–1396

"History"
Nicolai, Friedrich
EE Basel 1789
ADB, Vol. LXXXVIII.2 (1789) p. 225; Vol. XCVII.2 (1791) p. 501

"History"
Schroeckh [Prof. in Wittemberg]
GT Breslau Edition of 1767–1771
ADB, Supplement to Vols. XIII–XXIV (1777) pp. 1285–1286

"Life"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1778) Supplement pp. 1–2

"Pol. Disc."
EE Second Edition
GGA (1753) pp. 906–912

"Pol. Disc."
GT Königsberg & Leipzig Edition of 1800
NADB, Supplement II to Vols. XXIX–LXVIII (date?) pp. 617–618

"Pol. Disc."
GT Second Edition
NADB, Supplement II to Vols. XXIX–LXVIII (date?) p. 618

"Pol. Disc." [Only: "Die vollkommene Republik"]
GT
NADB, Vol. LIII (1800) pp. 264–265

"Religion"
Eberhard [Prof. in Halle]
GT
ADB, Vol. XLIX.1 (1782) pp. 131–136

"Religion"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT
GGA (1782) pp. 143–144

"Religion"
Meiners, Christoph
EE First Edition
GGA (1779) Supplement pp. 753–763

"Treatise"
GT Halle Edition of 1790–91
NADB, Vol. IV (1793) p. 211

"Treatise"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT Halle Edition of 1790–91
GGA (1790) pp. 1441–1448; (1792) p. 436

"Treatise"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT Jena Edition of 1791
GGA (1791) p. 1009

"Treatise"
Tiedemann [Hofrath und Prof. der Philosophie in Marburg]
GT Halle Edition of 1790–91
ADB, Vol. XCVII.2 (1791) pp. 437–447

Hutcheson

"Logicae"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
LE Strassburg
GGA (1771) pp. 902–904

"System"
EE First Edition
GGA (1757) pp. 666–667; pp. 691–696; pp. 741–743; pp. 780–784; pp. 822–828

"System"
GT
GGA (1757) p. 828

Millar
"Ranks"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1771) pp. 1323–1328

"Ranks"
Herder

GT First Edition
FGA (1772) No.: LXXVII, pp. 609–614

"Ranks"
Witte [Hofrath in Rostock]
GT Leipzig 1772
ADB, Vol. XX.2 (1773) pp. 598–600

Oswald

"Appeal"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT
GGA (1774) pp. 834–838; (1775) pp. 60–61

"Appeal"
Less, Gottfried
EE First Edition
GGA (1769) pp. 265–275; pp. 289–294; pp. 370–371

"Appeal"
Pistorius [Praepos. in Poseritz]
GT
ADB, Vol. XXVIII.1 (1776) pp. 157–9

Reid

"Inquiry"
Tiedemann [Hofrath und Professor der Phil. in Marburg]
GT
ADB, Vol. LIII.2 (1783) p. 417

Robertson

"America"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
EE Basel 1790
GGA (1790) p. 1072

"America"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
EE First Edition
GGA (1777) Supplement pp. 657–667; pp. 689–699

"America"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob
GT First Edition
GGA (1777) pp. 1057–1058

"America"
Reinwald. W.F.H. [Rath und Geh. Archivar in Meinungen]

EE Basel 1790
ADB, Vol. CXVI.2 (1794) p. 539

"America"
von Schmid-Phiseldeck [Hofrath in Wolfenbüttel]
GT First Edition
ADB, Supplement to Vols. XXV-XXXVI (1780) pp. 1531–1532

"Charles"
GT Third Edition
NADB, Vol. XXVIII (1797) pp. 333–336

"Charles"
Eberhard [Prof. in Halle]
GT First Edition
ADB, Vol. XIV.2 (1771) pp. 595–6; Supplement to Vols. XIII-XXIV (1777) p. 1326

"Charles"
Haller, Albrecht von
EE First Edition
GGA (1770) pp. 571–573; 931–933

"Christ"
Eberhard [Prof. in Halle]
GT First Edition
ADB, Vol. XXXII.2 (1777) p. 392

"India"
GT
NADB, Vol. I (1793) pp. 325–330

"India"
Forster, Georg
EE First Edition
GGA (1791) pp. 1937–1949

"India"
Forster, Georg
GT
GGA (1791) p. 1949

"Scotl."
EE First Edition
GGA (1760) pp. 913–918

Smith

"TMS"
GT Leipzig Edition of 1791–1795
NADB, Vol. XIX (1795) pp. 455–461

"TMS"
Eberhard [Prof. in Halle]
GT Braunschweig Edition of 1770
ADB, Supplement to Vols. XIII-XXIV (1777) p. 496

"TMS"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE Sixth Edition
GGA (1792) pp. 396–398

"TMS"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT Braunschweig Edition of 1770
GGA (1771) pp. 85–87

"WN"
GT Breslau & Leipzig Edition of 1799
NADB, Vol. LV (1800) pp. 240–241

"WN"
GT Breslau Edition of 1794–96
NADB, Vol. XXVI (1796) pp. 266–267

"WN"
GT Leipzig Edition of 1776–1792
NADB, Vol. V.2 (1793) pp. 619–620

"WN"
Eyring [Prof. in Göttingen]
GT Leipzig Edition of 1776–1778
ADB, Vol. XXXI.2 (1777) pp. 586–589; Vol. XXXVIII.1 (1779) pp. 297–303

"WN"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1777) pp. 234–240; (1777) Supplement pp. 213–220

"WN"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
GT Leipzig Edition of 1776–1778
GGA (1777) p. 240; (1778) Supplement p. 544

"WN"
Iselin, Isaak
GT First Edition
Eph, Vol. II (1777) pp. 170–206

"WN"
Sartorius, Georg
GT Breslau Edition of 1794–96
GGA (1794) pp. 1901–1904

"WN"
Sartorius, Georg
GT Leipzig Edition of 1776–1792
GGA (1793) pp. 1660–1662

"WN"
Walch [Rath und Geh. Archivar in Meinungen]
EE Basel 1791
ADB, Vol. CXIII.2 (1793) p. 582

Steuart

"Inquiry"
GT Hamburg Edition [advertised]
GGA (1768) pp. 117–119

"Inquiry"
von Springer [Praes. in Bückeburg]
GT Hamburg Edition
ADB, Vol. XIII.1 (1770) pp. 113–151

"Inquiry"
von Springer [Praes. in Bückeburg]
GT Tübingen Edition
ADB, Vol. XIII.1 (1770) p. 152; Vol. XXIV.2 (1775) pp. 545–555

Tucker

"Light"
Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich
EE First Edition
GGA (1770) pp. 393–403; pp. 517–528; pp. 730–738; 885–895

"Light"
Heyne, Christian Gottlob (1771) Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich (1772)
GT
GGA (1771) pp. 193–194; (1772) p. 881

"Light"
Pistorius [Praepos. in Poseritz]
GT
ADB, Vol. XXII.1 (1774) pp. 250–252

APPENDIX III

A Bibliography of Contemporary German Popularizations of the Theories of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Anon., *Abriss des gegenwärtigen Zustandes von Grossbritannien.* [Extracts from Hume's "History", freely adapted] (Copenhagen, 1767).
Anon., *Das Genie des Herrn Humes oder Sammlung der vorzüglichsten Grundsätze dieses Philosophen.* [Extracts from various writings of Hume]. Aus dem Französischen [!] übersetzt von J.G. Bremer (Leipzig, 1774).
Buhle, Johann Gottlieb, "Geschichte der Theorie der Staatswirthschaft in England" [1803/04] Vol. V, pp. 481–768 & Vol. VI, pp. 3–50 of Buhle's: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie.* In 6 vols. [Popularization of Hume's economic "Essays", Adam Smith's "WN", and Steuart's "Principles of Political Economy"] (Göttingen, 1800–1804).
Cölln, Georg Friedrich Willibald, *Die neue Staatsweisheit oder Auszug aus Adam Smiths Untersuchungen.* [Extracts from Adam Smith's "WN" with critical comments] (Berlin, 1812).
Jacob, Ludwig Heinrich, *Grundsätze der Nationalökonomie oder National-Wirthschaftslehre.* [Popularization of Adam Smith's "WN"] (Halle, 1805); 2nd ed. (1819); 3rd ed. (1825).
Hennings, August, *Philosophische und statistische Geschichte des Ursprungs und des Fortgangs der Freyheit in Engeland* [!]. [Popularization of Hume's "History", and of other sources] (Copenhagen, 1783).
Kraus, Christian Jakob, *Die Staatswirthschaft.* In 5 vols. Ed. by Hans von Auerswald [The first 4 vols. are a popularization of Smith's "WN"] (Königsberg, 1808–11).
Lueder, August Ferdinand, *Über Nationalindustrie und Staatswirthschaft nach Adam Smith bearbeitet.* In 3 vols. [Popularization of Smith's "WN"] (Berlin, 1800–1804).
Meissner, August Gottlieb, *Geschichte von England.* In 2 vols. [Adaption of Hume's "History"] (Leipzig, 1777+1780).
Riedel, Friedrich Justus, *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften.* [Popularization of Home's "Elements of Criticism"] (Jena, 1767).
Sartorius, Georg Friedrich, *Handbuch der Staatswirthschaft, zum Gebrauch bey akademischen Vorlesungen; nach Adam Smith's Grundriss.* [Popularization of Smith's "WN"] (Berlin, 1796).
Sartorius, Georg Friedrich, *Von den Elementen des National-Reichthums und von der Staatswirthschaft nach Adam Smith.* [Popularization of Smith's "WN"] (Göttingen, 1806).
Schlosser, Johann Georg, *Longin: Vom Erhabenen.* Übersetzung mit Anhang [The 'Anhang' is partly based on Home's "Elements"] (Leipzig, 1781).
Schmid, Christian Heinrich, *Theorie der Poesie nach den neuesten Grundsätzen und Nachricht von den besten Dichtern nach den angenommenen Urtheilen* [Popularization of Home's "Elements of Criticism"] (Leipzig, 1767).

APPENDIX IV

All English Books and all Scottish Enlightenment Authors in Hegel's Library – An Extract from the Auction Catalogue[1]

(References are to the page and item number of the catalogue)

[1] *Verzeichniss der von dem Professor Herrn Dr. Hegel und dem Dr. Herrn Seebeck hinterlassenen Büchersammlungen* (Berlin, 1832). This extract has been edited. various misspellings have been corrected; the names of the authors, titles, and places of publication have been given in full, rather than in abbreviations; missing data have been supplied and other editorial mistakes have been corrected

p. 9 No.: 159–60. John Locke, *An Introduction into Human Understanding*. In 2 vols. (London, 1721).
p. 11 No.: 239–42, Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. In 4 vols. (Basel, 1791).
p. 31 No.: 678–9. Henry Home [Lord Kames], *Grundsätze der Kritik*. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von J.N. Meinhard. In 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1772).
p. 31 No.: 690. Tobias George Smollett, *The Expeditions of Humphry Clinker*. 2 parts in 1 vol. (Altenburg, 1785).
p. 32 No.: 713. Carl Friedrich Neumann, *History of the Pirates who Infested the China Sea, from 1807 to 1810* (London, 1831).
p. 32 No.: 714. Carl Friedrich Neumann, *The Catechism of the Shamans* (London, 1831).
p. 33 No.: 735. Laurence Sterne, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*. 6 parts in 1 vol. (Altenburg, 2nd edition, 1772).
p. 35 No.: 796. John Gay, *The Beggar's Opera* (London, 1749).
p. 37 No.: 828–30. James Macpherson, *The Poems of Ossian*. In 3 vols. (Gotha, 1807).
p. 38 No.: 889–91. Thomas Percy, *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*. In 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1803).
p. 39 No.: 945. William Shakespeare, *The British Theatre, Romeo and Juliet; The British Theatre, Othello* (Paris, 1827).
p. 40 No.: 956+957. Sir James Steuart, *Untersuchung der Grundsätze der Staatswissenschaft*. In 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1769 [=1796]).
p. 41 No.: 983. Henry Saint-John Bolingbroke, *Letters on the Study and Use of History* (Basel, 1791).
p. 41 No.: 987–91. Edward Hyde Clarendon, *The Life of Edward Clarendon by Himself*. In 5 parts (Basel, 1798).
p. 41 No.: 992–1003. Edward Hyde Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*. In 12 parts (Basel, 1798).
p. 42 No.: 1016–27. Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. In 12 parts (Leipzig, new edition, 1821).
p. 44 No.: 1101–6. William Robertson, *History of Scotland*. 3 parts in 6 vols (Basel, 1791).
p. 44 No.: 1107. William Robertson, *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India* (Basel, 1792).
p. 44 No.: 1108–11. William Robertson, *The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V*. In 4 vols. (Wien, 1787).
p. 64 No.: 1536. Theodor Arnold, *Vollständiges Wörterbuch, Englisch und Deutsch* (Leipzig, 1715).
p. 65 No.: 1563. *Annals of Oriental Literature*. To be continued quarterly. Part I (London, 1820).

APPENDIX V

All English Books and all Scottish Enlightenment Authors in the Steiger of Tschugg Library – An Extract from the Auction Catalogue[1]

[1] *Catalogue de la precieuse bibliothèque de feu M. l'Avoyer Christophe de Steiger de Tschugg* (Berne, 1880). The catalogue is not very accurate: it appears that there are rather a lot of misprints and other editorial mistakes, especially with regard to the English books listed. It seems likely that the bookseller or whoever did the catalogue for him did not know English.

No.: 2. Abbot, George. *A briefe description of the whole world* (London, 1674).
No.: 10. [Anonymous] *An historical account of the memorable actions of William III King of England* (London, 1689).
No.: 15. Addison, Joseph. *Miscellaneous works.* 3 vols., with life of Addison by Tickell (London, 1753).
No.: 16. Addison, Joseph. *The Free-holder, or Political essays* (London, 1751).
No.: 24. Allen, William [Pseudonym of Edward Sexby; originally applied to Cromwell] *Killing no murder* (London, 1743).
No.: 121. Blackmore, Sir Richard. *Creation* (London, 3rd edition, 1715).
No.: 132. Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John. *Letters on the spirit of patriotism* (London, 1750).
No.: 133. Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John. *Id* (London, 1752).
No.: 134. Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John. *Letters on the study and use of history* (London, 1752).
No.: 135. Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John. *A letter to Sir Windham; Reflections on the present state of the nation; A letter to Pope* (London, 1753).
No.: 148. Boyle, Robert. *Tracts* (London, 1671).
No.: 156. [Brown, Thomas] *The works of Mr. Thomas Brown.* 4 vols. (London, 8th ed., 1744).
No.: 175. Burton, R. [Pseudonym of Nathaniel Crouch] *Historical remarques and observations of the ancient and present state of London and Westminster* (London, 3rd edition, 1684).
No.: 176. Burton, R. [Pseudonym of Nathaniel Crouch] *The history of the kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland* (London, 1685).
No.: 179. Butler, Samuel. *Hudribas.* 3 parts. (London, 1750).
No.: 180. Butler, Samuel. *Id.* 3 parts. (London, 1761).
No.: 204. Casaubon, Meric. *A treatise proving spirits, witches and supernatural operations* (London, 1672).
No.: 215. Chamberlayne, Edward. *Angliae notitia, or, The present state of England.* 2 parts in 1 vol. (In the Savoy, 5th edition, 1671).
No.: 234. [Tindal, Matthew] *Christianity as old as the creation: or, the Gospel a republication of the religion of nature* (London, 1731).
No.: 238. Cibber, Colley. *The tragical history of King Richard III.* Altered from Shakespeare (London, 1766).
No.: 239a. Cibber, Colley. *The tragical history of King Richard III.* Altered from Shakespeare (London, 1769).
No.: 262. [Different authors] *Collection of political tracts* (London, 2nd edition, 1748).
No.: 279. Congreve, William. *The old batchelor – The double-dealer – Love for love – The mourning bride – The way of the world* [Bound in 1 vol.] (London, 1733–1747).
No.: 287. [Anonymous] *Court and city kalendar for 1768* (London).
No.: 310. [Dame Ranelagh, Pseudonym] *Dame Ranelagh's remonstrance in behalf of*

This extract has thus been edited (by means of comparing the data with such reliable catalogues as NUC and BLC): various misspellings have been corrected; the names of authors, titles, and places of publication have been given in full rather than in abbreviations; as far as possible, missing data have been supplied. I am grateful to Dr. Nicholas Boyle (Cambridge) who helped me to identify items Nos.: 234, 341, 407, 607, 1044).

The five Scottish Enlightenment items (Nos.: 611, 630, 631, 1055, 1056) have been marked: **.

Information on the manner and quality of the bindings and such trading descriptions as "très rare" have been omitted.

I am grateful to Dr. Helmut Schneider (Bochum) for kindly allowing me to use his copy of the original catalogue.

herself and her sisters, humbly presented to the Grand Jury of the County of Middlesex (London, 1750).

No.: 326. [Anonymous] *Description of the cityhouse of Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1738).

No.: 341. [Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John] *A dissertation upon parties; in several letters to Caleb D'Anvers* (London, 7th edition, 1749).

No.: 346. Dryden, John. *Almanzor and Almahide, or, The conquest of Granada by the Spaniards* (London, 1735).

No.: 360. Duncan, William. *The elements of logick*. 4 vols. (London, 5th edition, 1764).

No.: 391. [Anonymous] *On the Employment of time* (London, 1750).

No.: 395. R.B. [Pseudonym of Nathaniel Crouch] *England's Monarchs* (London, 3rd edition, 1690).

No.: 407. [Hay, William] *Essay on civil government* (London, 1743).

No.: 438. Fielding, Henry. *The history of Tom Jones, a foundling*. 4 vols. (London, 1750).

No.: 440. [Anonymous] *The first book, the discovery of a new world* (London, 3rd impression, 1767).

No.: 442. Fleetwood, William. *The reasonable communicant* (London, 21st edition, 1767).

No.: 445. Foster, James. *Discourses on all the principal branches of natural religion and social virtue*. 2 vols. (London, 1749).

No.: 479. Garrick, David. *The lying valet* (London, 3rd edition, 1743).
Gay, John. *The beggar's opera*. (London, 5th edition, 1742).

No.: 483. Gay, John. *Poems*. 2 vols. (London, 1753).

No.: 506. Goldsmith, Oliver. *The traveller, a poem* (London, 1770).

No.: 507. Gordon, Thomas. *Cato's letters; or: essays on liberty, civil and religious, and other important subjects*. 4 vols. (London, 5th edition, 1748).

No.: 519. [Gray, Thomas]. *Poems by Mr. Gray* (London, 1770).

No.: 565. [Harrington, James]. *The Oceana, and other works of James Harrington*. Ed. by John Toland (London, 3rd edition, 1747).

No.: 604 [Denne, Samuel] *The history and antiquities of Rochester* (Rochester, 1772).

No.: 605. *History and proceedings of the House of Lords, from the restoration*. 8 in 9 vols. (London, 1742–44).

No.: 606. *History and proceedings of the House of Commons, from the restoration*. 14 vols. (London, 1742–44).

No.: 607. [Goldsmith, Oliver] *The history of England, in a series of letters from a nobleman to his son*. 2 vols. (London, 1770).

No.: 608. *History, compleat, of the pirat. states of Barbary* (London, 1750).

No.: 611. **Home, Henry Lord Kames. *Elements of criticism*. 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 4th edition, 1769).

No.: 630. **Hume, David. *Essays, moral and political*. 2 vols. (London, 3rd edition, 1748).

No.: 631. **Hume, David. *Discours politiques*. Traduits de l'anglois par M. l'Abbé Le Blanc. 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1754).

No.: 632, [Nadasdy, Ferenc] *The Hungarian Rebellion* (London, 1672).

No.: 647. Johnson, Samuel. *Dictionary of the English language*. 2 vols. (London, 4th edition, 1770).

No.: 660. Justinian. *Institutiones*. Translated into English, with notes by G. Harris (London, 2nd ed., 1761).

No.: 743. Locke, John. *An Essay concerning human understanding*. 4 books in 2 vols. (London, 14th edition 1753).

No.: 820. [Cole, C. (Ed.)]. *Memoires, historical and political, cont. letters written by sovereign princes, state ministers, etc., 1697–1708* (London, 1735).

No.: 839. Milton, John. *Paradise lost*. A poem, in 12 books (London, 1746); *Paradise regained* (London, 1747).

No.: 909. [Anonymous] *Onania, or the heinous sin of self-pollution* (London, 17th edition, 1752).
No.: 977. [Pope, Alexander] *The works of Alexander Pope*. 9 vols. With the commentaries and notes of Mr. Warburton (London, 1752).
No.: 1015. [Raleigh, Sir Walter] *The works of Sir Walter Raleigh*. 2 vols. With a new account of his life by Thomas Birch (London, 1751).
No.: 1044. [Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John] *Remarks on the history of England* (London, 2nd edition, 1747).
No.: 1050. Richardson, Samuel. *Clarissa. Or, The history of a young lady*. 8 vols. (London, 3rd edition, 1751).
No.: 1054. Robertson, John. *A treatise of such mathematical instruments, as are usually put into a portable case* (London, 2nd edition, 1757).
No.: 1055 **Robertson, William. *The History of Scotland during the reigns of Queen Mary and King James VI*. 2 vols. (London, 5th ed., 1769).
No.: 1056. **Robertson, William. *History of the reign of the Emperor Charles V*. 4 vols. (London, 2nd edition, 1772).
No.: 1066. [Dillon, Wentworth Earl of Roscommon] *Poems by the Earl of Roscommon*. To which is added 'An essay on poetry' by John Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham and poems by Mr. Richard Duke (London, 1717).
No.: 1133. Selden, John. *An historical and political discourse of the laws and government of England* (London, 4th ed., 1739).
No.: 1141. Shaftesbury, Antony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of. *Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times*. 3 vols. (London, 1749).
No.: 1140. Shakespeare, William. *King Lear – Othello – Macbeth – Hamlet – Julius Caesar* [bound with 19 other plays]. 4 vols. (London, 1729–1750).
No.: 1141. Sherley, Thomas. *A philosophical essay: declaring the probable causes, whence stones are produced in the greater world* (London, 1672).
No.: 1142 Sidney, Algernon. *Discourses concerning government* (London, 3rd edition, 1751).
No.: 1151. Smollet, Tobias George. *The adventures of Peregrine Pickle*. 4 vols. (London, 1751).
No. 1155. Somerville, William. *The Chace. A Poem. To which is added, Hobbinol, or the Rural games* (London, 4th edition, 1757).
No.: 1163. *Springs, the secret, of the late changes in the ministry* (London, 1766).
No.: 1167. [Steele, Sir Richard] *The dramatic works of Sir Richard Steele* (London, n.d.).
No.: 1168. Steele, Sir Richard. *The Tatler. The lucubrations of Isaac Bickerstaff*. 4 vols. (London, 1749).
No.: 1170. [Steele, Addison and others] *The guardian*. 2 vols. (London, 1751).
No.: 1171. Steele and Addison. *The spectator*. 8 vols. (London, 1753).
No.: 1182. *Story-teller, the modern*. 2 vols. (London, 2nd edition, n.d. c. 1750).
No.: 1194. Swift, Jonathan. *Miscellanies*. 11 vols. (London, 4th ed., 1742–46). *The tale of a tub* (London, 10th ed., 1743). *Gulliver's travels* (London, 5th ed., 1751).
No.: 1221. Thomson, James. The works. 4 vols. (London, 1750).
No.: 1257. Vanbrugh, Sir John and Mr. Cibber. *The provok'd husband* (London, 1748).
No.: 1326. [Waller, Edmund]. *The works of Edmund Waller*. Published by Mr. Fenton (London, 1744).
No.: 1350. [Wilmont, John Earl of Rochester]. *The Poetical Works of the Earls of Rochester, Roscommon, and Dorset, etc*. 2 in 1 vol. (London, 1739).
No.: 1353. Young, Edward. *The complaint: or, Night Thoughts* (London, 1743).
No.: 1354. Young, Edward. *The complaint: or, Night Thoughts* (London, 1751).
No.: 1355. Young, Edward. *The complaint: or, Night Thoughts*. With index and glossary by Wright (London, 1787).